The Political cost of reforms

This paper formalizes in a fully-rational model the popular idea that politicians perceive an electoral cost in adopting costly reforms with future benefits and reconciles it with the evidence that reformist governments are not punished by voters. To do so, it proposes a model of elections where political ability is ex-ante unknown and investment in reforms is unobservable. On the one hand, elections improve accountability and allow to keep well-performing incumbents. On the other, politicians make too little reforms in an attempt to signal high ability and increase their reappointment probability. Although in a rational expectation equilibrium voters cannot be fooled and hence reelection does not depend on reforms, the strategy of underinvesting in reforms is nonetheless sustained by out-of-equilibrium beliefs. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, uncertainty makes reforms more politically viable and may, under some conditions, increase social welfare. The model is then used to study how political rewards can be set so as to maximize social welfare and the desirability of imposing a one-term limit to governments. The predictions of this theory are consistent with a number of empirical regularities on the determinants of reforms and reelection. They are also consistent with a new stylized fact documented in this paper: economic uncertainty is associated to more reforms in a panel of 20 OECD countries.

Political Competition in Hard Times

This paper analyzes a spatial model of political competition between two policy- motivated parties in hard times of crisis. Hard times are modeled in terms of policy- making costs carried by a newly elected party. The results predict policy divergence in equilibrium. If the ideological preferences of parties are quite diverse and extreme, there is a unique equilibrium in which the parties announce symmetric platforms and each party wins with probability one half. If one party is extreme while the other is more moderate, there is a unique equilibrium in which the parties announce asymmetric platforms. If the preferred policies of the parties are not very distinct, there are two equilibria with asymmetric platforms. An important property of equilibrium with asymmetric platforms is that a winning party necessarily announces its most preferred policy as a platform. JEL classification: D72. Keywords: Spatial model; Political competition; Two-party system; Policy-motivated parties; Hard times; Crisis.

Problemàtiques en l'estudi i investigació del "Dot Painting o Dot Art Movement" Aborigen austràlià

L'objecte d'estudi de la següent memòria són les obres de l'anomenat, en la literatura anglosaxona, "Dot Art Movement o Dot Painting"; un moviment artístic índigena contemporani engendrat entre la dècada dels 70 i els 80 del segle passat a les comunitats de Papunya i Yuendumu en el cor del Desert Australià. La memòria s'articula entorn les principals problemàtiques a les que s'enfronta la definició i descripció de l'anomenat "Dot Art Movement o Dot Painting" dins el context de consum i recepció de les obres a Europa. Aquestes problemàtiques, sobretot conceptuals però també metodològiques, són descrites entorn tres grans apartats: el fet "primitiu", el fet "aborigen" i el fet del "Dot Art Movement o Dot painting". A través d'aquests tres àmbits la memòria presenta diverses herències històriques de caràcter eurocèntric, amb base al període colonial, que dificulten la proliferació d'interpretacions i noves aproximacions vers la recepció europea de les obres d'aquest moviment artístic.

Contrasted influences of moon phases on the reproduction and movement patterns of four amphibian species inhabiting different habitats in central Italy

Many studies have provided evidence that prey adjust their behaviour to adaptively balance the fitness effects of reproduction and predation risk. Nocturnal terrestrial animals should deal with a range of environmental conditions during the reproductive season at the breeding sites, including a variable amount of natural ambient light. High degrees of illumination are expected to minimize those behaviours that might increase the animal detection by predators. Therefore, under habitat variable brightness conditions and in different ecosystems, the above mentioned behaviours are expected to depend on the variation in predation risk. Although moon effects on amphibian biology have been recognized, the direction of this influence is rather controversial with evidences of both increased and depressed activity under full moon. We tested in four nocturnal amphibian species (Hyla intermedia, Rana dalmatina, Rana italica, Salamandrina perspicillata) the effects of different (i) light conditions and (ii) habitats (open land vs. dense forest) on the reproductive phenology. Our results showed that the effects of the lunar cycle on the study species are associated with the change in luminosity, and there is no evidence of an endogenous rhythm controlled by biological clocks. The habitat type conditioned the amphibian reproductive strategy in relation to moon phases. Open habitat breeders (e. g., ponds with no canopy cover) strongly avoided conditions with high brightness, whereas forest habitat breeders were apparently unaffected by the different moon phases. Indeed, for all the studied species no effects of the moon phase itself on the considered metrics were found. Rather, the considered amphibian species seem to be conditioned mainly by moonlight irrespective of the moon phase. The two anurans spawning in open habitat apparently adjust their oviposition timing by balancing the fitness effects of the risk to be detected by predators and the reproduction.