En torno a los efectos de la edad en el aprendizaje escolar de una lengua extrangera

The purpose of this article is to treat a currently much debated issue, the effects of age on second language learning. To do so, we contrast data collected by our research team from over one thousand seven hundred young and adult learners with four popular beliefs or generalizations, which, while deeply rooted in this society, are not always corroborated by our data.Two of these generalizations about Second Language Acquisition (languages spoken in the social context) seem to be widely accepted: a) older children, adolescents and adults are quicker and more efficient at the first stages of learning than are younger learners; b) in a natural context children with an early start are more liable to attain higher levels of proficiency. However, in the context of Foreign Language Acquisition, the context in which we collect the data, this second generalization is difficult to verify due to the low number of instructional hours (a maximum of some 800 hours) and the lower levels of language exposure time provided. The design of our research project has allowed us to study differences observed with respect to the age of onset (ranging from 2 to 18+), but in this article we focus on students who began English instruction at the age of 8 (LOGSE Educational System) and those who began at the age of 11 (EGB). We have collected data from both groups after a period of 200 (Time 1) and 416 instructional hours (Time 2), and we are currently collecting data after a period of 726 instructional hours (Time 3). We have designed and administered a variety of tests: tests on English production and reception, both oral and written, and within both academic and communicative oriented approaches, on the learners' L1 (Spanish and Catalan), as well as a questionnaire eliciting personal and sociolinguistic information. The questions we address and the relevant empirical evidence are as follows: 1. "For young children, learning languages is a game. They enjoy it more than adults."Our data demonstrate that the situation is not quite so. Firstly, both at the levels of Primary and Secondary education (ranging from 70.5% in 11-year-olds to 89% in 14-year-olds) students have a positive attitude towards learning English. Secondly, there is a difference between the two groups with respect to the factors they cite as responsible for their motivation to learn English: the younger students cite intrinsic factors, such as the games they play, the methodology used and the teacher, whereas the older students cite extrinsic factors, such as the role of their knowledge of English in the achievement of their future professional goals. 2 ."Young children have more resources to learn languages." Here our data suggest just the opposite. The ability to employ learning strategies (actions or steps used) increases with age. Older learners' strategies are more varied and cognitively more complex. In contrast, younger learners depend more on their interlocutor and external resources and therefore have a lower level of autonomy in their learning. 3. "Young children don't talk much but understand a lot"This third generalization does seem to be confirmed, at least to a certain extent, by our data in relation to the analysis of differences due to the age factor and productive use of the target language. As seen above, the comparably slower progress of the younger learners is confirmed. Our analysis of interpersonal receptive abilities demonstrates as well the advantage of the older learners. Nevertheless, with respect to passive receptive activities (for example, simple recognition of words or sentences) no great differences are observed. Statistical analyses suggest that in this test, in contrast to the others analyzed, the dominance of the subjects' L1s (reflecting a cognitive capacity that grows with age) has no significant influence on the learning process. 4. "The sooner they begin, the better their results will be in written language"This is not either completely confirmed in our research. First of all, we perceive that certain compensatory strategies disappear only with age, but not with the number of instructional hours. Secondly, given an identical number of instructional hours, the older subjects obtain better results. With respect to our analysis of data from subjects of the same age (12 years old) but with a different number of instructional hours (200 and 416 respectively, as they began at the ages of 11 and 8), we observe that those who began earlier excel only in the area of lexical fluency. In conclusion, the superior rate of older learners appears to be due to their higher level of cognitive development, a factor which allows them to benefit more from formal or explicit instruction in the school context. Younger learners, however, do not benefit from the quantity and quality of linguistic exposure typical of a natural acquisition context in which they would be allowed to make use of implicit learning abilities. It seems clear, then, that the initiative in this country to begin foreign language instruction earlier will have positive effects only if it occurs in combination with either higher levels of exposure time to the foreign language, or, alternatively, with its use as the language of instruction in other areas of the curriculum.

A Note on Shapley's convex measure games

L. S. Shapley, in his paper 'Cores of Convex Games', introduces Convex Measure Games, those that are induced by a convex function on R, acting over a measure on the coalitions. But in a note he states that if this function is a function of several variables, then convexity for the function does not imply convexity of the game or even superadditivity. We prove that if the function is directionally convex, the game is convex, and conversely, any convex game can be induced by a directionally convex function acting over measures on the coalitions, with as many measures as players

Security strategies and equilibria in multiobjetives matrix games

Multiobjective matrix games have been traditionally analyzed from two different points of view: equiibrium concepts and security strategies. This paper is based upon the idea that both players try to reach equilibrium points playing pairs of security strategies, as it happens in scalar matrix games. We show conditions guaranteeing the existence of equilibria in security strategies, named security equilibria

All assignment games with the same core have the same nucleolus

There exist coalitional games with transferable utility which have the same core but different nucleoli. We show that this cannot happen in the case of assignment games. Whenever two assignment games have the same core, their nucleoli also coincide. To show this, we prove that the nucleolus of an assignment game coincides with that of its buyer-seller exact representative

Max-convex decompositions for cooperative TU games

We show that any cooperative TU game is the maximum of a finite collection of convex games. This max-convex decomposition can be refined by using convex games with non-negative dividends for all coalitions of at least two players. As a consequence of the above results we show that the class of modular games is a set of generators of the distributive lattice of all cooperative TU games. Finally, we characterize zero-monotonic games using a strong max-convex decomposition

A characterization of a new value and an existing value for cooperative games with levels structure of cooperation

En aquest treball presentem dues caracteritzacions de dos valors diferents en el marc dels jocs coalicionals amb cooperació restringida. Les restriccions són introduïdes com una seqüència finita de particions del conjunt del jugadors, de manera que cada una d'elles eés més grollera que l'anterior, formant així una estructura amb diferents nivells d'unions a priori.

Von Neumann-Morgenstern solution and convex descompositions of TU games

We study under which conditions the core of a game involved in a convex decomposition of another game turns out to be a stable set of the decomposed game. Some applications and numerical examples, including the remarkable Lucas¿ five player game with a unique stable set different from the core, are reckoning and analyzed.

The Lorenz-maximal core allocations and the kernel in some classes of assignment games

En aquest treball demostrem que en la classe de jocs d'assignació amb diagonal dominant (Solymosi i Raghavan, 2001), el repartiment de Thompson (que coincideix amb el valor tau) és l'únic punt del core que és maximal respecte de la relació de dominància de Lorenz, i a més coincideix amb la solucié de Dutta i Ray (1989), també coneguda com solució igualitària. En segon lloc, mitjançant una condició més forta que la de diagonal dominant, introduïm una nova classe de jocs d'assignació on cada agent obté amb la seva parella òptima almenys el doble que amb qualsevol altra parella. Per aquests jocs d'assignació amb diagonal 2-dominant, el repartiment de Thompson és l'únic punt del kernel, i per tant el nucleolo.

Coalitionally monotonic set-solutions for cooperative TU games

A static comparative study on set-solutions for cooperative TU games is carried out. The analysis focuses on studying the compatibility between two classical and reasonable properties introduced by Young (1985) in the context of single valued solutions, namely core-selection and coalitional monotonicity. As the main result, it is showed that coalitional monotonicity is not only incompatible with the core-selection property but also with the bargaining-selection property. This new impossibility result reinforces the tradeoff between these kinds of interesting and intuitive economic properties. Positive results about compatibility between desirable economic properties are given replacing the core selection requirement by the core-extension property.

Monge assignment games

Un juego de asignación se define por una matriz A; donde cada fila representa un comprador y cada columna un vendedor. Si el comprador i se empareja a un vendedor j; el mercado produce aij unidades de utilidad. Estudiamos los juegos de asignación de Monge, es decir, aquellos juegos bilaterales de asignación en los cuales la matriz satisface la propiedad de Monge. Estas matrices pueden caracterizarse por el hecho de que en cualquier submatriz 2x2 un emparejamiento óptimo está situado en la diagonal principal. Para mercados cuadrados, describimos sus núcleos utilizando sólo la parte central tridiagonal de elementos de la matriz. Obtenemos una fórmula cerrada para el reparto óptimo de los compradores dentro del núcleo y para el reparto óptimo de los vendedores dentro del núcleo. Analizamos también los mercados no cuadrados reduciéndolos a matrices cuadradas apropiadas.

On the nucleolus of 2 x 2 assignment games

[spa] En este artículo hallamos fórmulas para el nucleolo de juegos de asignación arbitrarios con dos compradores y dos vendedores. Se analizan cinco casos distintos, dependiendo de las entradas en la matriz de asignación. Los resultados se extienden a los casos de juegos de asignación de tipo 2 x m o m x 2.

Aggregate monotonic stable single-valued solutions for cooperative games

[cat] En aquest treball caracteritzem les solucions puntuals de jocs cooperatius d'utilitat transferible que compleixen selecció del core i monotonia agregada. També mostrem que aquestes dues propietats són compatibles amb la individualitat racional, la propietat del jugador fals i la propietat de simetria. Finalment, caracteritzem les solucions puntuals que compleixen les cinc propietats a l'hora.

The maximun and the addition of assigment games

[cat] En el context dels mercats a dues bandes, considerem, en primer lloc, que els jugadors poden escollir on dur a terme les seves transaccions. Mostrem que el joc corresponent a aquesta situació, que es representa pel màxim d’un conjunt finit de jocs d’assignació, pot ser un joc no equilibrat. Aleshores proporcionem condicions per a l’equilibri del joc i, per aquest cas, analitzem algunes propietats del core del joc. En segon lloc, considerem que els jugadors poden fer transaccions en diversos mercats simultàniament i, llavors, sumar els guanys obtinguts. El joc corresponent, representat per la suma d’un conjunt finit de jocs d’assignació, és equilibrat. A més a més, sota certes condicions, la suma dels cores dels dos jocs d’assignació coincideix amb el core del joc suma.

Hierarchy of interactive functions in father-mother-baby three-way games

In developmental research, the family has mainly been studied through dyadic interaction. Three-way interactions have received less attention, partly because of their complexity. This difficulty may be overcome by distinguishing between four hierarchically embedded functions in three-way interactions: (1) participation (inclusion of all participants), (2) organization (partners keeping to their roles), (3) focalization (sharing a common focus) and (4) affective contact (being in tune). We document this hierarchical model on a sample of 80 families observed in the Lausanne Trilogue Play situation across four different sites. Hierarchy between functions was demonstrated by means of Guttman scalability coefficient. Given the importance of the child's development in a threesome, the pertinence of this model for family assessment is discussed.