O mercado único e as pequenas e médias empresas

Trabalho de projeto de mestrado em Políticas Comunitárias e Cooperação Territorial

O impacto da gestão de fundo de maneio na rendibilidade das empresas durante a crise financeira: evidência europeia

Dissertação de mestrado em Finanças

Empresas sociais em Portugal: que realidade?

Dissertação de mestrado em Economia Social

Employment, turnover and career progress

The severe economic downturn that followed the Global Financial Crisis of 2007 was accompanied by major fluctuations in the labour market. During the Great Recession the rate of job destruction was such that, by 2013, active population was at levels of 1999; employment levels were at an historical minimum; and the unemployment rate soared to 17,5%. This chapter inspects the dynamics behind the aggregate fl uctuations in the labour market and studies the determinants of mobility within (promotions) and between fi rms, and whether these have changed during crisis, using Portuguese (LEED) data. During crisis women became more likely to make between- rm moves with short gaps of unemployment and less likely to find a new job after a long gap or to make a job-to-non-employment transition. More educated workers are less likely to experience between fi rm job mobility, both before and during crisis, and became less likely to make job-to-non-employment transitions during crisis. Young workers are the group that most suffered from crisis: they became less likely to make job-to-job transitions and their hazard of experiencing a transition into unemployment shoot up.

Declaració sobre la crisi econòmica global i el seu impacte en les compres consorciades (19 de gener de 2009)

Redactada en nom dels molts consorcis de biblioteques de tot el món que participen a l'ICOLC, aquesta declaració té dos propòsits. Té la intenció d'ajudar als editors i altres proveïdors de contingut amb els quals tenim accés als recursos d'informació electrònica (d'ara en endavant simplement anomenats editors) a entendre millor com l'actual crisi econòmica única afecta a la comunitat de la informació de tot el món. El segon propòsit és suggerir un ventall de propostes que creiem són de benefici comú per a les biblioteques i els proveïdors de serveis d'informació.

Modeling U.S. Inflation Dynamics: A Bayesian Nonparametric Approach

This paper uses an infinite hidden Markov model (IIHMM) to analyze U.S. inflation dynamics with a particular focus on the persistence of inflation. The IHMM is a Bayesian nonparametric approach to modeling structural breaks. It allows for an unknown number of breakpoints and is a flexible and attractive alternative to existing methods. We found a clear structural break during the recent financial crisis. Prior to that, inflation persistence was high and fairly constant.

Estimating Phillips Curves in Turbulent Times using the ECB’s Survey of Professional Forecasters

This paper uses forecasts from the European Central Bank's Survey of Professional Forecasters to investigate the relationship between inflation and inflation expectations in the euro area. We use theoretical structures based on the New Keynesian and Neoclassical Phillips curves to inform our empirical work. Given the relatively short data span of the Survey of Professional Forecasters and the need to control for many explanatory variables, we use dynamic model averaging in order to ensure a parsimonious econometric speci cation. We use both regression-based and VAR-based methods. We find no support for the backward looking behavior embedded in the Neo-classical Phillips curve. Much more support is found for the forward looking behavior of the New Keynesian Phillips curve, but most of this support is found after the beginning of the financial crisis.

Why do UK banks securitize?

The eight years from 2000 to 2008 saw a rapid growth in the use of securitization by UK banks. We aim to identify the reasons that contributed to this rapid growth. The time period (2000 to 2010) covered by our study is noteworthy as it covers the pre- financial crisis credit-boom, the peak of the fi nancial crisis and its aftermath. In the wake of the financial crisis, many governments, regulators and political commentators have pointed an accusing finger at the securitization market - even in the absence of a detailed statistical and economic analysis. We contribute to the extant literature by performing such an analysis on UK banks, focussing principally on whether it is the need for liquidity (i.e. the funding of their balance sheets), or the desire to engage in regulatory capital arbitrage or the need for credit risk transfer that has led to UK banks securitizing their assets. We show that securitization has been signi ficantly driven by liquidity reasons. In addition, we observe a positive link between securitization and banks credit risk. We interpret these latter findings as evidence that UK banks which engaged in securitization did so, in part, to transfer credit risk and that, in comparison to UK banks which did not use securitization, they had more credit risk to transfer in the sense that they originated lower quality loans and held lower quality assets. We show that banks which issued more asset-backed securities before the financial crisis suffered more defaults after the financial crisis.

The past, present and future of central banking

The financial crisis, on the one hand, and the recourse to ‘unconventional’ monetary policy, on the other, have given a sharp jolt to perceptions of the role and status of central banks. In this paper we start with a brief ‘contrarian’ history of central banks since the second world war, which presents the Great Moderation and the restricted focus on inflation targeting as a temporary aberration from the norm. We then discuss how recent developments in fiscal and monetary policy have affected the role and status of central banks, notably their relationships with governments, before considering the environment central banks will face in the near and middle future and how they will have to change to address it.

The determinants of sovereign bond yield spreads in the EMU

We use a panel of euro area countries to assess the determinants of long-term sovereign bond yield spreads over the period 1999.01-2010.12. We find that, unlike the period preceding the global financial crisis, European government bond yield spreads are wellexplained by macro- and fiscal fundamentals over the crisis period. We also find that the menu of macro and fiscal risks priced by markets has been significantly enriched since March 2009, including the risk of the crisis’ transmission among EMU member states, international risk and liquidity risk. Finally, we find that sovereign credit ratings are statistically significant in explaining spreads, yet compared to macro- and fiscal fundamentals their role is limited.

Monetary policy under the Labour government 1997- 2010: the first 13 years of the MPC

This paper examines the performance of monetary policy under the new framework established in 1997 up to the end of the Labour government in May 2010. Performance was relatively good in the years before the crisis, but much weaker from 2008. The new framework largely neglected open economy issues, while the Treasury’s EMU assessment in 2003 can be interpreted in different ways. inflation targeting in the UK and elsewhere may have contributed in some way to the eruption and depth of the financial crisis from 2008, but UK monetary policy responded in a bold and innovative way. Overall, the design and operation of monetary policy were much better than in earlier periods, but there remains scope for significant further evolution.

On the time-varying relationship between EMU sovereign spreads and their determinants

We use a dynamic multipath general-to-specific algorithm to capture structural instability in the link between euro area sovereign bond yield spreads against Germany and their underlying determinants over the period January 1999 – August 2011. We offer new evidence suggesting a significant heterogeneity across countries, both in terms of the risk factors determining spreads over time as well as in terms of the magnitude of their impact on spreads. Our findings suggest that the relationship between euro area sovereign risk and the underlying fundamentals is strongly timevarying, turning from inactive to active since the onset of the global financial crisis and further intensifying during the sovereign debt crisis. As a general rule, the set of financial and macro spreads’ determinants in the euro area is rather unstable but generally becomes richer and stronger in significance as the crisis evolves.

Exchange Rate Predictability in a Changing World

An expanding literature articulates the view that Taylor rules are helpful in predicting exchange rates. In a changing world however, Taylor rule parameters may be subject to structural instabilities, for example during the Global Financial Crisis. This paper forecasts exchange rates using such Taylor rules with Time Varying Parameters (TVP) estimated by Bayesian methods. In core out-of-sample results, we improve upon a random walk benchmark for at least half, and for as many as eight out of ten, of the currencies considered. This contrasts with a constant parameter Taylor rule model that yields a more limited improvement upon the benchmark. In further results, Purchasing Power Parity and Uncovered Interest Rate Parity TVP models beat a random walk benchmark, implying our methods have some generality in exchange rate prediction.

An Empirical Assessment of Optimal Monetary Policy Delegation in the Euro Area

We estimate a New Keynesian DSGE model for the Euro area under alternative descriptions of monetary policy (discretion, commitment or a simple rule) after allowing for Markov switching in policy maker preferences and shock volatilities. This reveals that there have been several changes in Euro area policy making, with a strengthening of the anti-inflation stance in the early years of the ERM, which was then lost around the time of German reunification and only recovered following the turnoil in the ERM in 1992. The ECB does not appear to have been as conservative as aggregate Euro-area policy was under Bundesbank leadership, and its response to the financial crisis has been muted. The estimates also suggest that the most appropriate description of policy is that of discretion, with no evidence of commitment in the Euro-area. As a result although both ‘good luck’ and ‘good policy’ played a role in the moderation of inflation and output volatility in the Euro-area, the welfare gains would have been substantially higher had policy makers been able to commit. We consider a range of delegation schemes as devices to improve upon the discretionary outcome, and conclude that price level targeting would have achieved welfare levels close to those attained under commitment, even after accounting for the existence of the Zero Lower Bound on nominal interest rates.

An Empirical Assessment of Optimal Monetary Policy Delegation in the Euro Area

We estimate a New Keynesian DSGE model for the Euro area under alternative descriptions of monetary policy (discretion, commitment or a simple rule) after allowing for Markov switching in policy maker preferences and shock volatilities. This reveals that there have been several changes in Euro area policy making, with a strengthening of the anti-inflation stance in the early years of the ERM, which was then lost around the time of German reunification and only recovered following the turnoil in the ERM in 1992. The ECB does not appear to have been as conservative as aggregate Euro-area policy was under Bundesbank leadership, and its response to the financial crisis has been muted. The estimates also suggest that the most appropriate description of policy is that of discretion, with no evidence of commitment in the Euro-area. As a result although both ‘good luck’ and ‘good policy’ played a role in the moderation of inflation and output volatility in the Euro-area, the welfare gains would have been substantially higher had policy makers been able to commit. We consider a range of delegation schemes as devices to improve upon the discretionary outcome, and conclude that price level targeting would have achieved welfare levels close to those attained under commitment, even after accounting for the existence of the Zero Lower Bound on nominal interest rates.