Start-up costs and pecuniary externalities as barriers to economic development

We use a dynamic monopolistic competition model to show that an economythat inherits a small range of specialized inputs can be trapped into alower stage of development. The limited availability of specialized inputsforces the final goods producers to use a labor intensive technology, whichin turn implies a small inducement to introduce new intermediate inputs. Thestart--up costs, which make the intermediate inputs producers subject todynamic increasing returns, and pecuniary externalities that result from thefactor substitution in the final goods sector, play essential roles in themodel.

Introducing systematic dispatcher-assisted cardiopulmonary resuscitation (telephone-CPR) in a non-Advanced Medical Priority Dispatch System (AMPDS): implementation process and costs.

OBJECTIVE: In order to improve the quality of our Emergency Medical Services (EMS), to raise bystander cardiopulmonary resuscitation rates and thereby meet what is becoming a universal standard in terms of quality of emergency services, we decided to implement systematic dispatcher-assisted or telephone-CPR (T-CPR) in our medical dispatch center, a non-Advanced Medical Priority Dispatch System. The aim of this article is to describe the implementation process, costs and results following the introduction of this new "quality" procedure. METHODS: This was a prospective study. Over an 8-week period, our EMS dispatchers were given new procedures to provide T-CPR. We then collected data on all non-traumatic cardiac arrests within our state (Vaud, Switzerland) for the following 12months. For each event, the dispatchers had to record in writing the reason they either ruled out cardiac arrest (CA) or did not propose T-CPR in the event they did suspect CA. All emergency call recordings were reviewed by the medical director of the EMS. The analysis of the recordings and the dispatchers' written explanations were then compared. RESULTS: During the 12-month study period, a total of 497 patients (both adults and children) were identified as having a non-traumatic cardiac arrest. Out of this total, 203 cases were excluded and 294 cases were eligible for T-CPR. Out of these eligible cases, dispatchers proposed T-CPR on 202 occasions (or 69% of eligible cases). They also erroneously proposed T-CPR on 17 occasions when a CA was wrongly identified (false positive). This represents 7.8% of all T-CPR. No costs were incurred to implement our study protocol and procedures. CONCLUSIONS: This study demonstrates it is possible, using a brief campaign of sensitization but without any specific training, to implement systematic dispatcher-assisted cardiopulmonary resuscitation in a non-Advanced Medical Priority Dispatch System such as our EMS that had no prior experience with systematic T-CPR. The results in terms of T-CPR delivery rate and false positive are similar to those found in previous studies. We found our results satisfying the given short time frame of this study. Our results demonstrate that it is possible to improve the quality of emergency services at moderate or even no additional costs and this should be of interest to all EMS that do not presently benefit from using T-CPR procedures. EMS that currently do not offer T-CPR should consider implementing this technique as soon as possible, and we expect our experience may provide answers to those planning to incorporate T-CPR in their daily practice.

Relative price riddles in international business cycle theory: Are transport costs the explanation?

We study relative price behavior in an international business cyclemodel with specialization in production, in which a goods marketfriction is introduced through transport costs. The transporttechnology allows for flexible transport costs. We analyze whetherthis extension can account for the striking differences betweentheory and data as far as the moments of terms of trade and realexchange rates are concerned. We find that transport costs increaseboth the volatility of the terms of trade and the volatility of thereal exchange rate. However, unless the transport technology isspecified by a Leontief technology, transport costs do not resolvethe quantitative discrepancies between theory and data. Asurprising result is that transport costs may actually lower thepersistence of the real exchange rate, a finding that is in contrastto much of the emphasis of the empirical literature.

Consumer Advisory Bulletin, "Free" and "Low-Cost" Computers: Beware of Unexpected Costs, January 2008

The Attorney General’s Consumer Protection Division receives hundreds of calls and consumer complaints every year. Follow these tips to avoid unexpected expense and disappointments. This record is about: "Free" and "Low-Cost" Computers: Beware of Unexpected Costs

Consumer Advisory Bulletin, "Free" and "Low-Cost" Computers: Beware of Unexpected Costs, June 2005

The Attorney General’s Consumer Protection Division receives hundreds of calls and consumer complaints every year. Follow these tips to avoid unexpected expense and disappointments. This record is about: "Free" and "Low-Cost" Computers: Beware of Unexpected Costs

Consumer Advisory Bulletin, "Rent-to-Own" -- Know the Costs!, January 2008

The Attorney General’s Consumer Protection Division receives hundreds of calls and consumer complaints every year. Follow these tips to avoid unexpected expense and disappointments. This record is about: "Rent-to-Own" -- Know the Costs!

Audit report on the Shelby County Area Solid Waste Agency for the year ended June 30, 2007

Audit report on the Shelby County Area Solid Waste Agency for the year ended June 30, 2007

Jackson County Sanitary Disposal Agency independent auditor's reports, basic financial statements and required supplementary information, schedule of findings, June 30, 2007

Audit report on the Jackson County Sanitary Disposal Agency for the year ended June 30, 2007

Audit report on the Heart of Iowa Regional Transit Agency, Des Moines, for the year ended June 30, 2007

Audit report on the Heart of Iowa Regional Transit Agency, Des Moines, for the year ended June 30, 2007

Audit report on the Westory Fire Agency for the year ended June 30, 2007

Audit report on the Westory Fire Agency for the year ended June 30, 2007

Hiring and firing costs, adverse selection and long-term unemployment

In this paper, we present a matching model with adverse selection that explains why flows into and out of unemployment are much lower in Europe compared to North America, while employment-to-employment flows are similar in the two continents. In the model,firms use discretion in terms of whom to fire and, thus, low quality workers are more likely to be dismissed than high quality workers. Moreover, as hiring and firing costs increase, firms find it more costly to hire a bad worker and, thus, they prefer to hire out of the pool of employed job seekers rather than out of the pool of the unemployed, who are more likely to turn out to be 'lemons'. We use microdata for Spain and the U.S. and find that the ratio of the job finding probability of the unemployed to the job finding probability of employed job seekers was smaller in Spain than in the U.S. Furthermore, using U.S. data, we find that the discrimination of the unemployed increased over the 1980's in those states that raised firing costs by introducing exceptions to the employment-at-will doctrine.

Audit report on the Crawford County Area Solid Waste Agency Commission for the year ended June 30, 2007

Audit report on the Crawford County Area Solid Waste Agency Commission for the year ended June 30, 2007

Building an honest microfinance organization: Embezzlement and the optimality of rigid repayment schedules and joint liability

We consider the agency problem of a staff member managing microfinancing programs, who can abuse his discretion to embezzle borrowers' repayments. The fact that most borrowers of microfinancing programs are illiterate and live in rural areas where transportation costs are very high make staff's embezzlement particularly relevant as is documented by Mknelly and Kevane (2002). We study the trade-off between the optimal rigid lending contract and the optimal discretionary one and find that a rigid contract is optimal when the audit cost is larger than gains from insurance. Our analysis explains rigid repayment schedules used by the Grameen bank as an optimal response to the bank staff's agency problem. Joint liability reduces borrowers' burden of respecting the rigid repayment schedules by providing them with partial insurance. However, the same insurance can be provided byborrowers themselves under individual liability through a side-contract.