Game-theoretic view on intermediated exchange

Intermediaries permeate modern economic exchange. Most classical models on intermediated exchange are driven by information asymmetry and inventory management. These two factors are of reduced significance in modern economies. This makes it necessary to develop models that correspond more closely to modern financial marketplaces. The goal of this dissertation is to propose and examine such models in a game theoretical context. The proposed models are driven by asymmetries in the goals of different market participants. Hedging pressure as one of the most critical aspects in the behavior of commercial entities plays a crucial role. The first market model shows that no equilibrium solution can exist in a market consisting of a commercial buyer, a commercial seller and a non-commercial intermediary. This indicates a clear economic need for non-commercial trading intermediaries: a direct trade from seller to buyer does not result in an equilibrium solution. The second market model has two distinct intermediaries between buyer and seller: a spread trader/market maker and a risk-neutral intermediary. In this model a unique, natural equilibrium solution is identified in which the supply-demand surplus is traded by the risk-neutral intermediary, whilst the market maker trades the remainder from seller to buyer. Since the market maker’s payoff for trading at the identified equilibrium price is zero, this second model does not provide any motivation for the market maker to enter the market. The third market model introduces an explicit transaction fee that enables the market maker to secure a positive payoff. Under certain assumptions on this transaction fee the equilibrium solution of the previous model applies and now also provides a financial motivation for the market maker to enter the market. If the transaction fee violates an upper bound that depends on supply, demand and riskaversity of buyer and seller, the market will be in disequilibrium.

Optimal game theoretic distributed control methodologies in small scale power systems

This dissertation presents the competitive control methodologies for small-scale power system (SSPS). A SSPS is a collection of sources and loads that shares a common network which can be isolated during terrestrial disturbances. Micro-grids, naval ship electric power systems (NSEPS), aircraft power systems and telecommunication system power systems are typical examples of SSPS. The analysis and development of control systems for small-scale power systems (SSPS) lacks a defined slack bus. In addition, a change of a load or source will influence the real time system parameters of the system. Therefore, the control system should provide the required flexibility, to ensure operation as a single aggregated system. In most of the cases of a SSPS the sources and loads must be equipped with power electronic interfaces which can be modeled as a dynamic controllable quantity. The mathematical formulation of the micro-grid is carried out with the help of game theory, optimal control and fundamental theory of electrical power systems. Then the micro-grid can be viewed as a dynamical multi-objective optimization problem with nonlinear objectives and variables. Basically detailed analysis was done with optimal solutions with regards to start up transient modeling, bus selection modeling and level of communication within the micro-grids. In each approach a detail mathematical model is formed to observe the system response. The differential game theoretic approach was also used for modeling and optimization of startup transients. The startup transient controller was implemented with open loop, PI and feedback control methodologies. Then the hardware implementation was carried out to validate the theoretical results. The proposed game theoretic controller shows higher performances over traditional the PI controller during startup. In addition, the optimal transient surface is necessary while implementing the feedback controller for startup transient. Further, the experimental results are in agreement with the theoretical simulation. The bus selection and team communication was modeled with discrete and continuous game theory models. Although players have multiple choices, this controller is capable of choosing the optimum bus. Next the team communication structures are able to optimize the players’ Nash equilibrium point. All mathematical models are based on the local information of the load or source. As a result, these models are the keys to developing accurate distributed controllers.

The TViews Table Role-Playing Game

The TViews Table Role-Playing Game (TTRPG) is a digital tabletop role-playing game that runs on the TViews table, bridging the separate worlds of traditional role-playing games with the growing area of massively multiplayer online role-playing games. The TViews table is an interactive tabletop media platform that can track the location of multiple tagged objects in real-time as they are moved around its surface, providing a simultaneous and coincident graphical display. In this paper we present the implementation of the first version of TTRPG, with a content set based on the traditional Dungeons & Dragons rule-set. We also discuss the results of a user study that used TTRPG to explore the possible social context of digital tabletop role-playing games.

A Simple Computer Game for Learning Mathematics

It is sometimes unquantifiable how hard it is for most people to deal with game addiction. Several articles have equally been published to address this subject, some suggesting the concept of Educational and serious games. Similarly, researchers have revealed that it does not come easy learning a subject like math. This is where the illusive world of computer games comes in. It is amazing how much people learn from games. In this paper, we have designed and programmed a simple PC math game that teaches rudimentary topics in mathematics.