Effects of sources and meteorology on particulate matter in the Western Mediterranean Basin: An overview of the DAURE campaign

DAURE (Determination of the Sources of Atmospheric Aerosols in Urban and Rural Environments in the Western Mediterranean) was a multidisciplinary international field campaign aimed at investigating the sources and meteorological controls of particulate matter in the Western Mediterranean Basin (WMB). Measurements were simultaneously performed at an urban-coastal (Barcelona, BCN) and a rural-elevated (Montseny, MSY) site pair in NE Spain during winter and summer. State-of-the-art methods such as 14C analysis, proton-transfer reaction mass spectrometry, and high-resolution aerosol mass spectrometry were applied for the first time in the WMB as part of DAURE. WMB regional pollution episodes were associated with high concentrations of inorganic and organic species formed during the transport to inland areas and built up at regional scales. Winter pollutants accumulation depended on the degree of regional stagnation of an air mass under anticyclonic conditions and the planetary boundary layer height. In summer, regional recirculation and biogenic secondary organic aerosols (SOA) formation mainly determined the regional pollutant concentrations. The contribution from fossil sources to organic carbon (OC) and elemental carbon (EC) and hydrocarbon-like organic aerosol concentrations were higher at BCN compared with MSY due to traffic emissions. The relative contribution of nonfossil OC was higher at MSY especially in summer due to biogenic emissions. The fossil OC/EC ratio at MSY was twice the corresponding ratio at BCN indicating that a substantial fraction of fossil OC was due to fossil SOA. In winter, BCN cooking emissions were identified as an important source of modern carbon in primary organic aerosol.

France, Italy, and Spain: Culturally Similar Nations, Yet Drastically Different In Their Roles as European Union Nations

Since France, Italy and Spain are neighboring Western European countries, whose languages and cultures have descended from Latin, it is inevitable that these countries share similarities on many levels. France, Italy and Spain share similar lifestyles, religious values and cultural heritages. Throughout history France, Italy and Spain have experienced many of the same historical events because of their geographical proximity. Now that all three countries are members of the European Union they have become further united by occupying a common area without border controls, and sharing a common market, laws, and currency. While France, Italy and Spain share many commonalities, their opinions and relationships within the European Union are diverse. Although each nation struggles to balance its national identity with its European identity and to maintain its sovereignty while at the same time giving some of it up to the EU, each nation has its own ideas about how much its identity should change and how much sovereignty it should give up to the EU government. Each nation also has unique opinions about what it means to part of the European Union and what the requirements for becoming a member nation should be. Each nation has different goals it hopes to accomplish for its own country and for the European Union. The differing ideas amongst France, Italy and Spain are a result of the variance that exists amongst their political and economic relationships and institutions, which have been molded by the historical experiences of each nation. The focus of this paper will be examining why France, Spain and Italy share many cultural similarities, yet differ so greatly in their roles as members of the European Union. After a brief background on the European Union, I will discuss the cultural similarities France, Italy and Spain share. I will then mention several economic and political differences between the three countries and use supporting evidence to explain why and in what context these differences have arisen

The Global Plankton Database: an inventory and data from the Former Soviet Union expeditions

At present time, there is a lack of knowledge on the interannual climate-related variability of zooplankton communities of the tropical Atlantic, central Mediterranean Sea, Caspian Sea, and Aral Sea, due to the absence of appropriate databases. In the mid latitudes, the North Atlantic Oscillation (NAO) is the dominant mode of atmospheric fluctuations over eastern North America, the northern Atlantic Ocean and Europe. Therefore, one of the issues that need to be addressed through data synthesis is the evaluation of interannual patterns in species abundance and species diversity over these regions in regard to the NAO. The database has been used to investigate the ecological role of the NAO in interannual variations of mesozooplankton abundance and biomass along the zonal array of the NAO influence. Basic approach to the proposed research involved: (1) development of co-operation between experts and data holders in Ukraine, Russia, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, UK, and USA to rescue and compile the oceanographic data sets and release them on CD-ROM, (2) organization and compilation of a database based on FSU cruises to the above regions, (3) analysis of the basin-scale interannual variability of the zooplankton species abundance, biomass, and species diversity.

Geochemistry of basement carbonates from ODP Site 801 in the western Pacific Ocean

Many studies argue, based partly on Pb isotopic evidence, that recycled, subducted slabs reside in the mantle source of ocean island basalts (OIB) (Hofmann and White, 1982, doi:10.1016/0012-821X(82)90161-3; Weaver, 1991 doi:10.1016/0012-821X(91)90217-6; Lassiter, and Hauri, 1998, doi:10.1016/S0012-821X(98)00240-4). Such models, however, have remained largely untested against actual subduction zone inputs, due to the scarcity of comprehensive measurements of both radioactive parents (Th and U) and radiogenic daughter (Pb) in altered oceanic crust (AOC). Here, we discuss new, comprehensive measurements of U, Th, and Pb concentrations in the oldest AOC, ODP Site 801, and consider the effect of subducting this crust on the long-term Pb isotope evolution of the mantle. The upper 500 m of AOC at Site 801 shows >4-fold enrichment in U over pristine glass during seafloor alteration, but no net change to Pb or Th. Without subduction zone processing, ancient AOC would evolve to low 208Pb/206Pb compositions unobserved in the modern mantle (Hart and Staudigel, 1989 [Isotopic characterization and identification of recycled components, in: Crust/Mantle Recycling at Convergence Zones, Eds. S.R. Hart, L. Gqlen, NATO ASI Series. Series C: Mathematical and Physical Sciences 258, pp. 15-28, D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht-Boston, 1989]). Subduction, however, drives U-Th-Pb fractionation as AOC dehydrates in the earth's interior. Pacific arcs define mixing trends requiring 8-fold enrichment in Pb over U in AOC-derived fluid. A mass balance across the Mariana subduction zone shows that 44-75% of Pb but <10% of U is lost from AOC to the arc, and a further 10-23% of Pb and 19-40% of U is lost to the back-arc. Pb is lost shallow and U deep from subducted AOC, which may be a consequence of the stability of phases binding these elements during seafloor alteration: U in carbonate and Pb in sulfides. The upper end of these recycling estimates, which reflect maximum arc and back-arc growth rates, remove enough Pb and U from the slab to enable it to evolve rapidly (<<0.5 Ga) to sources suitable to explain the 208Pb/206Pb isotopic array of OIB, although these conditions fail to simultaneously satisfy the 207Pb/206Pb system. Lower growth rates would require additional U loss (29%) at depths beyond the zones of arc and back-arc magmagenesis, which would decrease upper mantle kappa (232Th/238U) over time, consistent with one solution to the "kappa conundrum" (Elliott et al., 1999, doi:10.1016/S0012-821X(99)00077-1). The net effects of alteration (doubling of l [238U/204Pb]) and subduction (doubling of omega [232Th/204Pb]) are sufficient to create the Pb isotopic signatures of oceanic basalts.

Do European Union fines deter price-fixing? Bruegel Policy Brief 2013/04, May 2013

The issue: Anti-cartel enforcement is the least controversial of competition policy themes. Agreements to restrict competition such as price fixing or market sharing have obvious negative effects on welfare. Within the European Union, however, industry representatives have increasingly voiced concern that the European Commission applies a too-strict fining policy to enforce anti-cartel law, particularly since the introduction of new guidelines on fines in 2006. Fines are said to be too high, disproportionate and liable to introduce distortions into the market, ultimately leading to higher prices for consumers. It is often argued that more lenient approaches should be followed in crisis times. Policy challenge: High fines for cartel activity could entail costs for society and might be difficult to implement. Nevertheless, there is no case for reducing current levels of EU anti-cartel fines. Fine levels already take the economic crisis into account, and the net present value of fines might prove to be too low to discourage collusion. We estimate that fines might even be not high enough to offset the additional profits yielded by collusion. Fines should be complemented with other measures to increase deterrence, in particular personal sanctions targeting company officers who are responsible for leading the company to commit infringements. In the short term, pressure on decision makers could be increased by reducing the expected duration of investigations.

The Pro-Western Turn in Russia's Foreign Policy: Causes, Consequences and Prospects. OSW Point of View, September 2002

From Europe and Poland's point of view, one of the most important recent developments in international politics was the re-orientation of Russia's foreign policy. This paper aims to answer three important questions relating to this issue: 4. When and why did the "pro-Western turn" in the Russian Federation's policy take place? 5. Has it been profitable for Russia? 6. What goals will the Russian policy pursue in the future? An analysis of the last two years in Russia's foreign policy leads to the several conclusions, including those: 5. Clearly, the Russian leaders realise that in the longer term, Russia - in its desire for more influence in the world - will not be able to survive as an independent pole of power in international politics and it will have to join forces with the West (most likely, the European Union). 6. September 11 was not the cause of Russia's pro-Western turn, but rather a catalyst that put the process which started when Vladimir Putin took his office in sharp focus. 7. In the nearest future, this new direction of Russia's foreign policy seems not be challenged by internal opposition in Russia. 8. The "pro-Western turn" proved to be beneficial for Russia, although: d. Russia has not become a strategic ally of the US e. There has been no breakthrough in the relations between Russia and the European Union, and Moscow has not gained any real influence on NATO's important decisions. f. Russia has not become a major decision-maker of international politics. 5. Russia's closing to the West is in Poland's and Europe's interest.

Turkey after the start of negotiations with the European Union - foreign relations and the domestic situation, Part II. OSW Report, July 2008

The Centre for Eastern Studies has decided to embark on the project entitled 'Turkey after the start of negotiations with the European Union - foreign relations and the domestic situation' for two major reasons: the start of the accession negotiations between Ankara and the European Union in October 2005, and the significant part which Turkey plays in western Eurasia (the Caucasus, the countries in the basins of the Black and Caspian Seas, the Middle East and the Balkans) which We wish to present our readers our second report discussing Turkey's relations with Central Asia, the Caucasus and Russia, the aspect of Turkish foreign policy regarding the Black Sea, and the role of Turkey as a transit country for oil and gas from the Middle East and the Caspian regions. The evaluation of Turkey's standpoint and potential regarding the aforementioned issues is especially important, considering the tensions existing in Turkey's relations with the EU and the USA, as well as the West's increasing engagement in the Caucasus, Central Asia and Black Sea regions. In this process, Ankara may play the role of a significant ally for the West. However, it may just as readily play the role of its rival, who could co-operate with other countries and may seriously frustrate the implementation of the EU and US' goals. The Report was developed between autumn 2006 and autumn 2007, over which time the project participants searched for publicly available documents in Poland, Turkey, EU countries and the USA, and went on five research trips to Central Asia, Russia, Turkey and Caucasus, where they met local analysts, officials and researchers.

Dialogue with the Eurasian Union on Ukraine – an opportunity or a trap? OSW COMMENTARY No. 154, 2014-12-01

The Eurasian Union (or, to give it its full name, the Eurasian Economic Union, EEU) is Russia's flagship project, by use of which it aims to institutionally subordinate the post-Soviet states to itself using political ties and the projected common economic space. The Kremlin has so far managed to persuade Belarus and Kazakhstan, and tentatively also Armenia, to join this integration project, which on the surface looks like a multilateral initiative but in reality conceals a network of bilateral relations centred on Russia. However, in order for Russia to reconstruct its influence in its neighbourhood permanently and without change, it is of key importance that Ukraine is incorporated into the EEU. That still seemed feasible even in 2013, but the Maidan and the Russian-Ukrainian war have undone this possibility. However, they also opened up an alternative scenario for Russia, one in which the Western states recognise the Eurasian Union as a legitimate partner in discussions about a new order in Europe with a view to restoring peace in Ukraine. It is worth taking into account the strategic consequences of that scenario. We need to consider if the idea which Moscow has been lobbying for – and which has found some supporters in Brussels and Berlin – threatens to take us back to the Cold War system of geopolitical blocs and implies recognition of Russia's dominance over Ukraine and the other Eastern Partnership countries?

Review of the Economic Development in the Western Balkan States. OSW STUDIES No. 19, 2005-08-10

Foreword. Ten years after the end of the armed conflict, the Western Balkans1 are still being considered as the “land of the unsuccessful policies”. Enormous financial and technical assistance transferred by the International Community has not managed to meet the goals of integrating the region within itself as well as within the European markets. Explanation for this can be found in the consequences of the war and the remnants of the socialist state. The complexity of current institutional/ political arrangements combined with the limited willingness of the regional actors to introduce and implement much of the needed reforms have additionally contributed to the current state of affairs. The economy and politics in the region intertwine to an extent as probably in none of the other post-communist states. Therefore, the paper presents the recent economic performance of the Western Balkan countries in the light of their limited institutional development and lack of efficient regional cooperation. The paper discusses the importance of foreign direct investments’ inflow for the economic growth of the “latecomer” states and presents major drawbacks which limit the influx of the foreign capital to the region. It presents private sector activity and regional cooperation programmes. It discusses the role of the International Community with the main focus on the activities of the European Union. The EU is examined not only as the main aid donor but more importantly as a foreign trade partner. Furthermore, it analyses the impact of the presence of the International Community and their strategies towards the region with the special attention to the EU. Finally, it presents recommendations for the improvement of the economic performance in light of the enhanced political cooperation between the EU and the region.

Energy Union: Can Europe learn from Japan’s joint gas purchasing? CEPS Commentary, 11 December 2014

Japan’s two major electricity producing companies reached a preliminary agreement recently to establish a joint venture for the procurement of fossil fuel resources, primarily liquefied natural gas (LNG). The authors of this commentary ask whether this commercial initiative could serve as an example to Europe of how to increase the negotiating power of individual EU member states. They conclude that a private joint gas procurement company may indeed offer a solution for EU member states in Central and Eastern Europe, instead of yet another source of confrontation. Given the political volatility in the region, it could well be the key to balancing out the need for security of supply with an offer to guarantee security of demand, thereby creating the climate for stable commercial relations.

The "Pro-Western Turn" in Russia's Foreign Policy: Causes, Consequences and Prospects. OSW Point of View (unspecified), September 2002

From Europe and Poland's point of view, one of the most important recent developments in international politics was the re-orientation of Russia's foreign policy. This paper aims to answer three important questions relating to this issue: 1. When and why did the "pro-Western turn" in the Russian Federation's policy take place? 2. Has it been profitable for Russia? 3. What goals will the Russian policy pursue in the future? An analysis of the last two years in Russia's foreign policy leads to the several conclusions, including those: a. Clearly, the Russian leaders realise that in the longer term, Russia - in its desire for more influence in the world - will not be able to survive as an independent pole of power in international politics and it will have to join forces with the West (most likely, the European Union). b. September 11 was not the cause of Russia's pro-Western turn, but rather a catalyst that put the process which started when Vladimir Putin took his office in sharp focus. 7. In the nearest future, this new direction of Russia's foreign policy seems not be challenged by internal opposition in Russia. c. The "pro-Western turn" proved to be beneficial for Russia, although: d. Russia has not become a strategic ally of the US e. There has been no breakthrough in the relations between Russia and the European Union, and Moscow has not gained any real influence on NATO's important decisions. f. Russia has not become a major decision-maker of international politics. g. Russia's closing to the West is in Poland's and Europe's interest.

Efficient taxation of multi-national enterprises in the European Union. Bruges European Economic Policy (BEEP) Briefing 5/2003

Current arrangements for multi-national company taxation in EU are plagued by severe conceptual and administrative problems, leading to high compliance costs, considerable uncertainty and ample room for abuse. Integration is amplifying these difficulties. There are two possible approaches in designing an efficient trans-border corporate tax system for the European Union. The first is to consolidate the EU-wide operations of MNEs, using an agreed common base as the reference variable, and then to apportion this total tax base using some presumptive indicators of activity in each tax jurisdiction – hence, implicitly, of the likely benefits stemming from each location. The apportionment formula should respect requisites of neutrality between productive factors and forms of corporate financing. A radically different approach is also available that offers considerable advantages in terms of efficiency, simplicity and decentralisation, including full administrative autonomy of national tax authorities. It entails abandoning corporate income as the relevant tax base and taxing at a moderate rate some agreed measure of business activity such as company value added, sales or employment. These are the variables usually considered in formula apportionment, but they would apply directly without having first to go through the complications of EU-wide consolidation based on a common-base definition. Reference to a broad base, with no exemptions or deductions, would allow to set low statutory rates.