Opportunism, hold-up and the (contractual) theory of the firm

This paper considers the role of opportunism in three contractual theories of the firm: rent-seeking theory, property rights theory, and agency theory. In each case I examine whether it is possible to have a functioning contractual theory of the firm without recourse to opportunism. Without opportunism firms may still exist as a result of issues arising from (incomplete) contracting. Far from posing a problem for the theory of the firm, questioning the role of opportunism and the ubiquity of the hold-up problem helps us understand more about the purpose and functions of contracts which go beyond mere incentive alignment.

Foreign direct investment and corruption

In the last few decades, the world has witnessed an enormous growth in the volume of foreign direct investment (FDI). The global stock of FDI reached US$ 7.5 trillion in 2003 and accounted for 11% of world Gross Domestic Product, up from 7% in 1990. The sales of multinational enterprises at around US$ 19 trillion were more than double the level of world exports. Substantial FDI inflows went into transition countries. Inflows into one of the region's largest recipient, the Russian Federation, almost doubled, enabling Russia to become one of the five top FDI destinations in 2005-2006. FDI inflows in Russia have increased almost threefold from 13.6% in 2003 to 35% in 2007. In 2003, these flows were twice greater than those into China; whilst in 2007 they were six times larger. Russia's FDI inflows were also about 2.5 times greater than those of Brazil. Efficient government institutions are argued by many economists to foster FDI and growth as a result. However, the magnitude of this effect has yet to be measured. This thesis takes a Political Economy approach to explore, empirically, the potential impact of malfunctioning governmental institutions, proxied by three indices of perceived corruption, on FDI stocks accumulation/distribution within Russia over the period of 2002-2004. Using a regional data-set it concentrates on three areas relating to FDI. Firstly, it considers the significance, the size and the sign of the impact of perceived corruption on accumulation of FDI stocks within Russia. Secondly, it quantifies the impact of perceived corruption on the volume of FDI stocks simultaneously estimating the impact of the investment in public capital such as telecommunications and transportation networks on FDI in the presence of corruption. In particular, it addresses the question whether more corrupt regions in Russia are also those that could have accumulated more of FDI stocks, and investigates whether those 'more corrupt' regions would have had lower level of public capital investment. Finally, it examines whether decentralisation increases or decreases corruption and whether a larger extent of decentralisation has a positive or negative impact on FDI (stocks). The results of three studies are as follows. Firstly, along with market potential, corruption is found to be one of the key factors in explaining FDI distribution within Russia between 2002 and 2004. Secondly, corruption on average is found to be related to FDI positively suggesting that it may act as speed money: to save their time foreign direct investors might be willing to bribe the regional authorities so to move in front of the bureaucratic lines. Thirdly, although when corruption is controlled for, the impact of the latter on unobservable FDI is found to be on average positive, no association between FDI and public investment is observed with the only exception of transportation infrastructure (i.e., railway). The results might suggest therefore that it is possible that not only regions with high levels of perceived corruption attract more FDI but also that expansions in public capital investments are not accompanied by an increase of the volume of FDI (stocks) in regions with high levels of corruption. This casts some doubt on the productivity of the investment in public capital in these regions as it might be that bureaucrats may prefer to use these infrastructural projects for rent extraction. Finally, we find decentralisation to have a significant and positive impact on both FDI stock accumulation and corruption, suggesting that local governments may spend more on public goods to make the area more attractive to foreign investors but at the same time they may be interested into extracting rents from foreign investors. These results support the idea that the regulation of FDI is associated with and facilitated by a larger public sector, which distorts competition and introduces opportunities for rent-seeking by particular economic and political factors.

Privatisation, corporate control and employment growth:evidence from a panel of large Polish firms, 1996-2002

Using data on Polish firms this paper examines the relationship between corporate control structures, sales growth and the determinants of employment change. Privatised and de novo firms are the main drivers of employment growth; in the case of de novo firms, it is foreign ownership which underpins the result. Being privatised has a positive impact on employment but this is concentrated within a range of 3–6 years after privatisation. There are no systematic differences in employment response to negative sales growth across the ownership categories. Employment in state firms is less responsive to positive sales growth. From these results we infer that the behaviour of state firms is affected by both insider rent sharing and binding budget constraints.

Inherited labour hoarding, insiders and employment growth:panel data results : Poland, 1996-2002

Using panel data pertaining to large Polish (non-financial) firms this paper examines the determinants of employment change during the period 1996-2002. Paying particular attention to the asymmetry hypothesis we investigate the impact of own wages, outside wages, output growth, regional characteristics and sectoral affiliation on the evolution of employment. In keeping with the 'right to manage' model we find that employment dynamics are not affected negatively by alternative wages. Furthermore, in contrast to the early transition period, we find evidence that employment levels respond to positive sales growth (in all but state firms). The early literature, (e.g. Kollo, 1998) found that labour hoarding lowered employment elasticities in the presence of positive demand shocks. Our findings suggest that inherited labour hoarding may no longer be a factor. We argue that the present pattern of employment adjustment is better explained by the role of insiders. This tentative conclusion is hinged on the contrasting behaviour of state and privatised companies and the similar behaviour of privatised and new private companies. We conclude that lower responsiveness of employment to both positive and negative changes in revenue in state firms is consistent with the proposition that rent sharing by insiders is stronger in the state sector.

Privatisation, corporate control and employment growth:evidence from a panel of large Polish firms, 1996-2002

Using panel data on large Polish firms this paper examines the relationship between corporate control structures, sales growth and the determinants of employment change during the period 1996-2002. We find that privatised and de novo firms are the main drivers of employment growth and that, in the case of de novo firms, it is foreign ownership which underpins the result. Interestingly, we find that being privatised has a positive impact on employment growth but that this impact is concentrated within a range of three to six years after privatisation. In contrast with the findings of earlier literature, we find evidence that there are no systematic differences in employment response to negative sales growth across the ownership categories. On the other hand, employment in state firms is less responsive to positive sales growth. From these combined results we infer that the behaviour of state firms is constrained by both insider rent sharing and binding budget constraints. Consistent with this, we find that privatised companies, three to six years post-privatisation, are the firms for whom employment is most responsive to positive sales growth and as such, offer the best hope for rapid labour market expansion.

A weakly-supervised Bayesian model for violence detection from social media

Social streams have proven to be the mostup-to-date and inclusive information on cur-rent events. In this paper we propose a novelprobabilistic modelling framework, called violence detection model (VDM), which enables the identification of text containing violent content and extraction of violence-related topics over social media data. The proposed VDM model does not require any labeled corpora for training, instead, it only needs the in-corporation of word prior knowledge which captures whether a word indicates violence or not. We propose a novel approach of deriving word prior knowledge using the relative entropy measurement of words based on the in-tuition that low entropy words are indicative of semantically coherent topics and therefore more informative, while high entropy words indicates words whose usage is more topical diverse and therefore less informative. Our proposed VDM model has been evaluated on the TREC Microblog 2011 dataset to identify topics related to violence. Experimental results show that deriving word priors using our proposed relative entropy method is more effective than the widely-used information gain method. Moreover, VDM gives higher violence classification results and produces more coherent violence-related topics compared toa few competitive baselines.

Orthodoxy confirmed, but at what cost?

Examines the Court of Appeal ruling in Mexfield Housing Co-operative Ltd v Berrisford on whether a periodic tenancy agreement concluded by a housing association, which purported to prohibit the landlord from seeking possession unless the tenant was in arrears of rent, or otherwise in breach, could be terminated by way of a notice to quit, even where no breach had occurred, on the ground of uncertainty of term. Considers whether the agreement could be enforced under the rules of equity.

A fresh look at S.54(2)

Examines the operation of the provisions of the Law of Property Act 1925 s.54(2) containing an exception to the rule that a deed is required in order to create a valid legal lease and conferring full legal status to short-term letting agreements created by parol, focusing on the requirements that the lease must take effect in possession and must be at the best rent reasonably obtainable without fine. Calls for the former of these two requirements to be amended and the latter abolished on the ground that they give rise to unnecessary complexity in the law and, in the case of the latter, uncertainty.

Entrepreneurship in the neighborhood:shifting patterns of economic activities in residential neighborhoods in five dutch cities

Cities are oftentimes seen as undergoing a process of "emergence" in the "new economy." However, this process has largely remained empirically underdetermined. This article examines the intra-city geography of emerging businesses in newly dominant sectors of the urban economy. The change in dominant sectors coincides with a shift towards small- and medium-sized businesses, creating new economic opportunities for urban residential areas. The residential neighborhood is introduced as a place where supply and demand side drivers operate to attract or limit such new economic activity. Allen Scott's perspective of the cognitive-cultural economy is used to analyze which neighborhoods are flourishing sites of the cognitive-cultural sectors. His perspective on industries that are on the rise in urban environments and their growth potential proves very valuable. Social demographic characteristics on the level of the neighborhood are used as predictors of the composition of the local economy. The analyses show that in particular wealthy, gentrified neighborhoods are more prone than others to becoming "hubs" of the cognitive-cultural economy. However, disadvantaged neighborhoods may under certain conditions serve as incubators for business start-ups as they offer low-rent office spaces. This has important consequences for their future economic growth potential as well as the distribution of successful businesses in the city. © 2013 Urban Affairs Association.

State–society relations in a dynamic framework:the case of the Far East and Sub-Saharan Africa

According to the textbook approach, the developmental states of the Far East have been considered as strong and autonomous entities. Although their bureaucratic elites have remained isolated from direct pressures stemming from society, the state capacity has also been utilised in order to allocate resources in the interest of the whole society. Yet, society – by and large –has remained weak and subordinated to the state elite. On the other hand, the general perception of Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) has been just the opposite. The violent and permanent conflict amongst rent-seeking groups for influence and authority over resources has culminated in a situation where states have become extremely weak and fragmented, while society – depending on the capacity of competing groups for mobilising resources to organise themselves mostly on a regional or local level (resulting in local petty kingdoms) – has never had the chance to evolve as a strong player. State failure in the literature, therefore, – in the context of SSA – refers not just to a weak and captured state but also to a non-functioning, and sometimes even non-existent society, too. Recently, however, the driving forces of globalisation might have triggered serious changes in the above described status quo. Accordingly, our hypothesis is the following: globalisation, especially the dynamic changes of technology, capital and communication have made the simplistic “strong state–weak society” (in Asia) and “weak state–weak society” (in Africa) categorisation somewhat obsolete. While our comparative study has a strong emphasis on the empirical scrutiny of trying to uncover the dynamics of changes in state–society relations in the two chosen regions both qualitatively and quantitatively, it also aims at complementing the meaning and essence of the concepts and methodology of stateness, state capacity and state-society relations, the well-known building blocks of the seminal works of Evans (1995), Leftwich (1995), Migdal (1988) or Myrdal (1968).

State–society relations in a dynamic framework: The case of the Far East and Sub-Saharan Africa.

According to the textbook approach, the developmental states of the Far East have been considered as strong and autonomous entities. Although their bureaucratic elites have remained isolated from direct pressures stemming from society, the state capacity has also been utilised in order to allocate resources in the interest of the whole society. Yet, society – by and large –has remained weak and subordinated to the state elite. On the other hand, the general perception of Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) has been just the opposite. The violent and permanent conflict amongst rent-seeking groups for influence and authority over resources has culminated in a situation where states have become extremely weak and fragmented, while society – depending on the capacity of competing groups for mobilising resources to organise themselves mostly on a regional or local level (resulting in local petty kingdoms) – has never had the chance to evolve as a strong player. State failure in the literature, therefore, – in the context of SSA – refers not just to a weak and captured state but also to a non-functioning, and sometimes even non-existent society, too. Recently, however, the driving forces of globalisation might have triggered serious changes in the above described status quo. Accordingly, our hypothesis is the following: globalisation, especially the dynamic changes of technology, capital and communication have made the simplistic “strong state–weak society” (in Asia) and “weak state–weak society” (in Africa) categorisation somewhat obsolete. While our comparative study has a strong emphasis on the empirical scrutiny of trying to uncover the dynamics of changes in state–society relations in the two chosen regions both qualitatively and quantitatively, it also aims at complementing the meaning and essence of the concepts and methodology of stateness, state capacity and state-society relations, the well-known building blocks of the seminal works of Evans (1995), Leftwich (1995), Migdal (1988) or Myrdal (1968).

A gyenge hazai innovációs teljesítmény intézményi magyarázatához. Vitaírás a nemzetközi innovációs versenyben való részvétel akadályairól (Towards an institutional explanation of the country's weak innovation performance)

Miért van a magyar gazdaság hasonlóan kritikus helyzetben, mint a rendszerváltást megelőző időkben? Miért nem sikerül az eladósodást megállítani, a gazdaságot konszolidálni, és fenntartható növekedési pályára állítani? Ennek közvetlen okát a szerzők a fejlődés féloldalasságában és a duális gazdasági szerkezetben látják. A piacgazdasági intézmények bevezetése ugyanis nem járt együtt az egész gazdaságot (vagy legalábbis annak nagy részét) átfogó, a tudásvezérelt információgazdaság felé mutató, gyors fejlődéssel. Számos indikátor azt jelzi, hogy az ország lemaradt a nemzetközi innovációs versenyben. Az innovációk elégtelensége azonban nem véletlen, nem exogén adottság, hanem a formális piaci intézmények mögött meghúzódó valós intézményi berendezkedéssel, a gazdaságban ténylegesen észlelhető magatartásmintákkal magyarázható. A piacgazdasági intézmények és jogi keretek, amelyek elvileg lehetőséget adnak az erőforrásokhoz való szabad és nyílt hozzáférésre, csak részben töltődtek meg tartalommal. Az országban még mindig meglehetősen korlátozott a sikeres belépés lehetősége a piaci és a politikai arénába, azaz a magyar társadalom - a north-i terminológiával élve - "korlátozott hozzáférésre alapozott társadalomként" írható le. Az a tény, hogy a piaci szereplők esélyei az államhoz és intézményeihez fűződő kapcsolatoktól függően nagyban különböznek egymástól, és a gazdasági szereplők rendszerszerűen használják e kapcsolatokat járadékszerzésre, lefojtja az innovációt, és újra és újra megakasztja a fejlődést. / === / Why is Hungary's economy still in a critical state similar to the one before the change of system? Why is the indebtedness not being halted, the economy consolidated or vital structural reforms performed? The authors see the direct cause in lopsided development and a dual economic structure. The introduction of market economic institutions was not followed by rapid, overall development towards a knowledge-led, information economy. Several indicators show how Hungary has fallen behind in competition for international innovation. The inadequacy is not a fortuitous, exogenous attribute, but explicable in terms of a real institutional setup underlying the formal market institutions, and of actual behaviour patterns found in the economy. Only in part has substance been gained by the institutions and legal frames of a market economy that theoretically would provide free and open access to resources. The scope for successful entry into the market or political arena remains very narrow, so that in Douglass North's terms, Hungary's is still "a society based on restricted access." Innovation is stifled and development repeatedly impeded by the fact that market players' chances differ widely depending on their connections with the state and its institutions and such connections are used regularly in rent-seeking.

The corruption risks of EU funds in Hungary

In corruption, a group of players gain an economic advantage without providing any socially beneficial services in return, therefore corruption is considered to be a form of rent-seeking. Similar to other forms of rent-seeking, corruption causes losses on a societal level, due to the less efficient allocation of resources, as well as the costs of operation and prosecution. Fighting corruption is important not just because of ethical but also economic considerations. Contributions from the European Union are making possible the use of more funds than ever, and spending the full amount of this money is a priority preference of the government. The abundance of funds and the pressure on absorption increase corruption, by the managers of the funds overplanning the amount of money to be allocated to individual tender invitations, setting generous rules on eligible costs, and specifying low rates of own contribution wherever possible. As a result, the opportunities for rent-seeking are increased, as it is worth it for beneficiaries to carry out the project even after relinquishing part of the funds they have been awarded. Thus, the abundance of funds generates a sphere of corruption in which rent-seekers may appear on various levels of the system, often even without the knowledge or approval of those on higher decisionmaking levels.

Historical development of residential segregation and black housing quality in Dade County

This paper examines the relationship between the historical development of residential segregation in Black areas of Dade County and the level of housing quality in those areas. Previous literature studies the effect of hypersegregation on housing quality. Instead, this paper analyzes the nature of each Black community and the social process by which they became segregated in contrast with only hypersegregation being considered. Data were drawn from the 1990 Census of Housing and Population at the block group level for Dade County. Two indicators for housing quality were considered: crowding and rent. Six categories for Black areas in Dade County and one residual category were developed for the analysis. Regression's results show that the effect of each community on housing quality varies. For example, overcrowding goes down in first-ghetto areas when compared to second-ghetto areas, although the percentage of Blacks in both communities is about the same. ^