Endogenous cycles in a Stiglitz-Weiss economy

The literature on financiaI imperfections and business cycles has focused on propagation mechanisms. In this pape r we model apure reversion mechanism, such that the economy may converge to a two period equilibrium cycle. This mechanism confirms that financiaI imperfections may have a dramatic amplification effect. Unlike in some related models, contracts are complete. Indexation is not assumed away. The welfare properties of a possible stabilizing policy are analyzed. The model i tself is a dynamic extension of the well-known Stigli tz-Weiss model of lending under moral hazard. Although stylized the model still captures some important features of credit cycles.

Political budget cycles in a fiscal federation : the effect of partisan voluntary transfers

This article first presents an econometric study suggesting that intergovernmental transfers to Brazilian municipalities are strongly partisan motivated. In light of that stylized fact, it develops an extension to Rogoff (1990)’s model to analyze the effect of partisan motivated transfers into sub-national electoral and fiscal equilibria. The main finding is that important partisan transfers may undo the positive selection aspect of political budget cycles. Indeed, partisan transfers may, on one hand, eliminate the political budget cycle, solving a moral hazard problem, but, on the other hand, they may retain an incompetent incumbent in office, bringing about an adverse selection problem.

Optimal exchange rate policy, optimal incomplete taxation and business cycles

Implementation and collapse of exchange rate pegging schemes are recur- rent events. A currency crisis (pegging) is usually followed by an economic downturn (boom). This essay explains why a benevolent government should pursue Þscal and monetary policies that lead to those recurrent currency crises and subsequent periods of pegging. It is shown that the optimal policy induces a competitive equilibrium that displays a boom in periods of below average de- valuation and a recession in periods of above average devaluation. A currency crisis (pegging) can be understood as an optimal policy answer to a recession (boom).

Business cycles in emerging economies : the role of interest rates

This paper documents the empirical relation between the interest rates that emerging economies face in international capital markets and their business cycles. It shows that the patterns observed in the data can be interpreted as the equilibrium of a dynamic general equilibrium model of a small open economy, in which (i) firms have to pay for a fraction of the input bill before production takes place, and (ii) preferences generate a labor supply that is independent of the interest rate. In our sample, interest rates are strongly countercyclical, strongly positively correlated with net exports, and they lead the cycle. Output is very volatile and consumption is more volatile than output. The sample includes data for Argentina during 1983-2000 and for four other large emerging economies, Brazil, Mexico, Korea, and Philippines, during 1994-2000. The model is calibrated to Argentina’s economy for the period 1983-1999. When the model is fed with actual US interest rates and the actual default spreads of Argentine sovereign interest rates, interest rates alone can explain forty percent of output fluctuations. When simulated technology shocks are added to the model, it can account for the main empirical regularities of Argentina’s economy during the period. A 1% increase in country risk causes a contemporaneous fall in output of 0.5 ’subsequent recovery. An increase in US rates causes output to fall by the same on impact and by almost 2% two years after the shock. The asymetry in the effect of shocks to US rates and country risk is due to the fact that US interest rates are more persistent than country risk and that there is a significant spillover effect from US interest rates to country risk.

Signaling in political budget cycles: How far are you willing to go?

This paper analyzes how heterogeneity in two dimensions, competency and character, a¤ects political budget cycles. Competency is the e¢ciency in running the government. Character is the degree of opportunism. In this expanded space, previous results in the literature on the separating nature of the signaling equilibrium hold if heterogeneity in opportunism is low. With high heterogeneity in opportunism, no separating equilibrium exists. Rather, the equilibrium is partially pooling: only extreme types can be distinguished.

Common factors in Latin America's business cycles

This paper constructs new business cycle indices for Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico based on common dynamic factors extracted from a comprehensive set of sectoral output, external trade, fiscal and financial variables. The analysis spans the 135 years since the insertion of these economies into the global economy in the 1870s. The constructed indices are used to derive a business cyc1e chronology for these countries and characterize a set of new stylized facts. In particular, we show that ali four countries have historically displayed a striking combination of high business cyc1e volatility and persistence relative to advanced country benchmarks. Volatility changed considerably over time, however, being very high during early formative decades through the Great Depression, and again during the 1970s and ear1y 1980s, before declining sharply in three of the four countries. We also identify a sizeable common factor across the four economies which variance decompositions ascribe mostly to foreign interest rates and shocks to commodity terms of trade.

Modelo regulatório híbrido da educação superior privada: possibilidades, limites e desafios

Nos últimos vinte anos observamos a entrada de entidades privadas com fins lucrativos no meio educacional de nível superior, motivada e induzida por decisões de políticas educacionais na busca do ideal do acesso ao ensino combinado com a inclusão social. Assim, instituições privadas estabeleceram um novo modelo “em construção” de Educação Superior focado em Mercado, criando oportunidades para que tal segmento crescesse à margem de um processo regulatório econômico. Atualmente as possibilidades de abordagens regulatórias ampliaram-se, sendo plenamente admitido regulação em setores econômicos, e sob formatos que não sejam, necessariamente, o modelo de agências autônomas, podendo existir entidades similares às agências reguladoras, órgãos ou entidades dotadas de função regulatória, como no caso do Ministério da Educação e suas entidades supervisionadas - autarquias. A chamada regulação social qualitativa - oferta de vagas e autorização de cursos - mostra-se insuficiente para ordenar e articular a ação dos atores, num ambiente regulatório crescente em complexidade social e econômica. O modelo regulatório híbrido da ES privada propõe articular/combinar os já consagrados parâmetros da regulação social com os princípios e parâmetros da regulação econômica, numa nova forma de abordagem regulatória que agregue as seguintes dimensões: fundamentos econômicos; implementação de políticas públicas setorizadas, regionalizadas e indutoras; desenho institucional que priorize novas diretrizes para a entrada e manutenção no Sistema Federal de Ensino - autorizações e credenciamentos; fiscalização e controle; prospecção, avaliação; e accountability - e, acesso das IES às Políticas Públicas Programáticas, de caráter geral, assegurando o interesse público, a efetividade, a competitividade, a qualidade e o valor social no Ensino Superior Privado.

Antropologia dos militares no Brasil: problemas, limites e perspectivas

Centro de Pesquisa e Documentação de História Contemporânea do Brasil

Os limites do desenho institucional: uma investigação empírica dos mecanismos da influência presidencial sobre as agências reguladoras independentes no Governo Federal brasileiro

O trabalho investiga empiricamente o tema da influência presidencial sobre as agências reguladoras independentes (ARIs) no Governo Federal brasileiro, no período 1997-2014, como foco nos processos de nomeação para os cargos de direção destes órgãos, por meio de um método misto de caráter sequencial, combinando técnicas qualitativas e quantitativas. Primeiramente, utilizando a técnica do process tracing, uma análise histórico-comparativa da gênese e consolidação das dez ARIs federais no Brasil busca demonstrar a importância das hipóteses do credible commitment e da emulação institucional como variáveis explicativas da adoção do modelo. Em seguida, a influência política presidencial sobre as ARIs é mensurada analisando-se o padrão das vacâncias de cargos de direção, taxas de conclusão de mandato, bem, como o processo de aprovação das indicações presidenciais pelo Senado Federal. Por fim, são analisados os dados empíricos relativos ao perfil dos nomeados para cargos de direção nas ARIs no período estudado, incluindo variáveis como filiação partidária e qualificação profissional, buscando-se ainda verificar indícios de existência de trade-off entre estas duas dimensões.

Análise de impacto regulatório no direito ambiental : limites e possibilidades

A regulação ambiental carece de maior transparência. Os órgãos de proteção do meio ambiente, em regra, apenas publicam as versões finais das medidas elaboradas, sem explicitar as justificativas técnicas que as embasaram, as alternativas consideradas e as possíveis contribuições decorrentes de participação social, entre outras questões. Em consequência, tem-se um cenário desfavorável à realização de controle pelos mais diversos atores. Para superá-lo, a análise de impacto regulatório é apresentada como instrumento apto a agregar clareza, objetividade e eficiência ao processo decisório ambiental. A incorporação da ferramenta, no entanto, deve ser realizada com cuidado especial, tendo em vista a existência de três principais peculiaridades do direito do meio ambiente. Primeiro, o setor lida não só com situações de risco, mas também com casos de incerteza, em que a ausência de informação impossibilita o cálculo de probabilidade de ocorrência de possíveis resultados. Em segundo lugar, a regulação ambiental recai sobre bens não transacionados em mercados, o que dificulta a obtenção de seu valor de troca, aspecto relevante para a análise de custo-benefício como tradicionalmente conhecida. Por fim, o meio ambiente apresenta desenho regulatório absolutamente fragmentado, composto por variados órgãos normatizadores, deliberativos e fiscalizadores em todos os níveis da federação, o que eleva o risco de deficiências na formação técnica das autoridades reguladoras.

Os limites formais para a celebração do acordo de leniência (Lei 12.846/13) em face das garantias do particular

O presente trabalho apresenta um estudo sobre a recente Lei n. 12.846/13, em especial sobre o instituto do acordo de leniência, buscando estabelecer um marco para a celebração desses ajustes tendo em vista os direitos e garantias estabelecidos pela Constituição da República Federativa do Brasil de 1988. Inicialmente, aborda-se as intensas mudanças promovidas no Estado moderno e no direito sancionador de forma geral, questiona-se, em seguida, a existência de um núcleo comum entre o direito penal e o direito administrativo sancionador. Busca-se, por fim, propor soluções para maximizar a eficácia do sistema de controle e sanção da Lei n. 12.846/13, tendo em vista a necessidade de se harmonizar a Regulação Pública com a segurança jurídica e os direitos constitucionais da pessoa jurídica investigada, em especial quando ela celebra o acordo de leniência.

How the full opening of the capital account to highly liquid financial markets led Latin America to two and a half cycles of ‘mania, panic and crash’

Latin America has recently experienced three cycles of capital inflows, the first two ending in major financial crises. The first took place between 1973 and the 1982 ‘debt-crisis’. The second took place between the 1989 ‘Brady bonds’ agreement (and the beginning of the economic reforms and financial liberalisation that followed) and the Argentinian 2001/2002 crisis, and ended up with four major crises (as well as the 1997 one in East Asia) — Mexico (1994), Brazil (1999), and two in Argentina (1995 and 2001/2). Finally, the third inflow-cycle began in 2003 as soon as international financial markets felt reassured by the surprisingly neo-liberal orientation of President Lula’s government; this cycle intensified in 2004 with the beginning of a (purely speculative) commodity price-boom, and actually strengthened after a brief interlude following the 2008 global financial crash — and at the time of writing (mid-2011) this cycle is still unfolding, although already showing considerable signs of distress. The main aim of this paper is to analyse the financial crises resulting from this second cycle (both in LA and in East Asia) from the perspective of Keynesian/ Minskyian/ Kindlebergian financial economics. I will attempt to show that no matter how diversely these newly financially liberalised Developing Countries tried to deal with the absorption problem created by the subsequent surges of inflow (and they did follow different routes), they invariably ended up in a major crisis. As a result (and despite the insistence of mainstream analysis), these financial crises took place mostly due to factors that were intrinsic (or inherent) to the workings of over-liquid and under-regulated financial markets — and as such, they were both fully deserved and fairly predictable. Furthermore, these crises point not just to major market failures, but to a systemic market failure: evidence suggests that these crises were the spontaneous outcome of actions by utility-maximising agents, freely operating in friendly (‘light-touch’) regulated, over-liquid financial markets. That is, these crises are clear examples that financial markets can be driven by buyers who take little notice of underlying values — i.e., by investors who have incentives to interpret information in a biased fashion in a systematic way. Thus, ‘fat tails’ also occurred because under these circumstances there is a high likelihood of self-made disastrous events. In other words, markets are not always right — indeed, in the case of financial markets they can be seriously wrong as a whole. Also, as the recent collapse of ‘MF Global’ indicates, the capacity of ‘utility-maximising’ agents operating in (excessively) ‘friendly-regulated’ and over-liquid financial market to learn from previous mistakes seems rather limited.

How the full opening of the capital account to highly liquid financial markets led Latin America to two and a half cycles of ‘mania, panic and crash’

Latin America has recently experienced three cycles of capital inflows, the first two ending in major financial crises. The first took place between 1973 and the 1982 ‘debt-crisis’. The second took place between the 1989 ‘Brady bonds’ agreement (and the beginning of the economic reforms and financial liberalisation that followed) and the Argentinian 2001/2002 crisis, and ended up with four major crises (as well as the 1997 one in East Asia) — Mexico (1994), Brazil (1999), and two in Argentina (1995 and 2001/2). Finally, the third inflow-cycle began in 2003 as soon as international financial markets felt reassured by the surprisingly neo-liberal orientation of President Lula’s government; this cycle intensified in 2004 with the beginning of a (purely speculative) commodity price-boom, and actually strengthened after a brief interlude following the 2008 global financial crash — and at the time of writing (mid-2011) this cycle is still unfolding, although already showing considerable signs of distress. The main aim of this paper is to analyse the financial crises resulting from this second cycle (both in LA and in East Asia) from the perspective of Keynesian/ Minskyian/ Kindlebergian financial economics. I will attempt to show that no matter how diversely these newly financially liberalised Developing Countries tried to deal with the absorption problem created by the subsequent surges of inflow (and they did follow different routes), they invariably ended up in a major crisis. As a result (and despite the insistence of mainstream analysis), these financial crises took place mostly due to factors that were intrinsic (or inherent) to the workings of over-liquid and under-regulated financial markets — and as such, they were both fully deserved and fairly predictable. Furthermore, these crises point not just to major market failures, but to a systemic market failure: evidence suggests that these crises were the spontaneous outcome of actions by utility-maximising agents, freely operating in friendly (light-touched) regulated, over-liquid financial markets. That is, these crises are clear examples that financial markets can be driven by buyers who take little notice of underlying values — investors have incentives to interpret information in a biased fashion in a systematic way. ‘Fat tails’ also occurred because under these circumstances there is a high likelihood of self-made disastrous events. In other words, markets are not always right — indeed, in the case of financial markets they can be seriously wrong as a whole. Also, as the recent collapse of ‘MF Global’ indicates, the capacity of ‘utility-maximising’ agents operating in unregulated and over-liquid financial market to learn from previous mistakes seems rather limited.