Annuaire des postes, ou Manuel du service de la poste aux lettres : à l'usage du commerce et des voyageurs / publié par ordre de l'administration

1843.

Annuaire des postes, ou Manuel du service de la poste aux lettres : à l'usage du commerce et des voyageurs / publié par ordre de l'administration

1901.

Annuaire encyclopédique : politique, économie sociale, statistique, administration, sciences, littérature, beaux-arts, agriculture, commerce, industrie / publié par les directeurs de l'Encyclopédie du XIXe siècle

1861.

Annuaire encyclopédique : politique, économie sociale, statistique, administration, sciences, littérature, beaux-arts, agriculture, commerce, industrie / publié par les directeurs de l'Encyclopédie du XIXe siècle

1863.

Annuaire encyclopédique : politique, économie sociale, statistique, administration, sciences, littérature, beaux-arts, agriculture, commerce, industrie / publié par les directeurs de l'Encyclopédie du XIXe siècle

1859-1860.

Annuaire encyclopédique : politique, économie sociale, statistique, administration, sciences, littérature, beaux-arts, agriculture, commerce, industrie / publié par les directeurs de l'Encyclopédie du XIXe siècle

1865-1866.

Annuaire encyclopédique : politique, économie sociale, statistique, administration, sciences, littérature, beaux-arts, agriculture, commerce, industrie / publié par les directeurs de l'Encyclopédie du XIXe siècle

1869 (T9)-1871.

Annuaire encyclopédique : politique, économie sociale, statistique, administration, sciences, littérature, beaux-arts, agriculture, commerce, industrie / publié par les directeurs de l'Encyclopédie du XIXe siècle

1868 (T8).

Annuaire encyclopédique : politique, économie sociale, statistique, administration, sciences, littérature, beaux-arts, agriculture, commerce, industrie / publié par les directeurs de l'Encyclopédie du XIXe siècle

1867.

Annuaire encyclopédique : politique, économie sociale, statistique, administration, sciences, littérature, beaux-arts, agriculture, commerce, industrie / publié par les directeurs de l'Encyclopédie du XIXe siècle

1864.

Annuaire encyclopédique : politique, économie sociale, statistique, administration, sciences, littérature, beaux-arts, agriculture, commerce, industrie / publié par les directeurs de l'Encyclopédie du XIXe siècle

1862.

Stochasticity in economic losses increases the value of reputation in indirect reciprocity.

Recent theory predicts harsh and stochastic conditions to generally promote the evolution of cooperation. Here, we test experimentally whether stochasticity in economic losses also affects the value of reputation in indirect reciprocity, a type of cooperation that is very typical for humans. We used a repeated helping game with observers. One subject (the "Unlucky") lost some money, another one (the "Passer-by") could reduce this loss by accepting a cost to herself, thereby building up a reputation that could be used by others in later interactions. The losses were either stable or stochastic, but the average loss over time and the average efficiency gains of helping were kept constant in both treatments. We found that players with a reputation of being generous were generally more likely to receive help by others, such that investing into a good reputation generated long-term benefits that compensated for the immediate costs of helping. Helping frequencies were similar in both treatments, but players with a reputation to be selfish lost more resources under stochastic conditions. Hence, returns on investment were steeper when losses varied than when they did not. We conclude that this type of stochasticity increases the value of reputation in indirect reciprocity.

Tacit Collusion under Fairness and Reciprocity

This paper departs from the standard profit-maximizing model of firm behavior by assuming that firms are motivated in part by personal animosity-or respect-towards their competitors. A reciprocal firm responds to unkind behavior of rivals with unkind actions (negative reciprocity), while at the same time, it responds to kind behavior of rivals with kind actions (positive reciprocity). We find that collusion is easier to sustain when firms have a concern for reciprocity towards competing firms provided that they consider collusive prices to be kind and punishment prices to be unkind. Thus, reciprocity concerns among firms can have adverse welfare consequences for consumers.