The gain-loss asymmetry and single-self preferences

Kahneman and Tversky asserted a fundamental asymmetry between gains and losses, namely a reflection effect which occurs when an individual prefers a sure gain of $ pz to anuncertain gain of $ z with probability p, while preferring an uncertain loss of $z with probability p to a certain loss of $ pz.We focus on this class of choices (actuarially fair), and explore the extent to which thereflection effect, understood as occurring at a range of wealth levels, is compatible with single-self preferences.We decompose the reflection effect into two components, a probability switch effect,which is compatible with single-self preferences, and a translation effect, which is not. To argue the first point, we analyze two classes of single-self, nonexpected utility preferences, which we label homothetic and weakly homothetic. In both cases, we characterize the switch effect as well as the dependence of risk attitudes on wealth.We also discuss two types of utility functions of a form reminiscent of expected utility but with distorted probabilities. Type I always distorts the probability of the worst outcome downwards, yielding attraction to small risks for all probabilities. Type II distorts low probabilities upwards, and high probabilities downwards, implying risk aversion when the probability of the worst outcome is low. By combining homothetic or weak homothetic preferences with Type I or Type II distortion functions, we present four explicit examples: All four display a switch effect and, hence, a form of reflection effect consistent a single self preferences.

The provision of relative performance feedback information: An experimental analysis of performance and happiness

This paper studies the effect of providing relative performance feedback information onindividual performance and on individual affective response, when agents are rewardedaccording to their absolute performance. In a laboratory set-up, agents perform a realeffort task and when receiving feedback, they are asked to rate their happiness, arousaland feeling of dominance. Control subjects learn only their absolute performance, whilethe treated subjects additionally learn the average performance in the session.Performance is 17 percent higher when relative performance feedback is provided.Furthermore, although feedback increases the performance independent of the content(i.e., performing above or below the average), the content is determinant for theaffective response. When subjects are treated, the inequality in the happiness and thefeeling of dominance between those subjects performing above and below the averageincreases by 8 and 6 percentage points, respectively.

A measure of rationality and welfare

There is evidence showing that individual behavior often deviates fromthe classical principle of maximization. This evidence raises at least two importantquestions: (i) how severe the deviations are and (ii) which method is the best forextracting relevant information from choice behavior for the purposes of welfare analysis.In this paper we address these two questions by identifying from a foundationalanalysis a new measure of the rationality of individuals that enables the analysis ofindividual welfare in potentially inconsistent subjects, all based on standard revealedpreference data. We call such measure minimal index.

The challenge of representative design in psychology and economics

The demands of representative design, as formulated by Egon Brunswik (1956), set a high methodological standard. Both experimental participants and the situations with which they are faced should be representative of the populations to which researchers claim to generalize results. Failure to observe the latter has led to notable experimental failures in psychology from which economics could learn. It also raises questions about the meaning of testing economic theories in abstract environments. Logically, abstract tests can only be generalized to abstract realities and these may or may not have anything to do with the empirical realities experienced by economic actors.

Deciding analytically or trusting your intuition? The advantadges and disadvantadges of analytic and intuitive thought

Recent research has highlighted the notion that people can make judgmentsand choices by means of two systems that are labeled here tacit(or intuitive) and deliberate (or analytic). Whereas most decisionstypically involve both systems, this chapter examines the conditions underwhich each system is liable to be more effective. This aims to illuminatethe age-old issue of whether and when people should trust intuition or analysis. To do this, a framework is presented to understand how thetacit and deliberate systems work in tandem. Distinctions are also madebetween the types of information typically used by both systems as wellas the characteristics of environments that facilitate or hinder accuratelearning by the tacit system. Next, several experiments that havecontrasted intuitive and analytic modes on the same tasks are reviewed.Together, the theoretical framework and experimental evidence leads tospecifying the trade-off that characterizes their relative effectiveness.Tacit system responses can be subject to biases. In making deliberate systemresponses, however, people might not be aware of the correct rule to dealwith the task they are facing and/or make errors in executing it. Whethertacit or deliberate responses are more valid in particular circumstancesrequires assessing this trade-off. In this, the probability of making errorsin deliberate thought is postulated to be a function of the analytical complexityof the task as perceived by the person. Thus the trade-off is one of bias (inimplicit responses) versus analytical complexity (when tasks are handled indeliberate mode). Finally, it is noted that whereas much attention has beenpaid in the past to helping people make decisions in deliberate mode, effortsshould also be directed toward improving ability to make decisions intacit mode since the effectiveness of decisions clearly depends on both. Thistherefore represents an important frontier for research.

Profile of male adolescents with conduct disorder on intellectual efficacy, cognitive flexibility, cognitive coping, impulsivity and alexithymia: a comparison with high-risk controls

Background and Objectives: To specify which of the documented cognitive and emotional deficits characterize adolescents with conduct disorder (CD) compared with high-risk controls. Methods: High-risk adolescent males with and without CD were compared on intellectual efficiency, cognitive flexibility, impulsivity, alexithymia, and cognitive coping strategies. Substance use was controlled for in analyses. Results: Both groups showed normal intellectual efficiency and cognitive flexibility, as weil as heightened alexithymia and bebavioral impulsivity. Youths with CD evidenced more self-defeating and black-and-white tbinking under stress, and more acting-out under negative affect, than those without CD. Conclusions: Deficits specifie to CD resided in facets of emotional functioning and cognitive coping that might be targeted by a coping skills intervention.

Altruism, equity and reciprocity in a gift-exchange experiment: An encompassing approach

Considerable experimental evidence suggests that non-pecuniary motivesmust be addressed when modeling behavior in economic contexts. Recentmodels of non-pecuniary motives can be classified as either altruism-based, equity-based, or reciprocity-based. We estimate and compareleading approaches in these categories, using experimental data. Wethen offer a flexible approach that nests the above three approaches,thereby allowing for nested hypothesis testing and for determiningthe relative strength of each of the competing theories. In addition,the encompassing approach provides a functional form for utility in different settings without the restrictive nature of the approaches nested within it. Using this flexible form for nested tests, we findthat intentional reciprocity, distributive concerns, and altruisticconsiderations all play a significant role in players' decisions.

Stereological analysis of the rat and monkey amygdala

The amygdala is part of a neural network that contributes to the regulation of emotional behaviors. Rodents, especially rats, are used extensively as model organisms to decipher the functions of specific amygdala nuclei, in particular in relation to fear and emotional learning. Analysis of the role of the nonhuman primate amygdala in these functions has lagged work in the rodent but provides evidence for conservation of basic functions across species. Here we provide quantitative information regarding the morphological characteristics of the main amygdala nuclei in rats and monkeys, including neuron and glial cell numbers, neuronal soma size, and individual nuclei volumes. The volumes of the lateral, basal, and accessory basal nuclei were, respectively, 32, 39, and 39 times larger in monkeys than in rats. In contrast, the central and medial nuclei were only 8 and 4 times larger in monkeys than in rats. The numbers of neurons in the lateral, basal, and accessory basal nuclei were 14, 11, and 16 times greater in monkeys than in rats, whereas the numbers of neurons in the central and medial nuclei were only 2.3 and 1.5 times greater in monkeys than in rats. Neuron density was between 2.4 and 3.7 times lower in monkeys than in rats, whereas glial density was only between 1.1 and 1.7 times lower in monkeys than in rats. We compare our data in rats and monkeys with those previously published in humans and discuss the theoretical and functional implications that derive from our quantitative structural findings.

Relative payoffs and happiness: An experimental study

Some current utility models presume that people are concerned with their relative standing in a reference group. If this is true, do certain types care more about this than others? Using simple binary decisions and self-reported happiness, we investigate both the prevalence of ``difference aversion'' and whether happiness levels influence the taste for social comparisons. Our decision tasks distinguish between a person s desire to achieving the social optimum, equality or advantageous relative standing. Most people appear to disregard relative payoffs, instead typically making choices resulting in higher social payoffs. While we do not find a strong general correlation between happiness and concern for relative payoffs, we do observe that a willingness to lower another person s payoff below one s own (competitive preferences) seems correlated with unhappiness.

The impact of gender composition on team performance and decision-making: Evidence from the field

We investigate whether the gender composition of teams affect theireconomic performance. We study a large business game, played in groups ofthree, where each group takes the role of a general manager. There are twoparallel competitions, one involving undergraduates and the other involvingMBAs. Our analysis shows that teams formed by three women aresignificantly outperformed by any other gender combination, both at theundergraduate and MBA levels. Looking across the performancedistribution, we find that for undergraduates, three women teams areoutperformed throughout, but by as much as 10pp at the bottom and by only1pp at the top. For MBAs, at the top, the best performing group is two menand one woman. The differences in performance are explained bydifferences in decision-making. We observe that three women teams are lessaggressive in their pricing strategies, invest less in R&D, and invest more insocial sustainability initiatives, than any other gender combination teams.Finally, we find support for the hypothesis that it is poor work dynamicsamong the three women teams that drives the results.

Responsibility-allevation and effort provision in a gift-exchange experiment

Previous indirect evidence suggests that impulses towards pro-socialbehavior are diminished when an external authority is responsiblefor an outcome. The responsibility-alleviation effect states that ashift of responsibility to an external authority dampens internalimpulses toward honesty, loyalty, or generosity. In a gift-exchangeexperiment, we find that subjects respond with more generosity(higher effort) when a wage is determined by a random process thanwhen it is assigned by a third party, indicating that even a slightshift in perceived responsibility for the final payoffs can changebehavior. Responsibility-alleviation is a factor in economicenvironments featuring substantial personal interaction.

What risks do people perceive in everyday life? A perspective gained from the experience sampling method (ESM)

The experiential sampling method (ESM) was used to collect data from 74 parttimestudents who described and assessed the risks involved in their current activitieswhen interrupted at random moments by text messages. The major categories ofperceived risk were short-term in nature and involved loss of time or materials relatedto work and physical damage (e.g., from transportation). Using techniques of multilevelanalysis, we demonstrate effects of gender, emotional state, and types of risk onassessments of risk. Specifically, females do not differ from males in assessing thepotential severity of risks but they see these as more likely to occur. Also, participantsassessed risks to be lower when in more positive self-reported emotional states. Wefurther demonstrate the potential of ESM by showing that risk assessments associatedwith current actions exceed those made retrospectively. We conclude by notingadvantages and disadvantages of ESM for collecting data about risk perceptions.

Noise in Brain Activity Engenders Perception and Influences Discrimination Sensitivity.

Behavioral and brain responses to identical stimuli can vary with experimental and task parameters, including the context of stimulus presentation or attention. More surprisingly, computational models suggest that noise-related random fluctuations in brain responses to stimuli would alone be sufficient to engender perceptual differences between physically identical stimuli. In two experiments combining psychophysics and EEG in healthy humans, we investigated brain mechanisms whereby identical stimuli are (erroneously) perceived as different (higher vs lower in pitch or longer vs shorter in duration) in the absence of any change in the experimental context. Even though, as expected, participants' percepts to identical stimuli varied randomly, a classification algorithm based on a mixture of Gaussians model (GMM) showed that there was sufficient information in single-trial EEG to reliably predict participants' judgments of the stimulus dimension. By contrasting electrical neuroimaging analyses of auditory evoked potentials (AEPs) to the identical stimuli as a function of participants' percepts, we identified the precise timing and neural correlates (strength vs topographic modulations) as well as intracranial sources of these erroneous perceptions. In both experiments, AEP differences first occurred ∼100 ms after stimulus onset and were the result of topographic modulations following from changes in the configuration of active brain networks. Source estimations localized the origin of variations in perceived pitch of identical stimuli within right temporal and left frontal areas and of variations in perceived duration within right temporoparietal areas. We discuss our results in terms of providing neurophysiologic evidence for the contribution of random fluctuations in brain activity to conscious perception.

Revealed preference and indifferent selection

It is shown that preferences can be constructed from observed choice behavior in a way that is robust to indifferent selection (i.e., the agent is indifferent between two alternatives but, nevertheless, is only observed selecting one of them). More precisely, a suggestion by Savage (1954) to reveal indifferent selection by considering small monetary perturbations of alternatives is formalized and generalized to a purely topological framework: references over an arbitrary topological space can be uniquely derived from observed behavior under the assumptions that they are continuous and nonsatiated and that a strictly preferred alternative is always chosen, and indifferent selection is then characterized by discontinuity in choice behavior. Two particular cases are then analyzed: monotonic preferences over a partially ordered set, and preferences representable by a continuous pseudo-utility function.

Forward induction and the excess capacity puzzle: An experimental investigation

While the theoretical industrial organization literature has long arguedthat excess capacity can be used to deter entry into markets, there islittle empirical evidence that incumbent firms effectively behave in thisway. Bagwell and Ramey (1996) propose a game with a specific sequence ofmoves and partially-recoverable capacity costs in which forward inductionprovides a theoretical rationalization for firm behavior in the field. Weconduct an experiment with a game inspired by their work. In our data theincumbent tends to keep the market, in contrast to what the forwardinduction argument of Bagwell and Ramey would suggest. The results indicatethat players perceive that the first mover has an advantage without havingto pre-commit capacity. In our game, evolution and learning do not driveout this perception. We back these claims with data analysis, atheoretical framework for dynamics, and simulation results.