The effect of intergroup competition on group coordination: An experimental study

We report an experiment on the effect of intergroup competition on group coordination in the minimal-effort game (Van Huyck et al., 1990). The competition was between two 7-person groups. Each player in each group independently chose an integer from 1 to 7. The group with the higher minimum won the competition and each of its members was paid according to the game s original payoff matrix. Members of the losing group were paid nothing. In case of a tie, each player was paid half the payoff in the original matrix. This treatment was contrasted with two control treatments where each of the two groups played an independent coordination game, either with or without information about the minimum chosen by the outgroup. Although the intergroup competition does not change the set of strict equilibria, we found that it improved collective rationality by moving group members in the direction of higher-payoff equilibria. Merely providing group members with information about the minimal-effort level in the other group was not sufficient to generate this effect.

Relationships between host plant architecture and gall abundance and survival

The plant architecture hypothesis predicts that variation in host plant architecture influences insect herbivore community structure, dynamics and performance. In this study we evaluated the effects of Macairea radula (Melastomataceae) architecture on the abundance of galls induced by a moth (Lepidoptera: Gelechiidae). Plant architecture and gall abundance were directly recorded on 58 arbitrarily chosen M. radula host plants in the rainy season of 2006 in an area of Cerrado vegetation, southeastern Brazil. Plant height, dry biomass, number of branches, number of shoots and leaf abundance were used as predicting variables of gall abundance and larval survival. Gall abundance correlated positively with host plant biomass and branch number. Otherwise, no correlation (p > 0.05) was found between gall abundance with shoot number or with the number of leaves/plant. From a total of 124 galls analyzed, 67.7% survived, 14.5% were attacked by parasitoids, while 17.7% died due to unknown causes. Larvae that survived or were parasitized were not influenced by architectural complexity of the host plant. Our results partially corroborate the plant architecture hypothesis, but since parasitism was not related to plant architecture it is argued that bottom-up effects may be more important than top-down effects in controlling the population dynamics of the galling lepidopteran. Because galling insects often decrease plant fitness, the potential of galling insects in selecting for less architectural complex plants is discussed.

Ex post bargaining, labor coordination and wage formation at the firm level

We lay out a model of wage bargaining with two leading features:bargaining is ex post to relevant investments and there isindividual bargaining in firms without a Union. We compareindividual ex post bargaining to coordinated ex post bargainingand we analyze the effects on wage formation. As opposed to exante bargaining models, the costs of destroying the employmentrelationship play a crucial role in determining wages. Highfiring costs in particular yield a rent for employees. Ourtheory points to a employer size-wage effect that is independentof the production function and market power. We derive a simpleleast squares specification from the theoretical model thatallow us to estimate components of the wage premium fromcoordination. We reject the hypothesis that labor coordinationdoes not alter the extensive form of the bargaining game. Laborcoordination substantially increases bargaining power butdecreases labor's ability to pose costly threats to the firm.

Communication, coordination and efficiency in evolutionary one-population models

We analyze the role of commitment in pre-play communication for ensuringefficient evolutionarily stable outcomes in coordination games. All players are a priori identical as they are drawn from the same population. In games where efficient outcomes can be reached by players coordinating on the same action we find commitment to be necessary to enforce efficiency. In games where efficienct outcomes only result from play of different actions, communication without commitment is most effective although efficiency can no longer be guaranteed. Only when there are many messages then inefficient outcomes are negligible as their basins of attraction become very small.

Equilibrium selection through incomplete information in coordination games: An experimental study

We perform an experiment on a pure coordination game with uncertaintyabout the payoffs. Our game is closely related to models that have beenused in many macroeconomic and financial applications to solve problemsof equilibrium indeterminacy. In our experiment each subject receives anoisy signal about the true payoffs. This game has a unique strategyprofile that survives the iterative deletion of strictly dominatedstrategies (thus a unique Nash equilibrium). The equilibrium outcomecoincides, on average, with the risk-dominant equilibrium outcome ofthe underlying coordination game. The behavior of the subjects convergesto the theoretical prediction after enough experience has been gained. The data (and the comments) suggest that subjects do not apply through"a priori" reasoning the iterated deletion of dominated strategies.Instead, they adapt to the responses of other players. Thus, the lengthof the learning phase clearly varies for the different signals. We alsotest behavior in a game without uncertainty as a benchmark case. The gamewith uncertainty is inspired by the "global" games of Carlsson and VanDamme (1993).

Congruences between modular forms and lowering the level mod l^n

In this article we study the behavior of inertia groups for modularGalois mod l^n representations and in some cases we give a generalizationof Ribet s lowering the level result (cf. [Rib90]).

Computing congruences of modular forms and Galois representations modulo prime powers

This article starts a computational study of congruences of modular forms and modular Galoisrepresentations modulo prime powers. Algorithms are described that compute the maximum integermodulo which two monic coprime integral polynomials have a root in common in a sensethat is defined. These techniques are applied to the study of congruences of modular forms andmodular Galois representations modulo prime powers. Finally, some computational results withimplications on the (non-)liftability of modular forms modulo prime powers and possible generalisationsof level raising are presented.