The asymmetric behavior of the U.S public debt

Our main goal in this paper was to measure how e¢ cient is risk sharing between countries. In order to do so, we have used a international risk sharIn this paper we re-analyze the question of the U.S. public debt sustainability by using a quantile autoregression model. This modeling allows for testing whether the behavior of U.S. public debt is asymmetric or not. Our results provide evidence of a band of sustainability. Outside this band, the U.S. public debt is unsustainable. We also nd scal policy to be adequate in the sense that occasional episodes in which the public debt moves out of the band do not pose a threat to long run sustainability.

Investment in human capital in a macrodynamic framework: redistributive taxation, public debt and welfare

None

Public debt indexation and denomination, the case of Brazil: a comment

In this work I analyze the model proposed by Goldfajn (2000) to study the choice of the denomination of the public debt. The main purpose of the analysis is pointing out possible reasons why new empirical evidence provided by Bevilaqua, Garcia and Nechio (2004), regarding a more recent time period, Önds a lower empirical support to the model. I also provide a measure of the overestimation of the welfare gains of hedging the debt led by the simpliÖed time frame of the model. Assuming a time-preference parameter of 0.9, for instance, welfare gains associated with a hedge to the debt that reduces to a half a once-for-all 20%-of-GDP shock to government spending run around 1.43% of GDP under the no-tax-smoothing structure of the model. Under a Ramsey allocation, though, welfare gains amount to just around 0.05% of GDP.

Dinâmica não-linear e sustentabilidade da dívida pública brasileira

This paper contributes to the debate on whether the Brazilian public debt is sustainable or not in the long run by considering threshold effects on the Brazilian Budget Deficit. Using data from 1947 to 1999 and a threshold autoregressive model, we find evidence of delays in fiscal stabilization. As suggested in Alesina (1991), delayed stabilizations reflect the existence of political constraints blocking deficit cuts, which are relaxed only when the budget deficit reaches a sufficiently high level, deemed to be unsustainable. In particular, our results suggest that, in the absence of seignorage, only when the increase in the budget deficit reaches 1.74% of the GDP will fiscal authorities intervene to reduce the deficit. If seignorage is allowed, the threshold increases to 2.2%, suggesting that seignorage makes government more tolerant to fiscal imbalances.

The contagion effect of public debt on monetary policy: the brazilian experience

This paper attempts to explain why the Brazilian inter-bank interest rate is so high compared with rates practiced by other emerging economies. The interplay between the markets for bank reserves and government securities feeds into the inter-bank rate the risk premium of the Brazilian public debt.

Public debt sustainability and endogenous seignorage in Brazil: time-series evidence from 1947-92

Using national accounts data for the revenue-GDP and expenditure GDP ratios from 1947 to 1992, we examine two central issues in public finance. First, was the path of public debt sustainable during this period? Second, if debt is sustainable, how has the government historically balanced the budget after hocks to either revenues or expenditures? The results show that (i) public deficit is stationary (bounded asymptotic variance), with the budget in Brazil being balanced almost entirely through changes in taxes, regardless of the cause of the initial imbalance. Expenditures are weakly exogenous, but tax revenues are not;(ii) a rational Brazilian consumer can have a behavior consistent with Ricardian Equivalence (iii) seignorage revenues are critical to restore intertemporal budget equilibrium, since, when we exclude them from total revenues, debt is not sustainable in econometric tests.

The LDC debt problem: a game-theoretical analisys

We review the LDC debt crisis since 1982, by means of game theory. New insights are obtained into the reasons behind the formation of the creditors' carte1 and the nature of the difficu1ties invo1ved in the formation of the debtors' carte1. The standard view that Rubinstein's barganing mode1s are appropriate for dea1ing with debt re1ief is shown to be faulty, un1ess the debtor buys out the debt.