Mind-reading difficulties in the siblings of people with Asperger's syndrome: evidence for a genetic influence in the abnormal development of a specific cognitive domain

Background: Previous research suggests that the phenotype associated with Asperger's syndrome (AS) includes difficulties in understanding the mental states of others, leading to difficulties in social communication and social relationships. It has also been suggested that the first-degree relatives of those with AS can demonstrate similar difficulties, albeit to a lesser extent. This study examined 'theory of mind' (ToM) abilities in the siblings of children with AS relative to a matched control group. Method: 2 7 children who had a sibling with AS were administered the children's version of the 'Eyes Test'(Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Stone, & Rutherford, 1999). The control group consisted of 27 children matched for age, sex, and a measure of verbal comprehension, and who did not have a family history of AS/autism. Results: A significant difference was found between the groups on the Eyes Test, the 'siblings' group showing a poorer performance on this measure of social cognition. The difference was more pronounced among female siblings. Discussion: These results are discussed in terms of the familial distribution of a neuro-cognitive profile associated with AS, which confers varying degrees of social handicap amongst first-degree relatives. The implication of this finding with regard to the autism/AS phenotype is explored, with some discussion of why this neuro-cognitive profile (in combination with corresponding strengths) may have an evolutionary imperative.

The structuring body : a critical study in the description & explanation of perceptual experience

The aims of the dissertation are to find the right description of the structure of perceptual experience and to explore the ways in which the structure of the body might serve to explain it. In the first two parts, I articulate and defend the claim that perceptual experience seems direct and the claim that its objects seem real. I defend these claims as integral parts of a coherent metaphysically neutral conception of perceptual experience. Sense-datum theorists, certain influential perceptual psychologists, and early modern philosophers (most notably Berkeley) all disputed the claim that perceptual experience seems direct. In Part I, I argue that the grounds on which they did so were poor. The aim is then, in Part II, to give a proper appreciation of the distinctive intentionality of perceptual experience whilst remaining metaphysically neutral. I do so by drawing on the early work of Edmund Husserl, providing a characterisation of the perceptual experience of objects as real, qua mind-independent particulars. In Part III, I explore two possible explanations of the structure characterising the intentionality of perceptual experience, both of which accord a distinctive explanatory role to the body. On one account, perceptual experience is structured by an implicit pre-reflective consciousness of oneself as a body engaged in perceptual activity. An alternative account makes no appeal to the metaphysically laden concept of a bodily self. It seeks to explain the structure of perceptual experience by appeal to anticipation of the structural constraints of the body. I develop this alternative by highlighting the conceptual and empirical basis for the idea that a first-order structural affordance relation holds between a bodily agent and certain properties of its body. I then close with a discussion of the shared background assumptions that ought to inform disputes over whether the body itself (in addition to its representation) ought to serve as an explanans in such an account.

Conceptual and normative issues of memory enhancement

Our growing understanding of human mind and cognition and the development of neurotechnology has triggered debate around cognitive enhancement in neuroethics. The dissertation examines the normative issues of memory enhancement, and focuses on two issues: (1) the distinction between memory treatment and enhancement; and (2) how the issue of authenticity concerns memory interventions, including memory treatments and enhancements. rnThe first part consists of a conceptual analysis of the concepts required for normative considerations. First, the representational nature and the function of memory are discussed. Memory is regarded as a special form of self-representation resulting from a constructive processes. Next, the concepts of selfhood, personhood, and identity are examined and a conceptual tool—the autobiographical self-model (ASM)—is introduced. An ASM is a collection of mental representations of the system’s relations with its past and potential future states. Third, the debate between objectivist and constructivist views of health are considered. I argue for a phenomenological account of health, which is based on the primacy of illness and negative utilitarianism.rnThe second part presents a synthesis of the relevant normative issues based on the conceptual tools developed. I argue that memory enhancement can be distinguished from memory treatment using a demarcation regarding the existence of memory-related suffering. That is, memory enhancements are, under standard circumstances and without any unwilling suffering or potential suffering resulting from the alteration of memory functions, interventions that aim to manipulate memory function based on the self-interests of the individual. I then consider the issue of authenticity, namely whether memory intervention or enhancement endangers “one’s true self”. By analyzing two conceptions of authenticity—authenticity as self-discovery and authenticity as self-creation, I propose that authenticity should be understood in terms of the satisfaction of the functional constraints of an ASM—synchronic coherence, diachronic coherence, and global veridicality. This framework provides clearer criteria for considering the relevant concerns and allows us to examine the moral values of authenticity. rn

How Minds Work: A Cognitive Theory of Everything - a Tutorial on the IDA Model of Cognition

The IDA model of cognition is a fully integrated artificial cognitive system reaching across the full spectrum of cognition, from low-level perception/action to high-level reasoning. Extensively based on empirical data, it accurately reflects the full range of cognitive processes found in natural cognitive systems. As a source of plausible explanations for very many cognitive processes, the IDA model provides an ideal tool to think with about how minds work. This online tutorial offers a reasonably full account of the IDA conceptual model, including background material. It also provides a high-level account of the underlying computational “mechanisms of mind” that constitute the IDA computational model.

Philosophy's loss, neurology's gain:the endeavor of John Hughlings-Jackson

The year 2011 marked the centenary of the death of one of the founders of British neurology, John Hughlings-Jackson (1835-1911). By common consent he was a great clinician. But he was more. He endeavored to use clinical observations to throw light on one of the great problems of the modern world, the problem of mind. Hughlings-Jackson's daily contact with mentalities warped by neurological disease caused him to ponder deeply the nature of the mind-brain relationship, nowadays often known simply as the "hard problem. " In particular, he saw the danger of conflating mind and brain, a danger that has grown greater with the spectacular growth of neuroscientific knowledge during the last century. Although Hughlings-Jackson's neuroscientific thought is long outdated, his philosophic endeavors remain highly instructive. © 2012 by The Johns Hopkins University Press.

WAKING (TO) THINKING BEING: A STUDY OF EDUCATION, METAPHYSICS, MIND, AND LANGUAGE

This dissertation articulates the basic aims and achievements of education. It recognizes language as central to thinking, and philosophy and education as belonging profoundly to one another. The first step is to show that although philosophy can no longer claim to dictate the foundations of knowledge or of disciplines of inquiry, it still offers an exceptionally general level of self-understanding. Education is equally general and faces a similar crisis of self-identity, of coming to terms with reality. Language is the medium of thought and the repository of historical mind; so a child’s acquisition of language is her acquisition of rational freedom. This marks a metaphysical change: no longer merely an animal, she comes to exercise her powers of rationality, transcending her environment by seeking and expressing reasons for thinking and doing. She can think about herself in relation to the universe, hence philosophize and educate others in turn. The discussion then turns to the historical nature of language. The thinking already embedded in language always anticipates further questioning. Etymology serves as a model for philosophical understanding, and demonstrates how philosophy can continue to yield insights that are fundamental, but not foundational, to human life. The etymologies of some basic educational concepts disclose education as a leading out and into the midst of Being. The philosophical approach developed in previous chapters applies to the very idea of an educational aim. Discussion concerning the substantiality of educational ideals results in an impasse: one side recommends an open-­ended understanding of education’s aims; the other insists on a definitive account. However, educational ideals exhibit a conceptual duality: the fundamental achievements of education, such as rational freedom, are real; but how we should understand them remains an open question. The penultimate chapter investigates philosophical thinking as the fulfillment of rational freedom, whose creative insights can profoundly transform our everyday activities. That this transformative self-understanding is without end suggests the basic aims of education are unheimlich. The dissertation concludes with speculative reflection on the shape and nature of language, and with the suggestion that through education reality awakens to itself.

The influence of past behavior on future behavior: a mind-set perspective

A behavioral mind-set refers to the effect of performing a behavior in one situation (e.g., deciding which animals jump higher, dolphins or sea lions) on the likelihood of performing a conceptually similar behavior in subsequent, unrelated situations (e.g., deciding which of two candies to purchase). It reflects the activation and persistence of procedural knowledge. My dissertation circumscribes the construct of a behavioral mind-set and proposes a theoretical framework describing how mind-sets operate as well as their cognitive and motivational determinants. Three sets of studies investigated the role of mind-sets in different domains. The first set of studies explored the influence of making comparative judgments on subsequent decision making. Specifically, I found that making comparative judgment in one situation activates a which-to-buy mind-set that increases the willingness to decide which of two products to purchase in a later situation without considering the option of not buying anything at all. This mind-set can be activated not only by stating preferences for one of two products but also by comparing the relative attractiveness of wild animals, comparing the animals with respect to physical attributes, and estimating how similar one object is to another. Furthermore, the mind-set, once activated, influences not only purchase intentions in hypothetical situations but the actual decisions to purchase one of different types of products that are on sale after the experiment. The second set of studies investigated whether generating supportive elaborations or counterarguments in one situation will influence people’s tendency to engage in similar behavior in a subsequent, unrelated situation. I found that making supportive elaborations in one situation gives rise to a bolstering mind-set that, once activated, increases participants’ disposition to generate supportive thoughts in response to persuasive communications that they receive later and, therefore, increases the effectiveness of persuasion. Correspondingly, generating opposing arguments in an initial situation activates a counterarguing mind-set that increases the tendency to argue against the persuasive communications and decreases its effectiveness. However, a counterarguing mind-set may increase the effectiveness of persuasion if the messages are difficult to be refuted. The third set of studies distinguished between the influence of motivation on consumer behavior and the influence of a mind-set that is activated by this motivation. Specifically, I found that appetitive motivation, which naturally increases people’s tendency to acquire food products, can give rise to a cognition-based acquisition mind-set that increases people’s disposition to acquire non-food products as well. This acquisition mind-set may persist even when the appetitive motivation that gave rise to it is satiated by eating. Moreover, the disposition to acquire non-food products is not mediated by the products’ attractiveness. The studies suggest that motivation and mind-sets may independently influence consumers’ evaluation of a product and their dispositions to acquire it. Motivation is more likely to influence product evaluations whereas a mind-set is more likely to influence consumers’ acquisition dispositions. In summary, a behavioral mind-set can be activated in the process of performing a behavior. And the mind-set may influence people’s subsequent behaviors in unrelated situations in which the activated procedure is applicable. Moreover, motivation to engage in one behavior could also elicit a cognition-based mind-set, which may change people’s subsequent behaviors.

A PHENOMENOLOGY OF MIMETIC LEARNING AND MULTIMODAL COGNITION: INTEGRATING EXPERIENTIAL KNOWLEDGE INTO PROGRAMS IN RHETORIC, COMPOSITION, AND TECHNICAL COMMUNICATION

My dissertation emphasizes a cognitive account of multimodality that explicitly integrates experiential knowledge work into the rhetorical pedagogy that informs so many composition and technical communication programs. In these disciplines, multimodality is widely conceived in terms of what Gunther Kress calls “socialsemiotic” modes of communication shaped primarily by culture. In the cognitive and neurolinguistic theories of Vittorio Gallese and George Lakoff, however, multimodality is described as a key characteristic of our bodies’ sensory-motor systems which link perception to action and action to meaning, grounding all communicative acts in knowledge shaped through body-engaged experience. I argue that this “situated” account of cognition – which closely approximates Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of perception, a major framework for my study – has pedagogical precedence in the mimetic pedagogy that informed ancient Sophistic rhetorical training, and I reveal that training’s multimodal dimensions through a phenomenological exegesis of the concept mimesis. Plato’s denigration of the mimetic tradition and his elevation of conceptual contemplation through reason, out of which developed the classic Cartesian separation of mind from body, resulted in a general degradation of experiential knowledge in Western education. But with the recent introduction into college classrooms of digital technologies and multimedia communication tools, renewed emphasis is being placed on the “hands-on” nature of inventive and productive praxis, necessitating a revision of methods of instruction and assessment that have traditionally privileged the acquisition of conceptual over experiential knowledge. The model of multimodality I construct from Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology, ancient Sophistic rhetorical pedagogy, and current neuroscientific accounts of situated cognition insists on recognizing the significant role knowledges we acquire experientially play in our reading and writing, speaking and listening, discerning and designing practices.

Idealistic quantum psychopathology : a way forward?

Quantum psychopathology holds the so called “quantum mind” hypothesis, which is controversial. In addition, this hypothesis focuses attention onto quantum processes in the brain, and how this may relate to psychopathological issues. This is very “low level”. As a consequence, it is challenging to form bridges to “higher level” problems related to psychopathology. By adopting the stance used in the quantum interaction community or researchers, this reply puts forward the idea that an idealistic approach may circumvent the controversy and opens the way for addressing challenges at higher levels of psychopathology.

Developing a theatre of the integrated actor : the application of the Suzuki actor training method within three theatrical contexts

This research project examines the application of the Suzuki Actor Training Method (the Suzuki Method) within the work ofTadashi Suzuki's company in Japan, the Shizuoka Performing Arts Complex (SPAC), within the work of Brisbane theatre company Frank:Austral Asian Performance Ensemble (Frank:AAPE), and as related to the development of the theatre performance Surfacing. These three theatrical contexts have been studied from the viewpoint of a "participant- observer". The researcher has trained in the Suzuki Method with Frank:AAPE and SP AC, performed with Frank:AAPE, and was the solo performer and collaborative developer in the performance Surfacing (directed by Leah Mercer). Observations of these three groups are based on a phenomenological definition of the "integrated actor", an actor who is able to achieve a totality or unity between the body and the mind, and between the body and the voice, through a powerful sense of intention. The term "integrated actor" has been informed by the philosophy of Merleau-Ponty and his concept of the "lived body". Three main hypotheses are presented in this study: that the Suzuki Method focuses on actors learning through their body; that the Suzuki Method presents an holistic approach to the body and the voice; and that the Suzuki Method develops actors with a strong sense of intention. These three aspects of the Suzuki Method are explored in relation to the stylistic features of the work of SPAC, Frank:AAPE and the performance Surfacing.

Mind change complexity of learning logic programs

The present paper motivates the study of mind change complexity for learning minimal models of length-bounded logic programs. It establishes ordinal mind change complexity bounds for learnability of these classes both from positive facts and from positive and negative facts. Building on Angluin’s notion of finite thickness and Wright’s work on finite elasticity, Shinohara defined the property of bounded finite thickness to give a sufficient condition for learnability of indexed families of computable languages from positive data. This paper shows that an effective version of Shinohara’s notion of bounded finite thickness gives sufficient conditions for learnability with ordinal mind change bound, both in the context of learnability from positive data and for learnability from complete (both positive and negative) data. Let Omega be a notation for the first limit ordinal. Then, it is shown that if a language defining framework yields a uniformly decidable family of languages and has effective bounded finite thickness, then for each natural number m >0, the class of languages defined by formal systems of length <= m: • is identifiable in the limit from positive data with a mind change bound of Omega (power)m; • is identifiable in the limit from both positive and negative data with an ordinal mind change bound of Omega × m. The above sufficient conditions are employed to give an ordinal mind change bound for learnability of minimal models of various classes of length-bounded Prolog programs, including Shapiro’s linear programs, Arimura and Shinohara’s depth-bounded linearly covering programs, and Krishna Rao’s depth-bounded linearly moded programs. It is also noted that the bound for learning from positive data is tight for the example classes considered.

The nonconceptual gateway to early word learning

My research investigates why nouns are learned disproportionately more frequently than other kinds of words during early language acquisition (Gentner, 1982; Gleitman, et al., 2004). This question must be considered in the context of cognitive development in general. Infants have two major streams of environmental information to make meaningful: perceptual and linguistic. Perceptual information flows in from the senses and is processed into symbolic representations by the primitive language of thought (Fodor, 1975). These symbolic representations are then linked to linguistic input to enable language comprehension and ultimately production. Yet, how exactly does perceptual information become conceptualized? Although this question is difficult, there has been progress. One way that children might have an easier job is if they have structures that simplify the data. Thus, if particular sorts of perceptual information could be separated from the mass of input, then it would be easier for children to refer to those specific things when learning words (Spelke, 1990; Pylyshyn, 2003). It would be easier still, if linguistic input was segmented in predictable ways (Gentner, 1982; Gleitman, et al., 2004) Unfortunately the frequency of patterns in lexical or grammatical input cannot explain the cross-cultural and cross-linguistic tendency to favor nouns over verbs and predicates. There are three examples of this failure: 1) a wide variety of nouns are uttered less frequently than a smaller number of verbs and yet are learnt far more easily (Gentner, 1982); 2) word order and morphological transparency offer no insight when you contrast the sentence structures and word inflections of different languages (Slobin, 1973) and 3) particular language teaching behaviors (e.g. pointing at objects and repeating names for them) have little impact on children's tendency to prefer concrete nouns in their first fifty words (Newport, et al., 1977). Although the linguistic solution appears problematic, there has been increasing evidence that the early visual system does indeed segment perceptual information in specific ways before the conscious mind begins to intervene (Pylyshyn, 2003). I argue that nouns are easier to learn because their referents directly connect with innate features of the perceptual faculty. This hypothesis stems from work done on visual indexes by Zenon Pylyshyn (2001, 2003). Pylyshyn argues that the early visual system (the architecture of the "vision module") segments perceptual data into pre-conceptual proto-objects called FINSTs. FINSTs typically correspond to physical things such as Spelke objects (Spelke, 1990). Hence, before conceptualization, visual objects are picked out by the perceptual system demonstratively, like a finger pointing indicating ‘this’ or ‘that’. I suggest that this primitive system of demonstration elaborates on Gareth Evan's (1982) theory of nonconceptual content. Nouns are learnt first because their referents attract demonstrative visual indexes. This theory also explains why infants less often name stationary objects such as plate or table, but do name things that attract the focal attention of the early visual system, i.e., small objects that move, such as ‘dog’ or ‘ball’. This view leaves open the question how blind children learn words for visible objects and why children learn category nouns (e.g. 'dog'), rather than proper nouns (e.g. 'Fido') or higher taxonomic distinctions (e.g. 'animal').

Visceral hedonic rhetoric : exploring the design of interactive products

Blurb: This empirical study analysed consumer emotional responses towards interactive products, specifically looking at properties that persuasively induce the pursuit of pleasure at an instinctual level of cognition, now known as ‘visceral hedonic rhetoric'. By analysing three different types of interactive products results found hierarchical and inter-relatable attributes with the potential to provide a positive consumer-product relationship that is more meaningful, less disposable and more sustainable in the future.

Me and my body : the relevance of the difference for the distinction between withdrawing life support and euthanasia

In this paper I discuss David Shaw’s claim that the body of a terminally ill person can be conceived as a kind of life-support, akin to an artificial ventilator. I claim that this position rests upon an untenable dualism between the mind and the body. Given that dualism continues to be attractive to some thinkers, I attempt to diagnose the reasons why it continues to be attractive, as well as to demonstrate its incoherence, drawing on some recent work in the philosophy of psychology. I conclude that, if my criticisms are sound, Shaw’s attempt to deny the distinction between withdrawal and euthanasia fails.