Consumer Advisory Bulletin, "Rent-to-Own" -- Know the Costs!, January 2008

The Attorney General’s Consumer Protection Division receives hundreds of calls and consumer complaints every year. Follow these tips to avoid unexpected expense and disappointments. This record is about: "Rent-to-Own" -- Know the Costs!

Consumer Advisory Bulletin, "No-Equity Loans!" "Consolidate Your Debt!", June 2005

The Attorney General’s Consumer Protection Division receives hundreds of calls and consumer complaints every year. Follow these tips to avoid unexpected expense and disappointments. This record is about: "No-Equity Loans!" "Consolidate Your Debt!"

Consumer Advisory Bulletin, "Zero-Percent Financing" Can Cost You Plenty!, January 2008

The Attorney General’s Consumer Protection Division receives hundreds of calls and consumer complaints every year. Follow these tips to avoid unexpected expense and disappointments. This record is about: ""Zero-Percent Financing" Can Cost You Plenty!

Consumer Advisory Bulletin, "Credit Card Protection Plans" -- Paying for What You Can Do for Free?, January 2008

The Attorney General’s Consumer Protection Division receives hundreds of calls and consumer complaints every year. Follow these tips to avoid unexpected expense and disappointments. This record is about: "Credit Card Protection Plans" -- Paying for What You Can Do for Free?

Consumer Advisory Bulletin, Credit Insurance: Is it a Good Idea for You?, June 2005

The Attorney General’s Consumer Protection Division receives hundreds of calls and consumer complaints every year. Follow these tips to avoid unexpected expense and disappointments. This record is about: Credit Insurance: Is it a Good Idea for You?

Consumer Advisory Bulletin, Advance Fee Loans and Credit Repair Schemes, January 2008

The Attorney General’s Consumer Protection Division receives hundreds of calls and consumer complaints every year. Follow these tips to avoid unexpected expense and disappointments. This record is about: Advance Fee Loans and Credit Repair Schemes

Setting the rules of the game: The choice of electoral systems in advanced democracies

The origins of electoral systems have received scant attention in the literature. Looking at the history of electoral rules in the advanced world in the last century, this paper shows that the existing wide variation in electoral rules across nations can be traced to the strategic decisions that the current ruling parties, anticipating the coordinating consequences of different electoral regimes, make to maximize their representation according to the following conditions. On the one hand, as long as the electoral arena does not change substantially and the current electoral regime serves the ruling parties well, the latter have no incentives to modify the electoral regime. On the other hand, as soon as the electoral arena changes (due to the entry of new voters or a change in their preferences), the ruling parties will entertain changing the electoral system, depending on two main conditions: the emergence of new parties and the coordinating capacities of the old ruling parties. Accordingly, if the new parties are strong, the old parties shift from plurality/majority rules to proportional representation (PR) only if the latter are locked into a 'non-Duvergerian' equilibrium; i.e. if no old party enjoys a dominant position (the case of most small European states)--conversely, they do not if a Duvergerian equilibrium exists (the case of Great Britain). Similarly, whenever the new entrants are weak, a non-PR system is maintained, regardless of the structure of the old party system (the case of the USA). The paper discusses as well the role of trade and ethnic and religious heterogeneity in the adoption of PR rules.

Consumer Advisory Bulletin, Beware of “Free Trial Offers”, January 2008

The Attorney General’s Consumer Protection Division receives hundreds of calls and consumer complaints every year. Follow these tips to avoid unexpected expense and disappointments. This record is about: Hang Up on Telemarketing Fraud!

Consumer Advisory Bulletin, Prevent Home Repair Scams and Disputes, Mach 2008

The Attorney General’s Consumer Protection Division receives hundreds of calls and consumer complaints every year. Follow these tips to avoid unexpected expense and disappointments. This record is about: Prevent Home Repair Scams and Disputes

Consumer Advisory Bulletin, Beware of Foreclosure “Rescue” Scams, April 2008

The Attorney General’s Consumer Protection Division receives hundreds of calls and consumer complaints every year. Follow these tips to avoid unexpected expense and disappointments. This record is about: Beware of Foreclosure “Rescue” Scams

Take-the-best and other simple strategies: Why and when they work 'well' in binary choice

The effectiveness of decision rules depends on characteristics of bothrules and environments. A theoretical analysis of environments specifiesthe relative predictive accuracies of the lexicographic rule 'take-the-best'(TTB) and other simple strategies for binary choice. We identify threefactors: how the environment weights variables; characteristics of choicesets; and error. For cases involving from three to five binary cues, TTBis effective across many environments. However, hybrids of equal weights(EW) and TTB models are more effective as environments become morecompensatory. In the presence of error, TTB and similar models do not predictmuch better than a naïve model that exploits dominance. We emphasizepsychological implications and the need for more complete theories of theenvironment that include the role of error.

Hybrid consumption paths in the attribute space: A model and application with scanner data

This paper presents and estimates a dynamic choice model in the attribute space considering rational consumers. In light of the evidence of several state-dependence patterns, the standard attribute-based model is extended by considering a general utility function where pure inertia and pure variety-seeking behaviors can be explained in the model as particular linear cases. The dynamics of the model are fully characterized by standard dynamic programming techniques. The model presents a stationary consumption pattern that can be inertial, where the consumer only buys one product, or a variety-seeking one, where the consumer shifts among varied products.We run some simulations to analyze the consumption paths out of the steady state. Underthe hybrid utility assumption, the consumer behaves inertially among the unfamiliar brandsfor several periods, eventually switching to a variety-seeking behavior when the stationary levels are approached. An empirical analysis is run using scanner databases for three different product categories: fabric softener, saltine cracker, and catsup. Non-linear specifications provide the best fit of the data, as hybrid functional forms are found in all the product categories for most attributes and segments. These results reveal the statistical superiority of the non-linear structure and confirm the gradual trend to seek variety as the level of familiarity with the purchased items increases.

Cumulative dominance and heuristic performance in binary multi-attribute choice

Several studies have reported high performance of simple decision heuristics multi-attribute decision making. In this paper, we focus on situations where attributes are binary and analyze the performance of Deterministic-Elimination-By-Aspects (DEBA) and similar decision heuristics. We consider non-increasing weights and two probabilistic models for the attribute values: one where attribute values are independent Bernoulli randomvariables; the other one where they are binary random variables with inter-attribute positive correlations. Using these models, we show that good performance of DEBA is explained by the presence of cumulative as opposed to simple dominance. We therefore introduce the concepts of cumulative dominance compliance and fully cumulative dominance compliance and show that DEBA satisfies those properties. We derive a lower bound with which cumulative dominance compliant heuristics will choose a best alternative and show that, even with many attributes, this is not small. We also derive an upper bound for the expected loss of fully cumulative compliance heuristics and show that this is moderateeven when the number of attributes is large. Both bounds are independent of the values ofthe weights.

Country asymmetries, endogenous product choice and the speed of trade liberalization

In a world with two countries which differ in size, we study theimpact of (the speed of) trade liberalization on firms' profitsand total welfare of the countries involved. Firms correctlyanticipate the pace of trade liberalization and take it intoaccount when deciding on their product choices, which areendogenously determined at the beginning of the game. Competitionin the marketplace then occurs either on quantities or on prices.As long as the autarkic phase continues, local firms are nationalmonopolists. When trade liberalization occurs, firms compete in aninternational duopoly. We analyze trade effects by using twodifferent models of product differentiation. Across all thespecifications adopted (and independently of the price v. quantitycompetition hypothesis), total welfare always unambiguously riseswith the speed of trade liberalization: Possible losses by firmsare always outweighed by consumers' gains, which come under theform of lower prices, enlarged variety of higher average qualitiesavailable. The effect on profits depends on the type of industryanalyzed. Two results in particular seem to be worth of mention.With vertical product differentiation and fixed costs of qualityimprovements, the expected size of the market faced by the firmsdetermines the incentive to invest in quality. The longer the periodof autarky, the lower the possibility that the firm from the smallcountry would be producing the high quality and be the leader in theinternational market when it opens. On the contrary, when trade opensimmediately, national markets do not play any role and firms fromdifferent countries have the same opportunity to become the leader.Hence, immediate trade liberalization might be in the interest ofproducers in the small country. In general, the lower the size of thesmall country, the more likely its firm will gain from tradeliberalization. Losses from the small country firm can arise when itis relegated to low quality good production and the domestic marketsize is not very small. With horizontal product differentiation (thehomogeneous good case being a limit case of it when costs ofdifferentiation tend to infinity), investments in differentiationbenefit both firms in equal manner. Firms from the small country do notrun the risk of being relegated to a lower competitive position undertrade. As a result, they would never lose from it. Instead, firms fromthe large country may still incur losses from the opening of trade whenthe market expansion effect is low (i.e. when the country is very largerelative to the other).

Consumer Advisory Bulletin, "Flood and Storm Warning: Be Wary of Impostors Posing as Utility Workers", June 12, 2008

The Attorney General’s Consumer Protection Division receives hundreds of calls and consumer complaints every year. Follow these tips to avoid unexpected expense and disappointments. This record is about: "Look Before You Lease!"