Electronic voting systems in undergraduate teaching

One of the major differences undergraduates experience during the transition to university is the style of teaching. In schools and colleges most students study key stage 5 subjects in relatively small informal groups where teacher–pupil interaction is encouraged and two-way feedback occurs through question and answer type delivery. On starting in HE students are amazed by the sizes of the classes. For even a relatively small chemistry department with an intake of 60-70 students, biologists, pharmacists, and other first year undergraduates requiring chemistry can boost numbers in the lecture hall to around 200 or higher. In many universities class sizes of 400 are not unusual for first year groups where efficiency is crucial. Clearly the personalised classroom-style delivery is not practical and it is a brave student who shows his ignorance by venturing to ask a question in front of such an audience. In these environments learning can be a very passive process, the lecture acts as a vehicle for the conveyance of information and our students are expected to reinforce their understanding by ‘self-study’, a term, the meaning of which, many struggle to understand. The use of electronic voting systems (EVS) in such situations can vastly change the students’ learning experience from a passive to a highly interactive process. This principle has already been demonstrated in Physics, most notably in the work of Bates and colleagues at Edinburgh.1 These small hand-held devices, similar to those which have become familiar through programmes such as ‘Who Wants to be a Millionaire’ can be used to provide instant feedback to students and teachers alike. Advances in technology now allow them to be used in a range of more sophisticated settings and comprehensive guides on use have been developed for even the most techno-phobic staff.

Cheap dates and the delusion of gratification: are votes sold or traded in the EU Council of Ministers?

Each year, small Member States receive a disproportionate share of the European Union's (EU's) budget. A prominent explanation for this is that Council decision-making involves a healthy dose of vote selling, whereby large Member States offer small states generous fiscal transfers in exchange for influence over policy. But nobody has investigated whether net budget contributors actually get anything for their money. In this paper I identify the vote selling model's observable implications and find virtually no evidence consistent with Council cash-for-votes exchanges. I also show that a compromise model – the leading model of EU decision-making to date – modified to incorporate vote selling does not outperform a standard one that assumes votes are traded rather than sold. Taken together, the results suggest that Council decision-making operates with little or no vote selling, and that regardless of whatever they think they might be buying, net budget contributors get little or nothing in return for their money. These findings call for further investigation into how Member States approach the issue of fiscal transfers, and into the factors other than formal voting weight that affect the power of actors engaged in EU decision-making.

How large is congressional dependence in agriculture. Bayesian inference about ‘scale’ and ‘scope’ in measuring a spatial externality

The political economy literature on agriculture emphasizes influence over political outcomes via lobbying conduits in general, political action committee contributions in particular and the pervasive view that political preferences with respect to agricultural issues are inherently geographic. In this context, ‘interdependence’ in Congressional vote behaviour manifests itself in two dimensions. One dimension is the intensity by which neighboring vote propensities influence one another and the second is the geographic extent of voter influence. We estimate these facets of dependence using data on a Congressional vote on the 2001 Farm Bill using routine Markov chain Monte Carlo procedures and Bayesian model averaging, in particular. In so doing, we develop a novel procedure to examine both the reliability and the consequences of different model representations for measuring both the ‘scale’ and the ‘scope’ of spatial (geographic) co-relations in voting behaviour.

Risk aversion, overconfidence and private information as determinants of majority thresholds

We present and experimentally test a theoretical model of majority threshold determination as a function of voters’ risk preferences. The experimental results confirm the theoretical prediction of a positive correlation between the voter's risk aversion and the corresponding preferred majority threshold. Furthermore, the experimental results show that a voter's preferred majority threshold negatively relates to the voter's confidence about how others will vote. Moreover, in a treatment in which individuals receive a private signal about others’ voting behaviour, the confidence-related motivation of behaviour loses ground to the signal's strength.

Support for the far right in the 2014 European Parliament Elections: a comparative perspective

The May 2014 European Parliament (EP) elections were characterised by the success of far-right Eurosceptic parties, including the French Front National, UKIP, the Danish People’s Party, the Hungarian Jobbik, the Austrian FPÖ, the True Finns and the Greek Golden Dawn. However, a closer look at the results across Europe indicates that the success of far-right parties in the EP elections is neither a linear nor a clear-cut phenomenon: (1) the far right actually declined in many European countries compared to the 2009 results; (2) some of the countries that have experienced the worst of the economic crisis, including Spain, Portugal and Ireland, did not experience a significant rise in far-right party support; and (3) ‘far right’ is too broad an umbrella term, covering parties that are too different from each other to be grouped in one single party family.

Radical left-wing Euroscepticism in the 2014 elections: a cross-European comparison

This article examines the varied performance of radical left-wing Eurosceptic parties during the 2014 EP elections. While the performance of the radical right during this 'earthquake' election has been widely discussed, little attention has been paid to the radical left. The article examines the result comparatively, and identifies that: (1) across Europe, radical left-wing euroscepticism is limited to few countries, including Greece, Cyprus, France and Portugal; (2) the countries that have experienced the worst of the economic crisis did not experience a significant rise in far right-wing party support but did experience the rise of left-wing euroscepticism; (3) from this sample only Greece experienced the rise of both the radical right and radical left.

En attendant Sarko? France’s mainstream Right and Centre, 2012-2014

In winning the municipal elections of March 2014, France’s mainstream opposition – the Centrists and the Union pour un Mouvement Populaire (UMP) – benefited not only from the unpopularity of the Left in power, but also from its own (partial) reconstruction. The Centrists had reorganised; the UMP had reaffirmed its right-wing programme and drawn strength from the opposition social movements launched in 2013. The European elections of 2014, however, demonstrated the limitations of this reconstruction. Their weak institutionalisation – the original sin of France’s Right and centre-Right – left internal ideological differences and (above all) personal rivalries unchecked within both forces. These tensions were compounded, in the UMP, by a series of financial scandals. At their heart was former president Nicolas Sarkozy, still the activists’ darling, ever more clearly a candidate for 2017, but also more hobbled by judicial investigations.

Forecasting elections

In this paper we assess opinion polls, prediction markets, expert opinion and statistical modelling over a large number of US elections in order to determine which perform better in terms of forecasting outcomes. In line with existing literature, we bias-correct opinion polls. We consider accuracy, bias and precision over different time horizons before an election, and we conclude that prediction markets appear to provide the most precise forecasts and are similar in terms of bias to opinion polls. We find that our statistical model struggles to provide competitive forecasts, while expert opinion appears to be of value. Finally we note that the forecast horizon matters; whereas prediction market forecasts tend to improve the nearer an election is, opinion polls appear to perform worse, while expert opinion performs consistently throughout. We thus contribute to the growing literature comparing election forecasts of polls and prediction markets.

A Genetic Algorithm for the selection of structural MRI features for classification of Mild Cognitive Impairment and Alzheimer's Disease

This work investigates the problem of feature selection in neuroimaging features from structural MRI brain images for the classification of subjects as healthy controls, suffering from Mild Cognitive Impairment or Alzheimer’s Disease. A Genetic Algorithm wrapper method for feature selection is adopted in conjunction with a Support Vector Machine classifier. In very large feature sets, feature selection is found to be redundant as the accuracy is often worsened when compared to an Support Vector Machine with no feature selection. However, when just the hippocampal subfields are used, feature selection shows a significant improvement of the classification accuracy. Three-class Support Vector Machines and two-class Support Vector Machines combined with weighted voting are also compared with the former and found more useful. The highest accuracy achieved at classifying the test data was 65.5% using a genetic algorithm for feature selection with a three-class Support Vector Machine classifier.

More than Just the Final Straw: Stolen Elections as Revolutionary Triggers

Stolen elections are triggering events that overcome barriers to revolutionary action against electoral authoritarian regimes. They mobilize ordinary citizens, strengthen the opposition, and divide the regime. As neo-institutionalist theories of revolution suggest, the relative openness of electoral authoritarianism inhibits mass protest. But when elections are stolen, regimes undergo “closure,” increasing the probability of protest. The failure of other potential revolutionary precipitants underlines that stolen elections are not merely replaceable final straws. Stolen elections have not only been crucial for the emergence of revolutionary situations, they have shaped outcomes as well. Linking popular mobilization to fraudulent elections has become part of the repertoire of contention of democratic revolutionaries.