The constitutional power to make war: domestic legal issues raised by Australia's action in Iraq

The legal power to declare war has traditionally been a part of a prerogative to be exercised solely on advice that passed from the King to the Governor-General no later than 1942. In 2003, the Governor- General was not involved in the decision by the Prime Minister and Cabinet to commit Australian troops to the invasion of Iraq. The authors explore the alternative legal means by which Australia can go to war - means the government in fact used in 2003 - and the constitutional basis of those means. While the prerogative power can be regulated and/or devolved by legislation, and just possibly by practice, there does not seem to be a sound legal basis to assert that the power has been devolved to any other person. It appears that in 2003 the Defence Minister used his legal powers under the Defence Act 1903 (Cth) (as amended in 1975) to give instructions to the service head(s). A powerful argument could be made that the relevant sections of the Defence Act were not intended to be used for the decision to go to war, and that such instructions are for peacetime or in bello decisions. If so, the power to make war remains within the prerogative to be exercised on advice. Interviews with the then Governor-General indicate that Prime Minister Howard had planned to take the matter to the Federal Executive Council 'for noting', but did not do so after the Governor-General sought the views of the then Attorney-General about relevant issues of international law. The exchange raises many issues, but those of interest concern the kinds of questions the Governor-General could and should ask about proposed international action and whether they in any way mirror the assurances that are uncontroversially required for domestic action. In 2003, the Governor-General's scrutiny was the only independent scrutiny available because the legality of the decision to go to war was not a matter that could be determined in the High Court, and the federal government had taken action in March 2002 that effectively prevented the matter coming before the International Court of Justice

Finding a way through the ethical and legal maze : withdrawing medical treatment and euthanasia

This article examines Finnis' and Keown's claim that the intention/foresight distinction should be used as the basis for the lawfulness of withholding and withdrawing medical treatment, rather than the act/omission distinction which is currently used. I argue that whilst the intention/foresight distinction is sound and can apply to palliative pain relief hastening death, it cannot be applied to withholding and withdrawing medical treatment. Instead, the act/omission distinction remains the better basis for the lawfulness of withholding and withdrawal, and law reform is consequently unnecessary.

Legal responses to climate change

The challenges of climate change pose problems requiring new and innovative legal responses by legal practitioners, government officials and corporate officers. This book addresses a broad range of topic areas where climate change has impact and systematically analyses the key legal responses to climate change, both at the international level and within Australia at federal, State and local levels. In particular, it critically examines: •the rights, duties and market mechanisms established under the international climate change regime •the effect of climate change policies on the implementation of environmental and planning laws •new regimes for the implementation of renewable energy and energy efficiency initiatives •legal frameworks for the implementation of biological and geological sequestration projects (including forest projects and carbon rights); and •legal principles for the design of an effective carbon trading scheme for Australia It also considers the role of the common law including: •the likely response of the law of torts to emerging forms of climate change harm; and •potential liabilities for professionals who must take climate change into account in their decision-making and advice

Punitiveness and the criminalisation of the other : State wards, unlawful non-citizens and Indigenous youth

This paper explores the genealogies of bio-power that cut across punitive state interventions aimed at regulating or normalising several distinctive ‘problem’ or ‘suspect’ deviant populations, such as state wards, non-lawful citizens and Indigenous youth. It begins by making some general comments about the theoretical approach to bio-power taken in this paper. It then outlines the distinctive features of bio-power in Australia and how these intersected with the emergence of penal welfarism to govern the unruly, unchaste, unlawful, and the primitive. The paper draws on three examples to illustrate the argument – the gargantuan criminalisation rates of Aboriginal youth, the history of incarcerating state wards in state institutions, and the mandatory detention of unlawful non-citizens and their children. The construction of Indigenous people as a dangerous presence, alongside the construction of the unruly neglected children of the colony — the larrikin descendants of convicts as necessitating special regimes of internal controls and institutions, found a counterpart in the racial and other exclusionary criteria operating through immigration controls for much of the twentieth century. In each case the problem child or population was expelled from the social body through forms of bio-power, rationalised as strengthening, protecting or purifying the Australian population.

The role of legislative, executive and judicial mechanisms in ensuring a fair and effective asylum process

A good faith reading of core international protection obligations requires that states employ appropriate legislative, administrative and judicial mechanisms to ensure the enjoyment of a fair and effective asylum process. Restrictive asylum policies instead seek to ‘denationalize’ the asylum process by eroding access to national statutory, judicial and executive safeguards that ensure a full and fair hearing of an asylum claim. From a broader perspective, the argument in this thesis recognizes hat international human rights depend on domestic institutions for their effective implementation, and that a rights-based international legal order requires that power is limited, whether that power is expressed as an instance of the sovereign right of states in international law or as the authority of governments under domestic constitutions.

Omissions, causation and responsibility

In this paper I discuss a recent exchange of articles between Hugh McLachlan and John Coggon on the relationship between omissions, causation and moral responsibility. My aim is to contribute to their debate by isolating a presupposition I believe they both share, and by questioning that presupposition. The presupposition is that, at any given moment, there are countless things that I am omitting to do. This leads them both to give a distorted account of the relationship between causation and moral or (as the case may be) legal responsibility, and, in the case of Coggon, to claim that the law’s conception of causation is a fiction based on policy. Once it is seen that this presupposition is faulty, we can attain a more accurate view of the logical relationship between causation and moral responsibility in the case of omissions. This is important because it will enable us, in turn, to understand why the law continues to regard omissions as different, both logically and morally, from acts, and why the law seeks to track that logical and moral difference in the legal distinction it draws between withholding life-sustaining measures and euthanasia.

Access to protection for 'Offshore Entry Persons' aka asylum seekers

In 2001, amendments to the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) made possible the offshore processing of protection claims. The same amendments also foreshadowed the processing of claims by ‘offshore entry persons’ in Australia according to non-statutory procedures. After disbanding offshore processing the then Rudd Labor Government commenced processing of protection claims by ‘offshore entry persons’ in Australia under the Refugee Status Assessment process (RSA). The RSA process sought to substitute well established legislative criteria for the grant of a protection visa, as interpreted by the courts, with administrative guidelines and decision-making immune from judicial review. This approach was rejected by the High Court in the cases M61 and M69. This article analyses these developments in light of Australia’s international protection obligations, as well as considering the practical obstacles that continue to confront offshore entry persons as they pursue judicial review of adverse refugee status determinations after the High Court’s decision.