Forming efficient networks

In this paper, we suggest a simple sequential mechanism whose subgame perfect equilibria give rise to efficient networks. Moreover, the payoffs received by the agents coincide with their Shapley value in an appropriately defined cooperative game.

Efficient priority rules

We study the assignment of indivisible objects with quotas (houses, jobs, or offices) to a set of agents (students, job applicants, or professors). Each agent receives at most one object and monetary compensations are not possible. We characterize efficient priority rules by efficiency, strategy-proofness, and renegotiation-proofness. Such a rule respects an acyclical priority structure and the allocations can be determined using the deferred acceptance algorithm.

Can genetic algorithms explain experimental anomalies? An application to common property resources

It is common to find in experimental data persistent oscillations in the aggregate outcomes and high levels of heterogeneity in individual behavior. Furthermore, it is not unusual to find significant deviations from aggregate Nash equilibrium predictions. In this paper, we employ an evolutionary model with boundedly rational agents to explain these findings. We use data from common property resource experiments (Casari and Plott, 2003). Instead of positing individual-specific utility functions, we model decision makers as selfish and identical. Agent interaction is simulated using an individual learning genetic algorithm, where agents have constraints in their working memory, a limited ability to maximize, and experiment with new strategies. We show that the model replicates most of the patterns that can be found in common property resource experiments.

Bidding for the surplus: realizing efficient outcomes in general economic environments

In this paper, we consider two classes of economic environments. In the first type, agents are faced with the task of providing local public goods that will benefit some or all of them. In the second type, economic activity takes place via formation of links. Agents need both to both form a network and decide how to share the output generated. For both scenarios, we suggest a bidding mechanism whereby agents bid for the right to decide upon the organization of the economic activity. The subgame perfect equilibria of this game generate efficient outcomes.

Two algorithms to find a power integral basis

"Vegeu el resum a l'inici del fitxer adjunt."

Efficient and stable collective choices under gregarious preferences

We consider collective choice problems where a set of agents have to choose an alternative from a finite set and agents may or may not become users of the chosen alternative. An allocation is a pair given by the chosen alternative and the set of its users. Agents have gregarious preferences over allocations: given an allocation, they prefer that the set of users becomes larger. We require that the final allocation be efficient and stable (no agent can be forced to be a user and no agent who wants to be a user can be excluded). We propose a two-stage sequential mechanism whose unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome is an efficient and stable allocation which also satisfies a maximal participation property.

Integració de tècniques per a la comprovació eficient de restriccions d'integritat en la generació de programari per entorns web

Estudi elaborat a partir d’una estada al Politecnico de Milano, Itàlia, entre gener i juny del 2006. Un dels principals objectius de l’Enginyeria del Programari és automatitzar el màxim possible el procés de desenvolupament del programari, reduint costos mitjançant la generació automàtica del programari a partir de la seva especificació. Per assolir-ho, entre altres, cal resoldre el problema de la comprovació eficient de restriccions, que són una part fonamental de l’especificació del programari. Aquest és precisament l’àmbit en què s’està desenvolupant una tesi que presentarà un mètode que poden integrar totes les eines generadores de codi per tal d’assolir una implementació eficient de les restriccions d’integritat. En l’actual fase del projecte s’ha treballat per validar el mètode de la tesi, optimitzant-lo pel cas específic de les aplicacions web i estendre’l per poder tractar també aplicacions basades en workflows. Pel que fa a l’optimització del mètode per aplicacions web, s’han definit una sèrie de paràmetres que permeten configurar la implementació del mètode tenint en compte les necessitats específiques de rendiment de cada aplicació web en particular. Respecte als workflows (cada cop més populars i que s’usen com a definició d’alt nivell per a les aplicacions a desenvolupar) s’ha estudiat quins són els tipus de restriccions que impliquen i com després es pot aplicar el mètode de la tesi sobre aquestes restriccions per tal de generar de forma eficient també les aplicacions basades en workflows.

A Model-to-model analysis of the repeated Prisoners' Dilemma: genetic algorithms vs. evolutionary dynamics

We study the properties of the well known Replicator Dynamics when applied to a finitely repeated version of the Prisoners' Dilemma game. We characterize the behavior of such dynamics under strongly simplifying assumptions (i.e. only 3 strategies are available) and show that the basin of attraction of defection shrinks as the number of repetitions increases. After discussing the difficulties involved in trying to relax the 'strongly simplifying assumptions' above, we approach the same model by means of simulations based on genetic algorithms. The resulting simulations describe a behavior of the system very close to the one predicted by the replicator dynamics without imposing any of the assumptions of the analytical model. Our main conclusion is that analytical and computational models are good complements for research in social sciences. Indeed, while on the one hand computational models are extremely useful to extend the scope of the analysis to complex scenar

Identificació de variables d'estat del sistema costaner sensibles a la càrrega de nutrients

Projecte de recerca elaborat a partir d’una estada a la Napier University, Gran Bretanya, des d’octubre del 2006 a febrer del 2007. Els ecosistemes marins costaners són sistemes complexos, tant pel que fa a l’estructura de les comunitats que hi viuen com per la seva dinàmica, amb processos que impliquen múltiples escales d’espai i de temps. Aquesta complexitat natural s’ha incrementat al llarg de les darreres dècades com a conseqüència directa del creixement urbà al litoral. L’augment de població a les zones costaneres ha comportat no només un augment generalitzat en l’aport de nutrients inorgànics al mar, sinó també una forta intervenció sobre la línia de costa –construcció de ports, dics- i canvis en el moviment de les masses d’aigua. En aquest context, la interacció entre els factors turbulència-nutrients a la zona costanera pot ser clau per a millorar la nostra comprensió sobre el funcionament dels sistemes planctònics i, en darrer terme, per a derivar-ne mesures de gestió. A diferència de treballs experimentals previs, que adrecen els efectes de la turbulència i/o els nutrients sobre grups específics de plàncton, per avaluar la resposta conjunta de la comunitat necessitem paràmetres integradors, que relacionin diversos processos i donin una idea general de l’estat i funcionament de l’ecosistema. Durant l’estada de recerca alguns dels algoritmes que es fan servir per la costa escocesa van reformular-se i recalcular-se amb dades de la Mediterrània (dades procedents de la badia de Blanes i de la costa de Barcelona). Els resultats mostren una capacitat de resposta molt ràpida del plàncton als increments de nutrients, una variabilitat anual marcada (quant a diversitat d’organismes planctònics) i apunten el fòsfor com a principal limitant del creixement dels organismes en aquesta zona de la Mediterrània.

Assessing the assignation of public subsidies: Do the experts choose the most efficient R&D projects?

The implementation of public programs to support business R&D projects requires the establishment of a selection process. This selection process faces various difficulties, which include the measurement of the impact of the R&D projects as well as selection process optimization among projects with multiple, and sometimes incomparable, performance indicators. To this end, public agencies generally use the peer review method, which, while presenting some advantages, also demonstrates significant drawbacks. Private firms, on the other hand, tend toward more quantitative methods, such as Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA), in their pursuit of R&D investment optimization. In this paper, the performance of a public agency peer review method of project selection is compared with an alternative DEA method.

Are two-part tariffs efficient when consumers plan ahead?: An empirical study

During the last two decades there has been an increase in using dynamic tariffs for billing household electricity consumption. This has questioned the suitability of traditional pricing schemes, such as two-part tariffs, since they contribute to create marked peak and offpeak demands. The aim of this paper is to assess if two-part tariffs are an efficient pricing scheme using Spanish household electricity microdata. An ordered probit model with instrumental variables on the determinants of power level choice and non-paramentric spline regressions on the electricity price distribution will allow us to distinguish between the tariff structure choice and the simultaneous demand decisions. We conclude that electricity consumption and dwellings’ and individuals’ characteristics are key determinants of the fixed charge paid by Spanish households Finally, the results point to the inefficiency of the two-part tariff as those consumers who consume more electricity pay a lower price than the others.

Fast numerical algorithms for the computation of invariant tori in Hamiltonian systems

In this paper, we develop numerical algorithms that use small requirements of storage and operations for the computation of invariant tori in Hamiltonian systems (exact symplectic maps and Hamiltonian vector fields). The algorithms are based on the parameterization method and follow closely the proof of the KAM theorem given in [LGJV05] and [FLS07]. They essentially consist in solving a functional equation satisfied by the invariant tori by using a Newton method. Using some geometric identities, it is possible to perform a Newton step using little storage and few operations. In this paper we focus on the numerical issues of the algorithms (speed, storage and stability) and we refer to the mentioned papers for the rigorous results. We show how to compute efficiently both maximal invariant tori and whiskered tori, together with the associated invariant stable and unstable manifolds of whiskered tori. Moreover, we present fast algorithms for the iteration of the quasi-periodic cocycles and the computation of the invariant bundles, which is a preliminary step for the computation of invariant whiskered tori. Since quasi-periodic cocycles appear in other contexts, this section may be of independent interest. The numerical methods presented here allow to compute in a unified way primary and secondary invariant KAM tori. Secondary tori are invariant tori which can be contracted to a periodic orbit. We present some preliminary results that ensure that the methods are indeed implementable and fast. We postpone to a future paper optimized implementations and results on the breakdown of invariant tori.

Efficient Nash Equilibrium under Adverse Selection

This paper revisits the problem of adverse selection in the insurance market of Rothschild and Stiglitz [28]. We propose a simple extension of the game-theoretic structure in Hellwig [14] under which Nash-type strategic interaction between the informed customers and the uninformed firms results always in a particular separating equilibrium. The equilibrium allocation is unique and Pareto-efficient in the interim sense subject to incentive-compatibility and individual rationality. In fact, it is the unique neutral optimum in the sense of Myerson [22].

Efficient Competition through Cheap Talk: Competing Auctions and Competitive Search without Ex Ante Price

We consider a frictional two-sided matching market in which one side uses public cheap talk announcements so as to attract the other side. We show that if the first-price auction is adopted as the trading protocol, then cheap talk can be perfectly informative, and the resulting market outcome is efficient, constrained only by search frictions. We also show that the performance of an alternative trading protocol in the cheap-talk environment depends on the level of price dispersion generated by the protocol: If a trading protocol compresses (spreads) the distribution of prices relative to the first-price auction, then an efficient fully revealing equilibrium always (never) exists. Our results identify the settings in which cheap talk can serve as an efficient competitive instrument, in the sense that the central insights from the literature on competing auctions and competitive search continue to hold unaltered even without ex ante price commitment.