Recontracting and competition

We characterize the set of Walrasian allocations of an economy as theset of allocations which can be supported by abstract equilibria that satisfy a recontracting condition which reflects the idea that agents can freely trade with each other. An alternative (and weaker) recontracting condition characterizesthe core. The results are extended to production economies by extending thedefinition of the recontracting condition to include the possibility of agentsto recontract with firms. However, no optimization requirement is imposed onfirms. In pure exchange economies, an abstract equilibrium is a feasible allocation and a list of choice sets, one for each agent, that satisfy thefollowing conditions: an agent's choice set is a subset of the commodity space that includes his endowment; and each agent's equilibrium bundle isa maximal element in his choice set, with respect to his preferences. Therecontracting condition requires that any agent can buy bundles from any other agent's choice set by offering the other agent a bundle he prefers tohis equilibrium bundle.

Intraspecific competition reveals conditional fitness effects of single gene polymorphism at the Arabidopsis root growth regulator BRX.

Intraspecific genetic variation for morphological traits is observed in many organisms. In Arabidopsis thaliana, alleles responsible for intraspecific morphological variation are increasingly being identified. However, the fitness consequences remain unclear in most cases. Here, the fitness effects of alleles of the BRX gene are investigated. A brx loss-of-function allele, which was found in a natural accession, results in a highly branched but poorly elongated root system. Comparison between the control accession Sav-0 and an introgression of brx into this background (brxS) indicated that, surprisingly, brx loss of function did not negatively affect fitness in pure stands. However, in mixed, well-watered stands brxS performance and reproductive output decreased significantly, as the proportion of Sav-0 neighbors increased. Additional comparisons between brxS and a brxS line that was complemented by a BRX transgene confirmed a direct effect of the loss-of-function allele on plant performance, as indicated by restored competitive ability of the transgenic genotype. Further, because plant height was very similar across genotypes and because the experimental setup largely excluded shading effects, the impaired competitiveness of the brx loss-of-function genotype likely reflects below-ground competition. In summary, these data reveal conditional fitness effects of a single gene polymorphism in response to intraspecific competition in Arabidopsis.

Biologia, comportamento social e alocação sexual de Digelasinus diversipes (Kirby, 1882) (Hymenoptera, Argidae)

São apresentados os resultados de um estudo de dois anos sobre o Symphyta neotropical Digelasinus diversipes. Esta espécie é univoltina e comum na Estação Ecológica Jataí, uma reserva de Cerrado no Estado de São Paulo. As larvas alimentam-se gregariamente em Eugenia glazioviana (Myrtaceae) de novembro a abril. Associações entre grupos de alimentação foram freqüentes. Após o período de alimentação, as larvas congregam-se e comunalmente constróem uma massa de casulos (105 casulos ± 60DP; n = 25) aderida ao tronco da planta hospedeira, permanecendo em diapausa como prepupas até o início da estação chuvosa, em outubro. O pico populacional foi observado em dezembro, quando 62% (n = 2.967) dos adultos emergiram. Em condições experimentais, foram observadas emergências das 6:30 às 15:00 h, mas 73,5% (n = 223) dos adultos emergiram entre 9:00 e 12:00 h. Não foi observado, durante a emergência, sequenciamento sexual, mas em um agregado de casulos os machos podem emergir de 20 a 40 dias antes das fêmeas. Após a emergência os machos podem (1) dispersar-se (no início e final do período de emergência; outubro e novembro, janeiro e fevereiro, respectivamente) ou (2) permanecer sobre ou próximo ao agregado de casulos e copular com as fêmeas recém-emergidas (durante o pico de emergência, em dezembro). As cópulas duraram 4,28 minutos (± 3,4DP; n = 28). Ao longo do dia, os machos podem copular com diferentes fêmeas (1-8; n = 5); contudo, as fêmeas copularam apenas uma vez. Em média, as fêmeas emergem com 76 (± 21DP; n = 19) ovos maduros e todos eles são ovipositados de uma só vez sob uma única folha da planta hospedeira. A guarda dos ovos pelas fêmeas durou apenas 2 dias (n = 12) dos 30 necessários para sua incubação. O repertório de comportamentos da fêmea contra potenciais inimigos foi menor do que o observado em outras espécies de Symphyta. Aparentemente, a fêmea induz um necrosamento do tecido foliar que cobre os ovos. Isto formaria uma proteção rígida para os ovos durante sua incubação. Em D. diversipes, adultos de ambos os sexos não se alimentaram (condição controlada) e tiveram vida curta (5,2 dias ± 1,7DP; mínimo 1, máximo 11; n = 179). A razão sexual média foi 2,83 (± 0,014EP) em favor de fêmeas. Os principais fatores de mortalidade foram falhas no desenvolvimento, falta de alimento devido à intensa herbivoria e ataque de parasitóides. Parasitóides criados, Lymeon dieloceri (Costa Lima, 1937) (Ichneumonidae), Conura (Spilochalcis) sp. (Chalcididae) e Perilampus sp. (Perilampidae).

An agenda-setting model of electoral competition

This paper presents a model of electoral competition focusing on the formation of thepublic agenda. An incumbent government and a challenger party in opposition competein elections by choosing the issues that will key out their campaigns. Giving salience toan issue implies proposing an innovative policy proposal, alternative to the status-quo.Parties trade off the issues with high salience in voters concerns and those with broadagreement on some alternative policy proposal. Each party expects a higher probabilityof victory if the issue it chooses becomes salient in the voters decision. But remarkably,the issues which are considered the most important ones by a majority of votes may notbe given salience during the electoral campaign. An incumbent government may survivein spite of its bad policy performance if there is no sufficiently broad agreement on apolicy alternative. We illustrate the analytical potential of the model with the case of theUnited States presidential election in 2004.

Dynamic price competition with fixed capacities

Many revenue management (RM) industries are characterized by (a) fixed capacities in theshort term (e.g., hotel rooms, seats on an airline flight), (b) homogeneous products (e.g., twoairline flights between the same cities at similar times), and (c) customer purchasing decisionslargely influenced by price. Competition in these industries is also very high even with just twoor three direct competitors in a market. However, RM competition is not well understood andpractically all known implementations of RM software and most published models of RM donot explicitly model competition. For this reason, there has been considerable recent interestand research activity to understand RM competition. In this paper we study price competitionfor an oligopoly in a dynamic setting, where each of the sellers has a fixed number of unitsavailable for sale over a fixed number of periods. Demand is stochastic, and depending on howit evolves, sellers may change their prices at any time. This reflects the fact that firms constantly,and almost costlessly, change their prices (alternately, allocations at a price in quantity-basedRM), reacting either to updates in their estimates of market demand, competitor prices, orinventory levels. We first prove existence of a unique subgame-perfect equilibrium for a duopoly.In equilibrium, in each state sellers engage in Bertrand competition, so that the seller withthe lowest reservation value ends up selling a unit at a price that is equal to the equilibriumreservation value of the competitor. This structure hence extends the marginal-value conceptof bid-price control, used in many RM implementations, to a competitive model. In addition,we show that the seller with the lowest capacity sells all its units first. Furthermore, we extendthe results transparently to n firms and perform a number of numerical comparative staticsexploiting the uniqueness of the subgame-perfect equilibrium.

Sexual associations for two species of mutillid wasps (Hymenoptera, Mutillidae), with the description of a new species of Anomophotopsis

The sexes of Pseudometocha melanocephala (Perty, 1833) and of a new species of Anomophotopsis are associated based on mating pairs found in the field and also in laboratory mating trials. The previously unknown male of Pseudomethoca melanocephala (Perty, 1833) and both sexes of Anomophotopsis quinteroi Cambra, sp. nov., are described. We present the first distribution record of P. melanocephala from Argentina. Anecdotal data on their mating behavior are also discussed.

Comportamento sexual de Anastrepha sororcula Zucchi (Diptera, Tephritidae) em laboratório

Anastrepha sororcula Zucchi, 1979, é uma das espécies de mosca-das-frutas mais disseminadas no País, sendo considerada a praga-chave que causa os maiores danos à produção de goiaba (Psidium guajava L., 1758) no Brasil. Em vista da importância desta espécie no complexo de pragas naturais da fruticultura brasileira e, em face à escassez de dados sobre sua biologia e comportamento, este trabalho teve por objetivo obter informações sobre a idade de maturação sexual de A. sororcula em laboratório e descrever seu comportamento reprodutivo. Os machos atingiram a maturidade sexual entre 7 e 18 dias após a emergência, com a maioria dos indivíduos tornando-se sexualmente maduros entre 10 e 13 dias de idade. Exibiram comportamento de sinalização às fêmeas, caracterizado pela distensão da região pleural do abdome, formando uma pequena bolsa de cada lado e, eversão de uma diminuta bolsa membranosa de cutícula retal que circunda a área anal. Durante este processo, os machos realizaram rápidos movimentos de vibração das asas, produzindo sinais audíveis. Uma gotícula foi liberada da região anal durante os movimentos de vibração alar. Após a atração das fêmeas, os machos realizaram uma série de movimentos elaborados de cortejo. As fêmeas alcançaram a maturação sexual entre 14 e 24 dias da emergência, com a maioria tornando-se sexualmente madura aos 19 dias de idade. A exibição diária das atividades sexuais foi confinada quase que exclusivamente ao período das 16:00-17:30h. A. sororcula apresentou um acentuado padrão de protandria.

Competition, innovation and growth with limited commitment

We study how barriers to business start-up affect the investment in knowledge capital when contracts are not enforceable. Barriers to business start-up lower the competition for knowledge capital and, in absence of commitment, reduce the incentive to accumulate knowledge. As a result, countries with large barriers experience lower income and growth. Our results are consistent with cross-country evidence showing that the cost of business start-up is negatively correlated with the level and growth of income.

Globalization and the provision of incentives inside the firm: The effect of foreign competition

This paper studies the effect of changes in foreign competition on the structureof compensation and incentives of U.S. executives. We measure foreign competitionas import penetration and use tariffs and exchange rates as instrumental variables toestimate its causal effect on pay. We find that higher foreign competition leads tomore incentive provision in a variety of ways. First, it increases the sensitivity of payto performance. Second, it increases whithin-firm pay differentials between executivelevels, with CEOs typically experiencing the largest wage increases, partly becausethey receive the steepest incentive contracts. Finally, higher foreign competition is alsoassociated with a higher demand for talent. These results indicate that increased foreigncompetition can explain some of the recent trends in compensation structures.

The effect of intergroup competition on group coordination: An experimental study

We report an experiment on the effect of intergroup competition on group coordination in the minimal-effort game (Van Huyck et al., 1990). The competition was between two 7-person groups. Each player in each group independently chose an integer from 1 to 7. The group with the higher minimum won the competition and each of its members was paid according to the game s original payoff matrix. Members of the losing group were paid nothing. In case of a tie, each player was paid half the payoff in the original matrix. This treatment was contrasted with two control treatments where each of the two groups played an independent coordination game, either with or without information about the minimum chosen by the outgroup. Although the intergroup competition does not change the set of strict equilibria, we found that it improved collective rationality by moving group members in the direction of higher-payoff equilibria. Merely providing group members with information about the minimal-effort level in the other group was not sufficient to generate this effect.

Managing competition in professional services and the burden of inertia

Professional services require certain organizational patterns in order to avoid information asymmetries and external effects. These same patterns are used within production structures involving various degrees of monopoly. However, competitive restraints are justified today only when substantial external effects are clearly present, whereas information asymmetries hardly justify such restraints because reputational investments have become widespread in the economy and are relatively efficient in overcoming such asymmetries. As a consequence, innovation in the production of externalities can make competitive constraints unnecessary.