Employment Protection, International Specialization, and Innovation

We develop a model to analyse the implications of firing costs on incentives for R&D and international specialization. The Key idea is paying the firing cost, the country with a rigid labor market will tend to produce relatively secure goods, at a late stage of their product life cycle. Under international trade, an international product cycle emerges where, roughly, new goods are first produced in the low firing cost country will specialize in 'secondary innovations', that is, improvements in existing goods, while the low firing cost country will more specialize in 'primary innovation', that is, invention of new goods.

International Update, December 2007/January 2008

News from the Iowa International Trade Team

Country asymmetries, endogenous product choice and the speed of trade liberalization

In a world with two countries which differ in size, we study theimpact of (the speed of) trade liberalization on firms' profitsand total welfare of the countries involved. Firms correctlyanticipate the pace of trade liberalization and take it intoaccount when deciding on their product choices, which areendogenously determined at the beginning of the game. Competitionin the marketplace then occurs either on quantities or on prices.As long as the autarkic phase continues, local firms are nationalmonopolists. When trade liberalization occurs, firms compete in aninternational duopoly. We analyze trade effects by using twodifferent models of product differentiation. Across all thespecifications adopted (and independently of the price v. quantitycompetition hypothesis), total welfare always unambiguously riseswith the speed of trade liberalization: Possible losses by firmsare always outweighed by consumers' gains, which come under theform of lower prices, enlarged variety of higher average qualitiesavailable. The effect on profits depends on the type of industryanalyzed. Two results in particular seem to be worth of mention.With vertical product differentiation and fixed costs of qualityimprovements, the expected size of the market faced by the firmsdetermines the incentive to invest in quality. The longer the periodof autarky, the lower the possibility that the firm from the smallcountry would be producing the high quality and be the leader in theinternational market when it opens. On the contrary, when trade opensimmediately, national markets do not play any role and firms fromdifferent countries have the same opportunity to become the leader.Hence, immediate trade liberalization might be in the interest ofproducers in the small country. In general, the lower the size of thesmall country, the more likely its firm will gain from tradeliberalization. Losses from the small country firm can arise when itis relegated to low quality good production and the domestic marketsize is not very small. With horizontal product differentiation (thehomogeneous good case being a limit case of it when costs ofdifferentiation tend to infinity), investments in differentiationbenefit both firms in equal manner. Firms from the small country do notrun the risk of being relegated to a lower competitive position undertrade. As a result, they would never lose from it. Instead, firms fromthe large country may still incur losses from the opening of trade whenthe market expansion effect is low (i.e. when the country is very largerelative to the other).

Protectionist but globalised? Latin American custom duties and trade during the pre-1914 belle époque

While it is true that Latin American republics had no rival on maximising revenues from custom collection during the belle époque, this paper shows that Latin American countries were also generous importers, only behind the larger commercial countries of Western Europe in terms of imports per capita. Latin American citizens were much more linked to international trade than citizens of most regions of the world. Their relation to the world economy was tighter both via their imports and their exports relative to their population and income levels. This paper comes to show that there is no contradiction between the high custom collection by the Latin American republics and their high level of interaction with the global economy in the pre-1914 belle époque, although large country differences can be observed when descending from the regional to the national level.

Trade, markup heterogeneity and misallocations

We argue that the procompetitive effect of international trade may bring about significant welfare costs that have not been recognized. We formulate a stylized general equilibrium model with a continuum of imperfectly competitive industries to show that, under plausible conditions, a trade-induced increase in competition can actually amplify monopoly distortions. This happens because trade, while lowering the average level of market power, may increase its cross-sectoral dispersion. Using data on US industries, we document a dramatic increase in the dispersion of market power overtime. We also show evidence thattrade might be responsible for it and provide some quantifications of the induced welfare cost. Our results suggest that, to avoid some unpleasant effects of globalization, trade integration should be accompanied by procompetitive reforms (i.e., deregulation) in the nontraded sectors.

Trade and productivity

We estimate the effect of international trade on average laborproductivity at the country level. Our empirical approach relies onsummary measures of trade that, we argue, are preferable on boththeoretical and empirical grounds to the one conventionally used. Incontrast to the marginally significant and non-robust effects of tradeon productivity found previously, our estimates are highly significantand robust even when we include institutional quality and geographicfactors in the empirical analysis. We also examine the channels throughwhich trade and institutional quality affect average labor productivity.Our finding is that trade works through labor efficiency, whileinstitutional quality works through physical and human capitalaccumulation. We conclude with an exploratory analysis of the role oftrade policies for average labor productivity.

On the accuracy of Latin American trade statistics: A nonparametric test for 1925

This paper proposes a nonparametric test in order to establish the level of accuracy of theforeign trade statistics of 17 Latin American countries when contrasted with the trade statistics of the main partners in 1925. The Wilcoxon Matched-Pairs Ranks test is used to determine whether the differences between the data registered by exporters and importers are meaningful, and if so, whether the differences are systematic in any direction. The paper tests for the reliability of the data registered for two homogeneous products, petroleum and coal, both in volume and value. The conclusion of the several exercises performed is that we cannot accept the existence of statistically significant differences between the data provided by the exporters and the registered by the importing countries in most cases. The qualitative historiography of Latin American describes its foreign trade statistics as mostly unusable. Our quantitative results contest this view.

International Update, January/February 2009

International Trade News from the Iowa International Trade Office

Why did modern trade fairs appear?

According to our interpretation, modern trade fairs started in Europe during the FirstWorld War and in its immediate aftermath. With the closing of trade movements duringthe war, many cities had to resort to the old medieval tradition of providing especialpermits to traders to guarantee them personal protection during their trade meetings.During the tough post war crisis many more cities typically industrial districts-discovered in the creation of trade fairs a powerful competitive tool to attract markettransactions. We compare these developments with the remote origins of fairs, as, inboth cases, trade fair development is a reaction to the closing of free markets under thepressure of political violence.

Employment protection, international specialization and innovation

We develop a model to analyse the implications of firing costs on incentivesfor R&D and international specialization. The Key idea is paying the firingcost, the country with a rigid labor market will tend to produce relativelysecure goods, at a late stage of their product life cycle.Under international trade, an international product cycle emerges where,roughly, new goods are first produced in the low firing cost country willspecialize in 'secondary innovations', that is, improvements in existinggoods, while the low firing cost country will more specialize in 'primaryinnovation', that is, invention of new goods.

International Update, September-October 2009

International Business Development News from the International Trade Team

International Update, May-June 2010

International News from the Iowa International Trade Office of the Iowa Department of Economic Development's Business Development Division.

International Update, January-February 2011

International Trade Team news from the Business Development Division of the Iowa Department of Economic Development

International Update, May-June 2011

International Business News from the International Trade Team of the Iowa Department of Economic Development