Muslimische Theologen und Philosophen im Wett- und Widerstreit um die Ratio - Ein Thesenpapier zum Diktum der 'Vernunftreligion' Islam im 11.-14. Jahrhundert

In this paper I investigate the vivid discussions among Muslim theologians and philosophers about the relationship of reason and religion from the 11th to the 14th centuries – which continue to be used as points of reference today. I argue that the idea of Islam as a religion which is in harmony with reason was one of the key postulates of the dominant thinkers of that period, regardless of their school of thought or their attitude towards literal or allegorical ways of understanding the Coran. In consequence, religion has been rationalized or even intellectualized to a high degree while philosophy in turn has been deeply coloured by religious images and concepts. Yet the understanding of religion as well as of reason and its instruments has been so heterogeneous that rationalization could bear very different, even conflicting meanings, thereby undermining the postulated harmony. In seven theses I foreground several striking similarities and differences between theologians and philosophers who diverge in their usage and understanding of reason as well as of the nature of religion.

Mother-Child Spiritual Discourse: A Mixed Methods Study

Parents and children, starting at very young ages, discuss religious and spiritual issues¿where we come from, what happens to us after we die, is there a God, and so on. Unfortunately, few studies have analyzed the content and structure of parent-child conversation about religion and spirituality (Boyatzis & Janicki, 2003; Dollahite & Thatcher, 2009), and most studies have relied on self-report with no direct observation. The current study examined mother-child (M-C) spiritual discourse to learn about its content, structure, and frequency through a survey inventory in combination with direct video observation using a novel structured task. We also analyzed how mothers¿ religiosity along several major dimensions related to their communication behaviors within both methods. Mothers (N = 39, M age = 40) of children aged 3-12 completed a survey packet on M-C spiritual discourse and standard measures of mothers¿ religious fundamentalism, intrinsic religiosity, sanctification of parenting (how much the mother saw herself as doing God¿s work as a parent), and a new measure of parental openness to children¿s spirituality. Then, in a structured task in our lab, mothers (N = 33) and children (M age = 7.33) watched a short film or read a short book that explored death in an age-appropriate manner and then engaged in a videotaped conversation about the movie or book and their religious or spiritual beliefs. Frequency of M-C spiritual discourse was positively related to mothers¿ religious fundamentalism (r = .71, p = .00), intrinsic religiosity (r = .77, p = .00), and sanctification of parenting (r = .79, p = .00), but, surprisingly, was inversely related to mothers¿ v openness to child¿s spirituality (r = -.52, p = .00). Survey data showed that the two most common topics discussed were God (once a week) and religion as it relates to moral issues (once a week). According to mothers their children¿s most common method of initiating spiritual discourse was to repeat what he or she has heard parents or family say about religious issues (M = 2.97; once a week); mothers¿ most common method was to describe their own religious/spiritual beliefs (M = 2.92). Spiritual discourse most commonly occurred either at bedtime or mealtime as reported by 26% of mothers, with the most common triggers reported as daily routine/random thoughts (once a week) and observations of nature (once a week). Mothers¿ most important goals for spiritual discourse were to let their children know that they love them (M = 3.72; very important) and to help them become a good and moral person (M = 3.67; very important). A regression model showed that significant variance in frequency of mother-child spiritual discourse (R2 = .84, p = .00) was predicted by the mothers¿ importance of goals during discourse (ß = 0.46, p = .00), frequency that the mother¿s spirituality was deepened through spiritual discourse (ß = 0.39, p = .00), and the mother¿s fundamentalism (ß = 0.20, p = .05). In a separate regression, the mother¿s comfort in the structured task (ß = 0.70, p = .00), and the number of open-ended questions she asked (ß = -0.26, p = .03) predicted the reciprocity between mother and child (R2 = .62, p = .00). In addition, the mother¿s age (ß = 0.22, p = .059) and comfort during the task (ß = 0.73, p = .00) predicted the child¿s engagement within the structured task. Other findings and theoretical and methodological implications will be discussed.

The Sociolinguistics of Hungarian Outside Hungary

This study describes the sociolinguistic situation of the indigenous Hungarian national minorities in Slovakia (c. 600,000), Ukraine (c. 180,000), Romania (c. 2,000,000), Yugoslavia (c. 300,000), Slovenia (c. 8,000) and Austria (c. 6,000). Following the guidelines of Hans Goebl et al, the historical sociolinguistic portrait of each minority is presented from 1920 through to the mid-1990s. Each country's report includes sections on geography and demography, history, politics, economy, culture and religion, language policy and planning, and language use (domains of minority and/or majority language use, proficiency, attitudes, etc.). The team's findings were presented in the form of 374 pages of manuscripts, articles and tables, written in Hungarian and English. The core of the team's research results lies in the results of an empirical survey designed to study the social characteristics of Hungarian-minority bilingualism in the six project countries, and the linguistic similarities and differences between the six contact varieties of Hungarian and Hungarian in Hungary. The respondents were divided by age, education, and settlement group - city vs. village and local majority vs. local minority. The first thing to be observed is that Hungarian is tending to be spoken less to children than to parents and grandparents, a familiar pattern of language shift. In contact varieties of Hungarian, analytic constructions may be used where monolingual Hungarians would use a more synthetic form. Mr Kontra gives as an example the compound tagdij, which in Standard Hungarian means "membership fee" but which is replaced in contact Hungarian by the two-word phrase tagsagi dij. Another similar example concerns the synthetic verb hegedult "played the violin" and the analytic expression hegedun jatszott. The contrast is especially striking between the Hungarians in the northern Slavic countries, who use the synthetic form frequently, and those in the southern Slavic countries, who mainly use the analytic form. Mr. Kontra notes that from a structural point of view, there is no immediate explanation for this, since Slovak or Ukrainian are as likely to cause interference as is Serbian. He postulates instead that the difference may be attributable to some sociohistoric cause, and points out that the Turkish occupation of what is today Voivodina caused a discontinuity of the Hungarian presence in the region, with the result that Hungarians were resettled in the area only two and a half centuries ago. However, the Hungarians in today's Slovakia and Ukraine have lived together with Slavic peoples continuously for over a millennium. It may be, he suggests, that 250 years of interethnic coexistence is less than is needed for such a contact-induced change to run its course. Next Mr. Kontra moved on to what he terms "mental maps and morphology". In Hungarian, the names of cities and villages take the surface case (eg. Budapest-en "in Budapest") whereas some names denoting Hungarian settlements and all names of foreign cities take the interior case (eg. Tihany-ban "in Tihany" and Boston-ban "in Boston). The role of the semantic feature "foreign" in suffix-choice can be illustrated by such minimal pairs as Velence-n "in Velence, a village in Hungary" versus Velence-ben "in Velence [=Venice], a city in Italy", and Pecs-en "in Pecs, a city in Hungary" vs. Becs-ben "in Becs, ie. Vienna". This Hungarian vs. foreign distinction is often interpreted as "belonging to historical (pre-1920) Hungary" vs. "outside historical Hungary". The distinction is also expressed in the dichotomy "home" vs. "abroad'. The 1920 border changes have had an impact on both majority and minority Hungarians' mental maps, the maps which govern the choice of surface vs. interior cases with placenames. As there is a growing divergence between the mental maps of majority and minority Hungarians, so there will be a growing divergence in their use of the placename suffixes. Two placenames were chosen to scratch the surface of this complex problem: Craiova (a city in Oltenia, Romania) and Kosovo (Hungarian Koszovo) an autonomous region in southeast Yugoslavia. The assumption to be tested was that both placenames would be used with the inessive (interior) suffixes categorically by Hungarians in Hungary, but that the superessive suffix (showing "home") would be used near-categorically by Hungarians in Romania and Yugoslavia (Voivodina). Minority Hungarians in countries other than Romania and Yugoslavia would show no difference from majority Hungarians in Hungary. In fact, the data show that, contrary to expectation, there is considerable variation within Hungary. And although Koszovo is used, as expected, with the "home" suffix by 61% of the informants in Yugoslavia, the same suffix is used by an even higher percentage of the subjects in Slovenia. Mr. Kontra's team suggests that one factor playing a role in this might be the continuance of the former Yugoslav mentality in the Hungarians of Slovenia, at least from the geographical point of view. The contact varieties of Hungarian show important grammatical differences from Hungarian in Hungary. One of these concerns the variable use of Null subjects (the inclusion or exclusion of the subject of the verb). When informants were asked to insert either megkertem or megkertem ot - "I asked her" - into a test sentence, 54.9% of the respondents in the Ukraine inserted the second phrase as opposed to only 27.4% in Hungary. Although Mr. Kontra and his team concentrated more on the differences between Contact Hungarian and Standard Hungarian, they also discovered a number of similarities. One such similarity is demonstrable in the distribution of what Mr. Kontra calls an ongoing syntactic merger in Hungarian in Hungary. This change means effectively that two possibilities merge to form a third. For instance, the two sentences Valoszinuleg kulfoldre fognak koltozni and Valoszinu, hogy kulfoldre fognak koltozni merge to form the new construction Valszinuleg, hogy kulfoldre fognak koltozni ("Probably they will move abroad."). When asked to choose "the most natural" of the sentences, one in four chose the new construction, and a chi-square test shows homogeneity in the sample. In other words, this syntactic change is spreading across the entire Hungarian-speaking region in the Carpathian Basin Mr. Kontra believes that politicians, educators, and other interested parties now have reliable and up-to-date information about each Hungarian minority. An awareness of Hungarian as a pluricentric language is being developed which elevates the status of contact varieties of Hungarian used by the minorities, an essential process, he believes, if minority languages are to be maintained.

National Identity in Lithuania: Processes During the Period of Changes

Under the conditions of rapid and total change in the social, political, economic and legal environment in Lithuania, a re-orientation process is going on in all groups of society. In this process, not only younger but also middle-aged and old people become adherents to what Ms. Liubiniene calls the new, "post-materialist" values, strongly reinforced by powerful agents of socialisation originating in the West, like the media, advertising agencies and lifestyle-consumption models. As a result, the national identity of Lithuania and its inhabitants is being reconstructed. Ms. Liubiniene set out to examine the details of this evolving identity by conducting a survey of 1218 university staff and students. Her conclusions are set out in a 74 page manuscript, written in Lithuanian and available on disc. Change is most noticeable among the young. Indeed, time and time again, Ms. Liubiniene was to find that the age of 36 marks a natural watershed, with, for instance, the younger group valuing individualism highly and the older, collectivism. Ms. Liubiniene ventures to suggest that traditional values are deeply rooted amongst elderly people, women and people with an education in the humanities. Young people on the other hand, and especially those with a professional orientation towards business are more open to change and ready to adapt to new values. Turning to the evaluation of national symbols, Ms. Liubinie finds that those with an education in the humanities might be considered to be the most traditional, placing greater value on the symbols of nature, ethnic culture and religion. Folk songs and the crucifix are also in their top ten. Respondents with a technical education favour symbols of statehood and nature, and respondents with a business orientation assign greater value to the symbols of nature, history, sports and statehood. Ms. Liubinie concludes that the group of respondents most active and ready to adapt to new things is composed of young males of a business orientation. Generally the national identity of the young is weaker compared to that of the old. In the future, the combination of the evolution of values and the process of inter-generational replacement allows us to predict a weakening of the sense of national identity, or at least its transformation into something radically different to what it is today.

The New Electoral Geography of Central Europe

Zarycki studied the political map of Central Europe today on the basis of results of recent parliamentary and/or presidential elections in the Czech Republic, Hungary, L8ithuania, Poland, Slovakia and Ukraine. He identified first the structure of regional political cleavages, then the spatial patterns emerging in different countries. He also considered the significance and eventual regional differentiation of various possible influences on these patterns, including urbanisation, historical heritage, ethnic factors, population movements, economic differentiation, the effects of the transformation, demographic factors, education and religion. Virtually all the countries showed a cleavage between more traditional, anti (or non-) communist regions and secular areas with higher post-communist support. Except in Ukraine and the Czech Republic, the post-communist party is dominated by the direct heirs of the former communist parties transformed into moderate left parties. The second major class of cleavages was typical of the Visegrad countries, i.e. the conflict between liberal, mostly metropolitan, regions and a different periphery, usually with a strong populist or anti-liberal appeal. This usually depends on the existence of a sizeable well-educated class, usually pro-market and pro-Western, and on the resolution of the conflict between post and anti-Communists. The third type of cleavage is based on ethnic factors and is clearest in Lithuania and Slovakia, where there are large ethnic minorities. Of factors influencing political behaviour, the two major ones identified were the historical heritage and urbanisation.

A Christian Identity for the Liberal State?

It seems to be impossible for the liberal state to embrace a Christian identity, because ‘liberalism’ is exactly a device for separating state and religion. Discussing the implications of a recent decision of the European Court of Human Rights, Lautsi v. Italy (2011), I argue that this is not necessarily so. If paired with a liberal commitment to pluralism, a Christian identity might even be more inclusive of minority religions than a narrowly ‘liberal’ state identity, which has been the dominant response in Western Europe to the challenge of immigrant diversity, especially that of Muslim origins.

Repression, Anpassung, Neuorientierung: Islamische Bildung im sowjetischen und post- sowjetischen Raum

How did Islam survive in the Soviet Union, and how did it develop since 1991? In four case studies and four longitudinal surveys, senior specialists from the area and two German junior scholars discuss the transformations of Islam in Tatarstan, Azerbaijan, Daghestan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. Several chapters analyze the Bolsheviks’ attack on Islam since the 1920s. Altay Göyüşov and Il’nur Minnullin demonstrate how the Soviets first attempted to draw some groups of Muslim scholars and intellectuals to their side, in Azerbaijan and Tatarstan, respectively. In the early 1930s collectivization and outright state terror made a complete end to the Islamic infrastructure, including mosques and pious foundations, Muslim village courts (as shown by Vladimir Bobrovnikov for Dagestan), Islamic educational institutions (as documented by Aširbek Muminov for Uzbekistan), as well as the Muslim press (analyzed by Dilyara Usmanova for Tatarstan); also Sufi brotherhoods became a main target of violent repression (Šamil‘ Šixaliev, for Dagestan). Repression was followed by the establishment of a modus vivendi between state and religion in the post-war period (Muminov, Bobrovnikov, Šixaliev), and by the instrumentalization of religion for patriotic purposes in the post-Soviet Caucasus and Central Asia (Christine Hunner-Kreisel, Manja Stephan, both based on fieldwork). By the early 2000s Islam was almost everywhere back under full state control; the leading role of the state for defining „good“ and „bad“ Islam is largely taken for granted. While similar forms of state pressure in all regions thus allow us to draw an overall picture of how Islamic traditions were repressed and reanimated, the „archival revolution“ of the early 1990s provides fascinating insights into the specific developments in the individual regions, and into the adaptation strategies of the Muslim scholars and intellectuals on the spot. Still, the Soviet heritage is still very palpable; also the attempts to leapfrog the Soviet period and to link up again with the individual local Islamic traditions from before 1917, and even the negation of the Soviet experience in the form of embracing Islamic trends from abroad, are often still couched in largely Soviet mental frameworks.

Genetic Control of Plant Development by Overriding a Geometric Division Rule

Formative cell divisions are critical for multicellular patterning. In the early plant embryo, such divisions follow from orienting the division plane. A major unanswered question is how division plane orientation is genetically controlled, and in particular whether this relates to cell geometry. We have generated a complete 4D map of early Arabidopsis embryogenesis and used computational analysis to demonstrate that several divisions follow a rule that uses the smallest wall area going through the center of the cell. In other cases, however, cell division clearly deviates from this rule, which invariably leads to asymmetric cell division. By analyzing mutant embryos and through targeted genetic perturbation, we show that response to the hormone auxin triggers a deviation from the ``shortest wall'' rule. Our work demonstrates that a simple default rule couples division orientation to cell geometry in the embryo and that genetic regulation can create patterns by overriding the default rule.

Das Paradigma des kritischen Realismus

Der Kritische Realismus („Critical Realism“) ist seit Ian G. Barbours grundlegenden Issues in Science and Religion (1966) erkenntnistheoretisches Paradigma zentraler Ansätze im angelsächsischen Gespräch zwischen Theologie und Naturwissenschaften geworden; neben Barbour selbst sind hier insbesondere Arthur Peacocke und John Polkinghorne zu nennen.

Less than Nihilism

Chapter 2 by Luca Di Blasi (...) gives us an insight into the history of nihilism, specifically by exposing a continuity (or else a cycle or repetition) between the earliest debates on the subject in the turn of the nineteenth century and latest ones in the turn of the twenty-first Di Blasi emphasizes the fact that the struggle between philosophy and religion, reason and faith, was a pertinent motif in Jacobi’s critique of Fichte’s philosophy and in Hegel’s response to this critique. A similar problematic, and similar dynamic, recurs two centuries later, where debates around the concept of nihilism among thinkers like Vattimo, Derrida, Habermas, and Žižek again revolve around the relation between religion, science, secularism, and “post-secularism.” Beginning with Hegel, Di Blasi’s chapter ends with a focus on Žižek as a “neo-Hegelian” showing how, in attacking his contemporaries, Žižek mirrors and revives Hegel’s approach in his critique of Jacobi and Fichte. Suggestively, Žižek informs us that now “the circle is closed” and that “to be a Hegelian today does not mean to assume the superfluous burden of some metaphysical past, but to regain the ability to begin from the beginning...”

Ritualdiskurs, Ritualkritik und religiöse Praxis: Das Beispiel von Vipassanā nach S. N. Goenka im 'Westen'

By analysing primary sources, I show in this paper how the Vipassanā meditation movement publicly objects to being categorized as a religious movement that teaches a certain form of ritual. I argue that the application of the meta-language terms “ritual” or “religion” to the practices taught by this movement, even though it is doubtlessly possible, does not help us solve the problems in explaining this fact; nor does it help in analysing the movement and its history. I argue that it is more appropriate to understand the polemic differentiation by Vipassanā as a strategy in a “modern” public discourse on religion and ritual. It seems that the reason for applying this strategy lies in the wish to avoid being identified with negative connotations of the terms “ritual” and “religion,” such as inefficacy, irrationality and exaggerated rigidity. Instead, the protagonists stress rationality, efficacy and adaptation to the necessities of modern Western society. On the other hand, the movement also draws a line between itself and a so-called modern “esotericism” in which “rituals” are regarded as highly positive in their effects on humans.