Resistance to reform: Reconsidering the role of individual-specific uncertainty

Individual-specific uncertainty may increase the chances of reform beingenacted and sustained. Reform may be more likely to be enacted because amajority of agents might end up losing little from reform and a minoritygaining a lot. Under certainty, reform would therefore be rejected, butit may be enacted with uncertainty because those who end up losing believethat they might be among the winners. Reform may be more likely to besustained because, in a realistic setting, reform will increase theincentives of agents to move into those economic activities that benefit.Agents who respond to these incentives will vote to sustain reform infuture elections, even if they would have rejected reform under certainty.These points are made using the trade-model of Fernandez and Rodrik (AER,1991).

Mixed equilibrium in a Downsian model with a favored candidate

This paper examines competition in the standard one-dimensional Downsian model of two-candidate elections, but where one candidate (A) enjoys an advantage over the other candidate (D). Voters' preferences are Euclidean, but any voter will vote for candidate A over candidate D unless D is closer to her ideal point by some fixed distance \delta. The location of the median voter's ideal point is uncertain, and its distribution is commonly known by both candidates. The candidates simultaneously choose locations to maximize the probability of victory. Pure strategy equilibria often fails to exist in this model, except under special conditions about \delta and the distribution of the median ideal point. We solve for the essentially unique symmetric mixed equilibrium, show that candidate A adopts more moderate policies than candidate D, and obtain some comparative statics results about the probability of victory and the expected distance between the two candidates' policies.

Electoral competition under the threat of political unrest

We study elections in which one party (the strong party) controls a source of political unrest; e.g., this party could instigate riots if it lost the election. We show that the strong party is more likely to win the election when there is less information about its ability to cause unrest. This is because when theweak party is better informed, it can more reliably prevent political unrest by implementing a ``centrist'' policy. When there is uncertainty over the credibility of the threat, ``posturing'' by the strong party leads to platform divergence.

Voto dual y abstención diferencial. Un estudio sobre el comportamiento electoral en Cataluña

En este trabajo se presentan los resultados de un estudio empírico sobre los motivos del cambio sistemático de resultados electorales que se da en Cataluña según el ámbito de la convocatoria electoral de que se trate. La hipótesis, contrastada positivamente con datos del período 1982-1993, es que la victoria del partido nacionalista de centro derecha en las elecciones autonómicas en un territorio donde vencen siempre los socialistas en las elecciones legislativas se debe a la combinación de los fenómenos del voto dual y del abstencionismo diferencial. La aproximación metodológica de la elección racional permite construir grupos de electores que tienen distintas percepciones del espacio en el que se dirime la competición política, hecho que les induce a un comportamiento electoral diferenciado. Combinando estos resultados con los obtenidos del análisis con datos socioestructurales agregados, se establece un cierto perfil de los votantes duales y de los abstencionistas diferenciales. Finalmente, se realiza una interpretación de los resultados de las elecciones catalanas de 1995 y 1999 a la luz de los resultados de este estudio.This article presents the results of an empirical study about the reasons of the systematic change in the electoral results in Catalonia according to the type of elections. The hypothesis, positively tested with data from the period 1982-1993, is that the victory of the nationalist centre-right party in the autonomous elections in a region where always wins the socialist party in general elections, is due to the combination of the dual vote and differential abstention phenomena. The rational choice methodological approach allow to construct groups of electors with different perceptions about the space in which the political race takes place, fact that induces them different electoral behaviour. In combining these results with those obtained from the analysis with aggregated social and structural data, it is defined a certain the profile of the dual voters and the differential non-voters. Finally, it is given an interpretation of the Catalan election results in 1995 and 1999 using as a clue the results of this study.

Iowa Citizen Civic Handbook, 2009

Secretary of State, Michael Mauro is pleased to present the Iowa Citizen Civic Handbook. As the Commissioner of Elections and State registrar of Voters, it's my his goal to establish educational programs to improve and increase voter awareness and participation. This handbook will assist all Iowans of diverse cultures in becoming more knowledgeable about the benefits and responsibilities of citizenship ans serve as a useful tool for all Iowans.

Iowa Secretary of State 2008 Report, 2008

This report highlights the landmark election legislation adopted in the past two years and statistical information on absentee ballots, provisional ballots, and Election Day Registration. In addition, the report outlines the responsibilities of our Business Services Division which handles hundreds of thousands of corporate filings annually. The Secretary of State’s proposals to the 83rd General Assembly for 2009 legislation are mostly technical in nature and are also set forth in this report. The presidential election on November 4, 2008, brought more voters to the polls in Iowa than ever before. Despite fears of election day problems due to new voting equipment, Election Day Registration, and challenged voter procedures, the election went very smoothly in Iowa. The Elections and Voter Registration Division of my office worked diligently to provide training materials for election administrators and fielded thousands of calls and emails from voters. The result was an efficiently-run election statewide. Though the Secretary of State’s Office, like all other state agencies, is operating under strict budgetary constraints, I assure you that my staff and I will continue to provide excellent service and develop innovative solutions to get through these rough economic times.

Recherche de la noblesse de Normandie.

Contient : « Registre des personnes qui se sont trouvées nobles ès neuf elections de la généralité de Caen..., ès années 1598 et 1599 »

Recherche de la noblesse de Normandie.

Contient : « Registre des personnes qui se sont trouvées nobles ès neuf elections de la généralité de Caen..., ès années 1598 et 1599 »

Election Day Registration Guide, 2008

As of January 1, 2008, Iowa law allows you to register to vote on Election Day at the polling place for the precinct you currently live in. After showing proper identification you may register and vote at the precinct the same day. Please open file for more information.

How to Vote in Iowa, 2008

Take advantage of one of the following methods to cast your vote! Please open file for more information.

Politics in Iowa: How to Get Involved, 2008

Take advantage of one of the following information on how to be involved in politics in Iowa. Please open file for more information.

"Aquí... se habla de política". La participación de los afroporteños en las elecciones presidenciales de 1874

Los estudios sobre la población afroporteña en el siglo XIX continúan ofreciendo territorios inexplorados debido a la escasa presencia de fuentes documentales disponibles para el análisis. Aquí analizaremos su intervención en las elecciones, momento que, veremos, era de especial importancia para este colectivo. Estudiaremos también las formas de reclutamiento electoral e identificaciones diversas que se desprenden de periódicos afroporteños en las elecciones presidenciales de 1874.

Naisten poliittinen rekrytoituminen vuoden 1995 eduskuntavaaleissa ja niiden ehdokasasettelussa

Abstract: Political recruitment of Finnish women in the 1995 parliamentary elections and candidate selection

Mirror me : the effect of the voting advice application smartvote on voting preferences and behavior of Swiss voters

Voting Advice Applications (VAAs) have become a central component of election campaigns worldwide. Through matching political preferences of voters to parties and candidates, the web application grants voters a look into their political mirror and reveals the most suitable political choices to them in terms of policy congruence. Both the dense and concise information on the electoral offer and the comparative nature of the application make VAAs an unprecedented information source for electoral decision making. In times where electoral choices are found to be highly individualized and driven by political issue positions, an ever increasing number of voters turn to VAAs before casting their ballots. With VAAs in high demand, the question of their effects on voters has become a pressing research topic. In various countries, survey research has been used to proclaim an impact of VAAs on electoral behavior, yet practically all studies fail to provide the scientific evidence that would allow for making such claims. In this thesis, I set out to systematically establish the causal link between VAA use and electoral behavior, using various data sources and appropriate statistical techniques in doing so. The focus lies on the Swiss VAA smartvote, introduced in the forefront of the 2003 Swiss federal elections and meanwhile an integral part of the national election campaign, smartvote has produced over a million voting recommendations in the last Swiss federal elections to an active electorate of two million, potentially guiding a vast amount of voters in their choices on the ballot. In order to determine the effect of the VAA on electoral behavior, I analyze both voting preferences and choice among Swiss voters during two consecutive election periods. First, I introduce statistical techniques to adequately examine VAA effects in observational studies and use them to demonstrate that voters who used smartvote prior to the 2007 Swiss federal elections were significantly more likely to swing vote in the elections than non- users. Second, I analyze preference voting during the same election and show that the smartvote voting recommendation inclines politically knowledgeable voters to modify their ballots and cast candidate specific preference votes. Third, to further tackle the indication that smartvote use affects the preference structure of voters, I employ an experimental research design to demonstrate that voters who use the application tend to strengthen their vote propensities for their most preferred party and adapt their overall party preferences in a way that they consider more than one party as eligible vote options after engaging with the application. Finally, vote choice is examined for the 2011 Swiss federal election, showing once more that the VAA initiated a change of party choice among voters. In sum, this thesis presents empirical evidence for the transformative effect of the Swiss VAA smartvote on the electoral behavior.

Lobbying, political competition, and local land supply: recent evidence from Spain

We analyze whether local land supply is influenced by the degree of political competition, and interpret the findings as being indicative of the influence wielded by land development lobbies. We use a new database including both political and land supply data for more than 2,000 Spanish municipalities for the period 2003-2007. In Spain, land use policies are largely a local responsibility with municipalities having periodically to pass compre- hensive land use plans. The main policy variable in these plans, and the one analyzed here, is the amount of land classified for potential development. We measure local political competition as the margin of victory of the incumbent government. We instrument this variable using the number of votes obtained by parties represented in local government when standing at the first national legislative elections following the re-establishment of democracy, and the number of votes they actually obtained regionally at the national legislative elections. The results indicate that stiffer political competition does indeed reduce the amount of new land designated for development. This effect is found to be most marked in suburbs, in towns with a high percent of commuters and homeowners, and in municipalities governed by the left.