Access Update, April 2011

Monthly newsletter for the Iowa Department of Public Health

Time consistent Pareto solutions in common access resource gameswith asymmetric players

In the analysis of equilibrium policies in a di erential game, if agents have different time preference rates, the cooperative (Pareto optimum) solution obtained by applying the Pontryagin's Maximum Principle becomes time inconsistent. In this work we derive a set of dynamic programming equations (in discrete and continuous time) whose solutions are time consistent equilibrium rules for N-player cooperative di erential games in which agents di er in their instantaneous utility functions and also in their discount rates of time preference. The results are applied to the study of a cake-eating problem describing the management of a common property exhaustible natural resource. The extension of the results to a simple common property renewable natural resource model in in nite horizon is also discussed.

Access by Capacity and Peak-Load Pricing

Several European telecommunications regulatory agencies have recently introduced a fixed capacity charge (flat rate) to regulate access to the incumbent's network. The purpose of this paper is to show that the optimal capacity charge and the optimal access-minute charge analysed by Armstrong, Doyle, and Vickers (1996) have a similar structure and imply the same payment for the entrant. I extend the analysis tothe case where there is a competitor with market power. In this case, the optimalcapacity charge should be modified to avoid that the entrant cream-skims the market,fixing a longer or a shorter peak period than the optimal. Finally, I consider a multiproduct setting, where the effect of the product differentiation is exacerbated.

Access Update, June 2011

Monthly newsletter for the Iowa Department of Public Health

Worksharing and access discounts in the postal sector with asymmetrics information

This paper analyses the optimal worksharing discount granted to mailers and entrants in a liberalized sector when there is asymmetric information about the Post Office's cost. When the regulator is unable to ascertain which part of total cost of sorting has to be attributed to each sorting facility, the optimal 'accesss discount' given to the entrants is set in a pro-competitive way, thus facilitating the entry of firms that are less afficient than the Post Office. Howerver, with the same asymmetry of information, the optimal 'worksharing discount' given to the mailers is set to favor the Post Office, even when it is less efficient than the mailers in providing the sorting.

Report on a review of selected general and application controls for the Iowa Department of Education’s Electronic Access System for Iowa Education Records (EASIER) system for the period April 4 through May 10, 2011

Report on a review of selected general and application controls for the Iowa Department of Education’s Electronic Access System for Iowa Education Records (EASIER) system for the period April 4 through May 10, 2011

Access Update, August 2011

Monthly newsletter for the Iowa Department of Public Health

Access Update, October 2011

Monthly newsletter for the Iowa Department of Public Health

Quasilocal density functional theory and its application within the extended Thomas-Fermi approximation

In this paper we propose a generalization of the density functional theory. The theory leads to single-particle equations of motion with a quasilocal mean-field operator, which contains a quasiparticle position-dependent effective mass and a spin-orbit potential. The energy density functional is constructed using the extended Thomas-Fermi approximation and the ground-state properties of doubly magic nuclei are considered within the framework of this approach. Calculations were performed using the finite-range Gogny D1S forces and the results are compared with the exact Hartree-Fock calculations

Access Update, December 2011

Monthly newsletter for the Iowa Department of Public Health