971 resultados para Financial Resources
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Includes bibliography
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Includes bibliography
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Includes bibliography
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This Doctoral Dissertation is triggered by an emergent trend: firms are increasingly referring to investments in corporate venture capital (CVC) as means to create new competencies and foster the search for competitive advantage through the use of external resources. CVC is generally defined as the practice by non-financial firms of placing equity investments in entrepreneurial companies. Thus, CVC can be interpreted (i) as a key component of corporate entrepreneurship - acts of organizational creation, renewal, or innovation that occur within or outside an existing organization– and (ii) as a particular form of venture capital (VC) investment where the investor is not a traditional and financial institution, but an established corporation. My Dissertation, thus, simultaneously refers to two streams of research: corporate strategy and venture capital. In particular, I directed my attention to three topics of particular relevance for better understanding the role of CVC. In the first study, I moved from the consideration that competitive environments with rapid technological changes increasingly force established corporations to access knowledge from external sources. Firms, thus, extensively engage in external business development activities through different forms of collaboration with partners. While the underlying process common to these mechanisms is one of knowledge access, they are substantially different. The aim of the first study is to figure out how corporations choose among CVC, alliance, joint venture and acquisition. I addressed this issue adopting a multi-theoretical framework where the resource-based view and real options theory are integrated. While the first study mainly looked into the use of external resources for corporate growth, in the second work, I combined an internal and an external perspective to figure out the relationship between CVC investments (exploiting external resources) and a more traditional strategy to create competitive advantage, that is, corporate diversification (based on internal resources). Adopting an explorative lens, I investigated how these different modes to renew corporate current capabilities interact to each other. More precisely, is CVC complementary or substitute to corporate diversification? Finally, the third study focused on the more general field of VC to investigate (i) how VC firms evaluate the patent portfolios of their potential investee companies and (ii) whether the ability to evaluate technology and intellectual property varies depending on the type of investors, in particular for what concern the distinction between specialized versus generalist VCs and independent versus corporate VCs. This topic is motivated by two observations. First, it is not clear yet which determinants of patent value are primarily considered by VCs in their investment decisions. Second, VCs are not all alike in terms of technological experiences and these differences need to be taken into account.
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Strategic control is defined as the use of qualitative and quantitative tools for the evaluation of strategic organizational performance. Most research in strategic planning has focused on strategy formulation and implementation, but little work has been done on strategic performance evaluation particularly in the area of cancer research. The objective of this study was to identify strategic control approaches and financial performance metrics used by major cancer centers in the country as an initial step in expanding the theory and practice behind strategic organizational performance. Focusing on hospitals which share similar mandate and resource constraints was expected to improve measurement precision. The results indicate that most cancer centers use a wide selection of evaluation tools, but sophisticated analytical approaches were less common. In addition, there was evidence that high-performing centers tend to invest a larger degree of resources in the area of strategic performance analysis than centers showing lower financial results. The conclusions point to the need for incorporating higher degree of analytical power in order to improve the tracking of strategic performance. This study is one of the first to concentrate in the area of strategic control.^
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International politics affects oil trade. But do financial and commercial traders who participate in spot oil trading also respond to changes in international politics? We construct a firm-level dataset for all U.S. oil-importing companies over 1986-2008 to examine how these firms respond to increases in "political distance" between the U.S. and her trading partners, measured by divergence in their UN General Assembly voting patterns. Consistent with previous macro evidence, we first show that individual firms diversify their oil imports politically, even after controlling for unobserved firm heterogeneity. However, the political pattern of oil imports is not entirely driven by the concerns of hold-up risks, which exist when oil transactions via term contracts are associated with backward vertical FDI that is subject to expropriation. In particular, our results indicate that even financial and commercial traders significantly reduce their oil imports from U.S. political enemies. Interestingly, while these traders diversify their oil imports politically immediately after changes in international politics, other oil companies reduce their oil imports with a significant time lag. Our findings suggest that in designing regulations to avoid harmful repercussions on commodity and financial assets, policymakers need to understand the nature of political risk.
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To overcome the regulatory pitfalls, regulatory capacity and resources in financial markets governance need to be enhanced, not only at national but also at global levels. In order to shed light on policy issues and agendas in international financial policy cooperation, this paper focuses on the case of European financial integration and regulations. The analysis of policy developments at the European level in coordinating differing national interests, supervisory systems, and practices among EU member states highlights fundamental elements of global financial regulatory cooperation.
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The crisis in Russia’s financial market, which started in mid-December 2014, has exposed the real scale of the economic problems that have been growing in Russia for several years. Over the course of the last year, Russia’s basic macroeconomic indicators deteriorated considerably, the confidence of its citizens in the state and in institutions in charge of economic stability declined, the government and business elites became increasingly dissatisfied with the policy direction adopted by the Kremlin, and fighting started over the shrinking resources. According to forecasts obtained from both governmental and expert communities, Russia will fall into recession in 2015. The present situation is the result of the simultaneous occurrence of three unfavourable trends: the fact that the Russian economy’s resource-based development model has reached the limits of its potential due to structural weaknesses, the dramatic decline in oil prices in the second half of 2014, and the impact of Western economic sanctions. Given the inefficiency of existing systemic mechanisms, in the coming years the Russian leadership will likely resort to ad hoc solutions such as switching to a more interventionist “manual override” mode in governing the state. In the short term, this will allow them to neutralise the most urgent problems, although an effective development policy will be impossible without a fundamental change of the political and economic system in Russia.
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One of the key challenges that Ukraine is facing is the scale of its foreign debt (both public and private). As of 1st April it stood at US$ 126 billion, which is 109.8% of the country’s GDP. Approximately 45% of these financial obligations are short-term, meaning that they must be paid off within a year. Although the value of the debt has fallen by nearly US$ 10 billion since the end of 2014 (due to the private sector paying a part of the liabilities), the debt to GDP ratio has increased due to the recession and the depreciation of the hryvnia. The value of Ukraine’s foreign public debt is also on the rise (including state guarantees); since the beginning of 2015 it has risen from US$ 37.6 billion to US$ 43.6 billion. Ukraine does not currently have the resources to pay off its debt. In this situation a debt restructuring is necessary and this is one of the top priorities for the Ukrainian government as well as for the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and its assistance programme. Without this it will be much more difficult for Ukraine to overcome the economic crisis.
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The EU Banking Union combines micro- and macro-prudential regulation. It aims at breaking the “doom loop” between banks and sovereign debt, promoting financial stability and mitigating the next financial shock to the real EU economy, at the lowest possible cost to the financial institutions and to the taxpayers. Success, or failure, is determined by how the banking union copes with the challenges to its two main pillars, the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) and the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM). Under the SSM, in its new supervisory role, the ECB may be subject to conflicts between the objectives of price and financial stability, and the single-supervisor role may be sub-optimal. Two regulators might have been preferable and more focus on ECB accountability will now be required. The shock-absorbing Single Resolution Fund (SRF), which is part of the SRM, may not have the capacity to deal with a crisis of the size of the one of 2008. Especially as the nature and severity of a future financial crisis cannot be forecasted. The design of the banking union is not the result of theoretical studies, but a political compromise to deal with an acute crisis. The theoretical studies that are included in this paper are not supportive of the banking union in its current form. Nevertheless, there is a good chance that the EU Banking Union may succeed, as ECB supervision of the 123 systemically important banks should contain potential demands on the SRM. In the event of a crisis that is too severe for the banking union to absorb with its current capability, the crucial assumption is that there is political will to rapidly provide new resources. The same applies, if a major financial crisis develops before the banking union is fully operational.
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The EU Banking Union combines micro- and macro-prudential regulation. It aims at breaking the “doom loop” between banks and sovereign debt, promoting financial stability and mitigating the next financial shock to the real EU economy, at the lowest possible cost to the financial institutions and to the taxpayers. Success, or failure, is determined by how the banking union copes with the challenges to its two main pillars, the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) and the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM). Under the SSM, in its new supervisory role, the ECB may be subject to conflicts between the objectives of price and financial stability, and the single-supervisor role may be sub-optimal. Two regulators might have been preferable and more focus on ECB accountability will now be required. The shock-absorbing Single Resolution Fund (SRF), which is part of the SRM, may not have the capacity to deal with a crisis of the size of the one of 2008. Especially as the nature and severity of a future financial crisis cannot be forecasted. The design of the banking union is not the result of theoretical studies, but a political compromise to deal with an acute crisis. The theoretical studies that are included in this paper are not supportive of the banking union in its current form. Nevertheless, there is a good chance that the EU Banking Union may succeed, as ECB supervision of the 123 systemically important banks should contain potential demands on the SRM. In the event of a crisis that is too severe for the banking union to absorb with its current capability, the crucial assumption is that there is political will to rapidly provide new resources. The same applies, if a major financial crisis develops before the banking union is fully operational.
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This paper discusses the application of the new European rules for burden-sharing and bail-in in the banking sector, in view of their ability to accommodate broader policy goals of aggregate financial stability. It finds that the Treaty principles and the new discipline of state aid and the restructuring of banks provide a solid framework for combating moral hazard and removing incentives that encourage excessive risk-taking by bankers. However, the application of the new rules may have become excessively attentive to the case-by-case evaluation of individual institutions, while perhaps losing sight of the aggregate policy needs of the banking system. Indeed, in this first phase of the banking union, while large segments of the EU banking sector still require a substantial restructuring and recapitalisation, the market may not be able to provide all the needed resources in the current environment of depressed profitability and low growth. Thus, a systemic market failure may be making the problem impossible to fix without resorting to temporary public support. But the risk of large write-offs of capital instruments due to burden-sharing and bail-in may represent an insurmountable obstacle to such public support as it may set in motion an investors’ flight. The paper concludes by showing that existing rules do contain the flexibility required to accommodate aggregate policy requirements in the general interest, and outlines a public support scheme for the precautionary recapitalisation of solvent banks that would be compliant with EU law.
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August 1978.
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Mode of access: Internet.
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Includes bibliographical references.
