Investigação de plantas africanas: Viviane Raïssa Sipowo Tala.-

Pós-graduação em Química - IQ

Autonomia, integração regional e política externa brasileira: Mercosul e Unasul

Fundação de Amparo à Pesquisa do Estado de São Paulo (FAPESP)

Paulo Prado e a Semana de Arte Moderna: ensaios e correspondências

Pós-graduação em Letras - FCLAS

Itinerários, estruturas de sociabilidades e ação política: intelectuais de São Paulo na crise do Império (1875-1889)

Pós-graduação em História - FCHS

Experiências com livros que exploram a sua materialidade: mediações e leituras possíveis

Pós-graduação em Artes - IA

A participação dos medidores eletrônicos na rede inteligente de energia elétrica

Depuis que l'électricité a été découverte et que le secteur électrique s'est considérablement développé dans le XVIIIe siècle, jamais l'homme n'a pu se détacher de cette énergie. Pendant longtemps le système d'énergie électrique a fonctionné sans grand changement, mais avec le développement rapide des technologies, de nouvelles améliorations apparaissent. Ce mémoire traite des nouveaux concepts de réseaux d'énergie électrique appelés Réseaux intelligents ou Smart Grid. À travers un panorama de leurs développements dans le monde, cette étude porte d'une part, sur l'avancée des projets dans quelques pays et d'autre part, du niveau de développement de ce réseau au Brésil et de son intérêt pour le pays. L'étude a comme point central un des composants de ce réseau intelligent, le compteur communicant, qui est l'élément essentiel des interconnexions entre consommateurs et producteurs. Ce rapport apporte un éclaircissement sur les compteurs conventionnels et les compteurs intelligents et sur leur mode de fonctionnement. Enfin il aborde la question des consommateurs : par quels moyens leur transmettre tous ces changements à venir, puisque jusqu'à présent, leur seule participation était de payer l'énergie consommée. Avec le nouveau réseau, ils deviendront de véritables acteurs puisqu'ils seront informés en temps réel de leur consommation d'énergie électrique. Pour terminer, le mémoire montrera comment ils pourront s'adapter à cette nouvelle façon de gérer leur consommation en ésperant les inciter à une utilisation plus raisonnable de l'énergie et à modifier leur comportement en gérant de manière active leur consommation en intégrant notamment les énergies renouvelables

A participação dos medidores eletrônicos na rede inteligente de energia elétrica

Depuis que l'électricité a été découverte et que le secteur électrique s'est considérablement développé dans le XVIIIe siècle, jamais l'homme n'a pu se détacher de cette énergie. Pendant longtemps le système d'énergie électrique a fonctionné sans grand changement, mais avec le développement rapide des technologies, de nouvelles améliorations apparaissent. Ce mémoire traite des nouveaux concepts de réseaux d'énergie électrique appelés Réseaux intelligents ou Smart Grid. À travers un panorama de leurs développements dans le monde, cette étude porte d'une part, sur l'avancée des projets dans quelques pays et d'autre part, du niveau de développement de ce réseau au Brésil et de son intérêt pour le pays. L'étude a comme point central un des composants de ce réseau intelligent, le compteur communicant, qui est l'élément essentiel des interconnexions entre consommateurs et producteurs. Ce rapport apporte un éclaircissement sur les compteurs conventionnels et les compteurs intelligents et sur leur mode de fonctionnement. Enfin il aborde la question des consommateurs : par quels moyens leur transmettre tous ces changements à venir, puisque jusqu'à présent, leur seule participation était de payer l'énergie consommée. Avec le nouveau réseau, ils deviendront de véritables acteurs puisqu'ils seront informés en temps réel de leur consommation d'énergie électrique. Pour terminer, le mémoire montrera comment ils pourront s'adapter à cette nouvelle façon de gérer leur consommation en ésperant les inciter à une utilisation plus raisonnable de l'énergie et à modifier leur comportement en gérant de manière active leur consommation en intégrant notamment les énergies renouvelables

"Mi bèl pawòl, mi!" Rappresentazione delle lingue e della parola nella narrativa di Patrick Chamoiseau e Raphael Confiant (1986-1994)

From 1986 to 1994, Patrick Chamoiseau and Raphaël Confiant published a series of fictional and non-fictional writings focusing on language issues. Interest in these themes can certainly in part be explained by the "surconscience linguistique" that Lise Gauvin attributes to Francophone authors: a linguistic over-awareness which, in the case of these two Martiniquais writers, may be attributed to their Creole-French diglossia. Although we might believe that the idea of Gauvin is right, it doesn't seem enough to explain why the linguistic theme plays such a central role in Chamoiseau's and Confiant's works. Deeply influenced by Glissant's theories on Creole popular culture and Antillean literature (Le discours antillais), they conceived a "Créolité" poetics based on a primarly identity-based and geopolitical discourse. Declaring the need to build an authentically Creole literary discourse, one that finally expresses the Martiniquais reality, Chamoiseau and Confiant (as well as Bernabé, third and last author of Éloge de la créolité) found the «foundations of [their] being» in orality and its poetics in the Creole language. This belief was maily translated into their works in two ways: by representing the (diglossic) relationships occurring between their first languages (Creole and French) and by representing the Creole parole (orality) and its function. An analysis of our authors' literary and theoretical writings will enable us to show how two works that develop around the same themes and thesis have in fact produced very divergent results, which were perhaps already perceivable in the main ambiguities of their common manifestos.

Source of funding in experimental studies of mobile phone use on health: Update of systematic review

A previous review showed that among 59 studies published in 1995–2005, industry-funded studies were least likely to report effects of controlled exposure to mobile phone radiation on health-related outcomes. We updated literature searches in 2005–2009 and extracted data on funding, conflicts of interest and results. Of 75 additional studies 12% were industry-funded, 44% had public and 19% mixed funding; funding was unclear in 25%. Previous findings were confirmed: industry-sponsored studies were least likely to report results suggesting effects. Interestingly, the proportion of studies indicating effects declined in 1995–2009, regardless of funding source. Source of funding and conflicts of interest are important in this field of research.

Polonofilizm i polskość wśród czeskich emancypantek w drugiej połowie XIX wieku: przykład Karoliny Světlej

The awakening of national consciousness went hand in hand in Bohemia with an anxiety about national disappearance. In this context, the recourse to Pan-Slavism was for the Czechs a way to encourage themselves through the idea of belonging to a great Slavic world, while the Slavic Congress organized in Prague in 1848 was an attempt to realize this ideal. The Congress was a failure from the political point of view, but it did have some socio-cultural repercussions: notably, it served as a pretext for the advancement of women's issues in Bohemia. It is indeed in the wake of the Congress that Honorata z Wiśniowskich Zapová, a Polish women settled in Prague after her marriage to a Czech intellectual, founded, under the guise of collaboration between all Slavic women, the first women's association, as well as a (very short-lived) Czech-Polish institute, where Czech, as well as Polish girls, could get a quality education in their mother tongue. Honorata was undoubtedly the source of the polonophilia wind that seemed to blow over the Czech emancipation movement in the second half of the nineteenth century. In particular, Karolina Světlá showed in her Memoirs a great recognition for Honorata's efforts in matters of emancipation and education, and explicitly took up the challenge launched by the latter in founding another women's association and in inaugurating a school for underprivileged girls. But the tribute Světlá paid to Honorata is even more evident in her literary work, where Poland and the Polish woman (who often wears Honorata's features) play a significant role (see for example her short novel Sisters or her story A Few Days in the Life of a Prague Dandy). Světlá was probably the Czech feminist writer who, in her activities and in her work, relied most strongly on the Polish woman as a model for the Czech woman. However, she wasn't alone. In general, it was a characteristic of the Czech feminist movement of the second half of the nineteenth century to have recourse to the Polish woman and to Poland as a landmark for comparison and as a goal to be achieved.

Théorie des jeux expérimentale & action motrice

How do sportspeople succeed in a non-collaborative game? An illustration of a perverse side effect of altruism Are team sports specialists predisposed to collaboration? The scientific literature on this topic is divided. The present article attempts to end this debate by applying experimental game theory. We constituted three groups of volunteers (all students aged around 20): 25 team sports specialists; 23 individual sports specialists (gymnasts, track & field athletes and swimmers) and a control group of 24 non-sportspeople. Each subgroup was divided into 3 teams that played against each other in turn (and not against teams from other subgroups). The teams played a game based on the well-known Prisoner's Dilemma (Tucker, 1950) - the paradoxical "Bluegill Sunbass Game" (Binmore, 1999) with three Nash equilibria (two suboptimal equilibria with a pure strategy and an optimal equilibrium with a mixed, egotistical strategy (p= 1/2)). This game also features a Harsanyi equilibrium (based on constant compliance with a moral code and altruism by empathy: "do not unto others that which you would not have them do unto you"). How, then, was the game played? Two teams of 8 competed on a handball court. Each team wore a distinctive jersey. The game lasted 15 minutes and the players were allowed to touch the handball ball with their feet or hands. After each goal, each team had to return to its own half of the court. Players were allowed to score in either goal and thus cooperate with their teammates or not, as they saw fit. A goal against the nominally opposing team (a "guardian" strategy, by analogy with the Bluegill Sunbass Game) earned a point for everyone in the team. For an own goal (a "sneaker" strategy), only the scorer earned a point - hence the paradox. If all the members of a team work together to score a goal, everyone is happy (the Harsanyi solution). However, the situation was not balanced in the Nashian sense: each player had a reason to be disloyal to his/her team at the merest opportunity. But if everyone adopts a "sneaker" strategy, the game becomes a free-for-all and the chances of scoring become much slimmer. In a context in which doubt reigns as to the honesty of team members and "legal betrayals", what type of sportsperson will score the most goals? By analogy with the Bluegill Sunbass Game, we recorded direct motor interactions (passes and shots) based on either a "guardian" tactic (i.e. collaboration within the team) or a "sneaker" tactic (shots and passes against the player's designated team). So, was the group of team sports specialist more collaborative than the other two groups? The answer was no. A statistical analysis (difference from chance in a logistic regression) enabled us to draw three conclusions: ?For the team sports specialists, the Nash equilibrium (1950) was stronger than the Harsanyi equilibrium (1977). ?The sporting principles of equilibrium and exclusivity are not appropriate in the Bluegill Sunbass Game and are quickly abandoned by the team sports specialists. The latter are opportunists who focus solely on winning and do well out of it. ?The most altruistic players are the main losers in the Bluegill Sunbass Game: they keep the game alive but contribute to their own defeat. In our experiment, the most altruistic players tended to be the females and the individual sports specialists

Théorie des jeux expérimentale & action motrice

How do sportspeople succeed in a non-collaborative game? An illustration of a perverse side effect of altruism Are team sports specialists predisposed to collaboration? The scientific literature on this topic is divided. The present article attempts to end this debate by applying experimental game theory. We constituted three groups of volunteers (all students aged around 20): 25 team sports specialists; 23 individual sports specialists (gymnasts, track & field athletes and swimmers) and a control group of 24 non-sportspeople. Each subgroup was divided into 3 teams that played against each other in turn (and not against teams from other subgroups). The teams played a game based on the well-known Prisoner's Dilemma (Tucker, 1950) - the paradoxical "Bluegill Sunbass Game" (Binmore, 1999) with three Nash equilibria (two suboptimal equilibria with a pure strategy and an optimal equilibrium with a mixed, egotistical strategy (p= 1/2)). This game also features a Harsanyi equilibrium (based on constant compliance with a moral code and altruism by empathy: "do not unto others that which you would not have them do unto you"). How, then, was the game played? Two teams of 8 competed on a handball court. Each team wore a distinctive jersey. The game lasted 15 minutes and the players were allowed to touch the handball ball with their feet or hands. After each goal, each team had to return to its own half of the court. Players were allowed to score in either goal and thus cooperate with their teammates or not, as they saw fit. A goal against the nominally opposing team (a "guardian" strategy, by analogy with the Bluegill Sunbass Game) earned a point for everyone in the team. For an own goal (a "sneaker" strategy), only the scorer earned a point - hence the paradox. If all the members of a team work together to score a goal, everyone is happy (the Harsanyi solution). However, the situation was not balanced in the Nashian sense: each player had a reason to be disloyal to his/her team at the merest opportunity. But if everyone adopts a "sneaker" strategy, the game becomes a free-for-all and the chances of scoring become much slimmer. In a context in which doubt reigns as to the honesty of team members and "legal betrayals", what type of sportsperson will score the most goals? By analogy with the Bluegill Sunbass Game, we recorded direct motor interactions (passes and shots) based on either a "guardian" tactic (i.e. collaboration within the team) or a "sneaker" tactic (shots and passes against the player's designated team). So, was the group of team sports specialist more collaborative than the other two groups? The answer was no. A statistical analysis (difference from chance in a logistic regression) enabled us to draw three conclusions: ?For the team sports specialists, the Nash equilibrium (1950) was stronger than the Harsanyi equilibrium (1977). ?The sporting principles of equilibrium and exclusivity are not appropriate in the Bluegill Sunbass Game and are quickly abandoned by the team sports specialists. The latter are opportunists who focus solely on winning and do well out of it. ?The most altruistic players are the main losers in the Bluegill Sunbass Game: they keep the game alive but contribute to their own defeat. In our experiment, the most altruistic players tended to be the females and the individual sports specialists

Théorie des jeux expérimentale & action motrice

How do sportspeople succeed in a non-collaborative game? An illustration of a perverse side effect of altruism Are team sports specialists predisposed to collaboration? The scientific literature on this topic is divided. The present article attempts to end this debate by applying experimental game theory. We constituted three groups of volunteers (all students aged around 20): 25 team sports specialists; 23 individual sports specialists (gymnasts, track & field athletes and swimmers) and a control group of 24 non-sportspeople. Each subgroup was divided into 3 teams that played against each other in turn (and not against teams from other subgroups). The teams played a game based on the well-known Prisoner's Dilemma (Tucker, 1950) - the paradoxical "Bluegill Sunbass Game" (Binmore, 1999) with three Nash equilibria (two suboptimal equilibria with a pure strategy and an optimal equilibrium with a mixed, egotistical strategy (p= 1/2)). This game also features a Harsanyi equilibrium (based on constant compliance with a moral code and altruism by empathy: "do not unto others that which you would not have them do unto you"). How, then, was the game played? Two teams of 8 competed on a handball court. Each team wore a distinctive jersey. The game lasted 15 minutes and the players were allowed to touch the handball ball with their feet or hands. After each goal, each team had to return to its own half of the court. Players were allowed to score in either goal and thus cooperate with their teammates or not, as they saw fit. A goal against the nominally opposing team (a "guardian" strategy, by analogy with the Bluegill Sunbass Game) earned a point for everyone in the team. For an own goal (a "sneaker" strategy), only the scorer earned a point - hence the paradox. If all the members of a team work together to score a goal, everyone is happy (the Harsanyi solution). However, the situation was not balanced in the Nashian sense: each player had a reason to be disloyal to his/her team at the merest opportunity. But if everyone adopts a "sneaker" strategy, the game becomes a free-for-all and the chances of scoring become much slimmer. In a context in which doubt reigns as to the honesty of team members and "legal betrayals", what type of sportsperson will score the most goals? By analogy with the Bluegill Sunbass Game, we recorded direct motor interactions (passes and shots) based on either a "guardian" tactic (i.e. collaboration within the team) or a "sneaker" tactic (shots and passes against the player's designated team). So, was the group of team sports specialist more collaborative than the other two groups? The answer was no. A statistical analysis (difference from chance in a logistic regression) enabled us to draw three conclusions: ?For the team sports specialists, the Nash equilibrium (1950) was stronger than the Harsanyi equilibrium (1977). ?The sporting principles of equilibrium and exclusivity are not appropriate in the Bluegill Sunbass Game and are quickly abandoned by the team sports specialists. The latter are opportunists who focus solely on winning and do well out of it. ?The most altruistic players are the main losers in the Bluegill Sunbass Game: they keep the game alive but contribute to their own defeat. In our experiment, the most altruistic players tended to be the females and the individual sports specialists

Numerical modeling of electromagnetic coupling phenomena in the vicinities of overhead power transmission lines.

Electromagnetic coupling phenomena between overhead power transmission lines and other nearby structures are inevitable, especially in densely populated areas. The undesired effects resulting from this proximity are manifold and range from the establishment of hazardous potentials to the outbreak of alternate current corrosion phenomena. The study of this class of problems is necessary for ensuring security in the vicinities of the interaction zone and also to preserve the integrity of the equipment and of the devices there present. However, the complete modeling of this type of application requires the three- -dimensional representation of the region of interest and needs specific numerical methods for field computation. In this work, the modeling of problems arising from the flow of electrical currents in the ground (the so-called conductive coupling) will be addressed with the finite element method. Those resulting from the time variation of the electromagnetic fields (the so-called inductive coupling) will be considered as well, and they will be treated with the generalized PEEC (Partial Element Equivalent Circuit) method. More specifically, a special boundary condition on the electric potential is proposed for truncating the computational domain in the finite element analysis of conductive coupling problems, and a complete PEEC formulation for modeling inductive coupling problems is presented. Test configurations of increasing complexities are considered for validating the foregoing approaches. These works aim to provide a contribution to the modeling of this class of problems, which tend to become common with the expansion of power grids.

Monnaies émises par des «rebelles». Quelques remarques sur des frappes monétaires «non officielles» en Ifrîqiya et en al-Andalus au IXe siècle

Ce texte a pour objectif d’attirer l’attention sur un fait numismatique qui ne nous semble pas avoir été très souvent traité, celui des monnaies émises par des chefs politiques « rebelles » à une autorité normalement reconnue, dans un cas les Aghlabides de Kairouan, et dans l’autre les émirs omeyyades de Cordoue. L’étude de ce genre de monnaies devrait pouvoir aider à étudier, à partir des frappes réalisées en temps de crise politique, la question très importante de la légitimité du pouvoir dans l’Islam, et peut-être aussi celle des rapports de la frappe de monnaie avec les activités économiques. On n’attendra cependant pas de révélations des données très partielles et limitées qui vont suivre. Elles ne concernent en effet que deux frappes de dirhams correspondant chronologiquement au troisième siècle de l’Hégire qui, de 815 à 912, couvre pour l’essentiel le IXème siècle de l’ère chrétienne. L’une des monnaies date de son début (209 H/824-825), l’autre de sa fin (293 H/905-906). La première est Ifriqiyenne, la seconde andalouse; les deux, on l’a dit, sont frappées durant une époque de crise, et il peut être intéressant de les mettre en parallèle, sans prétendre en tirer de conclusions très nouvelles et de très grande portée, car il ne s’agit que de deux cas particuliers, auxquels la relative rareté de telles émissions, le fait qu’elles ont été peu étudiées et que les circonstances de la frappe des deux exemplaires présentés sont assez bien connues, incite tout de même à prêter quelque intérêt. La frappe andalouse pose par ailleurs un problème particulier, dans la mesure où elle correspond à un moment (entre les années 290/900 et 316/929) où le pouvoir omeyyade semble ne plus frapper de monnaies, ou pratiquement pas.