Property in body parts and products of the human body

An intriguing question, which until recently had not been directly explored by the courts, is the extent to which English law recognises body parts and products of the human body as property capable of ownership. Although the common law currently recognises no general property in a dead body (and only limited possessory rights in respect of it), this apparent “no-property rule” provides no justification, it is submitted, for denying proprietary status to parts or products of a living human body. The recent decision of the Court of Appeal in Yearworth v. North Bristol NHS Trust ([2009] EWCA Civ 37) lends strong support to the view that genetic material (as the product of a living human body) is capable of ownership, at least in the context of a claim in the tort of negligence and bailment. This article examines the various issues by reference to both English and Commonwealth authority.

Forfeiture relief

Looks at the common law forfeiture rule, preventing a person who has unlawfully killed another from profiting from the death, and the granting of relief under the Forfeiture Act 1982. Reviews case law on the forfeiture rule, its modification under s.2 in the interests of justice and the provision under s.3 that the rule does not preclude an application under the Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975. Reviews the Chancery Division ruling in Land v Land (Deceased), highlighting the ability for a claimant to choose whether to seek relief from forfeiture under s.2 of the 1982 Act or pursue a claim for reasonable financial provision from a deceased's estate under s.2 of the 1975 Act.

Oral agreements: estoppel, constructive trusts and restitution

Analyses the House of Lords judgment in Cobbe v Yeoman's Row Management Ltd in relation to claims by the prospective purchaser under an oral agreement for sale of a block of flats based on proprietary estoppel, a constructive trust and common law restitution brought against the owner of the property who sought to resile from the agreement after the purchaser had, at considerable expense, obtained planning permission to redevelop the property in reliance on assurances given by the owner that if permission was granted the sale would be honoured.

Dazed and Confused: Accidental Mixtures of Goods and the Theory of Acquisition of Title

This paper explores the law of accidental mixtures of goods. It traces the development of the English rules on mixture from the seminal nineteenth century case of Spence v Union Marine Insurance Co to the present day, and compares their responses to those given by the Roman law, which always has been claimed as an influence on our jurisprudence in this area. It is argued that the different answers given by English and Roman law to essentially the same problems of title result from the differing bases of these legal systems. Roman a priori theory is contrasted with the more practical reasoning of the common law, and while both sets of rules are judged to be coherent on their own terms, it is suggested that the difference between them is reflective of a more general philosophical disagreement about the proper functioning of a legal system, and the relative importance of theoretical and pragmatic considerations.

The Effect of Human RIghts on Criminal Evidentiary Processes: Convergence, Divergence or Realignment?

This article examines the contribution which the European Court of Human Rights has made to the development of common evidentiary processes across the common law and civil law systems of criminal procedure in Europe. It is argued that the continuing use of terms such as 'adversarial' and 'inquisitorial' to describe models of criminal proof and procedure has obscured the genuinely transformative nature of the Court's jurisprudence. It is shown that over a number of years the Court has been steadily developing a new model of proof that is better characterised as 'participatory' than as 'adversarial' or 'inquisitorial'. Instead of leading towards a convergence of existing 'adversarial' and 'inquisitorial' models of proof, this is more likely to lead towards a realignment of existing processes of proof which nonetheless allows plenty of scope for diverse application in different institutional and cultural settings.

Murder and the Ruthless Risk-Taker

The main focus of this article is the ways in which the problem of reckless murder is dealt with in the common law world. In a case of reckless murder it may not be possible to prove that the accused set out to kill or do serious injury; but the killing is nevertheless thought to merit classification as murder rather than manslaughter. This may be because the case is thought to be analytically indistinguishable from murder, or because the level of culpability demonstrated by the conduct in question is thought to deserve that stigma on other grounds. This article seeks, by reference to various common law systems, to analyse the different techniques used to classify the reckless killer as a murderer, and to compare their advantages and disadvantages in the light of the different rationales used to justify such a classification. The article concludes by arguing that the question whether reckless killers should be classified as murderers—and if so how—can only be decided by reference to broader conceptions of the nature of criminal culpability.

'Leaving Nothing to Chance'?: Joint Tenancies, The 'Right' of Survivorship and Unilateral Severance

The joint tenancy with its inherent right of survivorship is the most prevalent form of co-ownership in the common law world today. Most couples will be joint tenants of a family home, while relations (such as siblings) who purchase property together may opt for this arrangement. Inter vivos acquisitions aside, the huge intergenerational transfer of wealth within families on death can result in a joint tenancy, and it may also be a convenient estate planning device. The fact that property automatically vests in the surviving joint tenants on death is the reason why many people choose this form of co-ownership. However, there is one serious disadvantage. A joint tenancy is an inflexible form of landholding where relationships sour or family circumstances change over time, and co-owners want their respective `shares' of the property to pass to someone else on death. Where consensual severance is not possible, one joint tenant can sever unilaterally. The latter mechanism is vital in terms of giving effect to the wishes of the severing joint tenant, especially in situations of discord or a breakdown in relations with their fellow co-owners. However, unilateral severance also has serious implications for the non-severing joint tenant(s) who expected to inherit property through survivorship, and can impact significantly on ownership of the home and other family property. This article looks at unilateral severance as a means of subverting the right of survivorship. The focus is on personal and inter-family relationships, and the various legal issues and policy considerations associated with unilateral severance across the common law jurisdictions of Britain, Ireland, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand. It assesses the various methods of effecting unilateral severance and proposes specific measures, as well as considering novel arguments for preventing unilateral severance based on contractual agreements to the contrary and proprietary estoppel.

New Technology and Researchers’ Access to Court and Tribunal Information: the need for European analysis

We discuss the limitations and rights which may affect the researcher’s access to and use of digital, court and administrative tribunal based information. We suggest that there is a need for a European-wide investigation of the legal framework which affects the researcher who might wish to utilise this form of information. A European-wide context is required because much of the relevant law is European rather than national, but much of the constraints are cultural. It is our thesis that research improves understanding and then improves practice as that understanding becomes part of public debate. If it is difficult to undertake research, then public debate about the court system – its effectiveness, its biases, its strengths – becomes constrained. Access to court records is currently determined on a discretionary basis or on the basis of interpretation of rules of the court where these are challenged in legal proceedings. Anecdotal evidence would suggest that there are significant variations in the extent to which court documents such as pleadings, transcripts, affidavits etc are made generally accessible under court rules or as a result of litigation in different jurisdictions or, indeed, in different courts in the same jurisdiction. Such a lack of clarity can only encourage a chilling of what might otherwise be valuable research. Courts are not, of course, democratic bodies. However, they are part of a democratic system and should, we suggest – both for the public benefit and for their proper operation – be accessible and criticisable by the independent researcher. The extent to which the independent researcher is enabled access is the subject of this article. The rights of access for researchers and the public have been examined in other common law countries but not, to date, in the UK or Europe.