A cognitive Approach to Moral Responsibility: the case of a failed attempt to kill

Many theoretical claims about the folk concept of moral responsibility coming from the current literature are indeterminate because researchers do not clearly specify the folk concept of moral responsibility in question. The article pursues a cognitive approach to folk concepts that pays special attention to this indeterminacy problem. After addressing the problem, the article provides evidence on folk attributions of moral responsibility in the case a failed attempt to kill that goes against a specific claim coming from the current literature—that the dimension of causation is part of the structure of the folk concept of moral responsibility.

The good, the bad and the 'not so bad': reflecting on moral appraisal in practice

The aim of this paper is to facilitate reflection on the moral merit of practitioners in various contexts. Insight is gained from Aristotelian and Kantian accounts of moral character and an original framework for reflection is presented as an adjunct to ethical theory and principles considered when appraising others. In relation to states of character there is an irreconcilable difference between Kantian (deontic) and Aristotelian (aretaic) conceptions of the nature of full virtue (excellence of character), but at the same time it can be argued that in relation to practice their approaches complement each other. It is also argued that in relation to caring for the vulnerable, Aristotle’s conception of full virtue is more compelling than Kant’s. On the other hand, Kant’s notion of self - serving action is important in nursing and it therefore needs to be considered when reflecting on professional conduct. The conclusion reached is that Aristotelian and Kantian accounts of character appraisal should be used in a combined approach to moral appraisal. This approach draws on the accounts of both philosophers and offers valuable insight into moral character, professional conduct and, in a more formal setting, fitness to practise.

Re-imagining DDR Ex-combatants, leadership and moral agency in conflict transformation

Drawing upon criminological studies in the field of prisoner rehabilitation, this essay explores the relevance of the Demobilisation, Disarmament and Reintegration (DDR) framework to the process of conflict transformation in Northern Ireland. In a similar fashion to the critique of 'passivity' offered by, for example, the 'strengths based' or 'good lives' approach to prisoner resettlement and reintegration more generally, the authors contend that the Northern Ireland peace process offers conspicuous examples of former prisoners and combatants as agents and indeed leaders in the process of conflict transformation. They draw out three broad styles of leadership which have emerged amongst ex-combatants over the course of the Northern Ireland transition from conflict-political, military and communal. They suggest that cumulatively such leadership speaks to the potential of ex-prisoners and ex-combatants as moral agents in conflict transformation around which peacemaking can be constructed rather than as obstacles which must be 'managed' out of existence.

Moral Compromise

A moral compromise is a compromise on moral matters; it is agreement in the face of moral disagreement but where there is agreement on the importance of consensus – namely that it secures a morally desirable outcome. It is distinguishable from other forms of agreement, and an important distinction between moral compromise with public agreement and moral compromise with public disagreement is also made. Circumstances in which the former might be permissible are outlined, and the sense in which it is allowed all things considered to agree is made clear. The relevant discussions of Dan Brock and Mary Warnock on the role of the philosopher to public policy are critically reviewed. Finally, a brief list is offered of the considerations relevant to an estimation of whether and, if so, when such compromise is allowed.