Bundling electronic journals and competition among publishers

Site licensing of e-journals has been revolutionizing the way academicinformation is distributed. However, many librarians are concerned aboutthe possibility that publishers might abuse site licensing by practicingbundling. In this paper, we analyze the private and social incentives forthe publishers to use bundling in the context of STM electronic journalmarket. In the short run in which the number of journals is exogenouslygiven, we find a strong conflict between the two incentives: each publisherfinds bundling optimal and bundling increases the industry profit butreduces social welfare. However, in the long run we find that publishersmight have higher incentives to introduce new journals under bundlingthan without bundling and, in this case, bundling can reduce the industryprofit while increasing social welfare. Finally, we examine publishers incentive to provide links to the websites of the rival publishers underbundling and show that even asymmetric publishers have incentive tointerconnect.

Partisan competition, growth and the franchise

We present an argument for changes in the franchise in which an elite split along economic interests use the suffrage to influence implemented policies. Through the influence of these policies on the character of industrialization, we analyze the effects of franchise changes on economic growth. We identify in the social structure of society an explanation for the connection between enfranchisement and growth: When (1) there exist an economic conflict among the elite, (2) landed classes are not politically strong, and (3) there exists a critical mass of industrial workers, we observe both growth and democratization. The lack of conditions (1) or (2) resolves in stagnant autocracies while the absence of condition (3) drives growth-deterring democratic expansions. We provide historical support for our argument by analyzing the experience of 11 countries.

Desarrollo sexual del paiche (arapaima gigas) en las zonas reservadas del estado (ríos Pacaya y Samiria) 1971 - 1975

Desarrolla los datos registrados en la Reserva Nacional Pacaya - Samiria, de noviembre de 1971 a noviembre de 1975, efectuado con 697 paiches hembras; donde determinaron el ciclo de desove y la longitud que alcanza el paiche en su primera madurez sexual.

Duplo Padrão Sexual e Conhecimento das Doenças Sexualmente Transmissíveis nos Estudantes Africanos em Braga

A modificação do comportamento de risco e o estudo dos factores psicossociais associados a esses comportamentos têm vindo a assumir um papel de grande importância no domínio da prevenção das doenças sexualmente transmissíveis. Contudo, têm sido vários os factores, nomeadamente de carácter social e psicossocial relacionada com as práticas de comportamentos sexuais de risco. São disso exemplo as normas sociais que ditam o comportamento sexual mais indicado para homens e para as mulheres (duplo padrão sexual) e, por outro lado, os factores relacionados com a adopção de comportamentos e estratégias de protecção contra as DST`s e o HIV/SIDA. Este estudo teve como objectivo principal verificar a relação entre o duplo padrão sexual e o conhecimento das DST`s. Ou seja, pretende-se ver como a influência do duplo padrão e dos estereótipos sociais influenciam o comportamento e prática sexual, os conhecimentos, atitudes e crenças dos jovens africanos (PALOP) estudantes da Universidade do Minho e da Universidade Católica Portuguesa de Braga. A amostra foi constituída por 107 participantes, predominantemente do sexo feminino (n=64) e masculino (n=43) com a idade compreendida entre os 17 e os 30 anos. Este estudo centrou a atenção numa população de jovens adultos com características específicas: “estudantes africanos”. Os instrumentos utilizados foram a Escala do Duplo Padrão Sexual, traduzido e adaptado a população portuguesa por Nogueira, 2008 e o Questionário do Conhecimento das Doenças Sexualmente Transmissíveis adaptado a população portuguesa por Cruz e Nogueira, 2007. Os resultados obtidos apontaram para: a) a existência de um duplo padrão sexual tradicional; b) a não existência de relações significativas entre o grau de conhecimentos e as outras variáveis psicossociais; e c) um baixo nível do conhecimento das DST`s. Este estudo parece revelar-se de uma importância fundamental para a intervenção e prevenção das DST`s em particular do HIV/SIDA. Também parece evidenciar a potencial ineficácia de programas de prevenção das DST`s centrados único e exclusivamente na transmissão de conhecimentos, como sendo um único indicador da eficácia dos programas de prevenção e mudanças de atitudes e comportamentos.

Reporte de datos de madurez sexual de la anchoveta peruana (engraulis ringens) durante el periodo 1961 - 1987

Se presentan datos de madurez sexual promedio mensual de la anchoveta peruana, Engraulis ringens por longitudes y sexos, para las Regiones Norte (06°-10°S), Centro (10°-14° S) y Sur (14°-18°20 ' S) para el período 1961-87. Estos se obtuvieron usando los datos de madurez sexual colectados macroscópicamente de ejemplares procedentes de los desembarques a lo largo del litoral peruano.

Isolating DNA from sexual assault cases: a comparison of standard methods with a nuclease-based approach.

AbstractText BACKGROUND: Profiling sperm DNA present on vaginal swabs taken from rape victims often contributes to identifying and incarcerating rapists. Large amounts of the victim's epithelial cells contaminate the sperm present on swabs, however, and complicate this process. The standard method for obtaining relatively pure sperm DNA from a vaginal swab is to digest the epithelial cells with Proteinase K in order to solubilize the victim's DNA, and to then physically separate the soluble DNA from the intact sperm by pelleting the sperm, removing the victim's fraction, and repeatedly washing the sperm pellet. An alternative approach that does not require washing steps is to digest with Proteinase K, pellet the sperm, remove the victim's fraction, and then digest the residual victim's DNA with a nuclease. METHODS: The nuclease approach has been commercialized in a product, the Erase Sperm Isolation Kit (PTC Labs, Columbia, MO, USA), and five crime laboratories have tested it on semen-spiked female buccal swabs in a direct comparison with their standard methods. Comparisons have also been performed on timed post-coital vaginal swabs and evidence collected from sexual assault cases. RESULTS: For the semen-spiked buccal swabs, Erase outperformed the standard methods in all five laboratories and in most cases was able to provide a clean male profile from buccal swabs spiked with only 1,500 sperm. The vaginal swabs taken after consensual sex and the evidence collected from rape victims showed a similar pattern of Erase providing superior profiles. CONCLUSIONS: In all samples tested, STR profiles of the male DNA fractions obtained with Erase were as good as or better than those obtained using the standard methods.

Strategic ambiguity in electoral competition

Many have observed that political candidates running for election areoften purposefully expressing themselves in vague and ambiguous terms. In thispaper we provide a simple formal model of this phenomenon. We model theelectoral competition between two candidates as a two--stage game. In thefirst stage of the game two candidates simultaneously choose their ideologies,and in the second stage they simultaneously choose their level of ambiguity.Our results show that ambiguity, although disliked by voters, may be sustainedin equilibrium. The introduction of ambiguity as a strategic choice variablefor the candidates can also serve to explain why candidates with the sameelectoral objectives end up ``separating'', that is, assuming different ideological positions.

Competition and cost overruns. Optimal misspecification of procurement contracts

Most cases of cost overruns in public procurement are related to important changes in the initial project design. This paper deals with the problem of design specification in public procurement and provides a rationale for design misspecification. We propose a model in which the sponsor decides how much to invest in design specification and awards competitively the project to a contractor. After the project has been awarded the sponsor engages in bilateral renegotiation with the contractor, in order to accommodate changes in the initial project s design that new information makes desirable. When procurement takes place in the presence of horizontally differentiated contractors, the design s specification level is seen to affect the resulting degree of competition. The paper highlights this interaction between market competition and design specification and shows that the sponsor s optimal strategy, when facing an imperfectly competitive market supply, is to underinvest in design specification so as to make significant cost overruns likely. Since no such misspecification occurs in a perfectly competitive market, cost overruns are seen to arise as a consequence of lack of competition in the procurement market.

Allocating ideas: Horizontal competition in tournaments

We develop a stylized model of horizontal and vertical competition intournaments with two competing firms. The sponsor cares about the qualityof the design but also about the design location. A priori not even thesponsor knows his preferred design location, which is only discoveredonce he has seen the actual proposals. We show that the more efficientfirm is more likely to be conservative when choosing the design location.Also, to get some differentiation in design locations, the cost differencebetween contestants can neither be too small nor too big. Therefore, ifthe sponsor mainly cares about the design location, participation in thetournaments by the two lowest cost contestants cannot be optimal for thesponsor.

Competition amongst contests

This article analyses the allocation of prizes in contests. While existing models consider a single contest with an exogenously given set of players, in our model several contests compete for participants. As a consequence, prizes not only induce incentive effects but also participation effects. We show that contests that aim to maximize players aggregate effort will award their entire prize budget to the winner. In contrast, multiple prizes will be awarded in contests that aim to maximize participation and the share of the prize budget awarded to the winner increases in the contests randomness. We also provide empirical evidence for this relationship using data from professional road running. In addition, we show that prize structures might be used to screen between players of differing ability.

Ignorance promotes competition: An auction model with endogenous private valuations

We study a situation in which an auctioneer wishes to sell an object toone of N risk-neutral bidders with heterogeneous preferences. Theauctioneer does not know bidders preferences but has private informationabout the characteristics of the ob ject, and must decide how muchinformation to reveal prior to the auction. We show that the auctioneerhas incentives to release less information than would be efficient andthat the amount of information released increases with the level ofcompetition (as measured by the number of bidders). Furthermore, in aperfectly competitive market the auctioneer would provide the efficientlevel of information.

Competition and cost overruns in procurement

Most cases of cost overruns in public procurement are related to important changes in theinitial project design. This paper deals with the problem of design speciffication in public procurement and provides a rationale for design misspeciffication. We propose a model in which the sponsor decides how much to invest in design speciffication and awards competitively the project to a contractor. After the project has been awarded the sponsor engages in bilateral renegotiation with the contractor, in order to accommodate changes in the initial project's design that new information makes desirable. When procurement takes place in the presence of horizontally differentiated contractors, the design's speciffication level is seen to affect the resulting degree of competition. The paper highlights this interaction between market competition and design speciffication and shows that the sponsor's optimal strategy, when facing an imperfectly competitive market supply, is to underinvest in design speciffication so as to make signifficant cost overrunslikely. Since no such misspeciffication occurs in a perfectly competitive market, cost overruns are seen to arise as a consequence of lack of competition in the procurement market.

Negativity effect in multiparty electoral competition

We construct a dynamic voting model of multiparty competition in order to capture the following facts: voters base their decision on past economicperformance of the parties, and parties and candidates have different objectives. This model may explain the emergence of parties' ideologies,and shows the compatibility of the different objectives of parties and candidates. Together, these results give rise to the formation ofpolitical parties, as infinetely-lived agents with a certain ideology, out of the competition of myopic candidates freely choosing policy positions. We also show that in multicandidate elections held under the plurality system, Hotelling's principle of minimum differentiation is no longer satisfied.