863 resultados para price to earnings
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The molecular diagnosis of retinal dystrophies (RD) is difficult because of genetic and clinical heterogeneity. Previously, the molecular screening of genes was done one by one, sometimes in a scheme based on the frequency of sequence variants and the number of exons/length of the candidate genes. Payment for these procedures was complicated and the sequential billing of several genes created endless paperwork. We therefore evaluated the costs of generating and sequencing a hybridization-based DNA library enriched for the 64 most frequently mutated genes in RD, called IROme, and compared them to the costs of amplifying and sequencing these genes by the Sanger method. The production cost generated by the high-throughput (HT) sequencing of IROme was established at CHF 2,875.75 per case. Sanger sequencing of the same exons cost CHF 69,399.02. Turnaround time of the analysis was 3 days for IROme. For Sanger sequencing, it could only be estimated, as we never sequenced all 64 genes in one single patient. Sale cost for IROme calculated on the basis of the sale cost of one exon by Sanger sequencing is CHF 8,445.88, which corresponds to the sale price of 40 exons. In conclusion, IROme is cheaper and faster than Sanger sequencing and therefore represents a sound approach for the diagnosis of RD, both scientifically and economically. As a drop in the costs of HT sequencing is anticipated, target resequencing might become the new gold standard in the molecular diagnosis of RD.
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In 1990 Colombia replaced its traditional system of severance paymentswith a new system of severance payments savings accounts (SPSAs). Althoughseverance payments often are justified on the grounds that they provideinsurance against earnings loss, they also increase costs for employersand distort employment decisions. The impact of severance payments dependslargely on how much of the costs to employers can be shifted to workers.The theoretical analysis in this paper shows that, in contrast to atraditional system of severance payments, the system of SPSAs facilitatesthe shifting of severance payments costs to workers in the form of lowerwages. Empirical results using the Colombian National Household Surveysindicate that the introduction of SPSAs shifted around 80% of the totalseverance payments contributions to wages and had a positive effect onweekly hours. Results using the 1997 Colombian Living Standards MeasurementSurvey suggest that, although SPSAs in part replaced employer insurancewith self-insurance, SPSAs continue to play a consumption smoothing rolefor the non-employed.
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Re-licensing requirements for professionals that move across borders arewidespread. In this paper, we measure the returns to an occupationallicense using novel data on Soviet trained physicians that immigrated toIsrael. An immigrant re-training assignment rule used by the IsraelMinistry of Health provides an exogenous source of variation inre-licensing outcomes. Instrumental variables and quantile treatmenteffects estimates of the returns to an occupational license indicate excesswages due to occupational entry restrictions and negative selectioninto licensing status. We develop a model of optimal license acquisitionwhich suggests that the wages of high-skilled immigrant physicians in thenonphysician sector outweigh the lower direct costs that these immigrantsface in acquiring a medical license. Licensing thus leads to lower averagequality of service. However, the positive earnings effect of entry restrictionsfar outweighs the lower practitioner quality earnings effect that licensinginduces.
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We study the earnings structure and the equilibrium assignment of workers when workers exert intra-firm spillovers on each other.We allow for arbitrary spillovers provided output depends on some aggregate index of workers' skill. Despite the possibility of increasing returns to skills, equilibrium typically exists. We show that equilibrium will typically be segregated; that the skill space can be partitioned into a set of segments and any firm hires from only one segment. Next, we apply the model to analyze the effect of information technology on segmentation and the distribution of income. There are two types of human capital, productivity and creativity, i.e. the ability to produce ideas that may be duplicated over a network. Under plausible assumptions, inequality rises and then falls when network size increases, and the poorest workers cannot lose. We also analyze the impact of an improvement in worker quality and of an increased international mobility of ideas.
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We examine the effect of oil price fluctuations ondemocratic institutions over the 1960-2007 period. We also exploitthe very persistent response of income to oil price fluctuations tostudy the effect of persistent (oil price-driven) income shocks ondemocracy. Our results indicate that countries with greater net oilexports over GDP see improvements in democratic institutionsfollowing upturns in international oil prices. We estimate that a 1percentage point increase in per capita GDP growth due to apositive oil price shock increases the Polity democracy score byaround 0.2 percentage points on impact and by around 2 percentagepoints in the long run. The effect on the probability of a democratictransition is around 0.4 percentage points.
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To understand whether retailers should consider consumer returns when merchandising, we study howthe optimal assortment of a price-taking retailer is influenced by its return policy. The retailer selects itsassortment from an exogenous set of horizontally differentiated products. Consumers make purchase andkeep/return decisions in nested multinomial logit fashion. Our main finding is that the optimal assortmenthas a counterintuitive structure for relatively strict return policies: It is optimal to offer a mix of the mostpopular and most eccentric products when the refund amount is sufficiently low, which can be viewed asa form of risk sharing between the retailer and consumers. In contrast, if the refund is sufficiently high, orwhen returns are disallowed, optimal assortment is composed of only the most popular products (a commonfinding in the literature). We provide preliminary empirical evidence for one of the key drivers of our results:more eccentric products have higher probability of return conditional on purchase. In light of our analyticalfindings and managerial insights, we conclude that retailers should take their return policies into accountwhen merchandising.
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We characterize the Walrasian allocations correspondence by means offour axioms: consistency, replica invariance, individual rationality andPareto optimality. It is shown that for any given class of exchange economiesany solution that satisfies the axioms is a selection from the Walrasianallocations with slack. Preferences are assumed to be smooth, but may besatiated and non--convex. A class of economies is defined as all economieswhose agents' preferences belong to an arbitrary family (finite or infinite)of types. The result can be modified to characterize equal budget Walrasianallocations with slack by replacing individual rationality with individualrationality from equal division. The results are valid also for classes ofeconomies in which core--Walras equivalence does not hold.
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Many revenue management (RM) industries are characterized by (a) fixed capacities in theshort term (e.g., hotel rooms, seats on an airline flight), (b) homogeneous products (e.g., twoairline flights between the same cities at similar times), and (c) customer purchasing decisionslargely influenced by price. Competition in these industries is also very high even with just twoor three direct competitors in a market. However, RM competition is not well understood andpractically all known implementations of RM software and most published models of RM donot explicitly model competition. For this reason, there has been considerable recent interestand research activity to understand RM competition. In this paper we study price competitionfor an oligopoly in a dynamic setting, where each of the sellers has a fixed number of unitsavailable for sale over a fixed number of periods. Demand is stochastic, and depending on howit evolves, sellers may change their prices at any time. This reflects the fact that firms constantly,and almost costlessly, change their prices (alternately, allocations at a price in quantity-basedRM), reacting either to updates in their estimates of market demand, competitor prices, orinventory levels. We first prove existence of a unique subgame-perfect equilibrium for a duopoly.In equilibrium, in each state sellers engage in Bertrand competition, so that the seller withthe lowest reservation value ends up selling a unit at a price that is equal to the equilibriumreservation value of the competitor. This structure hence extends the marginal-value conceptof bid-price control, used in many RM implementations, to a competitive model. In addition,we show that the seller with the lowest capacity sells all its units first. Furthermore, we extendthe results transparently to n firms and perform a number of numerical comparative staticsexploiting the uniqueness of the subgame-perfect equilibrium.
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This article analyses the impact of the reference pricesystem on the price-setting strategies of thepharmaceutical firms and on the level of generic usage.This model is the first to take explicitly into accountthe impact of the reference price mechanism on the levelof competition between brand-name and generic drugs andnational pharmaceutical spending. We consider aduopolistic model with one firm producing the brand-namedrug, whose patent has already expired, and the otherproducing the corresponding generic version. We work ina partial equilibrium framework where firms set pricessequentially and consumers face heterogeneous switchingcosts.We show that brand producers compensate thedecline of profits by selling greater quantities insteadof charging higher prices, thus fostering pricecompetition in the pharmaceutical market. This result isa consequence of both the assumption of a verticallydifferentiated model and the introduction of thereference price system.
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Objective: Single port laparoscopy andNOTES aim at decreasing the number¦of trocars, at a price of increased technical difficulty and cost, without until now¦any proof of benefit for the patient.Morbidity related to 5 mm trocar sites (TS)¦is claimed to be low, but there are no good quality data on this topic. The aim¦of the present prospective study is to measure the morbidity and overall specific¦impact related to the 5 mm TS and compare them to larger TS.¦Methods:Wecollected prospectively data on 300 consecutive patients operated¦by laparoscopy in our institution between 2009 and 2010. Pain, morbidity,¦cosmetic, and overall patient discomfort were assessed specifically for each¦TS, using standardized questionnaires, at 3 time points: at discharge from¦the hospital, at 1 month and at 6 months after surgery. Results were compared¦between 5 mmand larger TS (10 mm, 12 mmand 15 mm).Trocar sites replaced¦by a minilaparotomy or a stoma were excluded from analysis. In this study we¦present the short-term results.¦Results: Three-hundred patients (mean age 47·5, women 55%) were operated¦with 1074 TS of which 477(44%) were 5 mm TS. Indication to laparoscopy was¦cholecystectomy (31·3%), appendectomy (26·6%), upper GI surgery (16·3%),¦colon resection (13·3%) or other (12·3%). Follow-up at 1 month was completed¦in 90%.¦The 5 mm TS had an infection rate of 0·2%, and a hematoma rate of 1·7%.¦VAS pain scores at the 5mm TS were ≤3 in 91·6% at rest and in 75·9% upon¦effort at discharge, and in 97% at 1 month. Median patient scar assessment¦score (PSAS) of the 5 mm TS at 1 month was 6 (IQR: 2-9) out of 60 (0 =¦best score). Overall discomfort of the 5 mm TS in a VAS scale was 0 in 77%¦and ≤3 in 95% of patients at 1 month. Morbidity, pain assessments, PSAS, and¦overall discomfort scores were all significantly better for 5 mm TS compared to¦larger TS.¦Conclusion: Morbidity, pain, cosmetic impact and overall patient's discomfort¦related to a 5 mm trocar site is extremely low. For this reason, any potential¦advantage related to omitting 5 mm trocars to perform the same type of surgery¦will be difficult to demonstrate.
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The Attorney General’s Consumer Protection Division receives hundreds of calls and consumer complaints every year. Follow these tips to avoid unexpected expense and disappointments. This record is about: Price-Gouging Rule in Effect in Storm- and Flood-damaged Counties
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For many goods (such as experience goods or addictive goods), consumers preferences may change over time. In this paper, we examine a monopolist s optimal pricing schedule when current consumption can affect a consumer s valuation in the future and valuations are unobservable. We assume that consumers are anonymous, i.e. the monopolist can t observe a consumer s past consumption history. For myopic consumers, the optimal consumption schedule is distorted upwards, involving substantial discounts for low valuation types. This pushes low types into higher valuations, from which rents can be extracted.For forward looking consumers, there may be a further upward distortion of consumption due to a reversal of the adverse selection effect; low valuation consumers now have a strong interest in consumption in order to increase their valuations. Firms will find it profitable to educate consumers and encourage forward looking behavior.
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It is widely accepted in the literature about the classicalCournot oligopoly model that the loss of quasi competitiveness is linked,in the long run as new firms enter the market, to instability of the equilibrium. In this paper, though, we present a model in which a stableunique symmetric equilibrium is reached for any number of oligopolistsas industry price increases with each new entry. Consequently, the suspicion that non quasi competitiveness implies, in the long run, instabilityis proved false.
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The paper analyzes the effects of strategic behavior by an insider in a price discovery process, akin to an information tatonnement, in the presence of a competitive informed sector. Such processes are used in the preopening period of continuous trading systems in several exchanges. It is found that the insider manipulates the market using a contrarian strategy in order to neutralize the effect of the trades of competitive informed agents. Furthermore, consistently with the empirical evidence available, we find that information revelation accelerates close to the opening, that the market price does not converge to the fundamental value no matter how many rounds the tatonnement has, and that the expected trading volume displays a U-shaped pattern. We also find that a market with a larger competitive sector (smaller insider) has an improved informational efficiency and an increased trading volume. The insider provides a public good (a lower informativeness of the price) for the competitive informed sector.
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We consider a linear price setting duopoly game with differentiated products and determine endogenously which of the players will lead and which will follow. While the follower role is most attractive for each firm, we show that waiting is more risky for the low cost firm so that, consequently, risk dominance considerations, as in Harsanyi and Selten (1988), allow the conclusion that only the highcost firm will choose to wait. Hence, the low cost firm will emerge as the endogenous price leader.