Do charges to freight trucks and trains in the European Union reflect their social marginal costs? Application to the case of Spain

In the last few years, the European Union (EU) has become greatly concerned about the environmental costs of road transport in Europe as a result of the constant growth in the market share of trucks and the steady decline in the market share of railroads. In order to reverse this trend, the EU is promoting the implementation of additional charges for heavy goods vehicles (HGV) on the trunk roads of the EU countries. However, the EU policy is being criticised because it does not address the implementation of charges to internalise the external costs produced by automobiles and other transport modes such as railroad. In this paper, we first describe the evolution of the HGV charging policy in the EU, and then assess its practical implementation across different European countries. Second, and of greater significance, by using the case study of Spain, we evaluate to what extent the current fees on trucks and trains reflect their social marginal costs, and consequently lead to an allocative-efficient outcome. We found that for the average case in Spain the truck industry meets more of the marginal social cost produced by it than does the freight railroad industry. The reason for this lies in the large sums of money paid by truck companies in fuel taxes, and the subsidies that continue to be granted by the government to the railroads.

The impact of reforming air passenger rights in the European Union

Máster en Economía del Turismo, Transporte y Medio Ambiente

The changing politics of preference formation in international trade negotiations: the European Union in the Doha Round

This research seeks to provide an explanation for variations of “politics” of preference formation in international trade negotiations. Building on the ‘policy determines politics’ argument, I hypothesize the existence of a causal relationship between issue-characteristics and their variations with politics dynamics and their variations. More specifically, this study seeks to integrate into a single analytical framework two dimensions along which variations in the “politics of preference formation” can be organized: configurations of power relationships among the relevant actors in the structures within which they interact as well as the logic and the motivations of the actors involved in the policy making process. To do so, I first construct a four-cell typology of ‘politics of preference formation’ and, then, I proceed by specifying that the type of state-society configurations as well as the type of actors’ motivations in the “politics of preference formation” depend, respectively, on the degree to which a policy issue is perceived as politically salient and on the extent to which the distributional implications of such an issue can be calculated by the relevant stakeholders in the policy making process. The empirical yardstick against which the validity of the theoretical argument proposed is tested is drawn from evidence concerning the European Union’s negotiating strategy in four negotiating areas in the context of the so-called WTO’s Doha Development Round of multilateral trade negotiations: agriculture, competition, environment and technical assistance and capacity building.

The market manipulation regime in the European Union

Market manipulation is an illegal practice that enables a person can profit from practices that artificially raise or lower the prices of an instrument in the financial markets. Its prohibition is based on the 2003 Market Abuse Directive in the EU. The current market manipulation regime was broadly considered as a big success except for enforcement and supervisory inconsistencies in the Member States at the initial. A review of the market manipulation regime began at the end of 2007, which became quickly incorporated into the wider EU crisis-era reform program. A number of weaknesses of current regime have been identified, which include regulatory gaps caused by the development of trading venues and financial products, regulatory gaps concerning cross-border and cross-markets manipulation (particular commodity markets), legal uncertainty as a result of various implementation, and inefficient supervision and enforcement. On 12 June 2014, a new regulatory package of market abuse, Market Abuse Regulation and Directive on criminal sanctions for market abuse, has been adopted. And several changes will be made concerning the EU market manipulation regime. A wider scope of the regime and a new prohibition of attempted market manipulation will ensure the prevention of market manipulation at large. The AMPs will be subject to strict scrutiny of ESMA to reduce divergences in implementation. In order to enhance efficiency of supervision and enforcement, powers of national competent authorities will be strengthened, ESMA is imposed more power to settle disagreement between national regulators, and the administrative and criminal sanctioning regimes are both further harmonized. In addition, the protection of fundamental rights is stressed by the new market manipulation regime, and some measures are provided to guarantee its realization. Further, the success EU market manipulation regime could be of significant reference to China, helping China to refine its immature regime.

European Union Trade Policy after Enlargement: Larger Crowds, Shifting Priorities and Informal Decision-Making

The article focuses on the effects of Eastern enlargement on EU trade policy-making. On interest constellation, the article makes a case that protectionist forces have been strengthened relative to liberal forces. This slight protectionist turn is mostly witnessed in the area of anti-dumping and with respect to the Doha trade round. On preference aggregation, guided by a principal–agent framework, it is argued that the growth in the number of actors (principals and interest groups) has not constrained the role of the European Commission (agent). However, it has led to an increase in informal processes and has empowered large trading nations vis-a`-vis smaller and less ‘comitology-experienced’ member states.