Weather and War – Economic and social vulnerability in Switzerland at the end of the First World War

Neutral Switzerland – not embedded in the fighting forces – yet was involved in the Great War mainly in economical terms. Since Switzerland is a landlocked country especially agriculture became an important topic of war economy in regard to food security. Until 1916 national food supply was limited but could be maintained through barter trade. In 1916 a crisis on both supply and production level occurred and led to a decline in food availability and to immense price risings causing social turmoil. This paper aims to outline the factors of vulnerability in respect of food in Switzerland during the First World War and further it will show different coping strategies that were undertaken during that time. The paper takes the work of Mario Aeby and Christian Pfister (University of Bern) into consideration that pointed out to weather anomalies during the years 1916 and 1917 aggravating the already tense food situation. Arguing for an overlap of supply and production crisis the paper focuses on agricultural and economic history including environmental impacts. Further the paper addresses the question of what makes a food system resilient to such unforeseen impacts.

The silent services of the world ocean

The most recent comprehensive assessment carried out by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change has concluded that “Human influence on the climate system is clear,” a headline statement that was approved by all governments in consensus. This influence will have long-lasting consequences for ecosystems, and the resulting impacts will continue to be felt millennia from now. Although the terrestrial impacts of climate change are readily apparent now and have received widespread public attention, the effects of climate change on the oceans have been relatively invisible. However, the world ocean provides a number of crucial services that are of global significance, all of which come with an increasing price caused by human activities. This needs to be taken into account when considering adaptation to and mitigation of anthropogenic climate change.

Bargaining for power and information : an experimental and theoretical analysis of the interaction between institutions, externalities and adverse selection

Bargaining is the building block of many economic interactions, ranging from bilateral to multilateral encounters and from situations in which the actors are individuals to negotiations between firms or countries. In all these settings, economists have been intrigued for a long time by the fact that some projects, trades or agreements are not realized even though they are mutually beneficial. On the one hand, this has been explained by incomplete information. A firm may not be willing to offer a wage that is acceptable to a qualified worker, because it knows that there are also unqualified workers and cannot distinguish between the two types. This phenomenon is known as adverse selection. On the other hand, it has been argued that even with complete information, the presence of externalities may impede efficient outcomes. To see this, consider the example of climate change. If a subset of countries agrees to curb emissions, non-participant regions benefit from the signatories’ efforts without incurring costs. These free riding opportunities give rise to incentives to strategically improve ones bargaining power that work against the formation of a global agreement. This thesis is concerned with extending our understanding of both factors, adverse selection and externalities. The findings are based on empirical evidence from original laboratory experiments as well as game theoretic modeling. On a very general note, it is demonstrated that the institutions through which agents interact matter to a large extent. Insights are provided about which institutions we should expect to perform better than others, at least in terms of aggregate welfare. Chapters 1 and 2 focus on the problem of adverse selection. Effective operation of markets and other institutions often depends on good information transmission properties. In terms of the example introduced above, a firm is only willing to offer high wages if it receives enough positive signals about the worker’s quality during the application and wage bargaining process. In Chapter 1, it will be shown that repeated interaction coupled with time costs facilitates information transmission. By making the wage bargaining process costly for the worker, the firm is able to obtain more accurate information about the worker’s type. The cost could be pure time cost from delaying agreement or cost of effort arising from a multi-step interviewing process. In Chapter 2, I abstract from time cost and show that communication can play a similar role. The simple fact that a worker states to be of high quality may be informative. In Chapter 3, the focus is on a different source of inefficiency. Agents strive for bargaining power and thus may be motivated by incentives that are at odds with the socially efficient outcome. I have already mentioned the example of climate change. Other examples are coalitions within committees that are formed to secure voting power to block outcomes or groups that commit to different technological standards although a single standard would be optimal (e.g. the format war between HD and BlueRay). It will be shown that such inefficiencies are directly linked to the presence of externalities and a certain degree of irreversibility in actions. I now discuss the three articles in more detail. In Chapter 1, Olivier Bochet and I study a simple bilateral bargaining institution that eliminates trade failures arising from incomplete information. In this setting, a buyer makes offers to a seller in order to acquire a good. Whenever an offer is rejected by the seller, the buyer may submit a further offer. Bargaining is costly, because both parties suffer a (small) time cost after any rejection. The difficulties arise, because the good can be of low or high quality and the quality of the good is only known to the seller. Indeed, without the possibility to make repeated offers, it is too risky for the buyer to offer prices that allow for trade of high quality goods. When allowing for repeated offers, however, at equilibrium both types of goods trade with probability one. We provide an experimental test of these predictions. Buyers gather information about sellers using specific price offers and rates of trade are high, much as the model’s qualitative predictions. We also observe a persistent over-delay before trade occurs, and this mitigates efficiency substantially. Possible channels for over-delay are identified in the form of two behavioral assumptions missing from the standard model, loss aversion (buyers) and haggling (sellers), which reconcile the data with the theoretical predictions. Chapter 2 also studies adverse selection, but interaction between buyers and sellers now takes place within a market rather than isolated pairs. Remarkably, in a market it suffices to let agents communicate in a very simple manner to mitigate trade failures. The key insight is that better informed agents (sellers) are willing to truthfully reveal their private information, because by doing so they are able to reduce search frictions and attract more buyers. Behavior observed in the experimental sessions closely follows the theoretical predictions. As a consequence, costless and non-binding communication (cheap talk) significantly raises rates of trade and welfare. Previous experiments have documented that cheap talk alleviates inefficiencies due to asymmetric information. These findings are explained by pro-social preferences and lie aversion. I use appropriate control treatments to show that such consideration play only a minor role in our market. Instead, the experiment highlights the ability to organize markets as a new channel through which communication can facilitate trade in the presence of private information. In Chapter 3, I theoretically explore coalition formation via multilateral bargaining under complete information. The environment studied is extremely rich in the sense that the model allows for all kinds of externalities. This is achieved by using so-called partition functions, which pin down a coalitional worth for each possible coalition in each possible coalition structure. It is found that although binding agreements can be written, efficiency is not guaranteed, because the negotiation process is inherently non-cooperative. The prospects of cooperation are shown to crucially depend on i) the degree to which players can renegotiate and gradually build up agreements and ii) the absence of a certain type of externalities that can loosely be described as incentives to free ride. Moreover, the willingness to concede bargaining power is identified as a novel reason for gradualism. Another key contribution of the study is that it identifies a strong connection between the Core, one of the most important concepts in cooperative game theory, and the set of environments for which efficiency is attained even without renegotiation.

The Long-Run Relationship between Money, Nominal GDP, and the Price Level in Venezuela: 1950 to 1996

This paper explores whether a significant long-run relationship exists between money and nominal GDP and between money and the price level in the Venezuelan economy. We apply time-series econometric techniques to annual data for the Venezuelan economy for 1950 to 1996. An important feature of our analysis is the use of tests for unit roots and cointegration with structural breaks. Certain characteristics of the Venezuelan experience suggest that structural breaks may be important. Since the economy depends heavily on oil revenue, oil price shocks have had important influences on most macroeconomic variables. Also since the economy possesses large foreign debt, the world debt crisis that exploded in 1982 had pervasive effects on the Venezuelan economy. Radical changes in economic policy and political instability may have also significantly affected the movement of the macroeconomy. We find that a long-run relationship exists between narrow money (M1) and nominal GDP, the GDP deflator, and the CPI when one makes allowances for one or two structural breaks. We do not find such long-run relationships when broad money (M2) is used.

The Time-Series Properties on Housing Prices: A Case Study of the Southern California Market

We examine the time-series relationship between housing prices in eight Southern California metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs). First, we perform cointegration tests of the housing price indexes for the MSAs, finding seven cointegrating vectors. Thus, the evidence suggests that one common trend links the housing prices in these eight MSAs, a purchasing power parity finding for the housing prices in Southern California. Second, we perform temporal Granger causality tests revealing intertwined temporal relationships. The Santa Anna MSA leads the pack in temporally causing housing prices in six of the other seven MSAs, excluding only the San Luis Obispo MSA. The Oxnard MSA experienced the largest number of temporal effects from other MSAs, six of the seven, excluding only Los Angeles. The Santa Barbara MSA proved the most isolated in that it temporally caused housing prices in only two other MSAs (Los Angels and Oxnard) and housing prices in the Santa Anna MSA temporally caused prices in Santa Barbara. Third, we calculate out-of-sample forecasts in each MSA, using various vector autoregressive (VAR) and vector error-correction (VEC) models, as well as Bayesian, spatial, and causality versions of these models with various priors. Different specifications provide superior forecasts in the different MSAs. Finally, we consider the ability of theses time-series models to provide accurate out-of-sample predictions of turning points in housing prices that occurred in 2006:Q4. Recursive forecasts, where the sample is updated each quarter, provide reasonably good forecasts of turning points.

The Texas driver responsibility program: A preliminary analysis of the impact on impaired driving and trauma system funding

Objective. In 2003, the State of Texas instituted the Driver Responsibility Program (TDRP), a program consisting of a driving infraction point system coupled with a series of graded fines and annual surcharges for specific traffic violations such as driving while intoxicated (DWI). Approximately half of the revenues generated are earmarked to be disbursed to the state's trauma system to cover uncompensated trauma care costs. This study examined initial program implementation, the impact of trauma system funding, and initial impact on impaired driving knowledge, attitudes and behaviors. A model for targeted media campaigns to improve the program's deterrence effects was developed. ^ Methods. Data from two independent driver survey samples (conducted in 1999 and 2005), department of public safety records, state health department data and a state auditor's report were used to evaluate the program's initial implementation, impact and outcome with respect to drivers' impaired driving knowledge, attitudes and behavior (based on constructs of social cognitive theory) and hospital uncompensated trauma care funding. Survey results were used to develop a regression model of high risk drivers who should be targeted to improve program outcome with respect to deterring impaired driving. ^ Results. Low driver compliance with fee payment (28%) and program implementation problems were associated with lower surcharge revenues in the first two years ($59.5 million versus $525 million predicted). Program revenue distribution to trauma hospitals was associated with a 16% increase in designated trauma centers. Survey data demonstrated that only 28% of drivers are aware of the TDRP and that there has been no initial impact on impaired driving behavior. Logistical regression modeling suggested that target media campaigns highlighting the likelihood of DWI detection by law enforcement and the increased surcharges associated with the TDRP are required to deter impaired driving. ^ Conclusions. Although the TDRP raised nearly $60 million in surcharge revenue for the Texas trauma system over the first two years, this study did not find evidence of a change in impaired driving knowledge, attitudes or behaviors from 1999 to 2005. Further research is required to measure whether the program is associated with decreased alcohol-related traffic fatalities. ^

The Chilean wheat market and its price support mechanism : a spatial market integration analysis

This research investigates the spatial market integration of the Chilean wheat market in relation with its most representative international markets by using a vector error correction model (VECM) and how a price support policy, as a price band, affect it. The international market was characterized by two relevant wheat prices: PAN from Argentina and Hard Red Winter from the United States. The spatial market integration level, expressed in the error correction term (ECT), allowed concluding that there is a high integration degree among these markets with a variable influence of the price band mechanism mainly related with its estimation methodology. Moreover, this paper showed that Chile can be seen as price taker as long as the speed of its adjustment to international shocks, being these reactions faster than in the United States and Argentina. Finally, the results validated the "Law of the One Price", which assumes price equalization across all local markets in the long run.

Transformation of the Rice Marketing System and Myanmar's Transition to a Market Economy

Creating a rice marketing system has been one of the central policy issues in Myanmar's move to a market economy since the end of the 1980s. Two liberalizations of rice marketing were implemented in 1987 and 2003. This paper examines the essential aspects of the liberalizations and the subsequent transformation of Myanmar's rice marketing sector. It attempts to bring into clearer focus the rationale of the government's rice marketing reforms which is to maintain a stable supply of rice at a low price to consumers. Under this rationale, however, the state rice marketing sector continued to lose efficiency while the private sector was allowed to develop on condition that it did not jeopardize the rationale of stable supply at low price. The paper concludes that the prospect for the future development of the private rice marketing sector is dim since a change in the rice market's rationale is unlikely. Private rice exporting is unlikely to be permitted, while the domestic market is approaching the saturation point. Thus, there is little momentum for the private rice sector to undertake any substantial expansion of investment.

The Sheepskin Marketing Channel in Ethiopia after Liberalization: The Survival Strategies of the Participants

Sheepskin market in Ethiopia seems to enjoy the benefits of the economic liberalization policy since 1991, such as price deregulation or liberalization of economic activities. The close observation on the profiles and activities of each actor in the marketing channel, however, illustrates that the actors have tried to complement the lack of appropriate infrastructure and legal protection, which should be provided by the government, through utilizing their social and blood ties. While these ties have implemented the role of the government, there are risks that the marketing channel might be developed based on coalition with social network and the poor without the network would be excluded.

Application of the Input-Output Decomposition Technique to China's Regional Economies

Structural decomposition techniques based on input-output table have become a widely used tool for analyzing long term economic growth. However, due to limitations of data, such techniques have never been applied to China's regional economies. Fortunately, in 2003, China's Interregional Input-Output Table for 1987 and Multi-regional Input-Output Table for 1997 were published, making decomposition analysis of China's regional economies possible. This paper first estimates the interregional input-output table in constant price by using an alternative approach: the Grid-Search method, and then applies the standard input-output decomposition technique to China's regional economies for 1987-97. Based on the decomposition results, the contributions to output growth of different factors are summarized at the regional and industrial level. Furthermore, interdependence between China's regional economies is measured and explained by aggregating the decomposition factors into the intraregional multiplier-related effect, the feedback-related effect, and the spillover-related effect. Finally, the performance of China's industrial and regional development policies implemented in the 1990s is briefly discussed based on the analytical results of the paper.

An empirical analysis of the money demand function in India

This paper empirically analyzes India’s money demand function during the period of 1980 to 2007 using monthly data and the period of 1976 to 2007 using annual data. Cointegration test results indicated that when money supply is represented by M1 and M2, a cointegrating vector is detected among real money balances, interest rates, and output. In contrast, it was found that when money supply is represented by M3, there is no long-run equilibrium relationship in the　money demand function. Moreover, when the money demand function was estimated using　dynamic OLS, the sign onditions of the coefficients of output and interest rates were found to be　consistent with theoretical rationale, and statistical significance was confirmed when money supply was represented by either M1 or M2. Consequently, though India’s central bank presently uses M3 as an indicator of future price movements, it is thought appropriate to focus on M1 or M2, rather than M3, in managing monetary policy.

Transformation of the Financial Sector in Indonesia

Introduction : The source and deployment of finance are central issues in economic development. Since 1966, when the Soeharto Administration was inaugurated, Indonesian economic development has relied on funds in the form of aid from international organizations and foreign countries. After the 1990s, a further abundant inflow of capital sustained a rapid economic development. Foreign funding was the basis of Indonesian economic growth. This paper will describe the mechanism for allocating funds in the Indonesian economy. It will identify the problems this mechanism generated in the Indonesian experience, and it will attempt to explain why there was a collapse of the financial system in the wake of the Asian Currency Crisis of 1997. History of the Indonesian Financial system The year 1966 saw the emergence of commercial banks in Indonesia. It can be said that before 1966 a financial system hardly existed, a fact commonly attributed to economic disruptions like the consecutive runs of fiscal deficit and hyperinflation under the Soekarno Administration. After 1996, with the inauguration of Soeharto, a regulatory system of financial legislation, e.g. central banking law and banking regulation, was introduced and implemented, and the banking sector that is the basis of the current financial system in Indonesia was built up. 　　　The Indonesian financial structure was significantly altered at the first financial reform of 1983. Between 1966 and 1982, the banking sector consisted of Bank Indonesia (the Central Bank) and the state-owned banks. There was also a system for distributing the abundant public revenue derived from the soaring oil price of the 1970s. The public finance distribution function, incorporated in Indonesian financial system, changed after the successive financial reforms of 1983 and 1988, when there was a move away from the monopoly-market style dominated by state-owned banks (which was a system of public finance distribution that operated at the discretion of the government) towards a modern market mechanism. The five phases of development The Indonesian financial system developed in five phases between 1966 and the present time. The first period (1966-72) was its formative period, the second (1973-82) its policy based finance period under soaring oil prices, the third (1983-91) its financial-reform period, the fourth (1992-97) its period of expansion, and the fifth (1998-) its period of financial restructuring. The first section of this paper summarizes the financial policies operative during each of the periods identified above. In the second section changes to the financial sector in response to policies are examined, and an analysis of these changes shows that an important development of the financial sector occurred during the financial reform period. In the third section the focus of analysis shifts from the general financial sector to particular commercial banks’ performances. In the third section changes in commercial banks’ lending and fund-raising behaviour after the 1990s are analysed by comparing several banking groups in terms of their ownership and foundation time. The last section summarizes the foregoing analyses and examines the problems that remain in the Indonesian financial sector, which is still undergoing restructuring.

Cost Reduction Effects of "pseudo FTAs" in Asia -Application of a price model based on a multilateral I/O table-

This paper examines the repercussion effects on the production cost of industries in Asian countries when some countries eliminate tariffs and import commodity taxes on all imports. This kind of analysis is related in some sense to that measuring the effects of FTAs on economies, and thus may be considered as an analysis of “pseudo FTAs.” Examining a number of combinations of “pseudo FTAs” between China, Japan, and ASEAN, it is found that the case of China plus Japan plus ASEAN is the most effective “pseudo FTA” of the combinations in terms of production cost reduction. The method is a form of price model based on the Asian International Input-Output Table. Almost no studies on price models related to multilateral I/O tables have been implemented thus far.

Effectiveness of the monetary policy framework in present-day India : have financial variables functioned as useful policy indicators

In April 1998, the RBI, the Indian central bank, formally announced a shift in its policy framework from monetary targeting to a multiple indicator approach, and since then, under this framework, the bank has considered a range of economic and financial variables as policy indicators for drawing policy perspectives. This paper aims to examine the effectiveness of this current policy framework in India by analyzing the causal relationships of each indicator variable on the objective variables. The results reveal that, except for bank credit, all indicator variables considered in this study have a causal relationship with at least either output or price level, suggesting that most preannounced economic and financial variables have served as useful policy indicators under the multiple indicator approach.

Competition of the mechanisms : how Chinese home appliance firms coped with default risk of trade credit?

During the transition period from a planned economy to a market economy in 1990s of China, there was a considerable accrual of deferred payment, and default due to inferior enforcement institutions. This is a very common phenomenon in the transition economies at that time. Interviews with home electronics appliance firms revealed that firms coped with this problem by adjusting their sales mechanisms (found four types), and the benefit of institutions was limited. A theoretical analysis claim that spot and integration are inferior to contracts, a contract with a rebate on volume and prepayment against an exclusive agent can realize the lowest cost and price. The empirical part showed that mechanisms converged into a mechanism with the rebate on volume an against exclusive agent and its price level is the lowest. The competition is the driving force of the convergence of mechanisms and improvement risk management capacity.