Political centralization and government accountability

This paper studies fiscal federalism when regions differ in voters' ability to monitor publicofficials. We develop a model of political agency in which rent-seeking politicians providepublic goods to win support from heterogeneously informed voters. In equilibrium, voterinformation increases government accountability but displays decreasing returns. Therefore,political centralization reduces aggregate rent extraction when voter information varies acrossregions. It increases welfare as long as the central government is required to provide publicgoods uniformly across regions. The need for uniformity implies an endogenous trade off between reducing rents through centralization and matching idiosyncratic preferences throughdecentralization. We find that a federal structure with overlapping levels of government canbe optimal only if regional differences in accountability are sufficiently large. The modelpredicts that less informed regions should reap greater benefits when the central governmentsets a uniform policy. Consistent with our theory, we present empirical evidence that lessinformed states enjoyed faster declines in pollution after the 1970 Clean Air Act centralizedenvironmental policy at the federal level.

Politique fédérale des agglomérations dans les domaines des transports et de l'urbanisation

La croissance de la population, de l'économie et des transports individuels motorisés, particulièrement depuis la seconde moitié du 20ème siècle, ont notamment comme corollaire le développement urbanistique hors des frontières de la ville-centre et la formation des agglomérations. Ces zones urbaines sont stratégiques puisqu'elles accueillent une part toujours plus importante de la population et représentent le moteur de l'économie nationale. Toutefois, le développement des agglomérations et de la mobilité individuelle motorisée ne va pas sans poser de nombreux problèmes, dont la résolution nécessite de les aborder à l'échelle de l'agglomération, en coordonnant les transports et l'urbanisation. Notre système politique fédéral se définit notamment par une répartition des compétences dans une multitude de domaines entre les trois niveaux institutionnels de la Confédération, des cantons et des communes. Cette réalité est particulièrement vraie en matière d'aménagement du territoire. Il est à noter que les plus petites unités institutionnelles (les communes) conservent encore aujourd'hui des prérogatives importantes dans ce domaine. Au début des années 2000, la Confédération a développé une politique publique en faveur de ces zones stratégiques. Au moyen du fonds d'infrastructure, la politique fédérale des agglomérations dans les domaines des transports et de l'urbanisation est une politique publique incitative. Le dépôt, par les agglomérations, d'un projet respectant un cahier des charges précis et proposant des mesures de coordination entre les transports et l'urbanisation, permet d'obtenir un cofinancement fédéral du transport d'agglomération. Parmi les projets d'agglomération de première génération présentés à la Confédération, certains ont obtenu le cofinancement, d'autres pas. Le dimensionnement trop généreux des surfaces à bâtir fut notamment un facteur d'échec du projet d'agglomération de Fribourg, alors que la capacité à développer l'urbanisation à l'intérieur de l'agglomération fut un facteur de succès du projet Lausanne-Morges. L'analyse des projets d'agglomération Riviera et Monthey-Aigle, qui sont des projets de deuxième génération, confrontée à des entretiens avec des urbanistes et des responsables politiques, permet d'identifier leurs faiblesses et leurs atouts. Le projet d'agglomération Riviera présente une complémentarité des territoires et un grand potentiel de développement, mais aussi un manque de cohésion des partenaires du projet. Quant au projet Monthey-Aigle, il existe une réelle volonté politique de trouver des solutions aux conflits, mais les possibilités de développer les transports publics sont faibles. Dans le cadre de l'examen fédéral de ces deux projets d'agglomération, les éléments précités pourraient être des facteurs d'échec ou de succès. La politique publique fédérale invite les agglomérations à penser le développement de leurs transports et de leur urbanisation à un niveau global. La prise de hauteur et la coordination politique que cela suppose sont à même d'améliorer le lieu de vie des trois-quarts de la population suisse et de préserver le moteur de l'économie nationale. The growth of population, economy and personal motorised transportation, most particularly since the second half of the 20th century, has, as a consequence, induced an expansion of urban areas outside the borders of cities and encouraged the formation of urban agglomerations. These urban zones are of strategic importance as they attract an increasingly large population and represent a real driver of the national economy. However, the development of these agglomerations and the motorised mobility of their inhabitants cause numerous problems which require solutions to be adopted at the level of the agglomeration involving the interconnection of transport and urbanisation. Our federal political system is characterised by a distribution of responsibilities in many domains among the three institutional levels, namely the Confederation, the cantons and the communes. This is particularly the case of territorial developments. It should be noted that the smallest institutional units, the communes, still hold today important responsibilities in this area. At the beginning of the years 2000, the Confederation has developed a public policy in favour of these strategic zones. Through the establishment of an infrastructure fund, the federal policy in favour of urban agglomerations in the areas of transport and urbanisation aims at providing incentives to agglomerations. The submission by the agglomeration of a project containing a clear description of tasks and measures to integrate transport and urbanisation can result in a cofinancing participation by the Confederation in this project. Among the projects of first generation which had been submitted to the Confederation, some have received the cofinancing, others have not. The too generous dimension of the building areas in the project submitted by the agglomeration of Fribourg was a factor of its failure, while the capacity to develop urbanisation within the agglomeration was a factor of success for the Lausanne-Morges project. The analysis of the projects of the agglomerations Riviera and Monthey-Aigle which are projects of the second generation, as well as the interviews of urbanists and concerned officials have allowed us to identify their strengths and weaknesses. The Riviera project provides a complementary approach and a high potential of territorial developments, but at the same time denotes a lack of cohesion among partners of the project. With respect to the project Monthey-Aigle, there is a real political willingness to resolve conflicts, but the potential for the development of public transports is small. In the consideration by the Confederation of these two projects, the factors mentioned above may bring success or failure. The federal public policy incites the agglomerations to conceive the development of their transportation and urbanisation plans at a global level. The elevation of interests and the political coordination that this requires can improve the place of living of ¾ of the Swiss population and preserve the engine of growth of the national economy.

Federal Dynamics in Times of Economic and Financial Crisis

The global economic and financial crisis is a challenge for all governments, but particularly for federal states because divided and/or shared territorial powers make federations susceptible to coordination problems in fiscal policy making. This article explores the effects of the ongoing crisis on federal relations. Three kinds of problems that may become the cause of federal tensions and conflicts are evoked: opportunism of subgovernments, centralisation and erosion of solidarity among members of the federation. Our analysis of fiscal policies and federal conflicts of 11 federations between 2007 and the present reveals three kinds of coordination problems: shirking in the use of federal government grants, rent-seeking in equalisation payments, and over-borrowing and over-spending. Our results show that shirking remained limited to few cases and occurred only in the first part of the crisis. However, rent-seeking and over-borrowing and over-spending led to a reduction of solidarity among subgovernments and to increased regulation of the fiscal discretion of the members of the federation. Subsequently, tensions in federal relations increased - although only in one case did this challenged the federal order.

The Political Communication of Independent Regulatory Agencies

Since independent regulatory agencies (IRAs) became key actors in European regulatory governance in the 1990s, a significant share of policy-making has been carried out by organizations that are neither democratically elected nor directly accountable to elected politicians. In this context, public communication plays an important role. On the one hand, regulatory agencies might try to use communication to raise their accountability and thereby to mitigate their democratic deficit. On the other hand, communication may be used with the intent to steer the behavior of the regulated industry when more coercive regulatory means are unfeasible or undesirable. However, empirical research focusing directly on how regulators communicate is virtually non-existent. To fill this gap, this paper examines the public communication of IRAs in four countries (the United Kingdom, Germany, Ireland, and Switzerland) and three sectors (financial services, telecommunications, and broadcasting). The empirical analysis, based on qualitative interviews and a quantitative content analysis, indicates that the organization of the communication function follows a national pattern approach while a policy sector approach is helpful for understanding the use of communication as a soft tool of regulation.

More Money, Fewer Problems? Cross-Level Effects of Economic Deprivation on Political Representation

While equal political representation of all citizens is a fundamental democratic goal, it is hampered empirically in a multitude of ways. This study examines how the societal level of economic inequality affects the representation of relatively poor citizens by parties and governments. Using CSES survey data for citizens' policy preferences and expert placements of political parties, empirical evidence is found that in economically more unequal societies, the party system represents the preferences of relatively poor citizens worse than in more equal societies. This moderating effect of economic equality is also found for policy congruence between citizens and governments, albeit slightly less clear-cut.

Patents in the Information and Communications Technology Sector - Development Trends, Problem Areas and Pressures for Change

The patent system was created for the purpose of promoting innovation by granting the inventors a legally defined right to exclude others in return for public disclosure. Today, patents are being applied and granted in greater numbers than ever, particularly in new areas such as biotechnology and information andcommunications technology (ICT), in which research and development (R&D) investments are also high. At the same time, the patent system has been heavily criticized. It has been claimed that it discourages rather than encourages the introduction of new products and processes, particularly in areas that develop quickly, lack one-product-one-patent correlation, and in which theemergence of patent thickets is characteristic. A further concern, which is particularly acute in the U.S., is the granting of so-called 'bad patents', i.e. patents that do not factually fulfil the patentability criteria. From the perspective of technology-intensive companies, patents could,irrespective of the above, be described as the most significant intellectual property right (IPR), having the potential of being used to protect products and processes from imitation, to limit competitors' freedom-to-operate, to provide such freedom to the company in question, and to exchange ideas with others. In fact, patents define the boundaries of ownership in relation to certain technologies. They may be sold or licensed on their ownor they may be components of all sorts of technology acquisition and licensing arrangements. Moreover, with the possibility of patenting business-method inventions in the U.S., patents are becoming increasingly important for companies basing their businesses on services. The value of patents is dependent on the value of the invention it claims, and how it is commercialized. Thus, most of them are worth very little, and most inventions are not worth patenting: it may be possible to protect them in other ways, and the costs of protection may exceed the benefits. Moreover, instead of making all inventions proprietary and seeking to appropriate as highreturns on investments as possible through patent enforcement, it is sometimes better to allow some of them to be disseminated freely in order to maximize market penetration. In fact, the ideology of openness is well established in the software sector, which has been the breeding ground for the open-source movement, for instance. Furthermore, industries, such as ICT, that benefit from network effects do not shun the idea of setting open standards or opening up their proprietary interfaces to allow everyone todesign products and services that are interoperable with theirs. The problem is that even though patents do not, strictly speaking, prevent access to protected technologies, they have the potential of doing so, and conflicts of interest are not rare. The primary aim of this dissertation is to increase understanding of the dynamics and controversies of the U.S. and European patent systems, with the focus on the ICT sector. The study consists of three parts. The first part introduces the research topic and the overall results of the dissertation. The second part comprises a publication in which academic, political, legal and business developments that concern software and business-method patents are investigated, and contentiousareas are identified. The third part examines the problems with patents and open standards both of which carry significant economic weight inthe ICT sector. Here, the focus is on so-called submarine patents, i.e. patentsthat remain unnoticed during the standardization process and then emerge after the standard has been set. The factors that contribute to the problems are documented and the practical and juridical options for alleviating them are assessed. In total, the dissertation provides a good overview of the challenges and pressures for change the patent system is facing,and of how these challenges are reflected in standard setting.

The political ecology of ecosystem services

The dominance of ''ecosystem services'' as a guiding concept for environmental management - where it appears as a neutral, obvious, taken-for-granted concept - hides the fact that there are choices implicit in its framing and in its application. In other words, it is a highly political concept, and its utility depends on the arena in which it is used and what it is used for. Following a political ecology framework, and based on a literature review, bibliometric analyses, and brief examples from two tropical rainforest countries, this review investigates four moments in the construction and application of the ecosystem services idea: socio-historical (the emergence of the discourse), ontological (what knowledge does the concept allow?), scientific (difficulties in its practical application), and political (who wins, who loses?). We show how the concept is a boundary object with widespread appeal, trace the discursive and institutional context within which it gained traction, and argue that choices of scale, definition, and method in measuring ecosystem services frustrate its straightforward application. As a result, it is used in diverse ways by dif- ferent interests to justify different kinds of interventions that at times might be totally opposed. In Madagascar, the ecosystem services idea is mainly used to justify forest conservation in ways open to cri- tique for its neoliberalization of nature or disempowerment of communities. In contrast, in the Brazilian Amazon, the discourse of ecosystem services has served the agendas of traditional populations and family farm lobbies. Ecosystem services, as an idea and tool, are mobilized by diverse actors in real-life situa- tions that lead to complex, regionally particular and fundamentally political outcomes.

Corporate political activity and firm outcomes: A meta-analysis

Using meta-analytic methods on a sample of 74 studies, we explore the links between CPA and public policy outcomes, and between CPA and firm outcomes. We find that CPA has at best a weak effect and that it appears to be better at maintaining public policy than changing them.

Asset freezing, corporate political resources and the Tullock paradox

In 1967, Gordon Tullock asked why firms do not spend more on campaign contributions, despite the large rents that could be generated from political activities. We suggest in this paper that part of the puzzle could come from the fact that one important type of political activity has been neglected by the literature which focuses on campaign contributions or political connections. We call this neglected activity "asset freezing": situations in which firms delay lay-offs or invest in specific technologies to support local politicians' re-election objectives. In doing so, firms bear a potentially significant cost as they do not use a portion of their economic assets in the most efficient or productive way. The purpose of this paper is to provide a first theoretical exploration of this phenomenon. Building on the literature on corporate political resources, we argue that a firm's economic assets can be evaluated based on their degree of "political freezability," which depends on the flexibility of their use and on their value for policy-makers. We then develop a simple model in which financial contributions and freezing assets are alternative options for a firm willing to lawfully influence public policy-making, and derive some of our initial hypotheses more formally.