Dynamic Option Adjusted Spread and the Value of Mortgage Backed Securities (Draft 2)

We extend a reduced form model for pricing pass-through mortgage backed securities (MBS) and provide a novel hedging tool for investors in this market. To calculate the price of an MBS, traders use what is known as option-adjusted spread (OAS). The resulting OAS value represents the required basis points adjustment to reference curve discounting rates needed to match an observed market price. The OAS suffers from some drawbacks. For example, it remains constant until the maturity of the bond (thirty years in mortgage-backed securities), and does not incorporate interest rate volatility. We suggest instead what we call dynamic option adjusted spread (DOAS), which allows investors in the mortgage market to account for both prepayment risk and changes of the yield curve.

An investigation of customer order flow in the foreign exchange market

This paper examines the effect that heterogeneous customer orders flows have on exchange rates by using a new, and the largest, proprietary dataset of weekly net order flow segmented by customer type across nine of the most liquid currency pairs. We make several contributions. Firstly, we investigate the extent to which customer order flow can help to explain exchange rate movements over and above the influence of macroeconomic variables. Secondly, we address the issue of whether order flows contain (private) information which explain exchange rates changes. Thirdly, we look at the usefulness of order flow in forecasting exchange rate movements at longer horizons than those generally considered in the microstructure literature. Finally we address the question of whether the out-of-sample exchange rate forecasts generated by order flows can be employed profitably in the foreign exchange markets

Learning about Risk and Return: A Simple Model of Bubbles and Crashes

This paper demonstrates that an asset pricing model with least-squares learning can lead to bubbles and crashes as endogenous responses to the fundamentals driving asset prices. When agents are risk-averse they need to make forecasts of the conditional variance of a stock’s return. Recursive updating of both the conditional variance and the expected return implies several mechanisms through which learning impacts stock prices. Extended periods of excess volatility, bubbles and crashes arise with a frequency that depends on the extent to which past data is discounted. A central role is played by changes over time in agents’ estimates of risk.

The Rise and Fall of the ABS Market

The nancial crisis has raised some concern about the quality of information available on some traded assets on the securities markets to market participants and regulators. Asset-backed securitization in general got partial blame for the paucity of liquidity on bank balance sheets and the consequent credit crunch. After the Asset-Backed Security (ABS) market fell to near inactivity in 2009, the US federal government's Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility (TALF) provided backing and a boost to the issuance of asset-backed securitization. In this market condition, given the nature of ABS, it is di¢ cult for them not to be relatively illiquid, and this has resulted in unacceptable levels of market risk for most investors. Their liquidity before the crisis was driven by a market in continuous expansion, fed by Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV), Conduits, and other low capitalized term-transformation vehicles. Nowadays, the industry is concerned with the ongoing ABS reforms and how these will be implemented. This article reviews the ABS market in the last decade and the possible consequences of the recent regulatory proposals. It proposes a retention policy and the institution of a new nancial body to supervise the quality of the security in an ABS pool, its liquidity, and the model risk implied by the issuer's valuation model.

A Producer Theory with Business Risks

In this paper, we consider a producer who faces uninsurable business risks due to incomplete spanning of asset markets over stochastic goods market outcomes, and examine how the presence of the uninsurable business risks affects the producer's optimal pricing and production behaviours. Three key (inter-related) results we find are: (1) optimal prices in goods markets comprise ‘markup’ to the extent of market power and ‘premium’ by shadow price of the risks; (2) price inertia as we observe in data can be explained by a joint work of risk neutralization motive and marginal cost equalization condition; (3) the relative responsiveness of risk neutralization motive and marginal cost equalization at optimum is central to the cyclical variation of markups, providing a consistent explanation for procyclical and countercyclical movements. By these results, the proposed theory of producer leaves important implications both micro and macro, and both empirical and theoretical.

Why do UK banks securitize?

The eight years from 2000 to 2008 saw a rapid growth in the use of securitization by UK banks. We aim to identify the reasons that contributed to this rapid growth. The time period (2000 to 2010) covered by our study is noteworthy as it covers the pre- financial crisis credit-boom, the peak of the fi nancial crisis and its aftermath. In the wake of the financial crisis, many governments, regulators and political commentators have pointed an accusing finger at the securitization market - even in the absence of a detailed statistical and economic analysis. We contribute to the extant literature by performing such an analysis on UK banks, focussing principally on whether it is the need for liquidity (i.e. the funding of their balance sheets), or the desire to engage in regulatory capital arbitrage or the need for credit risk transfer that has led to UK banks securitizing their assets. We show that securitization has been signi ficantly driven by liquidity reasons. In addition, we observe a positive link between securitization and banks credit risk. We interpret these latter findings as evidence that UK banks which engaged in securitization did so, in part, to transfer credit risk and that, in comparison to UK banks which did not use securitization, they had more credit risk to transfer in the sense that they originated lower quality loans and held lower quality assets. We show that banks which issued more asset-backed securities before the financial crisis suffered more defaults after the financial crisis.

Central banks and house prices in the run-up to the crisis

The financial crisis and the role played within it by fluctuations in house prices has reopened the debate about whether monetary policy should respond to asset prices. This paper investigates how the central banks of the euro area, the UK and the US considered, understood and responded to the trends in house prices in the six or seven years preceding the crisis, and how they have analysed those developments since the crisis. It suggests that these central banks, particularly the Anglo-Saxon ones, might have been able to take some useful action if they had devoted more intellectual resources to analysing the possible misalignments of house prices and been willing to act on them.

No Good Deals - No Bad Models

Faced with the problem of pricing complex contingent claims, an investor seeks to make his valuations robust to model uncertainty. We construct a notion of a model- uncertainty-induced utility function and show that model uncertainty increases the investor's eff ective risk aversion. Using the model-uncertainty-induced utility function, we extend the \No Good Deals" methodology of Cochrane and Sa a-Requejo [2000] to compute lower and upper good deal bounds in the presence of model uncertainty. We illustrate the methodology using some numerical examples.

The Monetary policy rules in Europe: heterogeneity and common patters

The objective of this study is the empirical identification of the monetary policy rules pursued in individual countries of EU before and after the launch of European Monetary Union. In particular, we have employed an estimation of the augmented version of the Taylor rule (TR) for 25 countries of the EU in two periods (1992-1998, 1999-2006). While uniequational estimation methods have been used to identify the policy rules of individual central banks, for the rule of the European Central Bank has been employed a dynamic panel setting. We have found that most central banks really followed some interest rate rule but its form was usually different from the original TR (proposing that domestic interest rate responds only to domestic inflation rate and output gap). Crucial features of policy rules in many countries have been the presence of interest rate smoothing as well as response to foreign interest rate. Any response to domestic macroeconomic variables have been missing in the rules of countries with inflexible exchange rate regimes and the rules consisted in mimicking of the foreign interest rates. While we have found response to long-term interest rates and exchange rate in rules of some countries, the importance of monetary growth and asset prices has been generally negligible. The Taylor principle (the response of interest rates to domestic inflation rate must be more than unity as a necessary condition for achieving the price stability) has been confirmed only in large economies and economies troubled with unsustainable inflation rates. Finally, the deviation of the actual interest rate from the rule-implied target rate can be interpreted as policy shocks (these deviation often coincided with actual turbulent periods).

Pecuniary Externality through Credit Constraints: Two Examples without Uncertainty

This paper is a contribution to the growing literature on constrained inefficiencies in economies with financial frictions. The purpose is to present two simple examples, inspired by the stochastic models in Gersbach-Rochet (2012) and Lorenzoni (2008), of deterministic environments in which such inefficiencies arise through credit constraints. Common to both examples is a pecuniary externality, which operates through an asset price. In the second example, a simple transfer between two groups of agents can bring about a Pareto improvement. In a first best economy, there are no pecuniary externalities because marginal productivities are equalised. But when agents face credit constraints, there is a wedge between their marginal productivities and those of the non-credit-constrained agents. The wedge is the source of the pecuniary externality: economies with these kinds of imperfections in credit markets are not second-best efficient. This is akin to the constrained inefficiency of an economy with incomplete markets, as in Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1986).

Self-Fulfilling Price Cycles

This paper presents a model of a self-fulfilling price cycle in an asset market. Price oscillates deterministically even though the underlying environment is stationary. The mechanism that we uncover is driven by endogenous variation in the investment horizons of the different market participants, informed and uninformed. On even days, the price is high; on odd days it is low. On even days, informed traders are willing to jettison their good assets, knowing that they can buy them back the next day, when the price is low. The anticipated drop in price more than offsets any potential loss in dividend. Because of these asset sales, the informed build up their cash holdings. Understanding that the market is flooded with good assets, the uninformed traders are willing to pay a high price. But their investment horizon is longer than that of the informed traders: their intention is to hold the assets they purchase, not to resell. On odd days, the price is low because the uninformed recognise that the informed are using their cash holdings to cherry-pick good assets from the market. Now the uninformed, like the informed, are investing short-term. Rather than buy-and-hold as they do with assets purchased on even days, on odd days the uninformed are buying to sell. Notice that, at the root of the model, there lies a credit constraint. Although the informed are flush with cash on odd days, they are not deep pockets. On each cherry that they pick out of the market, they earn a high return: buying cheap, selling dear. However they don't have enough cash to strip the market of cherries and thereby bid the price up.

Contagious Illiquidity I: Contagion through Time

This paper is an investigation into the dynamics of asset markets with adverse selection a la Akerlof (1970). The particular question asked is: can market failure at some later date precipitate market failure at an earlier date? The answer is yes: there can be "contagious illiquidity" from the future back to the present. The mechanism works as follows. If the market is expected to break down in the future, then agents holding assets they know to be lemons (assets with low returns) will be forced to hold them for longer - they cannot quickly resell them. As a result, the effective difference in payoff between a lemon and a good asset is greater. But it is known from the static Akerlof model that the greater the payoff differential between lemons and non-lemons, the more likely is the market to break down. Hence market failure in the future is more likely to lead to market failure today. Conversely, if the market is not anticipated to break down in the future, assets can be readily sold and hence an agent discovering that his or her asset is a lemon can quickly jettison it. In effect, there is little difference in payoff between a lemon and a good asset. The logic of the static Akerlof model then runs the other way: the small payoff differential is unlikely to lead to market breakdown today. The conclusion of the paper is that the nature of today's market - liquid or illiquid - hinges critically on the nature of tomorrow's market, which in turn depends on the next day's, and so on. The tail wags the dog.

The Inflation Risk Premium on Government Debt in an Overlapping Generations Model

This paper presents a general equilibrium model in which nominal government debt pays an inflation risk premium. The model predicts that the inflation risk premium will be higher in economies which are exposed to unanticipated inflation through nominal asset holdings. In particular, the inflation risk premium is higher when government debt is primarily nominal, steady-state inflation is low, and when cash and nominal debt account for a large fraction of consumers' retirement portfolios. These channels do not appear to have been highlighted in previous models or tested empirically. Numerical results suggest that the inflation risk premium is comparable in magnitude to standard representative agent models. These findings have implications for management of government debt, since the inflation risk premium makes it more costly for governments to borrow using nominal rather than indexed debt. Simulations of an extended model with Epstein-Zin preferences suggest that increasing the share of indexed debt would enable governments to permanently lower taxes by an amount that is quantitatively non-trivial.

A Simple Characterization of Dynamic Completeness in Continuous Time

This paper investigates dynamic completeness of financial markets in which the underlying risk process is a multi-dimensional Brownian motion and the risky securities dividends geometric Brownian motions. A sufficient condition, that the instantaneous dispersion matrix of the relative dividends is non-degenerate, was established recently in the literature for single-commodity, pure-exchange economies with many heterogenous agents, under the assumption that the intermediate flows of all dividends, utilities, and endowments are analytic functions. For the current setting, a different mathematical argument in which analyticity is not needed shows that a slightly weaker condition suffices for general pricing kernels. That is, dynamic completeness obtains irrespectively of preferences, endowments, and other structural elements (such as whether or not the budget constraints include only pure exchange, whether or not the time horizon is finite with lump-sum dividends available on the terminal date, etc.)

Price Transmission and Effects of Exchange Rates on Domestic Commodity Prices via Offshore and Currency Hedging

The framework presents how trading in the foreign commodity futures market and the forward exchange market can affect the optimal spot positions of domestic commodity producers and traders. It generalizes the models of Kawai and Zilcha (1986) and Kofman and Viaene (1991) to allow both intermediate and final commodities to be traded in the international and futures markets, and the exporters/importers to face production shock, domestic factor costs and a random price. Applying mean-variance expected utility, we find that a rise in the expected exchange rate can raise both supply and demand for commodities and reduce domestic prices if the exchange rate elasticity of supply is greater than that of demand. Whether higher volatilities of exchange rate and foreign futures price can reduce the optimal spot position of domestic traders depends on the correlation between the exchange rate and the foreign futures price. Even though the forward exchange market is unbiased, and there is no correlation between commodity prices and exchange rates, the exchange rate can still affect domestic trading and prices through offshore hedging and international trade if the traders are interested in their profit in domestic currency. It illustrates how the world prices and foreign futures prices of commodities and their volatility can be transmitted to the domestic market as well as the dynamic relationship between intermediate and final goods prices. The equilibrium prices depends on trader behaviour i.e. who trades or does not trade in the foreign commodity futures and domestic forward currency markets. The empirical result applying a two-stage-least-squares approach to Thai rice and rubber prices supports the theoretical result.