The mutation theory; experiments and observations on the origin of species in the vegetable kingdom, by Hugo de Vries ... tr. by Prof. J. B. Farmer and A. D. Darbishire ...

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On boundary value problems for Willmore surfaces and Hartree-Fock theory of pseudo-relativistic atoms

Magdeburg, Univ., Fak. für Mathematik, kumulative Habil.-Schr., 2011

The Barcelonnettes: an example of network-entrepreneurs in XIX century Mexico. An explanation based on a theory of bounded rational choice with social embeddedness

A theory of network-entrepreneurs or "spin-off system" is presented in this paper for the creation of firms based on the community’s social governance. It is argued that firm’s capacity for accumulation depends on the presence of employees belonging to the same social/ethnic group with expectations of "inheriting" the firm and becoming entrepreneurs once they have been selected for their merits and loyalty towards their patrons. Such accumulation is possible because of the credibility of the patrons’ promises of supporting newcomers due to high social cohesion and specific social norms prevailing in the community. This theory is exemplified through the case of the Barcelonnettes, a group of immigrants from the Alps in the South of France (Provence) who came to Mexico in the XIX Century.

Corrigendum to "On randomized matching mechanisms" [Economic Theory 8(1996)377-381]

Ma (1996) studied the random order mechanism, a matching mechanism suggested by Roth and Vande Vate (1990) for marriage markets. By means of an example he showed that the random order mechanism does not always reach all stable matchings. Although Ma's (1996) result is true, we show that the probability distribution he presented - and therefore the proof of his Claim 2 - is not correct. The mistake in the calculations by Ma (1996) is due to the fact that even though the example looks very symmetric, some of the calculations are not as ''symmetric.''

Solovian and New Growth Theory from the Perspective of Allyn Young on Macroeconomic Increasing Returns

This paper evaluates, from an Allyn Youngian perspective, the neoclassical Solow model of growth and the associated empirical estimates of the sources of growth based on it. It attempts to clarify Young’s particular concept of generalised or macroeconomic “increasing returns” to show the limitations of a model of growth based on an assumption that the aggregate production function is characterised by constant returns to scale but “augmented” by exogenous technical progress. Young’s concept of endogenous, self-sustaining growth is also shown to differ in important respects (including in its policy implications) from modern endogenous growth theory.

On the homotopy theory of spectral categories

"Vegeu el resum a l'inici del document del fitxer adjunt."

The Marginal Productivity Theory Of The Price Of Capital: An Historical Perspective On The Origins Of The Codswallop

Although it might have been expected that, by this point in time, the unacceptability of the marginal productivity theory of the return on capital would be universally agreed, that is evidently not the case. Popular textbooks still propound the dogma to the innocent. This note is presented in the hope that a succinct indication of the origins of the theory it will contribute to a more general appreciation of the unrealistic and illogical nature of this doctrine.

Still More On Why We Should Bury The Marginal Productivity Theory Of The Price Of Capital: A Supplementary Note

The purpose of this note is to supplement the author’s earlier remarks on the unsatisfactory nature of the neoclassical account of how the return on capital is determined. (See Strathclyde Discussion Paper 12-03: “The Marginal Productivity Theory of the Price of Capital: An Historical Perspective on the Origins of the Codswallop”). The point is made via a simple illustration that certain matters which are problematical in neoclassical terms are perfectly straightforward when viewed from a classical perspective. Basically, the marginalist model of the nature of an economic system is not fit for purpose in that it fails to comprehend the essential features of a surplus-producing economic system as distinct from one merely of exchange.

The Effects of Experience on Preference Uncertainty: Theory and Empirics for Public and Quasi-Public Environmental Goods

This paper develop and estimates a model of demand estimation for environmental public goods which allows for consumers to learn about their preferences through consumption experiences. We develop a theoretical model of Bayesian updating, perform comparative statics over the model, and show how the theoretical model can be consistently incorporated into a reduced form econometric model. We then estimate the model using data collected for two environmental goods. We find that the predictions of the theoretical exercise that additional experience makes consumers more certain over their preferences in both mean and variance are supported in each case.

On the current existence of a coccidial line of development in the malaria parasites: a theory

Most opinion favors the origin of the malaria parasites from a coccidial ancestor. It is assumed that whatever the process through which the coccidia differentiated into a Plasmodium this phenomenon very probably occured millions of year ago, and during that differentiation process the original coccidia vanished. Therefore it has never repeated. At the light of some experiments the existence, at the present time, of a coccidial cycle of development in the malaria parasites, is proposed. The conection routes and mechanisms through which the malaria parasite changes to a coccidial life, and the routes in reverse are exposed. Transmission of the malaria-coccidial forms is suggested.

Effects of anxiety on visuospatial pattern discrimination and decision-making processes: what can we learn from brain dynamics ?

Detection and discrimination of visuospatial input involve at least extracting, selecting and encoding relevant information and decision-making processes allowing selecting a response. These two operations are altered, respectively, by attentional mechanisms that change discrimination capacities, and by beliefs concerning the likelihood of uncertain events. Information processing is tuned by the attentional level that acts like a filter on perception, while decision-making processes are weighed by subjective probability of risk. In addition, it has been shown that anxiety could affect the detection of unexpected events through the modification of the level of arousal. Consequently, purpose of this study concerns whether and how decision-making and brain dynamics are affected by anxiety. To investigate these questions, the performance of women with either a high (12) or a low (12) STAI-T (State-Trait Anxiety Inventory, Spielberger, 1983) was examined in a decision-making visuospatial task where subjects have to recognize a target visual pattern from non-target patterns. The target pattern was a schematic image of furniture arranged in such a way as to give the impression of a living room. Non-target patterns were created by either the compression or the dilatation of the distances between objects. Target and non-target patterns were always presented in the same configuration. Preliminary behavioral results show no group difference in reaction time. In addition, visuo-spatial abilities were analyzed trough the signal detection theory for quantifying perceptual decisions in the presence of uncertainty (Green and Swets, 1966). This theory treats detection of a stimulus as a decision-making process determined by the nature of the stimulus and cognitive factors. Astonishingly, no difference in d' (corresponding to the distance between means of the distributions) and c (corresponds to the likelihood ratio) indexes was observed. Comparison of Event-related potentials (ERP) reveals that brain dynamics differ according to anxiety. It shows differences in component latencies, particularly a delay in anxious subjects over posterior electrode sites. However, these differences are compensated during later components by shorter latencies in anxious subjects compared to non-anxious one. These inverted effects seem indicate that the absence of difference in reaction time rely on a compensation of attentional level that tunes cortical activation in anxious subjects, but they have to hammer away to maintain performance.

Interactive Epistemology and Reasoning: On the Foundations of Game Theory

Game theory describes and analyzes strategic interaction. It is usually distinguished between static games, which are strategic situations in which the players choose only once as well as simultaneously, and dynamic games, which are strategic situations involving sequential choices. In addition, dynamic games can be further classified according to perfect and imperfect information. Indeed, a dynamic game is said to exhibit perfect information, whenever at any point of the game every player has full informational access to all choices that have been conducted so far. However, in the case of imperfect information some players are not fully informed about some choices. Game-theoretic analysis proceeds in two steps. Firstly, games are modelled by so-called form structures which extract and formalize the significant parts of the underlying strategic interaction. The basic and most commonly used models of games are the normal form, which rather sparsely describes a game merely in terms of the players' strategy sets and utilities, and the extensive form, which models a game in a more detailed way as a tree. In fact, it is standard to formalize static games with the normal form and dynamic games with the extensive form. Secondly, solution concepts are developed to solve models of games in the sense of identifying the choices that should be taken by rational players. Indeed, the ultimate objective of the classical approach to game theory, which is of normative character, is the development of a solution concept that is capable of identifying a unique choice for every player in an arbitrary game. However, given the large variety of games, it is not at all certain whether it is possible to device a solution concept with such universal capability. Alternatively, interactive epistemology provides an epistemic approach to game theory of descriptive character. This rather recent discipline analyzes the relation between knowledge, belief and choice of game-playing agents in an epistemic framework. The description of the players' choices in a given game relative to various epistemic assumptions constitutes the fundamental problem addressed by an epistemic approach to game theory. In a general sense, the objective of interactive epistemology consists in characterizing existing game-theoretic solution concepts in terms of epistemic assumptions as well as in proposing novel solution concepts by studying the game-theoretic implications of refined or new epistemic hypotheses. Intuitively, an epistemic model of a game can be interpreted as representing the reasoning of the players. Indeed, before making a decision in a game, the players reason about the game and their respective opponents, given their knowledge and beliefs. Precisely these epistemic mental states on which players base their decisions are explicitly expressible in an epistemic framework. In this PhD thesis, we consider an epistemic approach to game theory from a foundational point of view. In Chapter 1, basic game-theoretic notions as well as Aumann's epistemic framework for games are expounded and illustrated. Also, Aumann's sufficient conditions for backward induction are presented and his conceptual views discussed. In Chapter 2, Aumann's interactive epistemology is conceptually analyzed. In Chapter 3, which is based on joint work with Conrad Heilmann, a three-stage account for dynamic games is introduced and a type-based epistemic model is extended with a notion of agent connectedness. Then, sufficient conditions for backward induction are derived. In Chapter 4, which is based on joint work with Jérémie Cabessa, a topological approach to interactive epistemology is initiated. In particular, the epistemic-topological operator limit knowledge is defined and some implications for games considered. In Chapter 5, which is based on joint work with Jérémie Cabessa and Andrés Perea, Aumann's impossibility theorem on agreeing to disagree is revisited and weakened in the sense that possible contexts are provided in which agents can indeed agree to disagree.