Cooperative games in strategic form

In this paper we view bargaining and cooperation as an interaction superimposed on a strategic form game. A multistage bargaining procedure for N players, the proposer commitment procedure, is presented. It is inspired by Nash s two-player variable-threat model; a key feature is the commitment to threats. We establish links to classical cooperative game theory solutions, such as the Shapley value in the transferable utility case. However, we show that even in standard pure exchange economies the traditional coalitional function may not be adequate when utilities are not transferable.

Report on the Strategic Sourcing Initiative implemented by the Department of Administrative Services (DAS)

Report on the Strategic Sourcing Initiative implemented by the Department of Administrative Services (DAS)

A foundation for strategic agenda voting

We offer complete characterizations of the equilibrium outcomesof two prominent agenda voting institutions that are widely used in the democraticworld: the amendment, also known as the Anglo-American procedure,and the successive, or equivalently the Euro-Latin procedure. Our axiomaticapproach provides a proper understanding of these voting institutions, and allowscomparisons between them, and with other voting procedures.

Risk reduction practices in men who have sex with men in Switzerland: serosorting, strategic positioning, and withdrawal before ejaculation.

The aim of this study was to identify predictors of intentional use of the HIV risk reduction practices of serosorting, strategic positioning, and withdrawal before ejaculation during unprotected anal intercourse (UAI) with casual partners. A cross-sectional survey pertaining to the Swiss HIV behavioral surveillance system, using an anonymous self-administered questionnaire, was conducted in 2007 in a self-selected sample of men having sex with other men (MSM). Analysis was restricted to participants with UAI with casual partner(s) (N = 410). Logistic regression was used to estimate factors associated with intentional use of serosorting, strategic positioning, and withdrawal before ejaculation. In the previous 12 months, 71% of participants reported having UAI with a casual partner of different or unknown HIV-status. Of these, 47% reported practicing withdrawal, 38% serosorting, and 25% strategic positioning. In the 319 participants with known HIV-status, serosorting was associated with frequent Internet use to find partners (OR = 2.32), STI (OR = 2.07), and HIV testing in the past 12 months (OR = 1.81). Strategic positioning was associated with HIV-status (OR = 0.13) and having UAI with a partner of different or unknown HIV-status (OR = 3.57). Withdrawal was more frequently practiced by HIV-negative participants or participants reporting high numbers of sexual partners (OR = 2.48) and having UAI with a partner of unknown or different serostatus (OR = 2.08). Risk reduction practices are widely used by MSM, each practice having its own specificities. Further research is needed to determine the contextual factors surrounding harm reduction practices, particularly the strategic or opportunistic nature of their use.

Long diagnostic delay in Crohn's disease is associated with complicated disease course and increased operation rate

Background: We have recently shown that the median diagnostic delay to establish Crohn's disease (CD) diagnosis (i.e. the period from first symptom onset to diagnosis) in the Swiss IBD Cohort (SIBDC) was 9 months. Seventy five percent of all CD patients were diagnosed within 24 months. The clinical impact of a long diagnostic delay on the natural history of CD is unknown. Aim: To compare the frequency and type of CD-related complications in the patient groups with long diagnostic delay (>24 months) vs. the ones diagnosed within 24 months. Methods: Retrospective analysis of data from the SIBDCS, comprising a large sample of CD patients followed in hospitals and private practices across Switzerland. The proportions of the following outcomes were compared between groups of patients diagnosed 1, 2-5, 6-10, 11-15, and ≥ 16 years ago and stratified according to the length of diagnostic delay: bowel stenoses, internal fistulas, perianal fistulas, CD-related surgical interventions, and extraintestinal manifestations. Results: Two hundred CD patients (121 female, mean age 44.9 ± 15.0 years, 38% smokers, 71% ever treated with immunomodulators and 35% with anti-TNF) with long diagnostic delay were compared to 697 CD patients (358 female, mean age 39.1 ± 14.9 years, 33% smokers, 74% ever treated with immunomodulators and 33% with anti-TNF) diagnosed within 24 months. No differences in the outcomes were observed between the two patient groups within year one after CD diagnosis. Among those diagnosed 2-5 years ago, CD patients with long diagnostic delay (n = 45) presented more frequently with internal fistulas (11.1% vs. 3.1%, p = 0.03) and bowel stenoses (28.9% vs. 15.7%, p = 0.05), and they more frequently underwent CD-related operations (15.6% vs. 5.0%, p = 0.02) compared to the patients diagnosed within 24 months (n = 159). Among those diagnosed 6-10 years ago, CD patients with long diagnostic delay (n = 48) presented more frequently with extraintestinal manifestations (60.4% vs. 34.6%, p = 0.001) than those diagnosed within 24 months (n = 182). For the patients diagnosed 11-15 years ago, no differences in outcomes were found between the long diagnostic delay group (n = 106) and the one diagnosed within 24 months (n = 32). Among those diagnosed ≥ 16 years ago, the group with long diagnostic delay (n = 71) more frequently underwent CD-related operations (63.4% vs. 46.5%, p = 0.01) compared to the group diagnosed with CD within 24 months (n = 241). Conclusions: A long diagnostic delay in CD patients is associated with a more complicated disease course and higher number of CD-related operations in the years following the diagnosis. Our results indicate that efforts should be undertaken to shorten the diagnostic delay in CD patients in order to reduce the risk for progression towards a complicated disease phenotype.

Improving Transition Outcomes: State Transition Plan: Iowa's Youth Development Strategic Plan 2007-2010 developed by the Iowa Collaboration for Youth Development team

Iowa's youth development plan for fulfilling Iowa's Promise.

On payoff heterogeneity in games with strategic complementarities

Payoff heterogeneity weakens positive feedback in binary choice models intwo ways. First, heterogeneity drives individuals to corners where theyare unaffected by strategic complementarities. Second, aggregate behaviouris smoother than individual behaviour when individuals are heterogeneous.However, this smoothing does not necessarily eliminate positive feedbackor guarantee a unique equilibrium. In games with an unbounded, continuouschoice space, heterogeneity may either weaken or strengthen positive feedback,depending on a simple convexity/concavity condition. We conclude that positivefeedback phenomena derived in representative agent models will often be robustto heterogeneity.

Forced diuresis improves the diagnostic accuracy of 18F-FDG PET in abdominopelvic malignancies.

Our aim was to evaluate the role of forced diuresis in improving the diagnostic accuracy of abdominopelvic (18)F-FDG PET. METHODS: Thirty-two patients were enrolled. Besides the presence of known intravesical tumors or undefined renal lesions on the initial PET scan, the inclusion criterion was the appearance of indeterminate or equivocal (18)F-FDG foci that extended along the course of the urinary tract and could not confidently be separated from urinary activity. For each patient, a second abdominopelvic PET study was performed after intravenous injection of 0.5 mg of furosemide per kilogram of body weight (maximum, 40 mg) coupled with parenteral infusion of physiologic saline. RESULTS: Forced diuresis coupled with parenteral hydration eliminated any significant (18)F-FDG activity from the lower urinary tract in 31 (97%) of 32 patients after the bladder had been voided 3 successive times. Twelve intravesical lesions were visualized with outstanding clarity, whereas radiologic suspicion of locally recurrent bladder tumors was ruled out in 3 patients. Among 14 indeterminate or equivocal extravesical foci, 7 were deemed of no clinical value because they disappeared after furosemide challenge, whereas 7 persisting foci were proven to be true-positive PET findings. The performance of (18)F-FDG PET in characterizing 3 renal-space-occupying lesions could not be improved by our protocol. CONCLUSION: Furosemide challenge has the potential to noninvasively resolve the inherent (18)F-FDG contrast handicap in the lower urinary tract.

Measuring strategic uncertainty in coordination games

This paper explores three aspects of strategic uncertainty: its relation to risk, predictability of behavior and subjective beliefs of players. In a laboratory experiment we measure subjects certainty equivalents for three coordination games and one lottery. Behavior in coordination games is related to risk aversion, experience seeking, and age.From the distribution of certainty equivalents we estimate probabilities for successful coordination in a wide range of games. For many games, success of coordination is predictable with a reasonable error rate. The best response to observed behavior is close to the global-game solution. Comparing choices in coordination games with revealed risk aversion, we estimate subjective probabilities for successful coordination. In games with a low coordination requirement, most subjects underestimate the probability of success. In games with a high coordination requirement, most subjects overestimate this probability. Estimating probabilistic decision models, we show that the quality of predictions can be improved when individual characteristics are taken into account. Subjects behavior is consistent with probabilistic beliefs about the aggregate outcome, but inconsistent with probabilistic beliefs about individual behavior.

Strategic behavior and price discovery

The paper analyzes the effects of strategic behavior by an insider in a price discovery process, akin to an information tatonnement, in the presence of a competitive informed sector. Such processes are used in the preopening period of continuous trading systems in several exchanges. It is found that the insider manipulates the market using a contrarian strategy in order to neutralize the effect of the trades of competitive informed agents. Furthermore, consistently with the empirical evidence available, we find that information revelation accelerates close to the opening, that the market price does not converge to the fundamental value no matter how many rounds the tatonnement has, and that the expected trading volume displays a U-shaped pattern. We also find that a market with a larger competitive sector (smaller insider) has an improved informational efficiency and an increased trading volume. The insider provides a public good (a lower informativeness of the price) for the competitive informed sector.

Minimax regret and strategic uncertainty

This paper introduces a new solution concept, a minimax regret equilibrium, which allows for the possibility that players are uncertain about the rationality and conjectures of their opponents. We provide several applications of our concept. In particular, we consider pricesetting environments and show that optimal pricing policy follows a non-degenerate distribution. The induced price dispersion is consistent with experimental and empirical observations (Baye and Morgan (2004)).

Strategic delegation in monetary unions

In monetary unions, monetary policy is typically made by delegates of the member countries. This procedure raises the possibility of strategic delegation - that countries may choose the types of delegates to influence outcomes in their favor. We show that without commitment in monetary policy, strategic delegation arises if and only if three conditions are met: shocks affecting individual countries are not perfectly correlated, risk-sharing across countries is imperfect, and the Phillips Curve is nonlinear. Moreover, inflation rates are inefficiently high. We argue that ways of solving the commitment problem, including the emphasis on price stability in the agreements constituting the European Union are especially valuable when strategic delegation is a problem.