List which includes costs, plans and receipts for amounts received between S.D. Woodruff and Boyd and Schurr

List (8 pages, handwritten) which includes costs, plans and receipts for amounts received between S.D. Woodruff and Boyd and Schurr, Dec. 3, 1875.

Vertical R&D Sprillovers, Cooperation, Market Structure, and Innovation.

This paper studies vertical R&D spillovers between upstream and downstream firms. The model incorporates two vertically related industries, with horizontal spillovers within each industry and vertical spillovers between the two industries. Four types of R&D cooperation are studied : no cooperation, horizontal cooperation, vertical cooperation, and simultaneous horizontal and vertical cooperation. Vertical spillovers always increase R&D and welfare, while horizontal spillovers may increase or decrease them. The comparison of cooperative settings in terms of R&D shows that no setting uniformly dominates the others. Which type of cooperation yields more R&D depends on horizontal and vertical spillovers, and market structure. The ranking of cooperative structures hinges on the signs and magnitudes of three competitive externalities (vertical, horizontal, and diagonal) which capture the effect of the R&D of a firm on the profits of other firms. One of the basic results of the strategic investment literature is that cooperation between competitors increases (decreases) R&D when horizontal spillovers are high (low); the model shows that this result does not necessarily hold when vertical spillovers and vertical cooperation are taken into account. The paper proposes a theory of innovation and market structure, showing that the relation between innovation and competition depends on horizontal spillovers, vertical spillovers, and cooperative settings. The private incentives for R&D cooperation are addressed. It is found that buyers and sellers have divergent interests regarding the choice of cooperative settings and that spillovers increase the likelihood of the emergence of cooperation in a decentralized equilibrium.

Information Sharing and the Stability of Cooperation in Research Joint Ventures.

The model studies information sharing and the stability of cooperation in cost reducing Research Joint Ventures (RJVs). In a four-stage game-theoretic framework, firms decide on participation in a RJV, information sharing, R&D expenditures, and output. An important feature of the model is that voluntary information sharing between cooperating firms increases information leakage from the RJV to outsiders. It is found that it is the spillover from the RJV to outsiders which determines the decision of insiders whether to share information, while it is the spillover affecting all firms which determines the level of information sharing within the RJV. RJVs representing a larger portion of firms in the industry are more likely to share information. It is also found that when sharing information is costless, firms never choose intermediate levels of information sharing : they share all the information or none at all. The size of the RJV is found to depend on three effects : a coordination effect, an information sharing effect, and a competition effect. Depending on the relative magnitudes of these effects, the size of the RJV may increase or decrease with spillovers. The effect of information sharing on the profitability of firms as well as on welfare is studied.

The Compliance Costs of Taxes on Businesses and Individuals a Review of the Evidence

This Paper Reviews the Literature on the Compliance Costs Incurred by Businesses and Individuals Because of One Or More Taxes. It Presents Both the Main Characteristics, Such As Sample Size, Interview Techniques and So On, and the Key Findings of the Nineteen Studies Reviewed. in General, One Can Conclude That Simpler Taxes Lead to Lower Compliance Costs.

The Macroeconomic Effects of Infrequent Information with Adjustment Costs

In the last decade, the potential macroeconomic effects of intermittent large adjustments in microeconomic decision variables such as prices, investment, consumption of durables or employment – a behavior which may be justified by the presence of kinked adjustment costs – have been studied in models where economic agents continuously observe the optimal level of their decision variable. In this paper, we develop a simple model which introduces infrequent information in a kinked adjustment cost model by assuming that agents do not observe continuously the frictionless optimal level of the control variable. Periodic releases of macroeconomic statistics or dividend announcements are examples of such infrequent information arrivals. We first solve for the optimal individual decision rule, that is found to be both state and time dependent. We then develop an aggregation framework to study the macroeconomic implications of such optimal individual decision rules. Our model has the distinct characteristic that a vast number of agents tend to act together, and more so when uncertainty is large. The average effect of an aggregate shock is inversely related to its size and to aggregate uncertainty. We show that these results differ substantially from the ones obtained with full information adjustment cost models.

The great asymmetry : America's closest allies in times of war

This dissertation focuses on military cooperation between the United States and its special allies. It argues that alliance expectations determine the level of military cooperation, while two intervening variables - the level of government cohesion and military capabilities - determine its implementation. This study also shows how secondary states deploy strategies to overcome power asymmetries through bilateral concessions, international organizations and by appealing to principle. The focus of the research is on special allies, as they have the most to gain or lose by going along with American plans. My contention is that secondary allies can rarely influence the dominant ally decisively, but they can act autonomously and resist to pressures exerted by the stronger alliance partner. The argument builds on three central claims. First, power asymmetries between allies translate into different assessments of international threats. Second, when disagreements over threats arise, the outcome of intra-alliance bargaining is not necessarily dictated by the preferences of the stronger power. Third, secondary states, as opposed to the dominant partner, face unique constraints when facing major foreign policy decisions, i.e. they face a trade-off between establishing a credible reputation as an alliance partner in a politically feasible way while minimizing domestic audience costs. To examine the theoretical puzzle presented by asymmetric military cooperation, I introduce a causal explanation that builds on neoclassical realism, to zone in on the interaction between systemic and domestic variables. My research makes a contribution to alliance theory and foreign policy decision-making by studying how special allies respond to American decisions in times of threat and how systemic constraints are channeled through state-level variables. To investigate the causal link between threat perception, alliance expectations and domestic constraints, this study relies on the method of structured focused comparison with three detailed case studies. The focus is on the initial decision made by special allies regarding whether or not to participle in joint mobilization with the United States. The decision-making process is presented from the perspective of secondary allied states and measures the explanatory factors that motivated the decision on military cooperation. The case studies are the UK, Canada and Australia’s response to the war in Afghanistan and the war in Iraq during the period of 2001 to 2003.

Depoliticization, instrumentalization and legitimacy of Czech development cooperation: A case of imposed altruism?

This paper draws on James Ferguson’s concept of ‘anti-politics machine’ and Pierre Bourdieu’s concept of illusio to explore the nature of the international development cooperation programmes financed by the Czech government. It argues that its character as an ‘anti-politics machine’ turns development into a highly technical issue and dismisses essential political questions of global equity and policy coherence from the public debate. Moreover, the actors in the field of development cooperation are held in an illusio: they are required to appear as altruistic, which obscures their particular interests. This instrumentalization of development aid contributes to further isolation of the Czech development constituency and raises fundamental questions for the democratic legitimacy of development cooperation.

Impact of type of drug insurance on adherence, persistence and costs of antidepressant drugs : a Quebec population-based study

Contexte: À date, il existe peu de données sur l’adhésion, la persistance et les coûts associés aux antidépresseurs selon le type d’assurance médicament (privé ou public). Objectif: Comparer selon le régime d’assurance médicament (privé ou public), l'adhésion, la persistance et les coûts des antidépresseurs. Méthodes de recherche: Une étude de cohorte appariée a été réalisée en utilisant des bases de données du Québec. Sujets: Nous avons sélectionné 194 patients assurés par un régime privé et 1923 patients assurés par le régime public de la Régie de l’assurance maladie du Québec (RAMQ) (18-64 ans) qui ont rempli au moins une ordonnance pour un antidépresseur entre décembre 2007 et septembre 2009. Mesures: L’adhésion, mesurée sur une période d’un an, a été estimée en utilisant le proportion of prescribed days covered (PPDC). Un modèle de régression linéaire a été utilisé afin d’estimer la différence moyenne en PPDC entre les patients assurés par un régime privé et ceux assurés par le régime public de la RAMQ. La persistance a été comparé entre ces deux groupes avec un modèle de régression de survie Cox, et le coût mensuel d'antidépresseurs ($ CAN) a été comparé entre ces deux groupes en utilisant un modèle de régression linéaire. Résultats: Le PPDC parmi les patients assurés par un régime privé était de 86,4% (intervalle de confiance (IC) 95%: 83,3%-89,5%) versus 81,3% (IC 95%: 80,1%-82,5%) pour les patients assurés par le régime public de la RAMQ, pour une différence moyenne ajustée de 6,7% (IC 95%: 3,0%-10,4%). La persistance après un an parmi les patients assurés par un régime privé était de 49,5% versus 18,9% pour les patients assurés par le régime public de la RAMQ (p <0,001), et le rapport de risque ajusté était de 0,48 (IC 95%: 0,30-0,76). Comparativement aux patients assurés par le régime public de la RAMQ, les patients ayant une assurance privée ont payé 14,94 $ CAD (95% CI: $12,30-$17,58) de plus par mois en moyenne pour leurs antidépresseurs. Conclusion: Les patients assurés par un régime privé avaient une meilleure adhésion, persistance, mais avaient aussi un plus haut coût pour leurs antidépresseurs que ceux assurés par le régime public de la RAMQ. Cette différence de coûts peut être due aux différentes exigences de paiement en pharmacie entre les deux régimes ainsi qu’aux limites des honoraires des pharmaciens imposés par le régime public.

Choosing Thesis Juries: The Costs of Taking a Strict Line on Conflicts of Interest

Étude de cas / Case study

Comparative costs and outcomes of traumatic brain injury from biking accidents with or without helmet use

Contexte: Évaluer les déterminants de maladies évitables et leurs coûts est nécessaire dans le contexte d’assurance maladie universelle. Le moment d’évaluer les impacts des traumatismes crâniocérébraux (TCC) survenus lors d’accidents de vélo est idéal vu la popularité récente du cyclisme au Québec. Objectifs: Comparer les caractéristiques démographiques et médicales, ainsi que les coûts sociétaux qu’engendrent les TCC de cyclistes portant ou non un casque. Méthodologie: Étude rétrospective de 128 cyclistes avec TCC admis à l’Hôpital Général de Montréal entre 2007 et 2011. Les variables indépendantes sont sociodémographiques, cliniques et le port du casque. Les variables dépendantes sont la durée de séjour, l’échelle GOS-E, l’échelle ISS, l’orientation au congé, les décès et les coûts à la société. Résultats: Le groupe portant un casque était plus vieux, plus éduqué, retraité et marié; au niveau médical, ils avaient des TCCs moins sévères à l’imagerie, des hospitalisations aux soins intensifs plus courtes et moins de neurochirurgies. Les coûts médians à la société pour les TCC isolés de cyclistes avec casque étaient significativement moindres. Conclusion: Dans cette étude, le port du casque semblait prévenir certaines complications des TCC et permettait de faire économiser de l’argent à l’état. Le port de casque est recommandé.

The costs of alcohol, illegal drugs, and tobacco in Canada, 2002.

Objective: The aim of this study was to estimate costs attributable to substance use and misuse in Canada in 2002. Method: Based on information about prevalence of exposure and risk relations for more than 80 disease categories, deaths, years of life lost, and hospitalizations attributable to substance use and misuse were estimated. In addition, substance-attributable fractions for criminal justice expenditures were derived. Indirect costs were estimated using a modified human capital approach. Results: Costs of substance use and misuse totaled almost Can. $40 billion in 2002. The total cost per capita for substance use and misuse was about Can. $1,267: Can. $463 for alcohol, Can. $262 for illegal drugs, and Can. $541 for tobacco. Legal substances accounted for the vast majority of these costs (tobacco: almost 43% of total costs; alcohol: 37%). Indirect costs or productivity losses were the largest cost category (61%), followed by health care (22%) and law enforcement costs (14%). More than 40,000 people died in Canada in 2002 because of substance use and misuse: 37,209 deaths were attributable to tobacco, 4,258 were attributable to alcohol, and 1,695 were attributable to illegal drugs. A total of about 3.8 million hospital days were attributable to substance use and misuse, again mainly to tobacco. Conclusions: Substance use and misuse imposes a considerable economic toll on Canadian society and requires more preventive efforts.