Voting with preferences over margins of victory

This paper analyzes a two-alternative voting model with the distinctive feature that voters have preferences over margins of victory. We study voting contests with a finite as well as an infinite number of voters, and with and without mandatory voting. The main result of the paper is the existence and characterization of a unique equilibrium outcome in all those situations. At equilibrium, voters who prefer a larger support for one of the alternatives vote for such alternative.The model also provides a formal argument for the conditional sincerity voting condition in Alesina and Rosenthal (1995) and the benefit of voting function in Llavador (2006). Finally, we offer new insights on explaining why some citizens may vote strategically for an alternative different from the one declared as the most preferred.

Individual responses to converting enzyme inhibitors and calcium antagonists.

This study was designed to assess whether the acute blood pressure response of an individual hypertensive patient to a calcium antagonist or an angiotensin converting enzyme (ACE) inhibitor is a good predictor of the long-term efficacy of these drug classes in this particular patient. The concept that good responses to ACE inhibitors and calcium antagonists may be mutually exclusive was also tested. Sixteen patients were included in a randomized crossover trial of enalapril, 20 mg daily, and diltiazem, 120 mg daily, for 6 weeks each. Blood pressure was measured by ambulatory blood pressure recording. During the washout phase, the acute effect of nifedipine, 10 mg p.o., and enalaprilat, 5 mg i.v., was evaluated. Nifedipine and enalaprilat reduced blood pressure equally well. The long-term blood pressure reduction induced by enalapril and diltiazem was similar. The acute blood pressure response to a given drug was not a good predictor of the result obtained with long-term therapy. No age dependency of the antihypertensive effect of either drug class was apparent. There was no evidence that a good response to one drug excluded a similarly good response to the other.

Social preferences and skill segregation

This paper shows that models where preferences of individuals dependnot only on their allocations, but also on the well-being of otherpersons, can produce both large and testable effects. We study theallocation of workers with heterogeneous productivities to firms. Weshow that even small deviations from purely selfish preferences leadsto widespread workplace skill segregation. That is, workers ofdifferent abilities tend to work in di¤erent firms, as long as theycare somewhat more about the utilities of workers who are close .

Iowa Individual Income Tax Statistical Report 2006

Iowa Individual Income Tax Statistical Report 2006

Social preferences: Some simple tests and a new model

Departures from pure self interest in economic experiments have recently inspired models of "social preferences". We conduct experiments on simple two-person and three-person games with binary choices that test these theories more directly than the array of games conventionally considered. Our experiments show strong support for the prevalence of "quasi-maximin" preferences: People sacrifice to increase the payoffs for all recipients, but especially for the lowest-payoff recipients. People are also motivated by reciprocity: While people are reluctant to sacrifice to reciprocate good or bad behavior beyond what they would sacrifice for neutral parties, they withdraw willingness to sacrifice to achieve a fair outcome when others are themselves unwilling to sacrifice. Some participants are averse to getting different payoffs than others, but based on our experiments and reinterpretation of previous experiments we argue that behavior that has been presented as "difference aversion" in recent papers is actually a combination of reciprocal and quasi-maximin motivations. We formulate a model in which each player is willing to sacrifice to allocate the quasi-maximin allocation only to those players also believed to be pursuing the quasi-maximin allocation, and may sacrifice to punish unfair players.

Optimal contracts, adverse selection and social preferences: An experiment

It has long been standard in agency theory to search for incentive-compatible mechanisms on the assumption that people care only about their own material wealth. However, this assumption is clearly refuted by numerous experiments, and we feel that it may be useful to consider nonpecuniary utility in mechanism design and contract theory. Accordingly, we devise an experiment to explore optimal contracts in an adverse-selection context. A principal proposes one of three contract menus, each of which offers a choice of two incentive-compatible contracts, to two agents whose types are unknown to the principal. The agents know the set of possible menus, and choose to either accept one of the two contracts offered in the proposed menu or to reject the menu altogether; a rejection by either agent leads to lower (and equal) reservation payoffs for all parties. While all three possible menus favor the principal, they do so to varying degrees. We observe numerous rejections of the more lopsided menus, and approach an equilibrium where one of the more equitable contract menus (which one depends on the reservation payoffs) is proposed and agents accept a contract, selecting actions according to their types. Behavior is largely consistent with all recent models of social preferences, strongly suggesting there is value in considering nonpecuniary utility in agency theory.

Biased quantitative measurement of interval ordered homothetic preferences

We represent interval ordered homothetic preferences with a quantitative homothetic utility function and a multiplicative bias. When preferences are weakly ordered (i.e. when indifference is transitive), such a bias equals 1. When indifference is intransitive, the biasing factor is a positive function smaller than 1 and measures a threshold of indifference. We show that the bias is constant if and only if preferences are semiordered, and we identify conditions ensuring a linear utility function. We illustrate our approach with indifference sets on a two dimensional commodity space.

Retirement incentives, individual heterogeneity and labour transitions of employed and unemployed workers

In this paper we analyze the sensitivity of the labour market decisions of workers close toretirement with respect to the incentives created by public regulations. We improve upon the extensiveprior literature on the effect of pension incentives on retirement in two ways. First, bymodeling the transitions between employment, unemployment and retirement in a simultaneousmanner, paying special attention to the transition from unemployment to retirement (which is particularlyimportant in Spain). Second, by considering the influence of unobserved heterogeneity inthe estimation of the effect of our (carefully constructed) incentive variables.Using administrative data, we find that, when properly defined, economic incentives have astrong impact on labour market decisions in Spain. Unemployment regulations are shown to be particularlyinfluential for retirement behaviour, along with the more traditional determinants linked tothe pension system. Pension variables also have a major bearing on both workers reemploymentdecisions and on the strategic actions of employers. The quantitative impact of the incentives, however,is greatly affected by the existence of unobserved heterogeneity among workers. Its omissionleads to sizable biases in the assessment of the sensitivity to economic incentives, a finding thathas clear consequences for the credibility of any model-based policy analysis. We confirm theimportance of this potential problem in one especially interesting instance: the reform of earlyretirement provisions undertaken in Spain in 2002. We use a difference-in-difference approach tomeasure the behavioural reaction to this change, finding a large overestimation when unobservedheterogeneity is not taken into account.

Implications of dynamic trading for insurance markets

We study the interaction between insurance and capital markets within singlebut general framework.We show that capital markets greatly enhance the risksharing capacity of insurance markets and the scope of risks that areinsurable because efficiency does not depend on the number of agents atrisk, nor on risks being independent, nor on the preferences and endowmentsof agents at risk being the same. We show that agents share risks by buyingfull coverage for their individual risks and provide insurance capitalthrough stock markets.We show that aggregate risk enters private insuranceas positive loading on insurance prices and despite that agents will buyfull coverage. The loading is determined by the risk premium of investorsin the stock market and hence does not depend on the agent s willingnessto pay. Agents provide insurance capital by trading an equally weightedportfolio of insurance company shares and riskless asset. We are able toconstruct agents optimal trading strategies explicitly and for verygeneral preferences.

Feeding and oviposition preferences of Ctenarytaina spatulata Taylor (Hemiptera, Psyllidae) for Eucalyptus spp. and other Myrtaceae in Brazil

Feeding and oviposition preferences of Ctenarytaina spatulata Taylor (Hemiptera, Psyllidae) for Eucalyptus spp. and other Myrtaceae in Brazil. The Australian psyllid, Ctenarytaina spatulata Taylor (Hemiptera, Psyllidae), was first detected in Brazil in 1994, where it was found on drought-affected shoots of Eucalyptus grandis in a plantation located in the northern part of Paraná State. The oviposition and feeding preferences of this psyllid were examined on 19 Eucalyptus species, one Eucalyptus hybrid (Cambiju), three Corymbia species and four native Myrtaceae species (Hexaclames edulis, Marlieria edulis, Plinia trunciflora, and Psydium sp.) under greenhouse conditions. The largest populations of C. spatulata were found on E. robusta and E. pellita, while sizeable infestations were also found on E. urophylla, E. grandis, and the Cambiju hybrid. The plants with the greatest symptoms of damage were E. grandis and E. resinifera. Eucalyptus cinerea, E. benthamii, E. pilularis, and E. dunnii were not infested and E. cloeziana was minimally infested. Among the Corymbia species, the number of eggs of C. spatulata was very low on C. citriodora and C. torelliana. No eggs and nymphs of C. spatulata were found on native Brazilian Myrtaceae. The number of eggs on plants was highly correlated with the subsequent levels of nymphs, suggesting that egg counts can be used as a viable monitoring tool to assist with the integrated management of this pest.

Systematic Assessment of Factors Influencing Preferences of Crohn's Disease Patients in Selecting an Anti-TNF agent (CHOOSE TNF TRIAL)

Background a nd A ims: I nfliximab (IFX), adalimumab (ADA)and certolizumab pegol (CZP) have similar efficacy for inductionand maintenance of clinical response and remission in Crohn'sdisease (CD). Given the comparable nature of t hese drugs,patients' p references m ay i nfluence the choice o f the product.Goal: to identify factors contributing to CD patients' decision inselecting one anti-TNF agent over the others.Methods: A p rospectdive s urvey was performed a mong a nti-TNF-naïve CD patients. Prior to completion of a questionnaire,patients were provided with a description of the three anti-TNFagents f ocusing on indications, route of administration, s ideeffects, and scientific evidence of efficacy and safety.Results: One hundred patients (47f/53m, mean age 45±16yrs)completed the questionnaire. Disease location was ileal, colonicand ileocolonic in 33%, 40% and 27% of patients, respectively.Thirty-six percent preferred ADA as medication of choice, while28% and 2 5% p referred CZP and IFX; 11% were u ndecided.Patients' decision in selecting an anti-TNF drug was influencedby t he following f actors: side effects ( 76%), p hysician'srecommendation (66%), route of administration (54%), efficacydata (52%), time required for therapy administration (27%),recommendations by other CD patients (21%) and interactionswith other medications (12%).Conclusions: T he majority of p atients p referred anti-TNFmedications t hat were a dministered by s ubcutaneous i njectionrather t han b y intravenous i nfusion. Side effect profile andphysicians' r ecommendation are t wo m ajor factors influencingthe patients' s election of a specific anti-TNF d rug. Patients'concerns about safety and lifestyle habits should be taken intoaccount when prescribing anti-TNF drugs.

Resistance to reform: Reconsidering the role of individual-specific uncertainty

Individual-specific uncertainty may increase the chances of reform beingenacted and sustained. Reform may be more likely to be enacted because amajority of agents might end up losing little from reform and a minoritygaining a lot. Under certainty, reform would therefore be rejected, butit may be enacted with uncertainty because those who end up losing believethat they might be among the winners. Reform may be more likely to besustained because, in a realistic setting, reform will increase theincentives of agents to move into those economic activities that benefit.Agents who respond to these incentives will vote to sustain reform infuture elections, even if they would have rejected reform under certainty.These points are made using the trade-model of Fernandez and Rodrik (AER,1991).

Intra-individual stability of neuromotor tasks from 6 to 18 years: a longitudinal study.

This study investigates the intra-individual stability of the speed of several motor tasks and the intensity of associated movements in 256 children (131 girls, 125 boys) from the Zurich generational study using the Zurich neuromotor assessment battery (ZNA) over a 12-year period from the age of 6 to 18 years. The stability was assessed by correlograms of standard deviation scores calculated from age- and gender-adjusted normative values and compared with standing height and full scale intelligence quotient (IQ). While motor tasks of hand, finger and foot (HFT) and contralateral associated movements (CAM) exhibited a moderate stability (summary measure as correlation coefficients between two measurements made 4 years apart: .61 and .60), other tasks (dynamic balance, static balance and pegboard) were only weakly stable (.46, .47 and .49). IQ and height were more stable than neuromotor components (.72 and .86). We conclude that the moderately stable HFT and CAM may reflect "motor traits", while the stability of the pegboard and balance tasks is weaker because these skills are more experience related and state-dependent.