Northeast Iowa Schools Insurance Trust, Independent Auditor's Reports, Financial Statement and Required Supplementary Information, Schedule of Findings, June 30, 2005

Other Audit Reports - 28E Organizations

Social Security in Theory and Practice (II): Efficiency Theories, Narrative Theories, and Implications for Reform

166 countries have some kind of public old age pension. What economic forces create and sustain old age Social Security as a public program? Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (1999b) document several of the internationally and historically common features of social security programs, and explore "political" theories of Social Security. This paper discusses the "efficiency theories", which view creation of the SS program as a full of partial solution to some market failure. Efficiency explanations of social security include the "SS as welfare for the elderly" the "retirement increases productivity to optimally manage human capital externalities", "optimal retirement insurance", the "prodigal father problem", the "misguided Keynesian", the "optimal longevity insurance", the "government economizing transaction costs", and the "return on human capital investment". We also analyze four "narrative" theories of social security: the "chain letter theory", the "lump of labor theory", the "monopoly capitalism theory", and the "Sub-but-Nearly-Optimal policy response to private pensions theory". The political and efficiency explanations are compared with the international and historical facts and used to derive implications for replacing the typical pay-as-you-go system with a forced savings plan. Most of the explanations suggest that forced savings does not increase welfare, and may decrease it.

A-1A Supplemental Security Income Program, July 2006

Supplemental Security Income Program, May 2006

A-1A Supplemental Security Income Program, May 2006

Supplemental Security Income Program, May 2006

A-1A Supplemental Security Income Program, June 2006

Supplemental Security Income Program, May 2006

Reputation based on punishment rather than generosity allows for evolution of cooperation in sizable groups

Cooperation among unrelated individuals can arise if decisions to help others can be based on reputation. While working for dyadic interactions, reputation-use in social dilemmas involving many individuals (e.g. public goods games) becomes increasingly difficult as groups become larger and errors more frequent. Reputation is therefore believed to have played a minor role for the evolution of cooperation in collective action dilemmas such as those faced by early humans. Here, we show in computer simulations that a reputation system based on punitive actions can overcome these problems and, compared to reputation system based on generous actions, (i) is more likely to lead to the evolution of cooperation in sizable groups, (ii) more effectively sustains cooperation within larger groups, and (iii) is more robust to errors in reputation assessment. Punishment and punishment reputation could therefore have played crucial roles in the evolution of cooperation within larger groups of humans.

A-1A Supplemental Security Income Program, August 2006

A-1A Supplemental Security Income Program, August 2006

Office of Treasurer of State, Iowa Educational Savings Plan Trust, Independent Auditor's Reports, Financial Statements and Supplementary Information, June 30, 2006

State Audit Reports

A-1A Supplemental Security Income Program, September 2006

A-1A Supplemental Security Income Program produced by the Department of Human Services

A-1A Supplemental Security Income Program, June 2002

Monthly report from Iowa Department of Human Services on income.

A-1A Supplemental Security Income Program, January 2002

Monthly report from Iowa Department of Human Services on income.

A-1A Supplemental Security Income Program, February 2002

Monthly report from Iowa Department of Human Services on income.

A-1A Supplemental Security Income Program, March 2002

Monthly report from Iowa Department of Human Services on income.

A-1A Supplemental Security Income Program, April 2002

Monthly report from Iowa Department of Human Services on income.

A-1A Supplemental Security Income Program, May 2002

Monthly report from Iowa Department of Human Services on income.