Turkey votes: Part I - The storm before the election. EPC Commentary, 26 March 2014

At an election rally on 20 March 2014, Turkish Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, declared he wanted to “root out Twitter, no matter what the international community thought”. A few hours later Twitter was shut down. The decision backfired. Turkey’s some 12 million Twitter users immediately found ways to circumnavigate the ban; it highlighted the increasingly authoritarian trend of Erdoğan; and it brought immediate condemnation from numerous foreign leaders. The move has been viewed by many Turks as part of an operation to cover up a corruption probe that has consumed Turkey since 17 December, before key local elections on 30 March. The elections, which will be followed by Presidential election in August and political ones expected in 2015, have become a referendum on Erdoğan’s popularity, and are set to shape Turkey’s political landscape. A lot is at stake as a big win for the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) may not only be used by Erdoğan to justify his response to the corruption scandal but also risks consolidating his increasingly authoritarian style of governance.

Turkey votes: Part III - President Erdoğan - A foregone conclusion? EPC Commentary, 10 July 2014

On 1 July, after months of speculation, Turkey’s Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, announced he would run in the country’s first direct presidential elections on 10 August. Erdoğan, who has dominated Turkish politics for over a decade, is viewed as the clear favourite. With current polls suggesting he could take as much as 52% of the vote, an outright victory in the first round is possible. His main rival, Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu, is very much the underdog. Until recently, an international diplomat with no experience in politics, he is the joint candidate of Turkey’s two main opposition parties, the Republican People’s Party (CHP) and the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP). Selahattin Demirtaş, the Co-Chairman of the Kurdish Peoples Democratic Party (HDP) is also in the race, but is not expected to make it into double digits. The Kurdish vote however, could prove to be crucial if the ballot goes to a second round on 24 August. With Erdoğan wanting to increase Presidential powers, the stakes are high. With his belief in majoritarian rule, and increasingly authoritarian style of governance there has been an erosion of democracy and civil liberties. Many observers fear this trend may increase.

Georgia- between a dream and reality. OSW Commentary no. 133, 15.04.2014

Following several years of political turmoil triggered by constitutional reform (a shift from a presidential to a semi-presidential system) and electoral reshuffles (parliamentary elections in 2012; presidential elections in 2013), the political situation in Georgia has stabilised: key posts in the country are now in the hands of democratically elected members of the Geor-gian Dream coalition. Despite its mosaic-like structure and internaltensions, Georgian Dream remains strong and enjoys high levels of public support. This puts it in good stead to play a central role in Georgian politics in the foreseeable future, including securing victory in the local government elections scheduled for June. However, local billionaire Bidzina Ivanishvili does not currently hold a political office - despite the fact that he is the founder, sponsor and undisputed leader of the coalition, as well as former prime minister and the most popular public figure in Georgia (besides Patriarch Ilia II). This raises several questions, for example: Who is really at the helm of the Georgian state? What is the lon-g-term vision of the current government? The past achievements of the politically heterogeneo-us Georgian Dream - dominated by Mr Ivanishvili - offer little help in answering these questions. In addition to a series of challenges on the domestic front, the new Georgian leadership is also facing strategic geopolitical challenges, compounded by the current conflict in Ukraine. These include the future of Georgia’s relations with the West (including the process of EU and NATO integration) and with Russia (in response to repeated attempts to re-integrate the post-Soviet republics). The scale and dynamism of the changes in both the geopolitical order in the post-Soviet region and in the relations between Russia and the West are causing further questions to be raised about their impact on the position of the Georgian political elite and about their consequences for the entire country.

Germany on Russia. Yes to links, no to rapprochement. OSW Point of View Number 39, March 2014

The German media have been correctly describing the atmosphere between the Chancellor's Office and the Kremlin as the chilliest in years. Various factors have laid bare the fact that the strategic partnership between Germany and Russia is at best currently undergoing a 'technical pause’: the underwhelming outcomes of the German-Russian intergovernmental consultations in the autumn of 2012 and of Chancellor Merkel's meeting with President Putin during the Hanover fair in the spring of 2013, as well as the way in which the EU dealt with the Cyprus debt issue and, finally, the support that Germany has extended to the anti-presidential protests in Ukraine. Meanwhile, the priorities of Germany's foreign and economic policy have changed considerably, not only as a result of the eurozone crisis, but also, even more importantly, because the attention of German business and politics has been shifting to the so-called neue Gestaltungsmächte, or new regional powers. German politicians increasingly believe that Russia should not be offered new methods or mechanisms of co-operation. Firstly, because the existing ones have not been fully utilised, and secondly, because Germany at this stage seems to have no idea of what the long-term strategy of co-operation with Putin's Russia should be.

Big business in Belarus - its genesis, conditions and prospects. OSW Commentary No. 113, 2013-09-09

Over the past ten to twenty years, Belarus has seen a steep rise in the number of local dollar millionaires. This has somewhat undermined the myth of an egalitarian model of society promoted through the Belarusian state propaganda. There is a small group of businessmen among the top earners who, in exchange for their political loyalty and their consent to share profits with those in power, have enjoyed a number of privileges that allow them to safely conduct business in an environment typically hostile to private enterprise. The favourable conditions under which they are operating have enabled them not only to accumulate substantial capital, but also to invest it abroad. However, since such businesses are seen as providing a financial safety net for the regime, in 2011 and 2012 some of their directors received an EU travel ban, while their companies were subjected to economic sanctions by Brussels. At the same time, fearing that Belarus’s big business could become powerful enough to influence the country’s political scene (as has been the case in Russia and Ukraine), Alexander Lukashenka has actively prevented such players from becoming too independent. Consequently, Belarus has so far not developed its own elite class of oligarchs who would be able to actively influence government policy. The current informal agreement between the government in Minsk and big business has proved stable and is unlikely to change in the near future. Nonetheless, a reordering of state power giving Belarus’s big business significant political influence would be possible should Mr Lukashenka lose power in the next presidential election.

Under the veneer of decentralisation. Ukraine's modernisation efforts stall due to lack of local government reform. OSW Commentary No. 102, 2013-02-12

President Viktor Yanukovych and his Party of Regions have been repeating the pledge to decentralise power in Ukraine and to give local government a greater decision-making role ever since the party appeared on the Ukrainian political scene. The implementation of this reform is crucial both for the economic recovery of Ukraine’s regions and the overall modernisation efforts of the Ukrainian state. At present relations between central government and the regions are regulated by Soviet-era legislation that fails to address the modern-day challenges facing Ukraine. The political elite in the country, including the opposition, appear to have reached consensus on the importance of the decentralisation reform. The first attempts to implement changes in this area were made in the late 1990s, followed by a comprehensive reform programme developed between 2007 and 2009 by Yulia Tymoshenko’s government. In 2012, the Constitutional Assembly under the President of Ukraine appointed a team of experts who drafted a document detailing the reform of local government and the territorial organisation of power1. The document envisages the implementation of what effectively are two major reforms: (1) an administrative-territorial reform, which would help consolidate the fragmented administrative structure, creating larger and more economically self-sufficient administrative units, and (2) local government reform, focusing on creating clearly defined powers for local authorities with a view to securing government funding for specific tasks delegated from central government. Nonetheless, despite these measures, and in spite of the rhetoric coming from President Yanukovych and other members of the Party of Regions, it seems unlikely that the reform will be implemented in the foreseeable future. A series of concrete political decisions taken by the president over the past three years indicate that Yanukovych has not abandoned his plan to build a highly centralised political system. This in turn limits the capacity to govern of local authorities and further restricts the sources of funding for Ukraine’s regions. This apparent resistance to change stems from the fact that by implementing the proposed reforms, the president and his political allies would be forced to relinquish much of their control over the political processes taking place in the country and would have to free up the distribution of budgetary resources between Kyiv and the regions. The implementation of the reform within the specified timeframe (i.e. by 2015) is also unlikely due to the upcoming presidential election and the deteriorating economic situation in Ukraine. Without a comprehensive reform of local government, however, Ukraine will be unable to undertake effective modernisation measures, which are key for the socio-economic development of the country’s regions.

Belarus 2006. OSW Report, January 2007

The presidential election of 19 March 2006, which Alyaksandr Lukashenka won, played an important role in developing the dictatorial political regime in Belarus. In order to ensure Lukashenka's victory, the authorities employed repressive and undemocratic methods, which since then have become permanent elements of the political system in Belarus. They included legal and administrative measures to limit the citizens' freedom, arbitrary ways of applying these measures, actions by the state security institutions intended to intimidate the public, a large-scale state propaganda campaign, and restrictions on civil liberties and freedom of speech. The presidential election strengthened Alyaksandr Lukashenka's political position, as the president extended his rule by another five years to 2011. It also reinforced the repression apparatus, consolidated the ruling group and ensured that the democrats remained marginalised. This has ensured the stability of the Belarusian regime and preserved the country's specific political and economic system.This report aims to present the situation in Belarus since the presidential election in March 2006. Part I, devoted to the internal situation, is a description of the internal political scene, i.e. the ruling camp and the opposition. It also includes a section on the prevailing moods in Belarusian society. Another section presents the economic situation in Belarus and the government's economic policy.Part II examines the foreign relations of Belarus, and consists of two sections: the first describes the Belarusian government's relations with Russia, its single most important foreign partner, and the second its relations with Western countries, i.e. the EU member states and NATO countries. Finally, the last part contains predictions of future developments in Belarus.

From stabilisation to stagnation. Viktor Yanukovych's reforms. OSW Point of View Number 32, March 2013

After winning the 2010 presidential election, Viktor Yanukovych and his government developed an ambitious and comprehensive programme of reforms across key areas of social and political life. The return to a presidential system of government created the ideal conditions for the introduction of deep reforms: it allowed Viktor Yanukovych to consolidate more power than any other Ukrainian president before him.The authorities launched an overhaul of the tax and the pension systems, and of the Ukrainian gas sector. Kyiv also completed its negotiations on an Association Agreement with the EU and on a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area. However, the reformist zeal of Ukraine’s political elite progressively diminished as the parliamentary election approached, the economy slowed down, and the polls showed a decline in support for the ruling Party of Regions. Many of the reforms still remain in the planning stages, and in many areas the government has moved backwards. Viktor Yanukovych has proved unable to make systemic changes, and has increasingly used his powers to crush political opposition in Ukraine. The outcome of the latest parliamentary elections prevents the formation of a stable parliamentary majority, which in turn, removes any chance of reform before the 2015 presidential ballot.

In Putin’s Shadow: Dmitry Medvedev’s presidency. OSW Point of View, November 2011

Dmitry Medvedev’s presidency was an experiment carried out by the Russian ruling elite. Even though the new president has been a loyal member of the ruling camp, this decision involved certain risk that the extensive constitutional powers could eventually encourage the new president to seek emancipation, which could provoke internal conflicts and splits in the elite. This paper analyses Medvedev’s presidency and tries to answer the question why this scenario did not take place and why Medvedev failed to overcome the restrictions imposed on him at the start of his presidential term. The paper also presents the activation of certain social groups during Medvedev’s presidency and their calls for a new social contract with the government.

2002 Parliamentary elections in Ukraine: Events, results and consequences; Ukraine's Parliamentary system after the elections. OSW Study 8/2003

2002 elections: On 31 March 2002, parliamentary elections were held in Ukraine. As expected, they were a major success for the centrist-rightist coalition focused around former Prime Minister Viktor Yuschenko. The communists emerged significantly weaker from the vote, and the "party of power" achieved a poor result. Yet, due to the mixed electoral law (half of the deputies were elected in single-mandate districts), the latter block, firmly supported by President Leonid Kuchma, resulted as the main force in Parliament. The results of particular parties and blocks were as follows: Viktor Yuschenko's Block received 23.57% of votes and 112 seats, the Communist Party of Ukraine - 19.98% of votes and 66 seats, the "For One Ukraine" block - 11.77% of votes and 101 seats, Yulia Tymoshenko's Block - 7.26% of votes and 22 seats, the Socialist Party of Ukraine - 6.87% of votes and 22 seats, and the Social Democratic Party of Ukraine (united) - 6.27% of votes and 24 seats. This shows how the mixed electoral regulations favour "For One Ukraine" and act against Yuschenko's block. One should note, however, that the latter gained the support of less than one quarter of voters. After the election: The dominant force in Ukraine's Verkhovna Rada, elected in March 2002, are the deputies of "One Ukraine", a fraction of the pro-presidential centre. "One Ukraine" has refused to admit any of the opposition's representatives (either from the right or left wings) into the parliament's presidium, but has accepted opposition-appointed heads of many parliamentary commissions. Viktor Yuschenko's "Our Ukraine", which has been the largest parliamentary fraction since June, attempted to proclaim itself the centre of the parliamentary majority, but its policy was awkward and inconsistent, and the main success of this club was that it didn't break up. Viktor Yuschenko's moves have been particularly incoherent and they undermined the image of Yuschenko as Ukraine's future leader, created throughout the course of the electoral campaign. In autumn, the main oligarchic groups and their representative fractions ("One Ukraine", which proved to be a useless instrument, was dissolved in June), reached a compromise with the president. It was agreed that the new prime minister should be a Donetsk clan representative (Viktor Yanukovych), and that the Dnipropetrovsk clan should appoint the president of the National Bank of Ukraine (this position went to Serhij Tihipko). The Kyiv clan obtained the President's Administration (Viktor Medvedchuk was appointed in spring) and a considerable number of parliamentary commissions. The president's interests in the government are to be protected by Mykola Azarov, former Head of the State Tax Administration. This compromise "package" was designed to secure the shares of the main oligarchic clans in the power and the president's strong position as mediator.

The future of the Franco-German tandem. OSW Commentary No. 83, 2012-07-11

Following the victories of François Hollande in the presidential election and the Socialist Party in the parliamentary election, the existing model of relations between Germany and France as symbolised by the Merkel-Sarkozy duo is undergoing a transformation. Along with the defeat for Sarkozy, who had fostered close cooperation with the German Chancellor, we are witnessing a change in the German-French modus operandi, which was based on making confidential agreements concerning the anti-crisis measures in the eurozone and then presenting ready-made solutions to other EU members (as in the case of the successive versions of the document currently known as the fiscal pact). However, a conflict in bilateral relations, which would mean a total breakdown of the Franco-German engine, is rather unlikely. In fact, François Hollande’s proposals have diminished the appearance of the two states’ exceptional compatibility, and have restored the specific relationship affected by the natural rivalry between two states, who because of their economies’ different orientation have divergent interests. Nevertheless, both sides are destined to reach a compromise, as neither can attain its goals in the face of the other’s opposition. In the long term, Hollande is likely to maintain a common front with Germany in fighting the crisis, while at the same time trying (with his allies from the south of the EU) to limit Berlin’s political and economic superiority.

The Orange Revolution in Ukraine: An attempt to understand the reasons. OSW Study 18/2005

The Ukrainian society in the run-up to the 2004 presidential election was in a state which political science literature characterises as an almost "ideal" condition for an outbreak of social unrest. Growing expectations, both economic and political, seemed vain due to mounting impediments. The victory of Viktor Yanukovych was perceived by many opinion-makers as a nail in the coffin of such aspirations.

The oligarchic democracy: The influence of business groups on Ukrainian politics. OSW Study 42/2012

The Ukrainian oligarchic system, which developed into its ultimate shape during Leonid Kuchma’s second presidency, turned out to be very durable. The nature of close relations between the government and the oligarchs has not undergone any major changes either as a consequence of the Orange Revolution or following Victor Yanukovych’s victory in the presidential election of 2010. Although reshuffles have taken place inside the political and business elites, nothing seems to be able to change this system, at least in the medium term. This text is aimed at presenting the network of connections existing between big business and politics in Ukraine and at pointing to the key oligarchic groups and the political forces they support. A definite majority of papers concerning contemporary Ukrainian politics as a rule disregard or deal with this subject very superficially, while it is impossible to understand modern Ukraine without understanding a number of dependencies existing between the political and business elites there.

Kyrgyzstan: Balancing on the Verge of Stability. EUCAM Policy Brief No. 19, July 2011

Following the ‘revolution’ in April 2010, the subsequent interethnic violence in June and the recent international inquiry into these events, Kyrgyzstan is not in safe waters yet. The coming period leading up to the Presidential elections will be important for the country’s stability. What is the current situation in the South of the country, which saw clashes between Kyrgyz and Uzbeks, and what are the expectations for the presidential elections? Is Kyrgyzstan on the road to democracy, and what role can external actors play?

Defying the Treaty: The Influence of the Polish and Lithuanian Council Presidencies on the Development of the Eastern Partnership. EU Diplomacy Paper No. 6, October 2014

Many scholars now argue that the Treaty of Lisbon has removed the role and influence of the rotating Council Presidency in the domain of the European Union’s foreign affairs. This paper will, however, go beyond a superficial, treaty-based analysis of the influence of the post-Lisbon rotating Council Presidency and instead look at two primary, residual, informal Presidential roles, namely agenda-shaping and brokering. It will examine the extent to which these informal roles allowed the Polish and Lithuanian Council Presidencies of July to December 2011 and 2013 respectively to influence the development of the bilateral, multilateral and internal tracks of the Eastern Partnership. The paper will argue that the considerable influence of these rotating Presidencies defied the logic of the Lisbon Treaty, suggesting that the ‘golden age’ of this six-month position, whereby individual Member States pursue foreign policy issues of significant domestic interest at the European level, has not yet passed.