How primatology can inform us about the evolution of the humand mind

Humans are primates. We have evolved from common ancestors and the evolution of the human body is becoming increasingly clear as the archeological record expands. But for most people the gap between humans and animals lies in the mind, not in the body. And minds do not fossilise. To reconstruct the evolution of mind, scholars have thus increasingly looked to our closest relatives for clues. Here I discuss four ways in which the study of primates may inform such reconstruction: fact-finding, phylogenetic reconstruction, analogy, and regression models. Knowledge about primates can help us bridge the gap. Extinction of our closest relatives, on the other hand, would not only deplete that source of information but also increase the apparent differences between animal and human minds. It is likely that we have a long history of displacing closely related species, including the other hominids, leading us to appear ever more unique.

Mind and body: Concepts of human cognition, physiology and false belief in children with autism or typical development

This study examined theory of mind (ToM) and concepts of human biology (eyes, heart, brain, lungs and mind) in a sample of 67 children, including 25 high functioning children with autism (age 6-13), plus age-matched and preschool comparison groups. Contrary to Baron-Cohen [1989, Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders, 19(4), 579-600], most children with autism correctly understood the functions of the brain (84%) and the mind (64%). Their explanations were predominantly mentalistic. They outperformed typically developing preschoolers in understanding inner physiological (heart, lungs) and cognitive (brain, mind) systems, and scored as high as age-matched typical children. Yet, in line with much previous ToM research, most children with autism (60%) failed false belief, and their ToM performance was unrelated to their understanding of. human biology. Results were discussed in relation to neurobiological and social-experiential accounts of the ToM deficit in autism.

Levinas and the defination of philosophy: An ethical approach

Emmanuel Levinas’ thought seems to be strictly neither rational, phenomenological nor ontological, and it thus intentionally exposes itself to the asking of the question ‘why call it philosophy at all’? While we may have trouble containing Levinas’ thought within our traditional philosophical boundaries, I argue that this gives us no reason to exclude him from philosophy proper as a mere poser, but rather provides the occasion for reflection on just what it means, in an ethical manner, to call something ‘philosophical’. Instead of asking whether or not philosophy can ‘contain’ Levinas’ thought, I contend that it would be more ethical to instead re-phrase the question in terms of ‘sociality’. When we do this, I argue, we can indeed justifiably call Levinas’ thought philosophy.

Language, Logos, and Social Ontology: Naturalist and Post-Naturalist Narratives of Human Rationality and Social Reality

I distinguish two ways that philosophers have approached and explained the reality and status of human social institutions. I call these approaches “naturalist” and “post-naturalist”. Common to both approaches is an understanding that the status of mind and its relation to the world or “nature” has implications on a conception of the status of institutional reality. Naturalists hold that mind is explicable within a scientific frame that conceives of mind as a fundamentally material process. By proxy, social reality is also materially explicable. Post-naturalists critique this view, holding instead that naturalism is parasitic on contemporary science—it therefore is non-compulsory and distorts how we ought to understand mind and social reality. A comparison of naturalism and post-naturalism will comprise the content of the first chapter. The second chapter turns to tracing out the dimensions of a post-naturalist narrative of mind and social reality. Post-naturalists conceive of mind and its activity of thought as sui generis, and it transpires from this that social institutions are better understood as a rational mind’s mode of the expression in the world. Post-naturalism conceives of social reality as a necessary dimension of thought. Thought requires a second person and thereby a tradition or context of norms that come to both structure its expression and become the products of expression. This is in contrast to the idea that social reality is a production of minds, and thereby derivative. Social reality, self-conscious thought, and thought of the second person are therefore three dimensions of a greater unity.

The influence of past behavior on future behavior: a mind-set perspective

A behavioral mind-set refers to the effect of performing a behavior in one situation (e.g., deciding which animals jump higher, dolphins or sea lions) on the likelihood of performing a conceptually similar behavior in subsequent, unrelated situations (e.g., deciding which of two candies to purchase). It reflects the activation and persistence of procedural knowledge. My dissertation circumscribes the construct of a behavioral mind-set and proposes a theoretical framework describing how mind-sets operate as well as their cognitive and motivational determinants. Three sets of studies investigated the role of mind-sets in different domains. The first set of studies explored the influence of making comparative judgments on subsequent decision making. Specifically, I found that making comparative judgment in one situation activates a which-to-buy mind-set that increases the willingness to decide which of two products to purchase in a later situation without considering the option of not buying anything at all. This mind-set can be activated not only by stating preferences for one of two products but also by comparing the relative attractiveness of wild animals, comparing the animals with respect to physical attributes, and estimating how similar one object is to another. Furthermore, the mind-set, once activated, influences not only purchase intentions in hypothetical situations but the actual decisions to purchase one of different types of products that are on sale after the experiment. The second set of studies investigated whether generating supportive elaborations or counterarguments in one situation will influence people’s tendency to engage in similar behavior in a subsequent, unrelated situation. I found that making supportive elaborations in one situation gives rise to a bolstering mind-set that, once activated, increases participants’ disposition to generate supportive thoughts in response to persuasive communications that they receive later and, therefore, increases the effectiveness of persuasion. Correspondingly, generating opposing arguments in an initial situation activates a counterarguing mind-set that increases the tendency to argue against the persuasive communications and decreases its effectiveness. However, a counterarguing mind-set may increase the effectiveness of persuasion if the messages are difficult to be refuted. The third set of studies distinguished between the influence of motivation on consumer behavior and the influence of a mind-set that is activated by this motivation. Specifically, I found that appetitive motivation, which naturally increases people’s tendency to acquire food products, can give rise to a cognition-based acquisition mind-set that increases people’s disposition to acquire non-food products as well. This acquisition mind-set may persist even when the appetitive motivation that gave rise to it is satiated by eating. Moreover, the disposition to acquire non-food products is not mediated by the products’ attractiveness. The studies suggest that motivation and mind-sets may independently influence consumers’ evaluation of a product and their dispositions to acquire it. Motivation is more likely to influence product evaluations whereas a mind-set is more likely to influence consumers’ acquisition dispositions. In summary, a behavioral mind-set can be activated in the process of performing a behavior. And the mind-set may influence people’s subsequent behaviors in unrelated situations in which the activated procedure is applicable. Moreover, motivation to engage in one behavior could also elicit a cognition-based mind-set, which may change people’s subsequent behaviors.

From physics to metaphysics: philosophy and style in the critical writings of T. S. Eliot (1913-1935)

This thesis considers Eliot's critical writing from the late 1910s till the mid-1930s, in the light of his PhD thesis - Knowledge and Experience in the Philosophy of F. H. Bradley - and a range of unpublished material: T S. Eliot's Philosophical Essays and Notes (1913- 4) in the Hayward Bequest (King's College, Cambridge University); T. S. Eliot's Family Papers in the T. S. Eliot Collection at the Houghton Library (Harvard University); and items from the Harvard University Archives at the Pusey Library. 'Me thesis offers a comprehensive view of Eliot's critical development throughout this important period. It starts by considering The Sacred Wood's ambivalence towards the metaphysical philosophy of F. H. Bradley and Eliot's apparent adoption of a scientific method, under the influence of Bertrand Russell. It will be argued that Eliot uses rhetorical strategies which simultaneously subvert the method he is propounding, and which set the tone for an assessment of his criticism throughout the 1920s. His indecision, in this period, about the label 'Metaphysical' for some poets of the seventeenth century, reveals the persistence of the philosophical thought he apparently rejects in 1916, when he chooses not to pursue a career in philosophy in Harvard. This rhetorical tactic achieves its fulfilment in Dante (1929), where Eliot finds a model in the medieval allegorical method and 'philosophical' poetry. Allegory is also examined in connection with the evaluation of Eliot's critical writings themselves to determine, for instance, the figurative dimension of his early scientific vocabulary and uncover metaphysical residues he had explicitly disowned but would later embrace. Finally, it is suggested that, the hermeneutics of allegory are historical and it is used here to test the relationship between Eliot's early and later critical writings, that is the early physics and the later metaphysics.

Transhuman education: Sloterdijk's reading of Heidegger's Letter on Humanism

Peter Sloterdijk presented a reading of Heidegger's Letter on Humanism at a conference held at Elmau in 1999. Reinterpreting the meaning of humanism in the light of Heidegger's Letter, Sloterdijk focused his presentation on the need to redefine education as a form of genetic ‘taming’ and proposed what seemed to be support for positive eugenics. Although Sloterdijk claimed that he only wanted to open a debate on the issue, he could not have been surprised at the level of opposition this suggestion aroused. In the weeks following, he blamed Habermas for raising this opposition and for refusing to engage with him openly. Although Luis Arenas has chronicled the aftermath of Sloterdijk's paper, it may be of interest to educators to examine how Heidegger's text is presented. What is this new humanism? If Heidegger's new humanism was based on a mystical attitude towards Being, so Sloterdijk's new humanism was to be based on the materialist principles of a biotechnological age. Unlike Heidegger who rejected technology as yet one further example of the forgetfulness of Being, Sloterdijk seems to embrace technology and the enhancement of the human body and mind as the next great step forward in educational theory. Could he possibly be right? Is education in these times a partner or an opponent of the technological enhancement of the human being? This article tries to identify Sloterdijk's disagreements with Heidegger on the question of the human.

An alternative to the Pythagorean rule? Reevaluating Problem 1 of cuneiform tablet BM 34 568

The first problem of the Seleucid mathematical cuneiform tablet BM 34 568 calculates the diagonal of a rectangle from its sides without resorting to the Pythagorean rule. For this reason, it has been a source of discussion among specialists ever since its first publication. but so far no consensus in relation to its mathematical meaning has been attained. This paper presents two new interpretations of the scribe`s procedure. based on the assumption that he was able to reduce the problem to a standard Mesopotamian question about reciprocal numbers. These new interpretations are then linked to interpretations of the Old Babylonian tablet Plimpton 322 and to the presence of Pythagorean triples in the contexts of Old Babylonian and Hellenistic mathematics. (C) 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

What is the Problem of Ad Hoc Hypotheses?

The received view of an ad hoc hypothesis is that it accounts for only the observation(s) it was designed to account for, and so non-adhocness is generally held to be necessary or important for an introduced hypothesis or modification to a theory. Attempts by Popper and several others to convincingly explicate this view, however, prove to be unsuccessful or of doubtful value, and familiar and firmer criteria for evaluating the hypotheses or modified theories so classified are characteristically available. These points are obscured largely because the received view fails to adequately separate psychology from methodology or to recognise ambiguities in the use of 'ad hoc'.

Children's understanding of pictorial and mental representations

Two studies demonstrate dissociation between children's understanding of pictorial representations (photos and drawings) and mental representations (beliefs). In Study 1, 37 preschoolers were tested on false belief, appearance-reality, false photo, and false drawing tasks. The false picture tasks were significantly easier, and no correlation was found between children's performances on false belief and false picture tasks. Ln Study 2, 30 children who failed a false belief pretest were randomly assigned to 3 training groups: Belief (trained on false belief tasks), Picture (trained on false picture tasks), or Control (trained on number conservation tasks). Training was conducted in 2 sessions over the course of 2 weeks, tasks were presented and feedback was provided. All children were posttested on theory of mind tasks, false picture tasks, and a number conservation task. The posttest results showed differential patterns of performance, with the Belief group scoring highest on the theory of mind posttests, the Picture group scoring highest on the false picture posttests, and the Control group scoring highest on the number conservation posttest. Results are discussed with respect to competing models of theory of mind development.

The evolutionary structure of scientific theories

David Hull's (1988c) model of science as a selection process suffers from a two-fold inability: (a) to ascertain when a lineage of theories has been established; i.e., when theories are descendants of older theories or are novelties, and what counts as a distinct lineage; and (b) to specify what the scientific analogue is of genotype and phenotype. This paper seeks to clarify these issues and to propose an abstract model of theories analogous to particulate genetic structure, in order to reconstruct relationships of descent and identity.