906 resultados para UNEMPLOYMENT
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Hungary has a higher unemployment rate than the member states of the European Union and even most former socialist countries. This rate for 15-64 year-olds has been around 56% since 1999, as against 66% in the European Union (OECD Employment Database). There is also a high degree of regional unevenness within the country. The situation is worst in North Hungary, an area of multiple economic and social deprivations. Several pieces of research have analysed the causes of long-term unemployment and have highlighted the main social, geographical and institutional factors behind it. People of low educational attainment who live in small villages and members of the Roma minority are particularly likely to have been without jobs for a long time.
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Peer reviewed
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Peer reviewed
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Peer reviewed
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General note: Title and date provided by Bettye Lane.
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General note: Title and date provided by Bettye Lane.
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General note: Title and date provided by Bettye Lane.
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General note: Title and date provided by Bettye Lane.
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The economic voting literature has been dominated by the incumbency-oriented hypothesis, where voters reward or punish government at the ballot box according to economic performance. The alternative, policy-oriented hypothesis, where voters favor parties closest to their issue position, has been neglected in this literature. We explore policy voting with respect to an archetypal economic policy issue – unemployment. Voters who favor lower unemployment should tend to vote for left parties, since they “own” the issue. Examining a large time-series cross-sectional (TSCS) pool of Western European nations, we find some evidence for economic policy voting. However, it exists in a form conditioned by incumbency. According to varied tests, left incumbents actually experience a net electoral cost, if the unemployment rate climbs under their regime. Incumbency, then, serves to break any natural economic policy advantage that might accrue to the left due to the unemployment issue.
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This thesis investigates the design of optimal tax systems in dynamic environments. The first essay characterizes the optimal tax system where wages depend on stochastic shocks and work experience. In addition to redistributive and efficiency motives, the taxation of inexperienced workers depends on a second-best requirement that encourages work experience, a social insurance motive and incentive effects. Calibrations using U.S. data yield higher expected optimal marginal income tax rates for experienced workers for most of the inexperienced workers. They confirm that the average marginal income tax rate increases (decreases) with age when shocks and work experience are substitutes (complements). Finally, more variability in experienced workers' earnings prospects leads to increasing tax rates since income taxation acts as a social insurance mechanism. In the second essay, the properties of an optimal tax system are investigated in a dynamic private information economy where labor market frictions create unemployment that destroys workers' human capital. A two-skill type model is considered where wages and employment are endogenous. I find that the optimal tax system distorts the first-period wages of all workers below their efficient levels which leads to more employment. The standard no-distortion-at-the-top result no longer holds due to the combination of private information and the destruction of human capital. I show this result analytically under the Maximin social welfare function and confirm it numerically for a general social welfare function. I also investigate the use of a training program and job creation subsidies. The final essay analyzes the optimal linear tax system when there is a population of individuals whose perceptions of savings are linked to their disposable income and their family background through family cultural transmission. Aside from the standard equity/efficiency trade-off, taxes account for the endogeneity of perceptions through two channels. First, taxing labor decreases income, which decreases the perception of savings through time. Second, taxation on savings corrects for the misperceptions of workers and thus savings and labor decisions. Numerical simulations confirm that behavioral issues push labor income taxes upward to finance saving subsidies. Government transfers to individuals are also decreased to finance those same subsidies.
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Since submission of the draft report to the OECD‐LEED Program on 30 June 2007, a unique seven‐years retrospective study of the unemployed high technology workers was released by Statistics Canada.1 Drawing upon Statistics Canada’s confidential Longitudinal Worker File – itself constructed from four administrative data sources that linked Records of Employment and tax filer information by the Social Insurance Number and firm‐level data by a company identifier – this study was able to identify and trace the re‐employment of those permanently laid off in the high‐tech industry by location. The findings are stunning.
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Iowa Unemployment Rates by County map produced by the Iowa Workforce Development.
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Iowa Unemployment Rates by County map produced by the Iowa Workforce Development.
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Iowa Unemployment Rates by County map produced by the Iowa Workforce Development.