Do we fear tax competition among new and old European countries ?

The purpose of this paper is to study both theoretically and empirically tax competition in the enlarged EU and to provide some insights on ongoing reforms concerning business taxation. We support the idea that even if one can observe cuts in "new" members statutory business tax rates, this should not result in fiercer tax competition between the "core" and "the "periphery" since infrastructure endowments and the existence of agglomeration rents in the core of the EU may prevent (at least partially) activities to relocate to the "new" members.

Road Use Tax Fund Efficiency Report, December 31, 2013

Senate File 2314, 84th General Assembly, states the Iowa Department of Transportation shall submit quarterly reports regarding the implementation of efficiency measures identified in the "Road Use Tax Fund Efficiency Report," January 2012. This report shall provide details of activities undertaken in the previous quarter relating to one-time and long-term program efficiencies and partnership efficiencies. Issues covered include savings realized from the implementation of particular efficiency measures; updates concerning measures that have not been implemented; efforts involving cities, counties, other jurisdictions, or stakeholder interest groups; any new efficiency measures identified or undertaken; and identification of any legislative action that may be required to achieve efficiencies.

Distributing State Road Use Tax Funds to Counties, HR-386, 1996

Iowa's county road system serves many critical functions in a changing environment. Many counties with very different social, economic, and demographic circumstances do not have adequate resources to provide the desired level of service on their secondary road systems. How the state's Road Use Tax Fund (RUTF) is distributed among counties is therefore of great importance. This report presents the results of a year-long study of how to distribute RUTF resources among Iowa's 99 counties. The project was undertaken at the request of county engineers who wish to replace the current method of allocation with one that is more stable, comprehensible, and predictable. This report describes the current allocation method, examines how other states distribute road funds to counties, and discusses potential allocation factors that could be included in a revised procedure. The process undertaken to narrow the range of possible formulas and determine the one to recommend is summarized. Finally, the report presents the allocation formula recommended by the project advisory committee, along with how it would operate.

Road Use Tax Fund Efficiency Report, March 2014

Senate File 2314, 84th General Assembly, states the Iowa Department of Transportation shall submit quarterly reports regarding the implementation of efficiency measures identified in the "Road Use Tax Fund Efficiency Report," January 2012. This report shall provide details of activities undertaken in the previous quarter relating to one-time and long-term program efficiencies and partnership efficiencies. Issues covered include savings realized from the implementation of particular efficiency measures; updates concerning measures that have not been implemented; efforts involving cities, counties, other jurisdiction, or stakeholder interest groups; any new efficiency measures identified or undertaken; and identification of any legislative action that may be required to achieve efficiencies.

The Governor's Blue Ribbon Transportation Task Force: Implementation Report for Maximizing the Efficient Use of Iowa's Road Use Tax Fund, 1998

This report documents the Iowa Department of Transportation's accomplishments and ongoing efforts in response to 39 recommendations proposed by the Governor's Blue Ribbon Transportation Task Force at the end of 1995. Governor Terry Branstad challenged the Task Force to "maximize the benefits of each dollar spent from the Road Use Tax Fund."

Local Public-Services Provision under Public-Private Partnerships : Contractual Design and Contracting Parties Incentives

When deciding to resort to a PPP contract for the provision of a local public service, local governments have to consider the demand risk allocation between the contracting parties. In this article, I investigate the effects of demand risk allocation on the accountability of procuring authorities regarding consumers changing demand, as well as on the cost-reducing effort incentives of the private public-service provider. I show that contracts in which the private provider bears demand risk motivate more the public authority from responding to customer needs. This is due to the fact that consumers are empowered when the private provider bears demand risk, that is, they have the possibility to oust the private provider in case of non-satisfaction with the service provision, which provides procuring authorities with more credibility in side-trading and then more incentives to be responsive. As a consequence, I show that there is a lower matching with consumers' preferences over time when demand risk is on the public authority rather than on the private provider, and this is corroborated in the light of two famous case studies. However, contracts in which the private provider does not bear demand risk motivate more the private provider from investing in cost-reducing efforts. I highlight then a tradeoff in the allocation of demand risk between productive and allocative efficiency. The striking policy implication of this article for local governments would be that the current trend towards a greater resort to contracts where private providers bear little or no demand risk may not be optimal. Local governments should impose demand risk on private providers within PPP contracts when they expect that consumers' preferences over the service provision will change over time.

Uncertainty, electoral incentives and political myopia

We study the determinants of political myopia in a rational model of electoral accountability where the key elements are informational frictions and uncertainty. We build aframework where political ability is ex-ante unknown and policy choices are not perfectlyobservable. On the one hand, elections improve accountability and allow to keep well-performing incumbents. On the other, politicians invest too little in costly policies withfuture returns in an attempt to signal high ability and increase their reelection probability.Contrary to the conventional wisdom, uncertainty reduces political myopia and may, undersome conditions, increase social welfare. We use the model to study how political rewardscan be set so as to maximise social welfare and the desirability of imposing a one-term limitto governments. The predictions of our theory are consistent with a number of stylised factsand with a new empirical observation documented in this paper: aggregate uncertainty, measured by economic volatility, is associated to better fiscal discipline in a panel of 20 OECDcountries.

Iowa Motor Fuel Tax Monthly Reports, January 2014

The monthly fuel tax report from Iowa Department of Transportation to the Iowa Department of Revenue and Finance.

Iowa Motor Fuel Tax Monthly Reports, January 2012

The monthly fuel tax report from Iowa Department of Transportation to the Iowa Department of Revenue and Finance.

Iowa Motor Fuel Tax Monthly Reports, January 2013

The monthly fuel tax report from Iowa Department of Transportation to the Iowa Department of Revenue and Finance.

Iowa Motor Fuel Tax Monthly Reports, February 2012

The monthly fuel tax report from Iowa Department of Transportation to the Iowa Department of Revenue and Finance.

Iowa Motor Fuel Tax Monthly Reports, February 2013

The monthly fuel tax report from Iowa Department of Transportation to the Iowa Department of Revenue and Finance.

Iowa Motor Fuel Tax Monthly Reports, February 2014

The monthly fuel tax report from Iowa Department of Transportation to the Iowa Department of Revenue and Finance.

Iowa Motor Fuel Tax Monthly Reports, March 2012

The monthly fuel tax report from Iowa Department of Transportation to the Iowa Department of Revenue and Finance.