Effects of employment protection and product market regulations on the Italian labor market

Labor market regulations have often being blamed for high and persistentunemployment in Europe, but evidence on their impact remains mixed. Morerecently, attention has turned to the impact of product market regulationson employment growth. This paper analyzes how labor and product marketregulations interact to affect turnover and employment. We present a matchingmodel which illustrates how barriers to entry in the product market mitigatethe impact of labor market deregulation. We, then, use the Italian SocialSecurity employer-employee panel to study the interaction between barriersto entry and dismissal costs. We exploit the fact that costs for unjustdismissals in Italy increased for firms below 15 employees relative to biggerfirms after 1990. We find that the increase in dismissal costs after 1990decreased accessions and separations in small relative to big firms,especially for women. Moreover, consistent with our model, we find evidencethat the increase in dismissal costs had smaller effects on turnover for womenin sectors faced with strict product market regulations.

Location models for ceding market share and shrinking services

New location models are presented here for exploring the reduction of facilities in aregion. The first of these models considers firms ceding market share to competitorsunder situations of financial exigency. The goal of this model is to cede the leastmarket share, i.e., retain as much of the customer base as possible while sheddingcostly outlets. The second model considers a firm essentially without competition thatmust shrink it services for economic reasons. This firm is assumed to close outlets sothat the degradation of service is limited. An example is offered within a competitiveenvironment to demonstrate the usefulness of this modeling approach.

The impact of firing costs on turnover and unemployment: Evidence from the Colombian labour market reform

Reductions in firing costs are often advocated as a way of increasingthe dynamism of labour markets in both developed and less developed countries. Evidence from Europe and the U.S. on the impact of firing costs has, however, been mixed. Moreover, legislative changes both in Europe and the U.S. have been limited. This paper, instead, examines the impact of the Colombian Labour Market Reform of 1990, which substantially reduced dismissal costs. I estimate the incidence of a reduction in firing costs on worker turnover by exploiting the temporal change in the Colombian labour legislation as well as the variability in coverage between formal and informal sector workers. Using a grouping estimator to control for common aggregate shocks and selection, I find that the exit hazard rates into and out of unemployment increased after the reform by over 1% for formal workers (covered by the legislation) relative to informal workers (uncovered). The increase of the hazards implies a net decrease in unemployment of a third of a percentage point, which accounts for about one quarter of the fall in unemployment during the period of study.

Trade, extent of the market and economic growth 1960-1996

We find that trade and domestic market size are robust determinants of economic growth overthe 1960-1996 period when trade openness is measured as the US dollar value of imports andexports relative to GDP in PPP US$ ('real openness'). When trade openness is measured asthe US dollar value of imports and exports relative to GDP in exchange rate US$ ('nominalopenness') however, trade and the size of domestic markets are often non-robust determinantsof growth. We argue that real openness is the more appropriate measure of trade and that ourempirical results should be seen as evidence in favor of the extent-of-the-market hypothesis.

The provision on non-audit services by auditors: Let the market evolve and decide

The provision of non-audit services by auditors to their auditclients reduces total costs, increases technical competence and motivates more intense competition. Furthermore, theseservices do not necessarily damage auditor independence nor the quality of non-audit services. This assessment leads to recommending that legislative policy should aim at facilitating the development and use of the safeguardsprovided by the free action of market forces. Regulation should thus aim to enable the parties-audit firms, self-regulatory bodies and audit clients-to discover through competitive market interaction both the most efficient mix of services and the corresponding quality safeguards, adjusting for the costs and benefits of each possibility. Particular emphasis is placed on the role played by fee income diversification and the enhancement, through disclosurerules, of market incentives to diversify.

A model of market-making

The two essential features of a decentralized economy taken intoaccount are, first, that individual agents need some informationabout other agents in order to meet potential trading partners,which requires some communication or interaction between theseagents, and second, that in general agents will face tradinguncertainty. We consider trade in a homogeneous commodity. Firmsdecide upon their effective supplies, and may create their ownmarkets by sending information signals communicating theirwillingness to sell. Meeting of potential trading partners isarranged in the form of shopping by consumers. The questions to beconsidered are: How do firms compete in such markets? And what arethe properties of an equilibrium? We establish existenceconditions for a symmetric Nash equilibrium in the firms'strategies, and analyze its characteristics. The developedframework appears to lend itself well to study many typicalphenomena of decentralized economies, such as the emergence ofcentral markets, the role of middlemen, and price-making.

Market structure and hospital efficiency: Evaluating potential effects of deregulation in a national health service

In this article we examine the potential effect of market structureon hospital technical efficiency as a measure of performance controlled byownership and regulation. This study is relevant to provide an evaluationof the potential effects of recommended and initiated deregulation policiesin order to promote market reforms in the context of a European NationalHealth Service. Our goal was reached through three main empirical stages.Firstly, using patient origin data from hospitals in the region of Cataloniain 1990, we estimated geographic hospital markets through the Elzinga--Hogartyapproach, based on patient flows. Then we measured the market level ofconcentration using the Herfindahl--Hirschman index. Secondly, technicaland scale efficiency scores for each hospital was obtained specifying aData Envelopment Analysis. According to the data nearly two--thirds of thehospitals operate under the production frontier with an average efficiencyscore of 0.841. Finally, the determinants of the efficiency scores wereinvestigated using a censored regression model. Special attention waspaid to test the hypothesis that there is an efficiency improvement in morecompetitive markets. The results suggest that the number of competitors inthe market contributes positively to technical efficiency and there is someevidence that the differences in efficiency scores are attributed toseveral environmental factors such as ownership, market structure andregulation effects.

Income taxation in a frictional labor market

A new model of wage dispersion is used to examine welfare aspects of income taxation. The model retains the dynamics of wage posting modelswhile exogenizing search e¤ort, therefore allowing more insight into policy issues. The results highlight effects that standard analyses do not take into account. The optimal income tax should depend on an incidenceeffect between workers and firms. This incidence effect arises from firmstrying to lower wages as much as possible. An employment tax proves, incertain cases, to be the best method to encourage labor force participation.

Ethical differentiation and market behavior: An experimental approach

Does ethical differentiation of products affect market behavior? We examined this issue in triopolistic experimental markets where producers set prices. One producer s costs were higher than the others. In two treatments, the additional costs were attributed tocompliance with ethical guidelines. In the third, no justification was provided. Manyparticipants playing the role of consumers reduced their experimental gains by purchasing the ethically differentiated product at a higher price whether or not they knew the amount of extra cost. Individual differences were important (students of business/economics paid smaller premia than others). Finally, we speculate about the observed demand function for ethics and emphasize the use of experimental methodology to complement empirical studies designed to assess the potential market for ethically differentiated products.

The pricing of academic journals: A two-sided market perspective

More and more academic journals adopt an open-access policy, by which articlesare accessible free of charge, while publication costs are recovered through authorfees. We study the consequences of this open access policy on a journal s qualitystandard. If the journal s objective was to maximize social welfare, open accesswould be optimal as long as the positive externalities generated by its diffusionexceed the marginal cost of distribution. However, we show that if an open accessjournal has a different objective (such as maximizing readers payoffs, the impactof the journal or its profit), it tends to choose a quality standard below the sociallyefficient level.

Reputation and honesty in a market for information

Previous works on asymmetric information in asset markets tendto focus on the potential gains in the asset market itself. We focus on the market for information and conduct an experimental study to explore, in a game of finite but uncertain duration, whether reputation can be an effective constraint on deliberate misinformation. At the beginning of each period, an uninformed potential asset buyer can purchase information, at a fixed price and from a fully-informed source, about the value of the asset in that period. The informational insiders cannot purchase the asset and are given short-term incentives to provide false information when the asset value is low. Our model predicts that, in accordance with the Folk Theorem, Pareto-superior outcomes featuring truthful revelation should be sustainable. However, this depends critically on beliefs about rationality and behavior. We find that, overall, sellers are truthful 89% of the time. More significantly, the observed frequency of truthfulness is 81% when the asset value is low. Our result is consistent with both mixed-strategy and trigger strategy interpretations and provides evidence that most subjects correctly anticipate rational behavior. We discuss applications to financial markets, media regulation, and the stability of cartels.

Protective or counter-productive? Labor market institutions and the effect of immigration on EU natives

We estimate the effect of immigrant flows on native employment in WesternEurope, and then ask whether the employment consequences of immigrationvary with institutions that affect labor market flexibility. Reducedflexibility may protect natives from immigrant competition in the nearterm, but our theoretical framework suggests that reduced flexibility islikely to increase the negative impact of immigration on equilibriumemployment. In models without interactions, OLS estimates for a panel ofEuropean countries in the 1980s and 1990s show small, mostly negativeimmigration effects. To reduce bias from the possible endogeneity ofimmigration flows, we use the fact that many immigrants arriving after1991 were refugees from the Balkan wars. An IV strategy based onvariation in the number of immigrants from former Yugoslavia generateslarger though mostly insignificant negative estimates. We then estimatemodels allowing interactions between the employment response toimmigration and institutional characteristics including business entrycosts. These results, limited to the sample of native men, generallysuggest that reduced flexibility increases the negative impact ofimmigration. Many of the estimated interaction terms are significant,and imply a significant negative effect on employment in countrieswith restrictive institutions.

Surviving in a competitive spatial market: The threshold capture model

Most facility location decision models ignore the fact that for a facility to survive it needs a minimum demand level to cover costs. In this paper we present a decision model for a firm thatwishes to enter a spatial market where there are several competitors already located. This market is such that for each outlet there is a demand threshold level that has to be achievedin order to survive. The firm wishes to know where to locate itsoutlets so as to maximize its market share taking into account the threshold level. It may happen that due to this new entrance, some competitors will not be able to meet the threshold and therefore will disappear. A formulation is presented together with a heuristic solution method and computational experience.

International capital flows and credit market imperfections: A tale of two frictions

The financial crisis of 2007-08 has underscored the importance of adverse selection in financialmarkets. This friction has been mostly neglected by macroeconomic models of financialimperfections, however, which have focused almost exclusively on the effects of limited pledgeability.In this paper, we fill this gap by developing a standard growth model with adverseselection. Our main results are that, by fostering unproductive investment, adverse selection:(i) leads to an increase in the economy s equilibrium interest rate, and; (ii) it generates a negativewedge between the marginal return to investment and the equilibrium interest rate. Underfinancial integration, we show how this translates into excessive capital inflows and endogenouscycles. We also extend our model to the more general case in which adverse selection and limitedpledgeability coexist. We conclude that both frictions complement one another and show thatlimited pledgeability exacerbates the effects of adverse selection.

Spatial market expansion through mergers

In this paper we present a model that studies firm mergers in a spatial setting. A new model is formulated that addresses the issue of finding the number of branches that have to be eliminated by a firm after merging with another one, in order to maximize profits. The model is then applied to an example of bank mergers in the city of Barcelona. Finally, a variant of the formulation that introduces competition is presented together with some conclusions.