State Library Update, September 2004

Quarterly State Library Update for patrons.

State Library Update, January 2005

Quarterly State Library Update for patrons.

State Library Update, March 2005

Quarterly State Library Update for patrons.

State Library Update, July 2005

Quarterly State Library Update for patrons.

State Library Update, January 2004

Quarterly State Library Update for patrons.

State Library Update, July 2007, Vol.5, no. 3

Quarterly State Library Update for patrons.

State Library Update, October 2003

Quarterly State Library Update for patrons.

State Library Update, July 2004

Quarterly State Library Update for patrons.

State Library Update, April 2004

Quarterly State Library Update for patrons.

Is a Combined School/Public Library Right for Your Community?

This document is intended to assist Iowa communities in making informed decisions on combining school and public library services. It provides decision-makers with a means of assessing the feasibility of establishing a combined library and, if the decision is made to proceed, with a Planning Guide that addresses the many areas of library operations that need to be considered if the combined library is to be successful. Alternatives to combining libraries exist. Contracted services provide one such option. There are many areas where school and public libraries can and should collaborate in order to provide better service to the community. These alternatives are also outlined in this document.

State Library Update, July 2006

Quarterly State Library Update for patrons.

Neglected risks, financial innovation, and financial fragility

We present a standard model of financial innovation, in which intermediaries engineer securities with cash flows that investors seek, but modify two assumptions. First, investors (and possibly intermediaries) neglect certain unlikely risks. Second, investors demand securities with safe cash flows. Financial intermediaries cater to these preferences and beliefs by engineering securities perceived to be safe but exposed to neglected risks. Because the risks are neglected, security issuance is excessive. As investors eventually recognize these risks, they fly back to safety of traditional securities and markets become fragile, even without leverage, precisely because the volume of new claims is excessive.

Cumulative cultural dynamics and the coevolution of cultural innovation and transmission: an ESS model for panmictic and structured populations.

When individuals in a population can acquire traits through learning, each individual may express a certain number of distinct cultural traits. These traits may have been either invented by the individual himself or acquired from others in the population. Here, we develop a game theoretic model for the accumulation of cultural traits through individual and social learning. We explore how the rates of innovation, decay, and transmission of cultural traits affect the evolutionary stable (ES) levels of individual and social learning and the number of cultural traits expressed by an individual when cultural dynamics are at a steady-state. We explore the evolution of these phenotypes in both panmictic and structured population settings. Our results suggest that in panmictic populations, the ES level of learning and number of traits tend to be independent of the social transmission rate of cultural traits and is mainly affected by the innovation and decay rates. By contrast, in structured populations, where interactions occur between relatives, the ES level of learning and the number of traits per individual can be increased (relative to the panmictic case) and may then markedly depend on the transmission rate of cultural traits. This suggests that kin selection may be one additional solution to Rogers's paradox of nonadaptive culture.

Employment Protection, International Specialization, and Innovation

We develop a model to analyse the implications of firing costs on incentives for R&D and international specialization. The Key idea is paying the firing cost, the country with a rigid labor market will tend to produce relatively secure goods, at a late stage of their product life cycle. Under international trade, an international product cycle emerges where, roughly, new goods are first produced in the low firing cost country will specialize in 'secondary innovations', that is, improvements in existing goods, while the low firing cost country will more specialize in 'primary innovation', that is, invention of new goods.