Estratègies d'intervenció i avaluació de l'hàbit tabàquic

Objectiu: Donar informació sobre els riscos del tabac, avaluar l’hàbit tabàquic i el compliment de la normativa vigent per part de la comunitat universitària a través d’una campanya de sensibilització. Metodologia: Prèviament a l’inici de les activitats es van dissenyar i passar unes enquestes per avaluar l’hàbit tabàquic als estudiants (a l’aula) i treballadors de l’Escola de Ciències de la Salut. Durant la setmana d’activitats, que coincidia amb el Dia Internacional de LLuita Antitabàquica, es va crear una taula informativa a càrrec dels estudiants de l’assignatura Atencions d’Infermeria a Addiccions i Toxicomanies, per tal d’informar de forma àmplia sobre el tabaquisme, conseqüències i tractaments. Al mateix temps i de forma passiva en uns monitors de TV es donava més informació, amb una material creat per aquesta campanya. Resultats: Els mitjans de comunicació van demostrar, des de l’inici de la campanya, un gran interès. Respecte a la participació per part de la comunitat universitària podem dir que va ser acceptable, al voltant de 1000 persones van passar per la taula informativa. El perfil dels estudiants que van contestar l’enquesta va ser dona (66.4%), alumne de fisioteràpia (49%), fumadors (regulars i ocasionals 52%). Dintre del grup de fumadors regulars per gèneres les dones fumen més 37%, front als homes 27.7%. Consum setmanal de cigarretes (regulars i ocasionals), presenta una mitjana de 59 (D.E=49). La majoria ha fet algun intent de deixar de fumar, 61%. Respecte al temps d’ abstinència un 69.9% no ha passat de 3 mesos i un 96% pensa que fumar en un espai tancat és perjudicial pels altres. Per últim, de tots el entrevistats la gran majoria (97.8%), declaren que fumen davant seu i a un 41.4 % els molesta. Conclusions: La Comissió fa una valoració positiva general, de com es van desenvolupar les diferents activitats. No obstant s’observa poca sensibilització per una part de la comunitat universitària respecte a la llibertat de viure.

Los repositorios como componentes esenciales de las bibliotecas. 3ª Jornada sobre la Biblioteca Digital Universitaria, Córdoba (Argentina), 27-28 de octubre del 2005

Los consorcios han sido una de las novedades más influyentes en la realidad bibliotecaria mundial de los últimos cinco años. Su expansión territorial y en actividades los ha convertido en un fenómeno que ha cambiado profundamente las formas tradicionales de definir los servicios bibliotecarios. El examen atento de las actividades que ha desarrollado el Consorcio de Bibliotecas Universitarias de Cataluña (CBUC) en el ámbito de las bibliotecas digitales es una muestra de las posibilidades de cooperación existentes en estos inicios del Siglo XXI. El CBUC inició sus actividades de contratación de contenidos digitales en el 1998. Los productos y servicios licenciados se agruparon bajo el nombre de Biblioteca Digital de Catalunya (BDC). La BDC contiene actualmente unas 6.800 revistas-e, 58 BBDD y 4.100 libros-e. De forma bastante paralela en el tiempo nacieron un servidor de sumarios electrónicos de revistas y un servidor de tesis doctorales a texto completo. La evolución de las necesidades de las bibliotecas ha comportado que hoy en el CBUC se tenga la visión de la BDC como un servicio formado de dos grandes partes: a) los productos exteriores sujetos a contratación y accesibles remotamente a través de servicios comerciales, y, b) servidores de aquellos objetos digitales generados en el ámbito del CBUC y que solo pueden ser puestos en la red por nosotros mismos. Para gestionar esta segunda parte de la BDC debemos constituir almacenes o repositorios digitales. Entre las diferentes posibilidades, el CBUC ha optado por crear repositorios institucionales colectivos de diferente tipo según los materiales que contienen. Hasta el momento se han creado tres repositorios: uno para tesis, uno para revistas y uno para literatura gris de investigación. Está previsto crear un cuarto repositorio para imágenes. La ponencia finaliza con los aprendizajes del CBUC en materia de repositorios. El principal es que la mayor dificultad para crearlos no son los elementos tecnológicos sino establecer mecanismos de relación con el profesorado y la universidad para que los diferentes documentos creados de forma electrónica pasen a formar parte de los repositorios institucionales correspondientes.

Retribution in a cheap-talk experiment

We use a two-person 3-stage game to investigate whether people choose to punish or reward another player by sacrificing money to increase or decrease the other person’s payoff. One player sends a message indicating an intended play, which is either favorable or unfavorable to the other player in the game. After the message, the sender and the receiver play a simultaneous 2x2 game. A deceptive message may be made, in an effort to induce the receiver to make a play favorable to the sender. Our focus is on whether receivers’ rates of monetary sacrifice depend on the process and the perceived sender’s intention, as is suggested by the literature on deception and procedural satisfaction. Models such as Rabin (1993), Sen (1997), and Charness and Rabin (1999) also permit rates of sacrifice to be sensitive to the sender’s perceived intention, while outcome-based models such as Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Bolton and Ockenfels (1997) predict otherwise. We find that deception substantially increases the punishment rate as a response to an action that is unfavorable to the receiver. We also find that a small but significant percentage of subjects choose to reward a favorable action choice made by the sender.

Consumers' behavior and the Bertrand paradox: an ACE approach

We analyze the classical Bertrand model when consumers exhibit some strategic behavior in deciding from which seller they will buy. We use two related but different tools. Both consider a probabilistic learning (or evolutionary) mechanism, and in the two of them consumers' behavior in uences the competition between the sellers. The results obtained show that, in general, developing some sort of loyalty is a good strategy for the buyers as it works in their best interest. First, we consider a learning procedure described by a deterministic dynamic system and, using strong simplifying assumptions, we can produce a description of the process behavior. Second, we use nite automata to represent the strategies played by the agents and an adaptive process based on genetic algorithms to simulate the stochastic process of learning. By doing so we can relax some of the strong assumptions used in the rst approach and still obtain the same basic results. It is suggested that the limitations of the rst approach (analytical) provide a good motivation for the second approach (Agent-Based). Indeed, although both approaches address the same problem, the use of Agent-Based computational techniques allows us to relax hypothesis and overcome the limitations of the analytical approach.

Corrigendum stable matchings and preferences of couples

We correct an omission in the definition of our domain of weakly responsive preferences introduced in Klaus and Klijn (2005) or KK05 for short. The proof of the existence of stable matchings (KK05, Theorem 3.3) and a maximal domain result (KK05, Theorem 3.5) are adjusted accordingly.

A cooperative appproach to queue allocation of indivisible objects

We consider the allocation of a finite number of indivisible objects to the same number of agents according to an exogenously given queue. We assume that the agents collaborate in order to achieve an efficient outcome for society. We allow for side-payments and provide a method for obtaining stable outcomes.

Sequencing games without initial order

In this note we study uncertainty sequencing situations, i.e., 1-machine sequencing situations in which no initial order is specified. We associate cooperative games with these sequencing situations, study their core, and provide links with the classic sequencing games introduced by Curiel et al. (1989). Moreover, we propose and characterize two simple cost allocation rules for uncertainty sequencing situations with equal processing times.

Distribution center consolidation games

We study the location-inventory model as introduced by Teo et al. (2001) to analyze the impact of consolidation of distribution centers on facility and inventory costs. We extend their result on profitability of consolidation. We associate a cooperative game with each location-inventory situation and prove that this game has a non-empty core for identical and independent demand processes. This illustrates that consolidation does not only lower joint costs (which was shown by Teo et al. (2001)), but it allows for a stable division of the minimal costs as well.

Coalition formation in a contest game with three heterogeneous players

We analyze the incentives for cooperation of three players differing in their efficiency of effort in a contest game. We concentrate on the non-cooperative bargaining foundation of coalition formation, and therefore, we adopt a two-stage model. In the first stage, individuals form coalitions following a bargaining protocol similar to the one proposed by Gul (1989). Afterwards, coalitions play the contest game of Esteban and Ray (1999) within the resulting coalition structure of the first stage. We find that the grand coalition forms whenever the distribution of the bargaining power in the coalition formation game is equal to the distribution of the relative efficiency of effort. Finally, we use the case of equal bargaining power for all individuals to show that other types of coalition structures may be observed as well.

Resource-monotonicity for house allocation problems

We study a simple model of assigning indivisible objects (e.g., houses, jobs, offices, etc.) to agents. Each agent receives at most one object and monetary compensations are not possible. We completely describe all rules satisfying efficiency and resource-monotonicity. The characterized rules assign the objects in a sequence of steps such that at each step there is either a dictator or two agents "trade" objects from their hierarchically specified "endowments."

Some things couples always wanted to know about stable matchings (but were afraid to ask)

It is well-known that couples that look jointly for jobs in the same centralized labor market may cause instabilities. We demonstrate that for a natural preference domain for couples, namely the domain of responsive preferences, the existence of stable matchings can easily be established. However, a small deviation from responsiveness in one couple's preference relation that models the wish of a couple to be closer together may already cause instability. This demonstrates that the nonexistence of stable matchings in couples markets is not a singular theoretical irregularity. Our nonexistence result persists even when a weaker stability notion is used that excludes myopic blocking. Moreover, we show that even if preferences are responsive there are problems that do not arise for singles markets. Even though for couples markets with responsive preferences the set of stable matchings is nonempty, the lattice structure that this set has for singles markets does not carry over. Furthermore we demonstrate that the new algorithm adopted by the National Resident Matching Program to fill positions for physicians in the United States may cycle, while in fact a stable matchings does exist, and be prone to strategic manipulation if the members of a couple pretend to be single.

I want you! An experiment studying the selection effect when assigning distributive power.

We study whether selection affects motivation. In our experiment subjects first answer a personality questionnaire. They then play a 3-person game. One of the three players decides between an outside option assigning him a positive amount, but leaving the two others empty-handed and allowing one of the other two players to distribute a pie. Treatments differ in the procedure by which distributive power is assigned: to a randomly determined or to a knowingly selected partner. Before making her decision the selecting player could consult the personality questionnaire of the other two players. Results show that knowingly selected players keep less for themselves than randomly selected ones and reward the selecting player more generously.

Sequential formation of coalitions through bilateral agreements

We study a sequential protocol of endogenous coalition formation based on a process of bilateral agreements among the players. We apply the game to a Cournot environment with linear demand and constant average costs. We show that the final outcome of any Subgame Perfect Equilibrium of the game is the grand coalition, provided the initial number of firms is high enough and they are sufficiently patient.

A generalized assignment game

The proposed game is a natural extension of the Shapley and Shubik Assignment Game to the case where each seller owns a set of different objets instead of only one indivisible object. We propose definitions of pairwise stability and group stability that are adapted to our framework. Existence of both pairwise and group stable outcomes is proved. We study the structure of the group stable set and we finally prove that the set of group stable payoffs forms a complete lattice with one optimal group stable payoff for each side of the market.

Fair procedures. Evidence from games involving lotteries

Procedural fairness plays a prominent role in the social discourse concerning the marketplace in particular, and social institutions in general. Random procedures are a simple case, and they have found application in several important social allocation decisions. We investigate random procedures in the laboratory. We find that an unbiased random procedure is an acceptable substitute for an unbiased allocation: similar patterns of acceptance and rejection result when either is inserted as a feasible proposal in a sequential battle-of-the-sexes. We also find that unbiasedness, known to be a crucial characteristic of allocation fairness, is important to procedural fairness: in the context of a random offer game, a biased outcome is more readily accepted when chosen by an unbiased random draw than by one that is biased. Procedural fairness is conceptually different than allocation fairness or attribution-based behavior, and none of the current models of fairness and reciprocity captures our results. Post hoc extension of one of these models (ERC) suggests that a deeper understanding of procedural fairness requires further investigation of competing fairness norms.