785 resultados para Governance of security
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Las redes de sensores inalámbricas son uno de los sectores con más crecimiento dentro de las redes inalámbricas. La rápida adopción de estas redes como solución para muchas nuevas aplicaciones ha llevado a un creciente tráfico en el espectro radioeléctrico. Debido a que las redes inalámbricas de sensores operan en las bandas libres Industrial, Scientific and Medical (ISM) se ha producido una saturación del espectro que en pocos años no permitirá un buen funcionamiento. Con el objetivo de solucionar este tipo de problemas ha aparecido el paradigma de Radio Cognitiva (CR). La introducción de las capacidades cognitivas en las redes inalámbricas de sensores permite utilizar estas redes para aplicaciones con unos requisitos más estrictos respecto a fiabilidad, cobertura o calidad de servicio. Estas redes que aúnan todas estas características son llamadas redes de sensores inalámbricas cognitivas (CWSNs). La mejora en prestaciones de las CWSNs permite su utilización en aplicaciones críticas donde antes no podían ser utilizadas como monitorización de estructuras, de servicios médicos, en entornos militares o de vigilancia. Sin embargo, estas aplicaciones también requieren de otras características que la radio cognitiva no nos ofrece directamente como, por ejemplo, la seguridad. La seguridad en CWSNs es un aspecto poco desarrollado al ser una característica no esencial para su funcionamiento, como pueden serlo el sensado del espectro o la colaboración. Sin embargo, su estudio y mejora es esencial de cara al crecimiento de las CWSNs. Por tanto, esta tesis tiene como objetivo implementar contramedidas usando las nuevas capacidades cognitivas, especialmente en la capa física, teniendo en cuenta las limitaciones con las que cuentan las WSNs. En el ciclo de trabajo de esta tesis se han desarrollado dos estrategias de seguridad contra ataques de especial importancia en redes cognitivas: el ataque de simulación de usuario primario (PUE) y el ataque contra la privacidad eavesdropping. Para mitigar el ataque PUE se ha desarrollado una contramedida basada en la detección de anomalías. Se han implementado dos algoritmos diferentes para detectar este ataque: el algoritmo de Cumulative Sum y el algoritmo de Data Clustering. Una vez comprobado su validez se han comparado entre sí y se han investigado los efectos que pueden afectar al funcionamiento de los mismos. Para combatir el ataque de eavesdropping se ha desarrollado una contramedida basada en la inyección de ruido artificial de manera que el atacante no distinga las señales con información del ruido sin verse afectada la comunicación que nos interesa. También se ha estudiado el impacto que tiene esta contramedida en los recursos de la red. Como resultado paralelo se ha desarrollado un marco de pruebas para CWSNs que consta de un simulador y de una red de nodos cognitivos reales. Estas herramientas han sido esenciales para la implementación y extracción de resultados de la tesis. ABSTRACT Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) are one of the fastest growing sectors in wireless networks. The fast introduction of these networks as a solution in many new applications has increased the traffic in the radio spectrum. Due to the operation of WSNs in the free industrial, scientific, and medical (ISM) bands, saturation has ocurred in these frequencies that will make the same operation methods impossible in the future. Cognitive radio (CR) has appeared as a solution for this problem. The networks that join all the mentioned features together are called cognitive wireless sensor networks (CWSNs). The adoption of cognitive features in WSNs allows the use of these networks in applications with higher reliability, coverage, or quality of service requirements. The improvement of the performance of CWSNs allows their use in critical applications where they could not be used before such as structural monitoring, medical care, military scenarios, or security monitoring systems. Nevertheless, these applications also need other features that cognitive radio does not add directly, such as security. The security in CWSNs has not yet been explored fully because it is not necessary field for the main performance of these networks. Instead, other fields like spectrum sensing or collaboration have been explored deeply. However, the study of security in CWSNs is essential for their growth. Therefore, the main objective of this thesis is to study the impact of some cognitive radio attacks in CWSNs and to implement countermeasures using new cognitive capabilities, especially in the physical layer and considering the limitations of WSNs. Inside the work cycle of this thesis, security strategies against two important kinds of attacks in cognitive networks have been developed. These attacks are the primary user emulator (PUE) attack and the eavesdropping attack. A countermeasure against the PUE attack based on anomaly detection has been developed. Two different algorithms have been implemented: the cumulative sum algorithm and the data clustering algorithm. After the verification of these solutions, they have been compared and the side effects that can disturb their performance have been analyzed. The developed approach against the eavesdropping attack is based on the generation of artificial noise to conceal information messages. The impact of this countermeasure on network resources has also been studied. As a parallel result, a new framework for CWSNs has been developed. This includes a simulator and a real network with cognitive nodes. This framework has been crucial for the implementation and extraction of the results presented in this thesis.
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En las últimas tres décadas, las dinámicas de restructuración económica a nivel global han redefinido radicalmente el papel de las ciudades. La transición del keynesianismo al neoliberalismo ha provocado un cambio en las políticas urbanas de los gobiernos municipales, que han abandonado progresivamente las tareas de regulación y redistribución para centrarse en la promoción del crecimiento económico y la competitividad. En este contexto, muchas voces críticas han señalado que la regeneración urbana se ha convertido en un vehículo de extracción de valor de la ciudad y está provocando la expulsión de los ciudadanos más vulnerables. Sin embargo, la regeneración de áreas consolidadas supone también una oportunidad de mejora de las condiciones de vida de la población residente, y es una política necesaria para controlar la expansión de la ciudad y reducir las necesidades de desplazamiento, promoviendo así ciudades más sostenibles. Partiendo de la hipótesis de que la gobernanza de los procesos de regeneración urbana es clave en el resultado final de las operaciones y determina el modelo de ciudad resultante, el objetivo de esta investigación es verificar si la regeneración urbana es necesariamente un mecanismo de extracción de valor o si puede mejorar la calidad de vida en las ciudades a través de la participación de los ciudadanos. Para ello, propone un marco de análisis del proceso de toma de decisiones en los planes de regeneración urbana y su impacto en los resultados de los planes, tomando como caso de estudio la ciudad de Boston, que desde los años 1990 trata de convertirse en una “ciudad de los barrios”, fomentando la participación ciudadana al tiempo que se posiciona en la escena económica global. El análisis se centra en dos operaciones de regeneración iniciadas a finales de los años 1990. Por un lado, el caso de Jackson Square nos permite comprender el papel de la sociedad civil y el tercer sector en la regeneración de los barrios más desfavorecidos, en un claro ejemplo de urbanismo “desde abajo” (bottom-up planning). Por otro, la reconversión del frente marítimo de South Boston para la construcción del Distrito de Innovación nos acerca a las grandes operaciones de regeneración urbana con fines de estímulo económico, tradicionalmente vinculadas a los centros financieros (downtown) y dirigidas por las élites gubernamentales y económicas (la growth machine) a través de procesos más tecnocráticos (top-down planning). La metodología utilizada consiste en el análisis cualitativo de los procesos de toma de decisiones y la relación entre los agentes implicados, así como de la evaluación de la implementación de dichas decisiones y su influencia en el modelo urbano resultante. El análisis de los casos permite afirmar que la gobernanza de los procesos de regeneración urbana influye decisivamente en el resultado final de las intervenciones; sin embargo, la participación de la comunidad local en la toma de decisiones no es suficiente para que el resultado de la regeneración urbana contrarreste los efectos de la neoliberalización, especialmente si se limita a la fase de planeamiento y no se extiende a la fase de ejecución, y si no está apoyada por una movilización política de mayor alcance que asegure una acción pública redistributiva. Asimismo, puede afirmarse que los procesos de regeneración urbana suponen una redefinición del modelo de ciudad, dado que la elección de los espacios de intervención tiene consecuencias sobre el equilibrio territorial de la ciudad. Los resultados de esta investigación tienen implicaciones para la disciplina del planeamiento urbano. Por una parte, se confirma la vigencia del paradigma del “urbanismo negociado”, si bien bajo discursos de liderazgo público y sin apelación al protagonismo del sector privado. Por otra parte, la planificación colaborativa en un contexto de “responsabilización” de las organizaciones comunitarias puede desactivar la potencia política de la participación ciudadana y servir como “amortiguador” hacia el gobierno local. Asimismo, la sustitución del planeamiento general como instrumento de definición de la ciudad futura por una planificación oportunista basada en la actuación en áreas estratégicas que tiren del resto de la ciudad, no permite definir un modelo coherente y consensuado de la ciudad que se desea colectivamente, ni permite utilizar el planeamiento como mecanismo de redistribución. ABSTRACT In the past three decades, the dynamics of global economic restructuring have radically redefined the role of cities. The transition from keynesianism to neoliberalism has caused a shift in local governments’ urban policies, which have progressively abandoned the tasks of regulation and redistribution to focus on promoting economic growth and competitiveness. In this context, many critics have pointed out that urban regeneration has become a vehicle for extracting value from the city and is causing the expulsion of the most vulnerable citizens. However, regeneration of consolidated areas is also an opportunity to improve the living conditions of the resident population, and is a necessary policy to control the expansion of the city and reduce the need for transportation, thus promoting more sustainable cities. Assuming that the governance of urban regeneration processes is key to the final outcome of the plans and determines the resulting city model, the goal of this research is to verify whether urban regeneration is necessarily a value extraction mechanism or if it can improve the quality of life in cities through citizens’ participation. It proposes a framework for analysis of decision-making in urban regeneration processes and their impact on the results of the plans, taking as a case study the city of Boston, which since the 1990s is trying to become a "city of neighborhoods", encouraging citizen participation, while seeking to position itself in the global economic scene. The analysis focuses on two redevelopment plans initiated in the late 1990s. The Jackson Square case allows us to understand the role of civil society and the third sector in the regeneration of disadvantaged neighborhoods, in a clear example of bottom-up planning. On the contrary, the conversion of the South Boston waterfront to build the Innovation District takes us to the big redevelopment efforts with economic stimulus’ goals, traditionally linked to downtowns and led by government and economic elites (the local “growth machine”) through more technocratic processes (top-down planning). The research is based on a qualitative analysis of the processes of decision making and the relationship between those involved, as well as the evaluation of the implementation of those decisions and their influence on the resulting urban model. The analysis suggests that the governance of urban regeneration processes decisively influences the outcome of interventions; however, community engagement in the decision-making process is not enough for the result of the urban regeneration to counteract the effects of neoliberalization, especially if it is limited to the planning phase and does not extend to the implementation of the projects, and if it is not supported by a broader political mobilization to ensure a redistributive public action. Moreover, urban regeneration processes redefine the urban model, since the choice of intervention areas has important consequences for the territorial balance of the city. The results of this study have implications for the discipline of urban planning. On the one hand, it confirms the validity of the "negotiated planning" paradigm, albeit under public leadership discourse and without a direct appeal to the leadership role of the private sector. On the other hand, collaborative planning in a context of "responsibilization" of community based organizations can deactivate the political power of citizen participation and serve as a "buffer" towards the local government. Furthermore, the replacement of comprehensive planning, as a tool for defining the city's future, by an opportunistic planning based on intervention in strategic areas that are supposed to induce change in the rest of the city, does not allow a coherent and consensual urban model that is collectively desired, nor it allows to use planning as a redistribution mechanism.
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Original charter dated May 31, 1650. The charter is engrossed on sheepskin and signed by Thomas Dudley.
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This dissertation investigates the question: has financial speculation contributed to global food price volatility since the mid 2000s? I problematize the mainstream academic literature on the 2008-2011 food price spikes as being dominated by neoclassical economic perspectives and offer new conceptual and empirical insights into the relationship between financial speculation and food. Presented in three journal style manuscripts, manuscript one uses circuits of capital to conceptualize the link between financial speculators in the global north and populations in the global south. Manuscript two argues that what makes commodity index speculation (aka ‘index funds’ or index swaps) novel is that it provides institutional investors with what Clapp (2014) calls “financial distance” from the biopolitical implications of food speculation. Finally, manuscript three combines Gramsci’s concepts of hegemony and ‘the intellectual’ with the concept of performativity to investigate the ideological role that public intellectuals and the rhetorical actor the market play in the proliferation and governance of commodity index speculation. The first two manuscripts take an empirically mixed method approach by combining regression analysis with discourse analysis, while the third relies on interview data and discourse analysis. The findings show that financial speculation by index swap dealers and hedge funds did indeed significantly contribute to the price volatility of food commodities between June 2006 and December 2014. The results from the interview data affirm these findings. The discourse analysis of the interview data shows that public intellectuals and rhetorical characters such as ‘the market’ play powerful roles in shaping how food speculation is promoted, regulated and normalized. The significance of the findings is three-fold. First, the empirical findings show that a link does exist between financial speculation and food price volatility. Second, the findings indicate that the post-2008 CFTC and the Dodd-Frank reforms are unlikely to reduce financial speculation or the price volatility that it causes. Third, the findings suggest that institutional investors (such as pension funds) should think critically about how they use commodity index speculation as a way of generating financial earnings.
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The future of Europe 2020 lies in its ability to become the protagonist of a new season in EU policy, in which countries can apply for more flexibility only if they can prove both structural reform and good governance, argues the author. By establishing a ‘new deal’ among member states, an improved Europe 2020 strategy can help Europe to complete its transition from austerity to prosperity. This Policy Brief makes the case for approaching the mid-term review of Europe 2020 on three different levels: i) the revision and update of the content of the Europe 2020 strategy, including its objectives, targets and major flagship initiatives; ii) the reform of the governance of the strategy; and iii) the repositioning of the strategy at the core of EU policy. The content of the strategy should be revised to include initiatives on infrastructure, the internal market and administrative capacity at all levels of government. The author sets out a number of policy recommendations for the European Commission and the member states to help realise these objectives.
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The government debt crisis, erupted in the Eurozone in 2009, nearly led to the collapse of European monetary union. Now that this has been averted, the question is what should be done to make the Eurozone sustainable in the long run. The survival of the Eurozone hinges on the capacity of its leaders to improve the eurozone's governance. With the exception of Greece, the root cause of the government debt crisis has little to do with the poor performance of the SGP, rather, with unsustainable debt accumulation by private actors. Also, the method of convergence implicit in the SGP has not worked well – macroeconomic divergences have stubbornly remained for nearly a decade and several countries experienced boom and bust dynamics. Although strong declines in real interest rates may explain part of the story (but e.g. Italy did not experience boom & bust), self-fulfilling waves of optimism and pessimism which might be called 'animal spirits' and are of mainly national origin, seem a good candidate for explanation. These national animal spirits endogenously trigger credit expansion and contraction. It follows that (national) movements of credit ought to be under much firmer control and this is up to the monetary authorities, including the ECB. Critical recommendations for better governance of the Eurozone should therefore combine credible measures to maintain fiscal discipline over the medium term with such instruments as minimum reserve requirements to control the growth of bank credit as well as minimum reserve requirements in different national banking systems. Finally, the idea of adding more sanctions to the SGP may be ill-conceived since, in future, it might pre-empt national governments to come to the rescue of banks (under credible threats of contagion) and/or prevent a downward spiral in economic activity.
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While the initial Commission Communication on Wider Europe (March 2003) did not include Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan in the forthcoming policy for the EU’s new neighbourhood, the Southern Caucasus region has now gained considerable attention in the framework of the ENP and beyond, not least because of security considerations. The ENP undoubtedly represents a step forward in the EU’s policy towards Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, yet its implementation highlights major differences between the three countries and important weaknesses in all three of them. The Eastern Partnership addresses some of these weaknesses and it also significantly strengthens the EU’s offer to South Caucasus countries, which is now fully in line with the perspectives proposed to the Western NIS. The paper highlights five main conclusions and recommendations: • Political, economic, social and diplomatic developments in the South Caucasus in the 2000's highlight both diverging trends and the persistence of tensions between the three countries. They also have different aspirations vis-à-vis the EU and different records in ENP implementation. The EU should therefore mainly rely upon an individual approach towards each country. • While bilateral relations should form the basis of the EU's approach, most of the challenges faced by Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan are not confined to national borders and require regional solutions. This applies primarily, but not exclusively, to the unresolved conflicts. The EU should promote targeted regional cooperation including, inter alia, confidence-building measures to address indirectly the protracted conflicts and measures supporting drivers of change, which play a critical role in the confidence-building process; • Under the ENP, especially since the opening of negotiations for association agreements and with the perspective of DCFTA, trade-related issues, market and regulatory reform have become prominent in the EU's relations with all three Caucasus countries. At the same time, the priorities identified when the ENP was launched, i.e. good governance and the rule of law, still correspond to major challenges in the South Caucasus. The EU should more clearly prioritise good governance and the rule of law as the basis of both the ENP and successful reforms; • In all partner countries (but even more so in the South Caucasus), ENP implementation has been adversely affected by poor administrative capacities and weak institutional coordination. The EU should increasingly focus on institutional reform/capacity building in its support to partner countries and ensure that the link between the ENP and domestic reform processes is strengthened; • In the South Caucasus the EU has recently concentrated on a few assistance tools such as budget support, Twinning and TAIEX. While these instruments undoubtedly bring an added value, they should be better combined with tools allowing for greater flexibility and targeting non-governmental actors, e.g. EIDHR/NSA.
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The Issue Reform of the governance of the euro area is being held back by disagreement on what is at the root of the euro area’s woes. Pre-crisis, the euro area suffered from the built-up of financial imbalances, price and wage divergence and an insufficient focus on debt sustainability. During the crisis, the main problems were slow resolution of banking problems, an inadequate fiscal policy stance in 2011-13 for the area as a whole, insufficient domestic demand in surplus countries and slow progress with structural reforms to overcome past divergences. Policy Challenge Euro-area governance needs to move beyond the improvements brought about by banking union and should establish institutions to prevent divergences of wages from productivity. We propose the creation of a European Competitiveness Council composed of national competitiveness councils, and the creation of a Eurosystem of Fiscal Policy (EFP) with two goals: fiscal debt sustainability and an adequate area-wide fiscal position. The EFP should have the right in exceptional circumstances to declare national deficits unlawful and to be able to force parliaments to borrow more so that the euro-area fiscal stance is appropriate. A euro-area chamber of the European Parliament would have to approve such decisions. No additional risk-sharing would be introduced. In the short term, domestic demand needs to be increased in surplus countries, while in deficit countries, structural reform needs to reduce past divergences.
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The European Union has developed new capacity as a security actor in third countries, in particular in the area of crisis management. Over the past two decades the EU has deployed numerous missions, both of a civilian and military nature. Moreover the EU has defined its ability to intervene all along the ‘crisis cycle’, (from prevention to mediation, from peace-keeping to post-conflict reconstruction) and using all tools at its disposal (taking a ‘comprehensive approach’). However the EU is still not perceived as a major security provider globally and interventions remain limited to some geographic areas, mostly in its neighbourhood and Africa, with just a few examples further afield. The EU also tends to avoid taking direct action and seems to prefer partnership arrangements with other players. How can we explain the growing activism and number of EU’s intervention with the low impact and lack of visibility? Can we expect the EU to become more active in the future, taking on more responsibility and leading roles in addressing conflict situations? This paper will argue that the main reason for the EU’s hesitant role in crisis management is to be found in the weak decision-making provisions for EU’s security interventions, as one of the few policy areas still subject to consensus amongst 28 European Union Member States. Lack of a clearer delegation of competence or stronger coordination structures is closely linked to low legitimacy for the EU to take more robust action as a security actor. In order to overcome this legitimacy problem, and in order to facilitate consensus amongst Member States, the EU thus privileges partnership arrangements with other actors who can provide legitimacy and know-how, such as the UN or the African Union. As there is no political desire in the EU for tighter decision-making in this area, we can expect that the EU will continue to play a supporting rather than leading role in crisis management, becoming the partner of choice as it deepens its experience. However this does not mean that the EU is playing just a secondary role in the wider area of security, in particular when looking at nontraditional security. Looking at the role of the EU in Asia, where the EU has deployed just two missions, this paper will offer a broader assessment of the EU as a partner in the area of security taking into account different types of actions. The paper will argue that in order to strengthen cooperation with Asian partners in the area of crisis management, the EU will need to define better what it is able to offer, present its actions as part of an overall strategy rather than ad-hoc and piecemeal, and enter into partnership arrangements with different players in the region.
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The state still matters. However, the members of the Euro-Atlantic community may be misinterpreting this crucial baseline prior launching their military interventions since 2001. The latest violence and collapse of the state of Iraq after the invasion of Northern Iraq by a radical Sunni Muslim terrorist group, so-called Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), demonstrate once again the centrality and requirement of a functioning state in order to maintain violent forces to disrupt domestic and regional stability. Since 2001, the US and its European allies have waged wars against failed-states in order to increase this security and national interests, and then have been involved in some type of state-building.1 This has been the case in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Mali, and Central African Republic (CAR). France went into Mali (2012) and CAR (2013), which preceded two European Union military and civilian Common Security and Defense Policy missions (CSDP), in order to avoid the collapse of these two states. The threat of the collapse of both states was a concern for the members of the Euro-Atlantic community as it could have spread to the region and causing even greater instabilities. In Mali, the country was under radical Islamic pressures coming from the North after the collapse of Libya ensuing the 2011 Western intervention, while in CAR it was mainly an ethno-religious crisis. Failed states are a real concern, as they can rapidly become training grounds for radical groups and permitting all types of smuggling and trafficking.2 In Mali, France wanted to protect its large French population and avoid the fall of Mali in the hands of radical Islamic groups directly or indirectly linked to Al-Qaeda. A fallen Mali could have destabilized the region of the Sahel and ultimately affected the stability of Southern European borders. France wanted to avoid the development of a safe haven across the Sahel where movements of people and goods are uncontrolled and illegal.3 Since the end of the Cold War, Western powers have been involved in stabilizing neighborhoods and regions, like the Balkans, Africa, and Middle East, which at the exceptions of the Balkans, have led to failed policies. 9/11 changes everything. The US, under President George W. Bush, started to wage war against terrorism and all states link to it. This started a period of continuous Western interventions in this post-9/11 era in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Mali and CAR. If history has demonstrated one thing, the members of the Euro-Atlantic community are struggling and will continue to struggle to stabilize Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Mali and Central African Republic (CAR) for one simple reason: no clear endgame. Is it the creation of a state à la Westphalian in order to permit these states to operate as the sole guarantor of security? Or is the reestablishment of status quo in these countries permitting to exit and end Western operations? This article seeks to analyze Western interventions in these five countries in order to reflect on the concept of the state and the erroneous starting point for each intervention.4 In the first part, the political status of each country is analyzed in order to understand the internal and regional crisis. In a second time, the concept of the state, framed into the Buzanian trinity, is discussed and applied to the cases. In the last part the European and American civilian-military doctrines are examined in accordance with their latest military interventions and in their broader spectrum.
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The EU’s October summit was dominated by one issue; the migration and refugee crisis, with EU leaders intent on putting on a public display of unity after weeks of bitter arguments, and concentrating on fire-fighting and immediate measures to tackle the most pressing reasons for, and impacts of, the crisis. Longer-term measures to address some of the root causes of increased migratory flows, support for the integration of newly arrived refugees or the introduction of new channels of legal migration, were not discussed. The Summit also spent little time on two issues that had originally been expected to be a key part of the agenda: the forthcoming British referendum on EU membership, where irritation with the slow pace of talks and British vagueness about its demands were in evidence; and the governance of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), where EU leaders missed another opportunity for a thorough debate about future perspectives on the basis of the ‘Five Presidents’ Report’.
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The main goal of this thesis is to report patterns of perceived safety in the context of airport infrastructure, taking the airport of Bologna as reference. Many personal and environmental attributes are investigated to paint the profile of the sensitive passenger and to understand why precise factors of the transit environment are so impactful on the individual. The main analyses are based on a 2014-2015 passengers’ survey, involving almost six thousand of incoming and outgoing passengers. Other reports are used to implement and support the resource. The analysis is carried out by using a combination of Chi-square tests and binary logistic regressions. Findings shows that passengers result to be particularly affected by the perception of airport’s environment (e.g., state and maintenance of facilities, clarity and efficacy of information system, functionality of elevators and escalators), but also by the way how the passenger reaches the airport and the quality of security checks. In relation to such results, several suggestions are provided for the improvement of passenger satisfaction with safety. The attention is then focused on security checkpoints and related operations, described on a theoretical and technical ground. We present an example of how to realize a proper model of the security checks area of Bologna’s airport, with the aim to assess present performances of the system and consequences of potential variations. After a brief introduction to Arena, a widespread simulation software, the existing model is described, pointing out flaws and limitations. Such model is finally updated and changed in order to make it more reliable and more representative of the reality. Different scenarios are tested and results are compared using graphs and tables.
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We propose a framework describing how family ownership can create or destroy value depending on the goals, resources, and governance of the family firm, which are each influenced by the family owners. Taking a contingency perspective, we suggest that a fit is required for all three elements – family- influenced goals, resources, and governance – for the family firm to flourish over generations. We conclude with a suggested research agenda indicating research opportunities at the nexus of these identified elements. Further we provide some guiding questions for practitioners that might stimulate fruitful discussions among family firm owners and managers about how to realize ‘‘fit.’’
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"October 1983."
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Mode of access: Internet.