Booms, Recessions and Financial Turmoil: A Fresh Look at Investment Decisions under Cyclical Uncertainty

The paper studies the interaction between cyclical uncertainty and investment in a stochastic real option framework where demand shifts stochastically between three different states, each with different rates of drift and volatility. In our setting the shifts are governed by a three-state Markov switching model with constant transition probabilities. The magnitude of the link between cyclical uncertainty and investment is quantified using simulations of the model. The chief implication of the model is that recessions and financial turmoil are important catalysts for waiting. In other words, our model shows that macroeconomic risk acts as an important deterrent to investments.

Strategic investment and international outsourcing in unionised oligopoly

We critically consider the conventional belief that the attractiveness of international outsourcing lies in cheaper labour costs overseas and that it offers a means to ‘escape’ the power of unions. We develop an oligopoly model in which firms facing unionised domestic labour market choose between producing an intermediate in-house or outsourcing it to a non-unionised foreign supplier that makes a relationship specific investment in developing the intermediate. We show that outsourcing typically results in higher wages and does not always reduce marginal costs. Trade liberalisation favours outsourcing particularly for the relatively less efficient firms.

The Technological Specialization of Countries: An Analysis of Patent Data

New methods of analysis of patent statistics allow assessing country profiles of technological specialization for the period 1990-2006. We witness a modest decrease in levels of specialization, which we show to be negatively influenced by country size and degree of internationalization of inventive activities.

How do technical change and technological distance influence the size of the Okun’s Law coefficient?

How does technical change influence the size of the Okun’s Law coefficient? Using a nonlinear version of Okun’s Law augmented with technical change and technological distance, we show that the impact of output movements on unemployment variations is influenced by the imitation or innovation origins of technical change

Characterizing Behavioral Decisions with Choice Datas

A number of different models with behavioral economics have a reduced form representation where potentially boundedly rational decision-makers do not necessarily internalize all the consequences of their actions on payoff relevant features (which we label as psychological states) of the choice environment. This paper studies the restrictions that such behavioral models impose on choice data and the implications they have for welfare analysis. First, we propose a welfare benchmark that is justified using standard axioms of rational choice and can be applied to a number of existing seminal behavioral economics models. Second, we show that Sen's axioms and fully characterize choice data consistent with behavioral decision-makers. Third, we show how choice data to infer information about the normative signi.cance of psychological states and establish the possibility of identifying welfare dominated choices.

Consumption Decisions When People Value Conformity

In this paper we assume that for some commodities individuals may wish to adjust their levels of consumption from their normal Marshallian levels so as to match the consumption levels of a group of other individuals, in order to signal that they conform to the consumption norms of that group. Unlike Veblen’s concept of conspicuous consumption this can mean that some individuals may reduce their consumption of the relevant commodities. We model this as a three-stage game in which individuals first decide whether or not they wish to adhere to a norm, then decide which norm they wish to adhere to, and finally decide their actual consumption. We present a number of examples of the resulting equilibria, and then discuss the potential policy implications of this model.

Disseny i desenvolupament de videojocs

Estudi i implementació d’una plataforma de prototipatge de videojocs mitjançant la qual es pot crear un videojoc elemental, descartant aspectes decoratius o accessoris. Aquesta eina pretén millorar l’etapa de disseny d’un videojoc avançant el moment en que aquest es podrà jugar. Això permetrà prendre decisions importants en base a proves i experiències mesurables. S’ha implementat un sistema programable en llenguatge de script que estalvia a l’usuari treballar en els aspectes tecnològics i li permet centrar-se en crear la mecànica del joc que vol ser provat.

Organizational configurations of strategic choices and strategic management accounting

This is the first study to adopt a configurational paradigm in an investigation of strategic management accounting (SMA) adoption. The study examines the alignment and effectiveness of strategic choice and strategic management accounting (SMA) system design configurations. Six configurations were derived empirically by deploying a cluster analysis of data collected from a sample of 193 large Slovenian companies. The first four clusters appear to provide some support for the central configurational proposition that higher levels of vertical and horizontal configurational alignments are associated with higher levels of performance. Evidence that contradicts the theory is also apparent, however, as the remaining two clusters exhibit high degrees of SMA vertical and horizontal alignment, but low performance levels. A particular contribution of the paper concerns its demonstration of the way that the configurational paradigm can be operationalised to examine management accounting phenomena and the nature of management accounting insights that can derive from applying the approach.

Relationship between technological progress, capital elasticity and emissions of industrial pollutants for the production sectors in Catalonia

As is known, the Kyoto Protocol proposes to reinforce national policies for emission reduction and, furthermore, to cooperate with other contracting parties. In this context, it would be necessary to assess these emissions, both in general and specifically, by pollutants and/or among productive sectors. The object of this paper is precisely to estimate the polluting emissions of industrial origin in Catalonia in the year 2001, in a multivariate context which explicitly allows a distinction to be made between the polluter and/or the productive sector causing this emission. Six pollutants considered, four directly related to greenhouse effect. A multi-level model, with two levels, pollutants and productive sectors, was specified. Both technological progress and elasticity of capital were introduced as random effects. Hence, it has been permitted that these coefficients vary according to one or other level. The most important finding in this paper is that elasticity of capital has been estimated as very non-elastic, with a range which varies between 0.162 (the paper industry) and 0.556 (commerce). In fact, and generally speaking, the greater capital the sector has, the less elasticity of capital has been estimated. Key words: Kyoto protocol, multilevel model, technological progress

Interactive Epistemology and Reasoning: On the Foundations of Game Theory

Game theory describes and analyzes strategic interaction. It is usually distinguished between static games, which are strategic situations in which the players choose only once as well as simultaneously, and dynamic games, which are strategic situations involving sequential choices. In addition, dynamic games can be further classified according to perfect and imperfect information. Indeed, a dynamic game is said to exhibit perfect information, whenever at any point of the game every player has full informational access to all choices that have been conducted so far. However, in the case of imperfect information some players are not fully informed about some choices. Game-theoretic analysis proceeds in two steps. Firstly, games are modelled by so-called form structures which extract and formalize the significant parts of the underlying strategic interaction. The basic and most commonly used models of games are the normal form, which rather sparsely describes a game merely in terms of the players' strategy sets and utilities, and the extensive form, which models a game in a more detailed way as a tree. In fact, it is standard to formalize static games with the normal form and dynamic games with the extensive form. Secondly, solution concepts are developed to solve models of games in the sense of identifying the choices that should be taken by rational players. Indeed, the ultimate objective of the classical approach to game theory, which is of normative character, is the development of a solution concept that is capable of identifying a unique choice for every player in an arbitrary game. However, given the large variety of games, it is not at all certain whether it is possible to device a solution concept with such universal capability. Alternatively, interactive epistemology provides an epistemic approach to game theory of descriptive character. This rather recent discipline analyzes the relation between knowledge, belief and choice of game-playing agents in an epistemic framework. The description of the players' choices in a given game relative to various epistemic assumptions constitutes the fundamental problem addressed by an epistemic approach to game theory. In a general sense, the objective of interactive epistemology consists in characterizing existing game-theoretic solution concepts in terms of epistemic assumptions as well as in proposing novel solution concepts by studying the game-theoretic implications of refined or new epistemic hypotheses. Intuitively, an epistemic model of a game can be interpreted as representing the reasoning of the players. Indeed, before making a decision in a game, the players reason about the game and their respective opponents, given their knowledge and beliefs. Precisely these epistemic mental states on which players base their decisions are explicitly expressible in an epistemic framework. In this PhD thesis, we consider an epistemic approach to game theory from a foundational point of view. In Chapter 1, basic game-theoretic notions as well as Aumann's epistemic framework for games are expounded and illustrated. Also, Aumann's sufficient conditions for backward induction are presented and his conceptual views discussed. In Chapter 2, Aumann's interactive epistemology is conceptually analyzed. In Chapter 3, which is based on joint work with Conrad Heilmann, a three-stage account for dynamic games is introduced and a type-based epistemic model is extended with a notion of agent connectedness. Then, sufficient conditions for backward induction are derived. In Chapter 4, which is based on joint work with Jérémie Cabessa, a topological approach to interactive epistemology is initiated. In particular, the epistemic-topological operator limit knowledge is defined and some implications for games considered. In Chapter 5, which is based on joint work with Jérémie Cabessa and Andrés Perea, Aumann's impossibility theorem on agreeing to disagree is revisited and weakened in the sense that possible contexts are provided in which agents can indeed agree to disagree.

Technological adoption in health care

This paper addresses the impact of payment systems on the rate of technology adoption. We present a model where technological shift is driven by demand uncertainty, increased patients' benefit, financial variables, and the reimbursement system to providers. Two payment systems are studied: cost reimbursement and (two variants of) DRG. According to the system considered, adoption occurs either when patients' benefits are large enough or when the differential reimbursement across technologies offsets the cost of adoption. Cost reimbursement leads to higher adoption of the new technology if the rate of reimbursement is high relative to the margin of new vs. old technology reimbursement under DRG. Having larger patient benefits favors more adoption under the cost reimbursement payment system, provided that adoption occurs initially under both payment systems.

Withdrawal, "serosorting" and "strategic positioning": use of risk reduction strategies with casual sex partners in men who have sex with men (MSM) in Switzerland, 2007

Introduction: 1) Withdrawal before ejaculation, "serosorting" (to choose a partner of same serostatus) and "strategic positioning" (only insertive vs. only receptive role in anal sex according to serostatus) are known to be used by MSM as alternatives to condom use. 2) Despite their questionable levels of effectiveness they are collectively labelled as "risk reduction strategies" (RRS). Objectives: The aim of this study is to estimate the prevalence and factors related to RRS in men who report unprotected anal intercourse (UAI) with occasional partners in the last 12 months. Methods: 1) In 2007, a module on RRS was included in a repeated national survey conducted among readers of gay newspapers, members of gay organizations and visitors of gay websites (N=2953). 2) Using an anonymous self-completed questionnaire, participants were asked whether, with the aim of avoiding HIV infection, RRS were used with occasional partners. Analysis: 1) Prevalences were calculated in participants who reported UAI with occasional partners in the last 12 months (n=416). 2) A logistic regression was performed, using "at least one RRS" as dependent variable. Number of partners in the last 12 months, HIV-status and usual socio-demographic characteristics were used as independent factors. Result : 1) 70% (292/416) of the participants reporting UAI used at least one RRS when they had unprotected sex with casual partners in the last 12 months (Table 1). 2) Withrawal before ejaculation was the most frequently reported strategy, followed by serosorting and strategic positioning (Table 1). 3) Participants who reported at least one RRS were more likely to be over 30 years and to belong to a gay organisation. HIV-positive and non-tested participants were less likely to report RRS than HIV-negative participants (Table 2). Conclusions: 1) The majority of MSM who reported UAI in the last 12 months tried to reduce risk of HIV transmission by using specific strategies (withdrawal, serosorting, strategic positioning). It is not known, however, to what extent the use of these strategies was systematic. 2) It is necessary to provide MSM with balanced information on these strategies and their respective level of effectiveness. 3) It is important to monitor the use of RRS in HIV behavioural surveillance surveys in MSM.