A-1 Monthly Public Assistance Statistical Report Family Investment Program, November 2005

A-1 - Monthly Public Assistance Statistical Report Family Investment Program - November 2005

Department of Commerce Iowa Credit Union Division Performance Report, FY 2004

Agency Performance Report from the Credit Union Division

Department of Commerce Iowa Credit Union Division Performance Report, FY 2005

Agency Performance Report from the Credit Union Division

A-1 Monthly Public Assistance Statistical Report-Family Investment Program, December 2005

A-1 December 2005 - Monthly Public Assistance Statistical Report - Family Investment Program

How current Tax Laws affect Woodlands Owners, August 1998

This report is on the effects of the tax reforam act of 1986 on timber production activites.

A-1 Monthly Public Assistance Statistical Report Family Investment Program, January 2006

Monthly Public Assistance Statistical Report Family Investment Program, January 2006

A-1 Monthly Public Assistance Statistical Report-Family Investment Program, February 2006

A-1 Monthly Public Assistance Statistical Report Family Investment Program, February 2006

A-1 Monthly Public Assistance Statistical Report Family Investment Program, March 2006

A-1 - March 2006 -Monthly Public Assistance Statistical Report Family Investment Program

A-1 Monthly Public Assistance Statistical Report Family Investment Program, April 2006

Monthly Public Assistance Statistical Report Family Investment Program, April 2006

A-1, Monthly Public Assistance Statistical Report Family Investment Program, May 2006

A-1 May 2006 - Monthly Public Assistance Statistical Report Family Investment Program

Adverse Selection, Credit, and Efficiency: the Case of the Missing Market

We analyze a standard environment of adverse selection in credit markets. In our envi- ronment, entrepreneurs who are privately informed about the quality of their projects need to borrow from banks. As is generally the case in economies with adverse selection, the competitive equilibrium of our economy is shown to be ine¢ cient. Under adverse selection, the choices made by one type of agents limit what can be o¤ered to other types in an incentive-compatible manner. This gives rise to an externality, which cannot be internalized in a competitive equilibrium. We show that, in this type of environment, the ine¢ ciency associated to adverse selection is the consequence of one implicit assumption: entrepreneurs can only borrow from banks. If an additional market is added (say, a .security market.), in which entrepreneurs can obtain funds beyond those o¤ered by banks, we show that the e¢ cient allocation is an equilibrium of the economy. In such an equilibrium, all entrepreneurs borrow at a pooling rate in the security market. When they apply to bank loans, though, only entrepreneurs with good projects pledge these additional funds as collateral. This equilibrium thus simultaneously entails cross- subsidization and separation between di¤erent types of entrepreneurs.

Prime Property Institutions for a Subprime Era: Exploring Innovative Models of Residential Development and Finance

This paper breaks new ground toward contractual and institutional innovation in models of homeownership, equity building, and mortgage enforcement. Inspired by recent developments in the affordable housing sector and in other types of public financing schemes, this paper suggests extending institutional and financial strategies such as timeand place-based division of property rights, conditional subsidies, and credit mediation to alleviate the systemic risks of mortgage foreclosure. Alongside a for-profit shared equity scheme that would be led by local governments, we also outline a private market shared equity model, one of bootstrapping home buying with purchase options.

Financing Constraints, Irreversibility, and Investment Dynamics

We develop a model of an industry with many heterogeneous firms that face both financing constraints and irreversibility constraints. The financing constraint implies that firms cannot borrow unless the debt is secured by collateral; the irreversibility constraint that they can only sell their fixed capital by selling their business. We use this model to examine the cyclical behavior of aggregate fixed investment, variable capital investment, and output in the presence of persistent idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks. Our model yields three main results. First, the effect of the irreversibility constraint on fixed capital investment is reinforced by the financing constraint. Second, the effect of the financing constraint on variable capital investment is reinforced by the irreversibility constraint. Finally, the interaction between the two constraints is key for explaining why input inventories and material deliveries of US manufacturing firms are so volatile and procyclical, and also why they are highly asymmetrical over the business cycle.

A-1, Monthly Public Assistance Statistical Report - Family Investment Program, June 2006

A-1 Monthly Public Assistance Statistical Report - Family Investment Program - June 2006

Firm-Specific Investment, Sticky Prices, and the Taylor Principle

According to the Taylor principle a central bank should adjust the nominal interest rate by more than one-for-one in response to changes in current inflation. Most of the existing literature supports the view that by following this simple recommendation a central bank can avoid being a source of unnecessary fluctuations in economic activity. The present paper shows that this conclusion is not robust with respect to the modelling of capital accumulation. We use our insights to discuss the desirability of alternative interest rate rules. Our results suggest a reinterpretation of monetary policy under Volcker and Greenspan: The empirically plausible characterization of monetary policy can explain the stabilization of macroeconomic outcomes observed in the early eighties for the US economy. The Taylor principle in itself cannot.