Fiscal decentralization in Spain: An asymmetric transition to democracy

Asymmetric fiscal decentralization, by which we mean different fiscal arrangements between the central government and different groups of, or individual, lower-level governments, may be justified from an economic efficiency perspective. As argued by Tiebout (1956), Oates (1972) and others, a decentralized system of regional and local governments is better able to accommodate differences in tastes for public goods and services. This efficiency argument calls for decentralization of fiscal authority to regional and local governments, but not necessarily asymmetric decentralization. However, when the differences in tastes for public goods and services arise out of differences in history, culture and language across regions of a country, asymmetric treatment may be justified. History, culture and language may influence how a group of people (a region) views autonomy, independence and fiscal authority. Some regions may have had experience with autonomous government in the past, they may have a culture that is strongly reliant upon (or leery of) the central government, or they may be fearful of losing their separate languages if they do not have special arrangements. To accommodate differences in taste for independence, autonomy, and fiscal authority, it may be necessary to have different fiscal arrangements between the central government and the different regions comprising the country.

Economic integration and corruption: The corrupt soul of the European Union

We study the link between corruption and economic integration. We show that if an economic union establishes a common regulation for public procurement, the country more prone to corruption benefits more from integration. However, if the propensities to corruption are too distinct, the less corrupt country will not be willing to join the union. This difference in corruption propensities can be offset by a difference in efficiency. We also show that corruption is lower if integration occurs. A panel data analysis for the European Union confirms that more corrupt countries are more favorable towards integration but less acceptable as potential new members.

Tobin meets Oates: Solidarity and the optimal fiscal federal structure

We explore the implications for the optimal degree of fiscal decentralization when people spreferences for goods and services, which classic treatments of fiscal federalism (Oates, 1972)place in the purview of local governments, exhibit specific egalitarianism (Tobin, 1970), orsolidarity. We find that a system in which the central government provides a common minimumlevel of the publicly provided good, and local governments are allowed to use their ownresources to provide an even higher local level, performs better from an efficiency perspectiverelative to all other systems analyzed for a relevant range of preferences over solidarity.

Does it cost to be virtuous? The macroeconomic effects of fiscal constraints

We study whether and how fiscal restrictions alter the business cycle features of macrovariables for a sample of 48 US states. We also examine the typical transmission properties of fiscal disturbances and the implied fiscal rules of states with different fiscal restrictions. Fiscal constraints are characterized with a number of indicators. There are similarities in second moments of macrovariables and in the transmission properties of fiscal shocks across states with different fiscal constraints. The cyclical response of expenditure differs in size and sometimes in sign, but heterogeneity within groups makes point estimates statistically insignificant. Creative budget accounting is responsible for the pattern. Implications for the design of fiscal rules and the reform of the Stability and Growth Pact are discussed.

Why do differences in the degree of fiscal decentralization endure?

A notable difference between the U.S. and many countries in Europe is in the degree of fiscal decentralization. Regional (and local) governments in the U.S. have significant autonomy in setting their own taxes and determining how to spend their revenues. This is not true of their counterparts in Spain, France, the United Kingdom, Czech Republic and many other European countries. In recent years, many countries formerly subject to dictatorshipsor communism have been considering decentralizing fiscal responsibility to sub-national governments as part of the process of democratization (see Bird and Ebel, forthcoming). Yet, much of Europe remains immune to adopting effective decentralization in which sub-national units have true taxing authority.

Price differentials in monetary unions: The role of fiscal shocks

We study the effect of regional expenditure and revenue shocks on price differentials for47 US states and 9 EU countries. We identify shocks using sign restrictions on the dynamicsof deficits and output and construct two estimates for structural price differentials dynamics which optimally weight the information contained in the data for all units. Fiscal shocks explain between 14 and 23 percent of the variability of price differentials both in the US and in the EU. On average, expansionary fiscal disturbances produce positive price differential responses while distortionary balance budget shocks produce negative price differential responses. In a number of units, price differential responses to expansionary fiscal shocks are negative. Spillovers and labor supply effects partially explain this pattern while geographical, political, and economic indicators do not.

Report of the Memorial Union Revenue Bond Funds of Iowa State University of Science and Technology as of and for the year ended June 30, 2008

Report of the Memorial Union Revenue Bond Funds of Iowa State University of Science and Technology as of and for the year ended June 30, 2008

Department of Commerce - Credit Union Division Performance Plan, FY 2009

Agency Performance Plan, Department of Commerce - Credit Union Division

Reforma do Sistema Fiscal em Cabo Verde

O trabalho que ora se apresenta designa – se” Reforma do Sistema Fiscal em Cabo Verde – Caso IVA (2004 a 2010) ” e enquadra-se no âmbito da licenciatura em Contabilidade e Administração – Ramo Administração e Controlo Financeiro ministrado no Instituto Superior de Ciências Económicas e Empresariais. Na elaboração deste tema pretende-se retratar a Reforma do Sistema Fiscal em Cabo Verde – caso IVA (2004 a 2010), especificamente, descrever o efeito do IVA no orçamento do Estado e na economia cabo-verdiana; identificar efeitos no mercado de bens e serviços após a implementação do IVA; analisar a sua contribuição para o nível da carga fiscal em Cabo Verde; comparar o nível de fiscalidade com a sustentabilidade das finanças públicas em Cabo Verde e por fim, recolher e analisar dados/informações relacionados com a gestão e arrecadação efectiva do IVA. O trabalho que hora se apresenta encontra-se dividido em três partes, sendo: A primeira parte, a introdução;  A segunda parte encontra-se dividida em quatro capítulos, a saber: No primeiro capítulo, retratar uma breve evolução das reformas do sistema fiscal cabo-verdiano; No segundo capitulo, a implementação do imposto sobre o valor acrescentado.  No terceiro capítulo, analisar o efeito da implementação do IVA na Economia cabo-verdiana (2004 a 2010). E por último, no quarto capítulo, analisar o efeito do Imposto sobre o Valor Acrescentado (IVA) no Orçamento do Estado (2004-2010).

Iowa Credit Union Division, Strategic Plan, 2008

This report outlines the strategic plan for Credit Union Division including, goals and mission.