Assessing the wellbeing of the Spanish elderly

In this paper we use a variety of data sources, both micro and macro, time series, crosssection, and panel data to provide an empirical evaluation of the current level of economicwellbeing of the Spanish elderly, and of its determinants. We focus, in particular on the role played by the pension system and its generosity in terms of minimum pension supplements and non-contributive pensions. In an IV context, we find that actual Social Security benefits contribute substantially to explain income and consumption poverty levels and trends of low income and consumption percentiles. Thus we offer support to previous evidence for Spain emphasizing the role of minimum benefit policies.

Sex-ratio regulation: the economics of fratricide in ants

In many insect societies, workers can manipulate the reproductive output of their colony by killing kin of lesser value to them. For instance, workers of the mound-building For mica exsecta eliminate male brood in colonies headed by a single-mated queen. By combining an inclusive fitness model and empirical data, we investigated the selective causes underlying these fratricides. Our model examines until which threshold stage in male brood development do the workers benefit from eliminating males to rear extra females instead. We then determined the minimal developmental stage reached by male larvae before elimination in F. exsecta field colonies. Surprisingly, many male larvae were kept until they were close to pupation, and only then eliminated. According to our model, part of the eliminated males were so large that workers would not benefit from replacing them with new females. Moreover, males were eliminated late in the season, so that new females could no longer be initiated, because matings take place synchronously during a short period. Together, these results indicate that workers did not replace male brood with new females, but rather reduced total brood size during late larval development. Male destruction was probably triggered by resource limitation, and the timing of brood elimination suggests that males may have been fed to females when these start to grow exponentially during the final larval stage. Hence, the evolution of fratricides in ants is best explained by a combination of ecological, demographic and genetic parameters.

Sovereign debt markets in turbulent times: Creditor discrimination and crowding-out effects

In 2007, countries in the Euro periphery were enjoying stable growth, low deficits, and lowspreads. Then the financial crisis erupted and pushed them into deep recessions, raising theirdeficits and debt levels. By 2010, they were facing severe debt problems. Spreads increased and,surprisingly, so did the share of the debt held by domestic creditors. Credit was reallocatedfrom the private to the public sectors, reducing investment and deepening the recessions evenfurther. To account for these facts, we propose a simple model of sovereign risk in which debtcan be traded in secondary markets. The model has two key ingredients: creditor discriminationand crowding-out effects. Creditor discrimination arises because, in turbulent times, sovereigndebt offers a higher expected return to domestic creditors than to foreign ones. This providesincentives for domestic purchases of debt. Crowding-out effects arise because private borrowingis limited by financial frictions. This implies that domestic debt purchases displace productiveinvestment. The model shows that these purchases reduce growth and welfare, and may lead toself-fulfilling crises. It also shows how crowding-out effects can be transmitted to other countriesin the Eurozone, and how they may be addressed by policies at the European level.

The Middle East in the American quest for world order : ideas of power, economics, and social development in United States foreign policy, 1953-1961

Doctoral dissertation, University of Tampere

A Brief Survey of Child Welfare in Iowa, 1937-1940

History of Child Welfare in Iowa and the studies pertaining to it for the years 1937 and 1940. Includes a table showing number of children and money paid per child through Widow's Pensions for the year 1939.

The History of the Establishment of the Division of Child Welfare of the Social Welfare Department of the State of Iowa, 1938

History of Child Welfare Legislation in the State of Iowa 1838-1898; Establishment of the Iowa State board of Control in 1898 and its influence on Child Welfare Legislation until 1925; Immediate background, organizing and the administration functions of the Child Welfare Division of the Social Welfare Department of the State of Iowa. NOTE: This document has pagination errors.

Report of the Section of Agencies and Institutions Division of Child Welfare State Department of Social Welfare, 1943

History of child and social welfare in the State of Iowa including legal responsibilities, rules and regulations, inspections and licensing and supervision. it also covers cooperation with state agencies. It also describes in detail the histories, functions and problems of individual welfare homes and schools.

Insurance and Welfare Benefits Education Report 2007

The following report is a summary of the insurance and welfare benefits education activities in 2007. 2007 was the first full year that DAS-HRE had a full-time health and welfare benefits educator.

Trends in the association between height and socioeconomic indicators in France, 1970-2003

Average physical stature has increased dramatically during the 20th century in many populations across the world with few exceptions. It remains unclear if social inequalities in height persist despite improvements in living standards in the welfare economies of Western Europe. We examined trends in the association between height and socioeconomic indicators in adults over three decades in France. The data were drawn from the French Decennial Health Surveys: a multistage, stratified, random survey of households, representative of the population, conducted in 1970, 1980, 1991, and 2003. We categorised age into 10-year bands, 25-34, 35-44, 45-54 and 55-64 years. Education and income were the two socioeconomic measures used. The slope index of inequality (SII) was used as a summary index of absolute social inequalities in height. The results show that average height increased over this period; men and women aged 25-34 years were 171.9 and 161.2 cm tall in 1970 and 177.0 and 164.0 cm in 2003, respectively. However, education-related inequalities in height remained unchanged over this period and in men were 4.48 cm (1970), 4.71 cm (1980), 5.58 cm (1991) and 4.69 cm (2003), the corresponding figures in women were 2.41, 2.37, 3.14 and 2.96 cm. Income-related inequalities in height were smaller and much attenuated after adjustment for education. These results suggest that in France, social inequalities in adult height in absolute terms have remained unchanged across the three decades under examination.

Healthy, educated and wealthy : Is the welfare state really harmful for growth?

In this paper, we study how public and private expenditures in health and education affect economic growth by their influence on people's health, abilities, skills and knowledge. We consider a growth accounting framework in order to test whether welfare expenditures more than offset the efficiency losses caused by distortionary taxation, and whether the effects of public expenditure on economic growth differ from those of private expenditure. Our empirical analysis is based on a panel of 19 OECD countries observed between 1971 and 1998. The results are consistent with the hypothesis that the contribution of welfare expenditures more than compensates for the distortions caused by the tax system; and the estimated positive impact is stronger for health than for education. We also find some evidence that public expenditure influences GDP growth more than private expenditure.

Deciding the sale of a life policy in the viatical market: Implications on individual welfare

[cat] En aquest article, es presenta un model econòmic que permet determinar la venda o no d'una pòlissa de vida (total o en part) per part d'un assegurat malalt terminal en el mercat dels viatical settlements. Aquest mercat va aparèixer a finals de la dècada dels 80 a conseqüència de l'epidèmia de la SIDA. Actualment, representa una part del mercat dels life settlements. Les pòlisses que es comercialitzen en el mercat dels viaticals són aquelles on l'assegurat és malalt terminal amb una esperança de vida de dos anys o menys. El model és discret i considera només dos períodes (anys), ja que aquesta és la vida residual màxima que contempla el mercat. L'agent posseix una riquesa inicial que ha de repartir entre consum i herència. S'introdueix en primer lloc la funció d'utilitat esperada del decisor i, utilitzant programació dinàmica, es dedueix l'estratègia que reporta una utilitat més gran (no vendre/vendre (en part) la pòlissa en el moment zero/vendre (en part) la pòlissa en el moment ú). L'òptim depèn del preu de la pòlissa venuda i de paràmetres personals de l'individu. Es troba una expressió analítica per l'estratègia òptima i es realitza un anàlisi de sensibilitat.

Healthy, educated and wealthy : Is the welfare state really harmful for growth?

In this paper, we study how public and private expenditures in health and education affect economic growth by their influence on people's health, abilities, skills and knowledge. We consider a growth accounting framework in order to test whether welfare expenditures more than offset the efficiency losses caused by distortionary taxation, and whether the effects of public expenditure on economic growth differ from those of private expenditure. Our empirical analysis is based on a panel of 19 OECD countries observed between 1971 and 1998. The results are consistent with the hypothesis that the contribution of welfare expenditures more than compensates for the distortions caused by the tax system; and the estimated positive impact is stronger for health than for education. We also find some evidence that public expenditure influences GDP growth more than private expenditure.