The future of human rights protection in the new Libya: prospects and challenges. Jean Monnet Occasional Paper No. 6/2014

There is no doubt that demand for the respect of human rights was one of the factors behind the Arab Spring and Libya is no exception. Four decades of absolute dictatorship headed by Muammar Gaddafi had been further tainted with gross violations of human rights of Libyan citizens and restrictions on their basic freedoms. Before the revolution, Libya was a country where no political parties were allowed. Freedom of expression and the press were extremely restricted. Reports about the country’s human rights violations published by a number of international organizations documented large scale human rights abuses at the hands of the Gaddafi regime. The 17 February 2011 revolution in Libya led to a turning point in the country’s history. The regime of Muammar Gaddafi which had dominated the country since 1969 eventually collapsed, leading to the beginning of the painful task of reconciliation and state building. Nonetheless it is estimated that more than 7000 prisoners are held captive by various militias and armed groups without due process. This in addition to thousands of internally displaced persons. State building involves the consolidation of a democratic state based on a democratic constitution. In 2011, a constitutional declaration was adopted to replace the one that had been in effect since 1969. This was intended as a stop-gap solution to allow the new political forces unleashed in the country time to write a new democratic constitution. To help consolidate the democratic state, three elements are required: that human rights be placed at its core; that these rights are truly implemented and applied; and lastly that the independence of the judiciary is safeguarded. For all this to happen it is also essential to strengthen education on human rights by encouraging non-governmental organizations to take a stronger role in promoting human rights. Libyan citizens can only avail themselves of these rights and strengthen their implementation if they know what they are and how they can benefit from their implementation

Flashlight Europe No. 3, November 2014: European Social Policy? Prospects for the New EU Commission

Whilst the intricate set of national and genuine European competences is probably just as convoluted as it has always been, the expectations of EU citizens are nothing of the sort. This is especially true in the area of employment and social affairs. What they want from policymakers is social safety and risk protection. And whether these things are done on the European or national level is of little importance. We have studied the latest data on social justice in the EU in order to describe the most important tasks and challenges currently facing Marianne Thyssen, the new Social Affairs Commissioner.

Europäische Sozialpolitik? Von den Möglichkeiten und Grenzen der neuen EU-Kommission = Flashlight Europe No. 3, November 2014: European social policy? Prospects for the New EU Commission

No abstract.

The Catholic Identity of Malta after Ten Years of Membership in the European Union: Challenges and Prospects. Occasional Paper 2/2014

Introduction. Ten years have elapsed since Malta’s accession in the European Union. One can still recall vividly the intense and acrimonious campaign prior to the membership referendum and the ensuing electoral victory that confirmed the Nationalist Party (PN) in power under the leadership of Edward Fenech Adami in 2003. In both cases the Maltese voted in favour of entry into the EU. During both exercises in democracy the Maltese were exposed to the rhetoric of both prophets of doom and prophets of plenty. For the former accession meant a loss of national and territorial independence, for the latter it meant the beginning of opportunity for all and, in some cases, the answer to all of Malta’s woes. Now, ten years later, a further appraisal of Malta’s membership and place in the European Union is called for. The purpose of this paper, however, is to reflect upon how this membership has affected the Roman Catholic Church in Malta and what prospects lie ahead for the Catholic community within Maltese society that remains in a state of constant flux on both the social and the religious level. It traces the major events that have accelerated the transformation of Malta into a secular society. The paper describes how these events, together with pressures that are being brought to bear by secular movements upon Maltese society, are profoundly affecting its Catholic identity and redrawing its moral landscape. It also discusses ways and means by which the Catholic Church in Malta can address these challenges and contribute towards the construction of a more humane Maltese society. In order to achieve this, it must first and foremost remain a coherent witness of a faith that is forever alive, dynamic and relevant.

The prospects for Croatia's co-operation with the Visegrad Group. OSW Commentary No. 116, 02.10.2013

The Visegrad Group gained a new neighbour in the European Union on 1 July 2013. Given the geographic proximity, similar level of development and a number of shared interests, Croatia could become a valuable partner in Central European regional co-operation. Co-operation in the “V4+” format is possible in most of the Visegrad Group’s priorities, primarily in: energy security, transport, neighbourhood policy and EU enlargement. V4 could be attractive for Croatia as a grouping which forms broader coalitions within the EU and is helpful in solving regional problems. However, making use of this potential in practice will depend on the determination to enhance co-operation, and its success may be thwarted by temporary bilateral issues.

What do the Maidan protests tell us about Ukraine? Diagnosis and prospects for Ukrainian politics. OSW Commentary No. 125, 22.01.2014

The outbreak of the protests in the Maidan in Kyiv, and also periodically in other Ukrainian cities, has come as a surprise to both the government and the opposition. These rallies have now been ongoing for several weeks and their most striking feature is their focus on citizenship and their apolitical nature and, by extension, a clear attempt to dissociate the protests from Ukraine’s political opposition. Neither Batkivshchyna, UDAR nor Svoboda have managed to take over full control of the demonstrations. On the one hand, this has been linked to the fact that the protesters have little confidence in opposition politicians and, on the other hand, to disputes over a joint strategy and to rivalry between the three parties. As a result, the citizen-led movement has managed to retain its independence from any political actors. As a consequence of the radicalisation and escalation of the protests following 19 January, the political opposition has lost a significant proportion of the control it had been in possession of until then. Maidan should also be seen as the first clear manifestation of a new generation of Ukrainians – raised in an independent Ukraine, well-educated and familiar with new social media, but nonetheless seeking to ground themselves in national tradition. After the initial shock and a series of failed attempts to quell the protests, the government has seemingly opted to wait out the unrest. At the same time, however, it has been creating administrative obstacles for both the political and the civil opposition, restricting their access to the media and severely limiting the legal possibility to organise demonstrations.

Ukrainians' EU migration prospects. OSW Commentary No. 128, 10.03.2014.

The political crisis in Ukraine, particularly the bloodshed seen on 18–20 February and the subsequent Russian intervention in Crimea, has sparked fears of another possible wave of immigrants heading to the EU. However, the country was partially politically stabilised (at least in its central and western parts), and this has made the scenario of a mass migration of people from Ukraine rather unlikely. If there is no civil war in Ukraine, any further development of the political situation in Ukraine may have only an indirect impact on the actual migration. Should the political instability continue, the Ukrainian economy remain in recession while jobs are available for Ukrainian immigrants in the EU, then an increase in the migration of Ukrainian citizens to the EU, including Poland, would be possible. In the short term there may be two characteristic groups of immigrants: (1) young people who will attempt to leave Ukraine for good due to the lack of job opportunities; (2) circulating migrants, mainly from western Ukraine, who will be looking for temporary jobs. Only if the economic downturn trend and political turmoil in Ukraine continues for a longer time, will settlement migration increase.

Making the impossible possible: the prospects for visa-free movement between the EU and its eastern partners. OSW Point of View Number 27, May 2012

To make the abolition of visas in relations between the EU and the Eastern European countries possible, the ”spell cast” must be broken on this issue. With the present levels of mobility and people-to-people, business and political contacts the introduction of a visa-free regime will be a natural consequence of the liberalisation processes which have been at work for years.Moreover, the decision to lift the visa requirement is unlikely to significantly stimulate an increase in migration pressure from Eastern European countries but could reduce the operating costs of expanded Schengen consular network. Lifting the visa requirement for Eastern European citizens can be temporary and conditional and allow for actual implementation of an increased conditionality rule. In political terms, making visa liberalisation a key issue would fundamentally change the partners’ approach to the Eastern Partnership and would provide a link to the Partnership for Modernisation targeted at Russia.

The Pro-Western Turn in Russia's Foreign Policy: Causes, Consequences and Prospects. OSW Point of View, September 2002

From Europe and Poland's point of view, one of the most important recent developments in international politics was the re-orientation of Russia's foreign policy. This paper aims to answer three important questions relating to this issue: 4. When and why did the "pro-Western turn" in the Russian Federation's policy take place? 5. Has it been profitable for Russia? 6. What goals will the Russian policy pursue in the future? An analysis of the last two years in Russia's foreign policy leads to the several conclusions, including those: 5. Clearly, the Russian leaders realise that in the longer term, Russia - in its desire for more influence in the world - will not be able to survive as an independent pole of power in international politics and it will have to join forces with the West (most likely, the European Union). 6. September 11 was not the cause of Russia's pro-Western turn, but rather a catalyst that put the process which started when Vladimir Putin took his office in sharp focus. 7. In the nearest future, this new direction of Russia's foreign policy seems not be challenged by internal opposition in Russia. 8. The "pro-Western turn" proved to be beneficial for Russia, although: d. Russia has not become a strategic ally of the US e. There has been no breakthrough in the relations between Russia and the European Union, and Moscow has not gained any real influence on NATO's important decisions. f. Russia has not become a major decision-maker of international politics. 5. Russia's closing to the West is in Poland's and Europe's interest.